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Abstract 
 
Resource acquisitions have added value to resource companies over the past two 
decades. This stems from the results of this research which has analysed 30 
transactions and further reviewed 22 transactions with a total value A$240 billion. 
However, this figure is dominated by the 1997 BHP Billiton bid for Rio Tinto and if 
this attempted takeover is excluded from the list, the total value of the transactions 
analysed is A$60 billion. 
 
The consolidation has occurred in three waves since the early 1990s. These periods 
are: 
• First, a period starting in 1995 and ending in 2000; it included the end of the 
1992-1996 bull run, the Asian Crisis and a period known as the 1998-2000 
bull run and ending during the start of the Tech Boom drift, 
• Secondly, a period between 2002 and 2004 which combines the waning 
stages of the Tech Boom drift and the commencement of the 2002-2008 
Resources Boom, and, 
• Thirdly, in a more recent period from 2006 to near the end of the 2002-2008 
resources boom. 
 
Each of these periods has different characteristics but overall there is a broad trend of 
foreign bidders acquiring Australian companies during weaker markets except during 
the 2002-2008 Resources Boom. 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for both bidders and targets have been 
estimated using an adapted market model for event analysis. It draws on the strong 
correlation of absolute resource share with commodity prices. 
 
Friendly transactions offer target shareholders a lower final offer price premia to the 
30-day average target share price prior to the announcement (dual listing – 17.8 per 
cent, mergers – 12.9 per cent) and compares to traditional takeovers which average 
48.7 per cent. In traditional takeovers the initial offer to 30-day average premia was 
37.2 per cent but increases to the final offer to 30-day average premia of 48.7 per 
 v
cent mostly reflecting the impact of competitive bidding. Average increases in the 
final offer prices in non-competitive bidding were 16.6 per cent. 
 
While both scrip and cash bids offered similar premia to target shareholders, foreign 
scrip on average offer a 20 per cent higher premia. Elsewhere, there were no material 
differences between the premia offered in hostile compared to non-hostile takeovers. 
 
Bidders offering a 35 per cent premium (whether cash or scrip) to target shareholders 
are expected to create CAR for the target shareholders at around 24 per cent on the 
bid announcement. If the bid involves foreign scrip, the premium needs to be raised 
by 30 per cent but then the CAR for target shareholders will be slightly lower than 
non-foreign scrip bids at 22.9 per cent. If, however, the bidder can structure a merger 
the premium can reduce to zero in a ‘merger of equals’. 
 
Overall, the negative bidder CAR during the event window is more than offset by 
positive CAR during the post-event window, leading to a net positive CAR for 
acquirers of an average of 7.1 per cent. The positive net CAR for acquirers using 
scrip bids is 11.3 per cent; it falls to 3.5 per cent for bidders using cash offers. 
 
In the alternative investment of exploration there are attractive probability weighted 
exploration returns but these are dampened by the high levels of expenditure required 
to achieve satisfactory levels of certainty. This will continue to undermine the 
investment appeal of junior explorers while greenfield exploration will become 
solely the domain of the majors. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This thesis is an investigation into the creation of shareholder wealth in resource 
companies through acquisitions. Merger and acquisition activity has been present in 
the Australian resource sector for many decades but it became more prevalent during 
the 1990’s and particularly during the 2000-2010 decade. This coincides with 
changing trends in global resource markets and, as discussed in this thesis, represents 
an interplay of diminishing exploration discovery rates, globalization of equity 
markets and changing expectations of investors. The outcome has been a vastly 
diminished Australian resource sector in terms of the number of listed companies on 
the Australian Stock Exchange and the average quality of projects within those 
companies. 
 
Recent merger and acquisition activity has coincided with the strongest resource and 
commodity rally experienced by the markets which extended from the June quarter 
2003 through to the June quarter 2008 (on a global basis, there is evidence that it 
commenced in 2002). While the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the second 
half of 2008 caused significant world-wide wealth destruction, there are many 
market analysts who believe that this correction only represents a temporary setback 
in what is perceived to be a long-term bull run driven by demand for commodities 
from newly developing economies, particularly China. 
 
There have been a number of factors which have sporadically driven an increase in 
merger and acquisition activity over the last two decades. However, an overriding 
theme has been company management’s desire to deliver corporate growth. Over this 
period the equity markets have invariably rated the resource sector  in comparison to 
other market sectors and in periods of resource downturns, it is the larger companies 
that attract disproportionately more investment and hence, a higher market rating. 
 
Acquisitions through either merger and takeover activity or outright resource project 
purchase have provided a quicker route to corporate growth than traditional 
exploration. While exploration offers the greatest capacity to create shareholder 
value through a single event, that is, a significant mineral discovery, the discovery 
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rate in exploration has diminished over time and investors do not have the patience 
or acceptance that a company will eventually be successful in its exploration 
endeavors. 
 
Across the broader market, many researchers have recognised that most acquisitions 
do not create shareholder value (Eccles et al, 1999, Sirower, 1997, Chapman et al 
1998). This generally stems from the subsequent failure to deliver previously 
estimated synergies from the transaction due to overly optimistic expectations by 
company management, which is typically reflected in an acquisition price premium 
that is never recouped. 
 
The author agrees with this proposition in general terms but believes that resource 
companies operate under special circumstances which, if managed correctly, can 
have a higher probability of creating shareholder value. Resource companies offer 
investors earnings, cash flow and resource/reserve value leverage to volatile 
commodity prices, where movements or expectations of imminent movements in the 
underlying commodity price can lead to enhanced movements in their share prices.  
 
Of course the timing of commodity prices movements can be a two-edged sword. 
Xstrata Mining plc’s $1.72 per share priced merger with MIM Holdings Limited in 
June 2003 at the commencement of the resource and commodity boom ranks as one 
of the most successful mergers in creating value for the predatory company. In 
comparison Zinifex Limited’s $775 million takeover offer for Allegiance Mining 
Limited in December 2007 at close to the peak of the resources boom ranks as one of 
the worst timed and priced acquisitions and was a contributing factor to the eventual 
near collapse of Oz Minerals Limited under a large debt burden during the height of 
the global financial crisis in November 2008. 
 
In resource company merger and acquisition activity, transaction success as 
measured in share price appreciation of the predator or merged entity may not 
necessarily reflect the actual returns from the transaction in a strict economic sense. 
Investors may view the transaction as delivering additional commodity price 
leverage or alternatively, contribute to greater earnings diversification which may not 
materially impact earnings or cash flow forecasts in the short-term but enhance the 
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company’s status as a desirable investment. These factors are generally specific to 
the quality and location of the company’s asset base, commodity exposure, market 
capitalization and the presence of strategic shareholders. 
 
A proposition of this thesis is that accurate tracking of market sentiment and hence 
the timing of merger and takeover activity can result in the creation of shareholder 
value almost irrespective of the economic return from the acquisition based on the 
conditions prevailing at the time of the acquisition. 
 
However, there are many factors which may derail acquisitions and, in most cases, 
these emerge in hostile takeovers where the predator does not have access to 
information to enable reasonable due diligence on the target. These circumstances 
have been highlighted in a number of acquisitions, for example, in Pasminco 
Limited’s hostile bid for Savage Resources Limited in 1998 where, after a successful 
takeover, it was discovered that the out-of-the-money hedge book of Savage 
Resources was far worse than expected (T. Shard pers comm. 1999). This, in 
combination with: 
• Pasminco’s high gearing and associated interest burden, both having 
increased with the debt funding of the takeover 
• weaker than expected commodity prices, particularly that of  zinc, and  
• a severe fall in the A$/US$ exchange rate crystallizing losses in Paminco’s 
own hedge book 
ultimately led to Pasminco moving into administration in 2001. It was later 
recapitalized and re-floated as Zinifex Limited in 2004. 
 
Hedging issues have been a major cost to the resources sector, particularly during the 
later part of the 1990’s. Many companies hedged the A$/US$ exchange rate for their 
US$ denominated revenues on misguided expectations that the A$/US$ exchange 
rate would continue to appreciate and erode future earnings and cash flows. Contrary 
to expectations at that time, the Australian dollar depreciated markedly and lead to 
significant unrealized losses on the balance sheets of resource companies,which were 
realized over subsequent years. Most economists would contend that the A$/US$ 
exchange rate is highly negatively correlated with commodity prices (see Chapter 3 
for detailed discussion) through Australia’s terms of trade. Therefore the A$/US$ 
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exchange rate can provide a natural buffer by depreciating during periods of falling 
commodity prices. While this leads to an argument that a company should either 
hedge both commodity prices and the exchange rate at the same time or not hedge 
either, many companies took a one way bet by just hedging the currency. 
 
Inappropriate currency hedging and adverse movements in the exchange rate during 
the 1990’s were two contributing factors undermining the strength of Australian 
resource companies but another was also the translation of the A$ share price in 
foreign currencies where the A$/US$ currency risk left many Australian resource 
companies undervalued relative to their global peers during the later part of the 
1990’s and earlier in this decade. 
 
There are a myriad of studies in the literature which relate to failed acquisition 
strategies pursued by North American industrial corporations and while some of 
these are discussed in Chapter 2, they typically involve emotive senior management 
who are keen to ‘win the battle’ and end up paying a significantly higher purchase 
price for assets than warranted. While this has been the case to some extent in the 
resource sector, merger and acquisition activity of Australian companies has tended 
to create shareholder value for the predatory company.  
 
 ‘Buy low, sell high’ is the axiom for astute investing and the cyclicality of 
commodity and resource markets and movements in the A$/US$ exchange rate have 
provided opportunities in the Australian resources sector which has lead to 
unparalleled mergers and acquisition activity over the last two decades. This has 
been stimulated by the corporate growth imperative overlain with the realization of 
diminishing returns from exploration. 
 
1.1 Project Aims 
Over the last two decades merger and acquisition activity has waxed and waned in 
response to factors which vary from the timing in commodity and economic cycles to 
the A$/US$ exchange rate, as well as global equity market expectations and the 
alternative avenues to pursue for corporate growth. 
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The aims of this project are to analyze merger and acquisition activity to determine 
trends and identify which strategies have created shareholder value. The project also 
seeks to interpret causes behind the share price movements of resource companies to 
provide a basis for the assessment of the value creation. It also seeks to re-classify 
exploration projects on an average probability weighted return basis to provide an 
investment comparison to merger and acquisition activity. 
 
Finally, it seeks to interpret future trends in merger and acquisition activity and the 
impact this may have on the Australian and global resource sectors. 
 
1.2 Defining Merger and Acquisitions 
Merger and acquisition activity or M&A is the general term used in the finance 
industry to refer to activity resulting in corporate consolidation. This consolidation 
involves the purchase of all the shares of one company by another company or its 
shareholders such that the first company is then delisted from the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) and becomes a subsidiary of the other company. 
 
Company acquisitions are generally executed through takeovers which may be either 
hostile or friendly and the nature of which may change during the course of the 
takeover. Most takeovers are ‘off market’, which involves the predatory company 
directly purchasing shares in the target company through written offers to its 
shareholders. On market takeovers, by contrast, involve the predator company 
purchasing shares through the stock market at a specified price. Takeovers can be 
conducted through both on and off market offers and there is a strictly defined 
process involving offer and response documents outlined by the Corporations Act, 
the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act and the Listing Rules of the Australian 
Securities Exchange (Levy and Pathak, 2008) 
 
Mergers tend to refer to activity involving the friendly merger of two companies with 
co-operative Boards, which may or may not involve a share price premium. 
Companies involved in mergers tend to be of similar size in comparison to takeovers 
which typically involve a larger company taking over a significantly smaller one. 
Mergers involve schemes of arrangement whereby one shareholder group agrees to 
accept the shares of another in exchange for their current shareholding (ASIC 2008).  
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 A detailed discussion of the regulatory framework for both takeovers and mergers 
and the application and strategies for each are outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
1.3 Resource Sector Coverage 
The M&A activity studied in this thesis has been conducted by companies listed in 
the ASX resource sector, with the market conveniently categorised into resource and 
industrial sectors for many years.  The ASX All-Resources Index (or the ASX 
Accumulation All-Resources Index) was the benchmark for the resource sector until 
the restructuring of the ASX indices in 2000 (ASX 1999). The current most 
appropriate benchmark is the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index although under the 
main market benchmark, the S&P/ASX 200 Index, resource companies are 
segregated into the Metals and Mining sector, a subsector within the S&P/ASX 200 
or 300 Materials Index and the oil and gas sector within the S&P/ASX 200 or 300 
Energy Index (see Section 1.10.1). 
 
Resource companies are classified as companies devoted to the exploration and 
discovery of mineral resources and/or their further beneficiation and processing. The 
more familiar commodities range from base metals (copper, zinc, lead, nickel), 
precious metals (mostly gold and silver), and bulk commodities including iron ore 
and coal. This thesis excludes analysis of steel companies although there are similar 
attributes of steel pricing to those of the above commodities and the linkage to world 
growth expectations. The steel sector has only recently become distinct in the ASX 
following the spin-off of OneSteel Limited and BlueScope Steel Limited from BHP 
Limited in 2000 and 2002 respectively. 
 
The thesis also examines part of the energy sector although it excludes traditional oil 
and gas industry M&A activity given the different industry dynamics, particularly 
the fact that this industry involves extensive syndication to mitigate the high risk 
involved in petroleum exploration. Segments of the energy sector studied by this 
thesis are uranium and coal. 
 
The globalization of resource companies has lead to many acquisitions conducted by 
overseas companies and hence, these companies require analysis relative to their own 
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markets or to global resource indices to identify whether the transactions have 
returned shareholder value. 
 
1.4 Research Scope 
The following section discusses the source of research materials for this project. It 
also outlines some limitations prevalent in the analysis given the diversity of 
influences which lead to market volatility and company diversity across the resource 
sector such as asset quality, management experience, commodity exposure, etc. 
 
1.4.1 Research Material 
One of the key goals of this thesis is to collate data from a number of non-academic 
sources to provide a basis for analysing resource transactions. Apart from journal 
publications and texts, these include: 
 
1. Company specific releases which may be required under ASX listing 
rules including continuous disclosure, as well as quarterly, half yearly and 
annual reporting. It also includes financial reporting and ad hoc 
presentations to keep the investment community informed of the 
companies activities, site visit presentations and questions as well as 
discussions with senior management over specific issues. 
2. Stock Broker research providing commentary and analysis on specific 
company or sector events or trends. 
3. Media information including newspaper or internet services reporting on 
company events  
4. Market data services provided by Stock Resource including Iguana, 
Factiva, ASX and Aspect Huntley. 
5. Specialist journal, bulletin or magazine publications, which vary from 
commodity bulletins (e.g. Metals Monitor, Platts Metals Week) to broad 
based magazines such as Resource Stocks magazine or Mining Journal. 
 
While there is a contrast in the rigour of academic research relative to other sources 
of data, non-academic data are essential in providing a timely record of company 
analyst or investor impressions and expectations at the time of the announcement of 
key events such as a takeover. It also provides a record of share and commodity price 
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movements at the time of a specific event which may not be evident in time series 
data such as closing day share prices. Unfortunately, this record including share price 
data is often deleted from newswire and market data services when it is greater than 
10-years old. 
 
Reilly (1985) notes that the material in academic journals differs in terms of 
timeliness and general orientation from investment magazines with the latter 
concerned with the current investment environment and highlighting investment 
opportunities. This is an accurate reflection of articles in resource publications, e.g. 
Resource Stocks, Paydirt, Mining Magazine, etc. However, most of these 
publications also provide a forum where senior company management can espouse 
their companies’ strategies which are designed to create shareholder value. Indeed 
many of these reviews involve direct input by company personnel and hence, provide 
a base case to which one can later compare the execution and effectiveness of 
relevant strategies. 
 
1.4.2 Research Analysis Limitations 
Stock markets are notoriously capricious and influenced by a wide array of factors 
which are problematic in the analysis of trends. Furthermore these create difficulties 
in substantiating causal relationships between share price movements and the 
corresponding movements in other parameters although they may appear obvious at 
the time. As outlined in Chapter 2 this is exacerbated in resources due to the 
influence of changing commodity prices in addition to normal market and resource 
company specific factors and this leads to less substantiated and more generalised 
research. 
 
The author also draws the reader’s attention to two key issues: 
• In academic research there can be minimal analysis on the potential linkage 
between events outside the market with traditional studies analysing excess 
stock returns over market returns (see Chapter 2). Resource company shares 
with high beta indices are often driven by less market-related phenomena 
(commodity prices movements, company specific activities) and therefore 
comparisons to broader market returns may not be valid. 
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• Most previous research has been conducted on larger markets, especially the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and/or with generally larger companies 
with high share price liquidity. Statistical analysis on large datasets is often 
used to provide analytical support for research contentions. This type of 
analysis is difficult in smaller markets like the Australian resource sector 
which lacks the breadth and depth of major US market sectors. 
 
In summary, the application of past research techniques to analysing resource 
acquisitions in the Australian market has had limitations ranging from an 
appreciation of the drivers of resource company share prices through to dataset size 
and appropriate event methodology as discussed in Chapter 2. As a consequence the 
breadth of this research has been wider than expected but addresses these issues and 
has led to a modified event analysis methodology which provides a reasonable basis 
for M&A analysis. 
 
1.5 Definitions 
This section briefly defines and discusses a number of terms which are used 
throughout the thesis. 
 
1.5.1 Shareholder Value 
Measuring changing shareholder value is a key aspect of this thesis as it determines 
whether management has been successful in creating shareholder value through 
acquisition and merger strategies. 
 
In this thesis, the creation of shareholder value is measured through a change in the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the share price of the acquiring company relative to 
the broader resource market in general. The share price is theoretically an 
independent variable which incorporates the expected value associated with the 
acquisition, whether beneficial or detrimental at a specific time. In addition a 
comparison is also carried out with the acquiring company and its share price 
sensitivities to key factors (e.g. ASX Indices, commodity prices) prior and post to the 
M&A activity. This thesis argues that an increased sensitivity to a key variable can 
deliver shareholder value in some circumstances as investors may be increasingly 
attracted to the stock as an investment. At the very least, an acquirer with a 
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subsequent higher index weighting will attract additional investment from index 
funds. 
 
A 30-day average share price level prior to the initial announcement of an M&A 
transaction is used for comparison to offer values. 
 
Other measures such as changes in earnings per share (eps), cash flow per share 
(cfps), dividends per share (dps), and NPV valuations are not applicable in many 
acquisitions, for example, it may take years for a newly acquired project to be 
developed and produce a positive cash flow. There is also the fact that the creation of 
shareholder value may be derived from a change in the market’s assessment of the 
asset base of a company while not creating a positive eps or cfps contribution, for 
example, a size premium if the company has increased in size through the acquisition 
and is now at a size level where it is attracting increased investment. 
 
1.6 Share Price Movements 
Over the years there has been a substantial level of research into the movement of 
share prices (Chen and Zhao, 2007, Campbell and Ammer, 1993, Fama and French, 
1995, Keim and Stambaugh, 1986, Vuolteenaho, 2002). On a broad market scale, 
researchers tend to model share price movement under normal trading conditions as a 
random walk exhibiting returns that follow a lognormal distribution (see Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless most authors would agree that new significant information or events 
may create significant changes in share prices and under the efficient market 
hypothesis, the consequence of a new significant event is impounded rapidly or 
instantaneously in the share price creating a price shock (Fama, 1970). 
 
This research supports the adage that movements in the share prices of (resource) 
companies are stimulated by perceived changes in the valuation of the company on a 
per share basis. This thesis refers to events which lead to these perceived changes in 
company valuations as share price ‘drivers’. This is an important distinction as a 
share price driver may or may not lead to an underlying change in the fundamental 
valuation of the assets of the company. 
 
The process is likely to evolve along the following steps: 
 10
 1. A share price driver emerges with an implied company valuation change 
2. Share price movement (positive or negative) 
3. Ongoing assessment as to the credibility and sustainability of the new 
valuation 
4. Potential further share price movement (positive or negative) 
 
The separation of ‘implied valuation change’ from a share price ‘driver’ is a key 
concept, which is not always appreciated by market participants. The initial and later 
ongoing assessment of company valuations can be stimulated by different share price 
drivers. An example in the context of a resource company would be when a valuation 
change may stem first from an unexpected increase in revenue due to stronger 
economic growth (stronger economic data = first share price driver) which is then 
followed by weaker than expected commodity price rise (weaker than forecast eps 
growth = second share price driver) and is followed by a takeover offer for one of the 
company’s peers in the same sector (relative valuations from peer takeover offer = 
third share price driver).  
 
Each of these drivers has implied increases or decreases in the company’s valuation 
and will lead to varying share price movements based on these valuation changes, 
each adjusted for certainty and sustainability. In essence, share price movements 
reflect a series of probability weighted valuation changes stemming from each share 
price driver as it emerges (see Chapter 4). 
 
The frequency of the emerging share price drivers also changes over time and 
depends on market conditions and other circumstances. An example is that in volatile 
market conditions, a falling share price may be supported by a prospective dividend 
yield but in a rising market, the prospect of earnings growth may be the key share 
price driver. 
 
1.6.1 Movements in the Share Price of Resources Companies 
The main share price driver of resource companies are changes in commodity prices 
and to a lesser extent, changes in exchange rates. Commodity prices directly 
influence the earnings and cash flows of resource companies as well as the value of 
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reserves, resources and exploration projects. However, commodity prices are 
influenced by the supply/demand fundamentals in their own specific markets, which 
may be unrelated to the operating performance of a particular resource company. An 
example is the increasing importance of speculative investment in commodity 
markets over recent years. 
 
The operating assets often have relatively fixed operating cost structures, and hence, 
increases in commodity prices can lead to significant changes in future earnings and 
operating cash flows. This can provide significant earnings and cash flow leverage to 
relatively small changes in the commodity price and ‘magnify’ the share price 
movement relative to the movement in the underlying commodity price.  
 
In addition, resource companies typically have mineral resources and reserves which 
become more valuable through the additional earnings and cash flows generated at 
higher commodity prices when they are finally exploited. In the extreme case, North 
American analysts typically value gold companies on a multiple of their gold 
resources and reserves and which often contrasts with valuations derived from 
price/earnings and price/cash flow multiples. This gives rise to the ‘gold premium’ in 
market valuations of gold companies. Elsewhere, a junior explorer focusing on 
specific target commodities may experience an increasing share price with increasing 
commodity prices on the prospect of greater value in the discovery or further 
delineation of mineralisation. 
 
In broader economic cycles, increasing demand for commodities normally stems 
from increasing world economic growth, often reflected in increasing industrial 
production. As mentioned, in the recent resource rally, a major component of this 
growth and increasing commodity demand stemmed from the significant increase in 
the rate of industrialisation and urbanisation of China and other emerging economies. 
As with the recent rapid increase in Chinese commodity demand, historically it has 
been unexpected increases in commodities demand that have led to the significant 
commodity price and resource sector rallies over time, e.g. as during the 1960’s. 
 
In summary, resource companies have attributes which provide: 
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• Leverage to world growth cycles through commodity price movements 
• Relatively fixed cost bases which enhance this leverage 
• Resource, reserve and exploration prospects which also increase in value with 
increasing commodity prices 
• Exploration value in the potential to discover an economic mineral deposit. 
 
The latter point is particularly relevant to junior explorers and generally diminishes 
with the increasing size and asset base of the company. As outlined in Bartrop & Guj 
(2009), it is the materiality of the exploration project target size relative to the 
company size that is important in generating shareholder value. 
 
1.6.2 Changing Resource Company Value 
The value of a company can be an absolute or relative measure but the latter 
predominates in the stock market and in particular, with resource companies, given 
constantly changing input parameters. In contrast, an absolute valuation could be 
derived from a cash bid for the company at a fixed price. 
 
In the case of resource companies, the author considers that change in value can be 
crystallised by either: 
 
• An expectation of a material change in future earnings and cash flow levels 
leading to a change in the value of the asset base of the company; or 
• A change in the value ascribed by the market to the value of this asset base 
 
The two differ with the first relating to specific company activities while the second 
reflects general market valuation changes. Of course company specific activities can 
also lead to the second valuation change, the most evident over the last decade has 
been corporate management seeking to grow their companies to capture a size 
premium where larger companies trade at higher price/earnings and price/cash flow 
multiples (see Chapter 5). This has generally involved mergers and acquisition 
activity. 
 
Share price drivers leading to the first outcome could include sustained changes in 
commodity prices or exchange rates, a new exploration discovery of a mineral 
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deposit or an extension of an existing resource base, and an expansion in the 
production of an existing asset, or the acquisition or divestment of an asset.  
 
In contrast share price drivers impacting on the second outcome relate to market 
trends and could include specific premia allocated to certain sectors reflecting 
specific commodity price expectations (e.g. the 2006 uranium bull run), the company 
size premia discussed earlier as well as direct corporate activity such as the threat of 
a potential takeover for the company. 
 
1.6.3 Measuring Investment Value Changes 
The traditional measures of a company’s value and hence the scope for a change in 
one of these measures to emerge as a share price driver includes:  
 
• Prospective earnings (one or two year horizon) as a function of the share 
price (short-term price earnings ratio) 
• Sustainable earnings levels as a function of the share price ( medium and 
long-term price earnings ratio) 
• Prospective cash flows excluding capital items (one or two year horizon) as a 
function of the share price (a short-term price to cash flow ratio) 
• Sustainable cash flows excluding capital items as a function of the share price 
(medium and long-term price to cash flow ratio) 
• Prospective dividend yield as a function of the share price 
• Sustainable dividend yield as a function of the share price 
• NPV valuations 
• Option valuations 
 
These factors apply with varying degrees of importance to resource companies, for 
instance the relevance of dividends and dividend yields is lower as resource 
companies often pay small or no dividends as the returns from investing in resource 
shares are expected through capital gain. NPV valuations are often utilised in valuing 
the assets held by resource companies, reflecting the varying and limited lives of 
mining operations, although this is becoming less common, particularly in the mid-
tier sector and is often generally absent in the junior sector (Bartrop, 2009). A third 
factor is that exploration companies may lack any appreciable earnings and cash flow 
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with share price drivers representing the reporting of new drill results on a particular 
exploration property. 
 
As mentioned earlier, changes in the above parameters are likely to constitute share 
price drivers although following the global financial crisis, there is often a pre-
emption of changes in the commodity prices (and subsequent eps and cfps changes) 
from the release of macroeconomic data indicating the likelihood and possible pace 
of a recovery in world economic growth. 
 
1.6.4 Changing Importance of Investment Measures 
As evident in the previous section, there are a number of valuation methodologies 
which can be applied to short-term (one to two year) parameters or medium to long-
term parameters (eg. two years or longer). Hence, it is likely that valuations derived 
under the different time frame scenarios will differ. 
 
The author considers that there is little doubt that the market alternates at various 
times between valuations derived on the short-term parameters and those derived 
from medium and long-term parameters which are influenced by general market 
conditions (see Figure 1). These are reflected into two common investment styles; 
momentum and value investing, although in practice many investors incorporate 
elements of both styles. 
 
Harrowell (1994) summarises the distinction between momentum and value 
investing as: 
 
• Value Investing – seeking stocks which are cheap relative to a fundamental 
valuation of their underlying assets and discarding expensive stocks. 
• Momentum Investing – seeking stocks about to appreciate in price and 
discarding those about to fall in price. 
 
The practical buying and selling timing points relative to an assessed ‘fundamental’ 
valuation are outlined in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical buy/sell timing points for value and momentum investing. The 
value investor must produce a valuation for the company and then decide at what 
level of discount or premium to that valuation they would each buy or sell. The 
momentum investor is attempting to pick the turning points. 
 
 
     From Harrowell (1994) 
 
During rising markets short-term valuation parameters dominate because the 
marginal investor is likely to be investing predominantly on a momentum investment 
style. This is evident as the emerging data, whether economic growth and/or 
increases in commodity prices, on the whole are generally only likely to impact on 
short-term valuations. An example is that a rising copper price now is unlikely to 
alter long-term copper price forecasts upon which medium and long-term valuations 
are based. These long-term copper forecasts are only likely to change if there is a 
sustained period of higher copper prices and there is an expected supply/demand 
balance over the long-term that would provide commodity analysts with the 
confidence to change long-term forecasts. 
 
In contrast, at the depths of a bear market where low spot commodity prices reduce 
short-term earnings and cash flows to levels where the corresponding share price 
ratios are lifted to exorbitant levels, it is likely that medium to long-term valuations 
such as NPV valuations or sustainable earnings and cash flow ratios, etc. are 
providing support to the share price (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Dominant market valuation parameters during different market conditions. 
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Using examples of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, Bartrop and Guj (2006) suggested 
that companies with established and forecast cash flows tend to trade in a cyclical 
manner around the cumulative Net Present Value (NPV) valuation of their assets in 
line with changing short-term valuation parameters. This is evident in Figure 3, 
which charts the BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto share prices around broker-average 
NPV valuations. 
 
NPV valuations are a common ‘fundamental’ way of valuing the resources sector 
and while individual brokers’ NPV valuations may vary in line with specific 
operating and revenue assumptions, the researchers considered that, as a consensus, 
they provided the market with more stable valuations upon which to compare the 
volatile share prices of mining stocks. 
 
Figure 3. BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto share prices and average broker NPV 
valuations. 
 
From Bartrop and Guj (2006). 
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The BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto share prices broadly follow the average NPV 
valuations but can trade at any one time at a discount or more often at a premium to 
the average NPV. From Figure 3 it is, however, evident that during buoyant market 
conditions, share prices can trade at significant premia relative to the underlying 
NPV valuations. Bartrop and Guj (2006) regarded this as a result of momentum 
investing as its drivers are short-term changing events almost entirely unrelated to a 
fundamental NPV valuation.  
 
This was particularly relevant in the recent bull run to June quarter 2008 where NPV 
valuations appeared to be playing ‘catch-up’. In bull markets, momentum investing 
can lead to ‘bubble’ situations as exemplified by uranium company share prices 
recently factoring in average enterprise values more than US$20/lb U3O8 for 
Australian uranium explorers with no producing mines, despite the fact that their 
uranium resources were in many cases unlikely to ever be brought into production 
(Bartrop 2007). 
 
1.7 Acquisition Targets 
The acquisition targets studied in this research are listed companies on the ASX 
(generally members of the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index) as the presence of a 
share price theoretically provides an independent and market-driven value which 
reflects future expectations on the company’s performance (Reilly,1985; Copeland et 
al, 1996; Peirson et al, 1990). 
 
In comparison, unlisted entities are not subject to continuous disclosure and other 
reporting requirements entailed by the listing rules on the ASX. 
 
1.7.1 Target Reserves and Resources  
Most resource companies seek to develop and mine mineral resources and it is 
generally the size and grade of these resources (and reserves subset) which ultimately 
dictates the scale of the operation through the economic optimisation of throughput 
rates and the level of capital expenditure that can be supported by the reserve base. 
 
In some cases it is the resource/reserve size combined with other factors such as 
remoteness and product value that can lead to the development of further 
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downstream processing including smelters and refineries. In most cases, with a 
significant resource/reserve base, incremental optimisation over time can involve 
multiple production level expansions as well potential development of downstream 
processing. 
 
Integrated operations supported by large and generally richer orebodies have been 
more common in the past (Mt Isa, Olympic Dam, Telfer, Broken Hill), but are still 
occurring in some projects in more recent times, e.g. Equinox Minerals’ Limited 
Lumwana project in Zambia which includes the development of a smelter to enhance 
project economics (Equinox 2009). Elsewhere, access to large resources such as the 
Aurukun bauxite deposit came with a statutory commitment to build an alumina 
refinery as part of the winning tender following the Queensland Government’s 
confiscation from Pechiney (Australia) Limited (Fitzgerald 2009). 
 
An important aspect is that it is the resources/reserve base which drives the value of 
mineral assets, not the level of historical capital expenditure which can be deemed 
scrap value if there is no supporting production base. Furthermore, the largely 
depreciated capital assets and infrastructure of many long-lived and possibly 
integrated operations, while still functional, would be prohibitively expensive to 
replace at current costs. This can provide low-cost acquisition opportunities (relative 
to replacement value) provided there is a production base capable of utilising this 
infrastructure and/or exploration potential (Sims and Bartrop, 1993). 
 
Hence, the due diligence of an acquisition of targeted resources and reserves is 
extremely important in merger and acquisition activity. The resource and reserve 
quality includes confidence levels (JORC classification, see below), reconciliation 
with any past production, future mining constraints, historical and forecast 
metallurgical performance and exploration potential to expand existing resources. 
The ability of an acquirer to create shareholder value often lies with strategies to 
develop further or expand acquired resources, particularly where the resources have 
been stranded and the acquirer can facilitate access to a processing plant. 
 
1.7.2 Exploration Tenement Acquisitions 
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The acquisition targets studied exclude basic grass-roots exploration joint ventures, 
farm-ins or tenement purchases. The reason is that in these cases, the success and the 
subsequent creation of shareholder wealth is generally derived from exploration 
activities leading to the discovery of a mineral resource – a high-risk strategy in itself 
(Bartrop and Guj, 2009). The factors controlling exploration success reflect first, the 
very existence of an undiscovered resource in a project area, and secondly, the use of 
appropriate exploration techniques, and lastly, the perseverance and funding required 
to discover it. 
 
Companies interested in acquiring exploration assets (non-petroleum) tend to identify 
prospective target areas through in-house research and then seek access to the ground 
which can involve; 
• If the area is available, completing and submitting an application to the 
relevant State minerals authority. 
• If the area is under an existing tenement, which is likely to remain in place 
for some time, approaching the owner and seeking a joint venture farm-in 
deal or an outright acquisition 
 
Approaching existing tenement holders is normally the more expensive option and 
has a degree of uncertainty in that an economic deal may not be struck or there may 
be an unwillingness by the owner to divest equity in the tenement. If a deal is 
consummated it is usually in the form of a joint venture with a farm-in structure 
which involves fixed expenditure commitments to achieve specific equity levels. 
Straight-out purchases are less common but may involve acquisition prices paid in 
scrip and/or cash and a production royalty may be kept by the owner over future 
production. 
 
The underlying selection of prospective areas and hence embarking on exploration 
acquisitions such as joint ventures can be relatively subjective. Companies may have 
target generation teams or individuals which apply new or in-house geological 
models or geophysical or geochemical data analysis to identify trends which elevate 
the prospectivity of certain areas. The reasons may also arise from a belief that past 
exploration efforts may have missed identifying and testing prospective targets or 
there may be change in commodity focus and/or geological model. It is also 
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important to note that larger resource companies have financial clout which provides 
greater opportunities for entry into their targeted projects given the attraction of this 
capital to often under-funded, junior explorers. 
 
These issues underline the difficulties in the analysis of exploration project 
acquisitions in two ways: 
• The discovery rates on acquired (or joint ventured) exploration properties 
versus non-acquired exploration properties are difficult to determine given 
the statistically small number of exploration discoveries relative to the global 
exploration effort, and; 
• The acquisition prices paid (farm-in structures or outright purchases) can be 
based on industry benchmarks or the financial clout of each partner and are 
less related to the generally unquantified exploration potential of the 
tenement and potentially the value of any future discovery. 
 
The risk in exploration has previously been assessed by Mackenzie and Woodall 
(1987). They note that the risk commonly involves the application of limited 
corporate funds to exploration programs which fail to yield any success. They 
categorized exploration risk into three areas: 
1. Discovery risk - the risk of actually discovering an economic mineral deposit 
is assessed by Mackenzie and Woodall (1987) as typically having a 1 to 2 per 
cent chance of success. 
2. Geological risk. This relates to the uncertainty of the return of a discovered 
resource due to geological variability amongst deposits. An example is the 
discovery of a mineral resource which is subeconomic because it does not 
meet minimum size or grade parameters. 
3. Market risk. This is ‘revenue’ risk where a discovery is rendered uneconomic 
due to weaker commodity prices. 
 
The author notes that the risks identified by Mackenzie and Woodall (1987) 
represents only three of a number of identifiable risks, for example, sovereign or 
country risk, exchange rate risk on revenues, technical risk on mining and 
beneficiation, environmental risk, etc. Broader categories such as ‘technical risk’ and 
‘commercial risk’ may be more appropriate for the last two categories whereas 
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‘discovery risk’ could include the risk of not discovering an orebody with economic 
size and grade characteristics. 
 
Nevertheless, Mackenzie and Woodall’s (1987) work does reiterate the high risk 
associated with exploration and the fact that this is unlikely to have a relationship 
with any acquisition activity to secure the tenements in the first place. This thesis 
analyses exploration discovery probabilities in Chapter 6 to quantify exploration as 
an alternative or complementary growth option to merger and acquisition activity. 
 
1.8 Trends in Evaluation and Reserve and Resource Reporting 
The following sections review the development of the Joint Ore Reserves Committee 
(JORC) code for the reporting of resources and reserves and the Valmin code for 
valuing resource assets. The various codes have ‘constrained’ the reporting of the 
discovery of new mineralisation, the estimation of reserves and resources, and 
independent expert valuations, particularly in relation to the ‘sign off’ of the 
reporting by a deemed and named competent person.  
 
1.8.1 Reporting of Exploration Results  
The reporting of the discovery of mineralisation to the Stock Market has been fraught 
with issues over many years that stem from the ability of company management to 
fabricate, exaggerate or place out of context encouraging drill results with a 
consequence of an unwarranted share price appreciation.  
 
The Australasian Code for Reporting of Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and 
Ore Reserves (the ‘JORC Code’ or ‘the Code’) was established in 1989 to provide 
minimum standards, recommendations and guidelines for public reporting in 
Australasia of exploration results, mineral resources and ore reserves. Revised and 
updated editions of the Code were issued in 1992, 1996 and 1999. The 2004 edition 
supersedes all previous editions (ASX 2004). 
 
The 2004 edition includes changes to the reporting of exploration results and 
includes the reporting of exploration targets (Stoker 2005). While the reporting of 
exploration results now requires the involvement of a competent person, the ability to 
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report exploration targets has now addressed a major deficiency in the JORC code 
prior to 2004.  
 
In particular, historical reserves and resources were not allowed to be reported in 
announcements to the ASX under the original guidelines despite the fact that many 
were conducted by competent geologists and would meet JORC compliance had the 
code been around at that time. This created a variation in information levels across 
the market as company releases to the ASX would not contain a specific non-JORC 
compliant resource while it may have been included in presentations to the 
investment community if it was deemed a material aspect of the company’s projects. 
Historically these presentations were not released to the market and created an 
unlevel ‘investment playing field’ but continuous disclosure requirements now mean 
that these presentations must be disclosed to the market (Bartrop, 2009). 
 
Clause 18 in the 2004 JORC Code also now provides the capacity to report 
exploration targets (ASX 2006). In summary, the terms ‘resource’ and ‘reserve’ must 
not be used in this context and any statement referring to potential quantity and grade 
of the target must be expressed as ranges and must include:  
• a detailed explanation of the basis for the statement, and  
• a proximate statement that the potential quantity and grade is conceptual in 
nature, that there has been insufficient exploration to define a mineral 
resource and that it is uncertain if further exploration will result in the 
determination of a mineral resource. 
 
However, despite over twenty years of development of the JORC code, in early 
2009, the ASX reported that after reviewing 5,200 announcements by mining 
entities, 6 per cent were found to contain a total of 333 instances of non-compliant 
reporting by 246 entities. There are around 800 mining entities listed on the ASX 
(ASX 2009).  
 
The consideration in resource company M&A activity is the reliability of exploration 
data as well as the context in which is it is presented to the market which may impact 
the share price of the company. Share price bubbles are discussed in Chapter 2, but it 
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is worth reviewing the Poseidon Nickel NL share price run as it is often cited as a 
significant reason for the creation of the JORC code (Stoker 2005). 
 
Poseidon Nickel NL announced on 1 October 1969 that drilling had intersected 40 
feet grading 3.56 per cent nickel and 0.55 per cent copper along with other lower-
grade intersections at Windarra, Western Australian (Sykes, 1978). The share price 
increased dramatically from below $2.00 prior to the announcement to peak at $280 
per share in the following February (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Poseidon Nickel NL Share Price  
 
From Simon (2003) 
 
Based on the data presented by Sykes (1978) and Simon (2003), the cause of the rise 
in share price represented a number of factors including the increasing importance of 
nickel and stainless steel production at that time, the low market capitalisation of the 
company at the time of the announcement (it was around $2 million in the period 
before the announcement), the presence of short selling with positions that had to be 
covered, director and management/consultants purchasing shares and potentially 
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unquantified information leaking from the field. Stoker (2005) highlights the 
ambiguity in the consultant geologist’s statement associated with the release of the 
assays as a key impetus for the introduction of the JORC code as follows: 
 
“The Consulting geologists, Burrill and Associates Pty Ltd quote that the mineralised 
zone has an indicated length of 1000 ft and a minium width of 65 ft”.  
 
However, a statement in this manner defining observable mineralisation trends is not 
unlike many statements reported now and it is probable that Burrill and Associates 
Pty Ltd would be deemed competent persons under the current JORC code had it 
been present at the time. What Poseidon Nickel NL and many other companies with 
similar but not so grand, speculative share price runs demonstrate is the attraction to 
investors of junior explorers with the first hints of a potentially huge discovery.   
 
This contrasts with intent to deceive as demonstrated by Canadian junior, Bre-X 
Minerals Ltd with its discovery of the Busang Gold deposit in Indonesia. Busang was 
purchased in 1993 and significant gold intersections were announced in October 
1995. The estimate of the project and hence, the company’s value increased over 
time; in 1995 it was 30Moz, in 1996 it was 60Moz, and finally in 1997 it was 
reported at 70Moz. The Bre-X share price increased to C$280 per share by 1997 
(split adjusted) and at its peak the company had a market capitalisation of US$4.4 
billion (Wikipedia, 2009). In 1997 as part of a development program involving 
Freeport McMoRan Inc., Freeport conducted check core assays and subsequently 
announced the discovery of insignificant amounts of gold. Later work by 
independent consultants confirmed the presence of ‘salting’ including the addition of 
shaved jewellery.  
 
The Bre-X fraud is an extreme case highlighting the level of due diligence required 
in remote but high-value projects. However, the willingness of investors to speculate 
will always remain a concern in early exploration success irrespective of JORC code 
reporting standards, and this represents a challenge in negotiating fairly priced M&A 
activity for companies involved in early stage discoveries. 
 
1.8.2 Reporting of Reserves and Resources 
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The Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC) code for the reporting of ore resources 
and reserves has changed little since it was first proposed in 1994 (Stoker 2005). The 
code is relatively simple and separates three categories of resources which reflect 
increasing levels of geological confidence (inferred, indicated and measured) with 
resources in the latter two categories able to be converted to reserves with 
consideration of ‘modifying factors’ which are mining, metallurgical, economic, 
marketing, legal, environmental, social and governmental factors (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Diagrammatic representation of the JORC Code for the reporting of 
mineral resources and ore reserves. 
 
From Stoker (2005). 
 
The strict category definitions are defined in Table 1 for both resources (Table 1a) 
and reserves (Table 1b). 
 
Table 1a. The JORC Code classification of resources. 
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Inferred Resource
An ‘Inferred Mineral Resource’ is that part of a Mineral Resource for which tonnage, 
grade and mineral content can be estimated with a low level of confidence. It is 
inferred from geological evidence and assumed but not verified geological and/or 
grade continuity. 
It is based on information gathered through appropriate techniques from locations 
such as outcrops, trenches, pits, workings and drill holes which may be limited or of 
uncertain quality and reliability.
Indicated Resource
An ‘Indicated Mineral Resource’ is that part of a Mineral Resource for which 
tonnage, densities, shape, physical characteristics, grade and mineral content can be 
estimated with a reasonable level of confidence. 
It is based on exploration, sampling and testing information gathered through 
appropriate techniques from locations such as outcrops, trenches, pits, workings and 
drill holes. The locations are too widely or inappropriately spaced to confirm 
geological and/or grade continuity but are spaced closely enough for continuity to be 
assumed.
Measured Resource
A ‘Measured Mineral Resource’ is that part of a Mineral Resource for which 
tonnage, densities, shape, physical characteristics, grade and mineral content can be 
estimated with a high level of confidence. 
It is based on detailed and reliable exploration, sampling and testing information 
gathered through appropriate techniques from locations such as outcrops, trenches, 
pits, workings and drill holes. The locations are spaced closely enough to confirm 
geological and grade continuity.
 
From ASX (2006). 
 
Table 1b. The JORC Code classification of reserves. 
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Proved Reserve
 A ‘Proved Ore Reserve’ is the economically mineable part of a Measured 
Mineral Resource. It includes diluting materials and allowances for losses 
which may occur when the material is mined. Appropriate assessments and 
studies have been carried out, and include consideration of and modification 
by realistically assumed mining, metallurgical, economic, marketing, legal, 
environmental, social and governmental factors. These assessments 
demonstrate at the time of reporting that extraction could reasonably be 
justified.
Probable Reserve
A ‘Probable Ore Reserve’ is the economically mineable part of an Indicated, 
and in some circumstances, a Measured Mineral Resource. It includes 
diluting materials and allowances for losses which may occur when the 
material is mined. Appropriate assessments and studies have been carried 
out, and include consideration of and modification by realistically assumed 
mining, metallurgical, economic, marketing, legal, environmental, social and 
governmental factors These assessments demonstrate at the time of 
reporting that extraction could reasonably be justified. 
 
From ASX (2006). 
 
While the code is clear in terms of the level of confidence (low, reasonable or high) 
of a resource estimated by a competent geologist, this level of confidence can be 
subjective between different deemed competent geologists. In addition, while the 
ASX adopts the JORC code for reporting by resource companies, penalties for 
breaches appear minimal and in the worst case, a retraction of the resource statement 
may be all that is required. This often stems from the ‘subjective’ element as to what 
constitutes the different levels of confidence and in practice, is an untested part of the 
code. 
 
This was highlighted in the case of Australian Mining Investments Ltd. (ASX code 
AUM), (now CuDeco Limited, ASX Code: CDU) when on the 29th June 2006, it 
reported an inferred resource of 59 million tonnes at 2.04 per cent copper equivalent 
for its Las Minerale orebody which is part of the Rocklands Group Copper Project 
near Cloncurry in north western Queensland (Australian Mining Investments, 2006). 
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The announcement stimulated a share price rally from below $2 to peak briefly 
around $10 before subsequently falling back to a closing price of $7.11 when a 
trading halt was requested on the 5th July (ASX 2006). The company was suspended 
for nine days until it reported an updated resource on the 13th July 2009 (CuDeco 
2006). The 13th July 2009 release reclassified the previous 59 million tonne inferred 
resource to a 25 million tonne inferred resource and with 34 million tonnes as target 
mineralisation based on the fact that the company’s competent person had 
extrapolated the mineralisation from drill hole data and this did not meet the inferred 
resource confidence criteria. The share price first fell to $2.28 then immediately 
recovered to over $3.00 (Figure 6). 
 
In this case, while the initial resource statement was retracted and then restated, 
investors who had bought shares at the peak share prices lost money as well as those 
investors who sold when the share price overshot on the downside. 
 
Figure 6. Cudeco Closing Share Price during 2006. 
 
Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Accidental or purposeful overstating of resources by companies has been frequent in 
the past (e.g. ASX 2009), and particularly in takeovers where it may take several 
months or even years for the incoming management team to appreciate the 
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overstatement and then seek to write off resources so that the annual resource 
statement trends towards realistic levels. There are a number of examples highlighted 
in the financial markets but Normandy Mining Ltd’s writeoff of a significant 
proportion of the gold resources of Great Central Mines Ltd’s Bronzewing mine in 
theyears following the 1999 takeover by Yandal Gold Pty Ltd. is a prime example.  
 
Hence, while the JORC resource and reserve reporting code is resilient with few 
changes since its establishment in 1994, its application can be variable and there 
continues to remain enough ‘flexibility’ within the code in the estimation of 
resources and reserves that indicates careful due diligence is paramount in M&A 
activity. 
 
1.8.3 Valmin Code 
The Australian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy and Mineral Industry Consultants 
Association comprising a number of bodies (AIG, MICA, AusIMM, Minerals 
Council of Australia, ASX, ASIC, SIA) created the Valmin Code. This Code 
provides a set of fundamental principles and supporting recommendations regarding 
good professional practice to assist those involved in the preparation of Independent 
Expert Reports that are public and required for the assessment and/or valuation of 
mineral and petroleum assets and securities so that the resulting reports will be 
reliable, thorough, understandable and include all the material information required 
by investors and their advisers when making investment decisions (Valmin 2005). 
 
The Valmin Code was first issued on 17 February 1995 and the second on 22 
November 1997 with the current edition issued in 2005. 
 
The relevance of the Valmin code is to ensure accuracy, materiality and reliability of 
Independent Expert’s reports in mergers and acquisition activity in supporting or 
otherwise, Board recommendations. As noted by Blumer (2000), it is the 
independence that is critical, particularly in light of the fact that the outcome may 
differ from the expectations of company management which is paying for the report 
and generally providing data for the valuation. 
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In this research, Independent Expert’s reports provide important, publicly available 
valuation parameters which can be directly compared to share price movements. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, share price movements inconsistent with these valuation 
parameters indicate that at the time the market was focused on alternative valuation 
criteria differing from those used by an Independent Expert. 
 
The Valmin Code is non-prescriptive on valuation methodology, but instead simply 
states that the expert must utilise valuation methods suitable for the mineral or 
petroleum assets or securities under consideration (Valmin 2005). Selection of an 
appropriate valuation method will depend on such factors as the: 
(a) nature of the valuation; 
(b) development status of the mineral or petroleum assets and 
(c) extent and reliability of available information 
 
It also notes that decisions as to the valuation methodology or methodologies to be 
used are solely the responsibility of the expert and must not be influenced by the 
commissioning entity, reasserting the independence of the process. 
 
If a company has current or future cash generating assets, the Valmin code 
recommends discounted cashflow/net present value methodologies inter alia. 
However, increased subjectivity emerges in the valuation of exploration properties 
and there are some novel approaches deemed applicable which are briefly outlined in 
the following sections. 
 
1.8.3.1 Multiple of Exploration Expenditure 
The multiple of exploration expenditure method is a process whereby a subjective 
factor (also called the prospectivity enhancement multiplier) is applied to previous 
relevant exploration expenditure to help derive a value for the tenement. In addition, 
a proportion of prudently budgeted proposed exploration program expenditure can be 
added to the historical expenditure. 
 
1.8.3.2 Joint Venture Terms 
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The terms of a proposed joint venture agreement may be used to provide a market 
value based on the amount an incoming participant is prepared to spend to earn an 
interest in the property.  
 
1.8.3.3 Empirical Methods 
Market value determinations may be made according to the Independent Expert’s 
knowledge of the particular property. This can include a discount applied to values 
arrived at by considering known and/or conceptual target models for the project area. 
The market value may also be rated in terms of a dollar value per unit area or dollar 
value per commodity unit. This latter method is termed a “Yardstick” or a “Real 
Estate” approach. Both methods rely on infrequent sales of similar assets and are 
inherently subjective, reliant on so-called technical considerations and/or the 
informed opinion of the valuer. 
 
1.8.3.4 Similar Transactions 
When commercial transactions concerning properties in similar circumstances have 
recently occurred, the market value precedent may be applied in part or in full to the 
property under consideration. 
 
The techniques described above highlight potential value uncertainty in Independent 
Expert’s reports, particularly where there is a significant value assigned to an 
exploration portfolio relative to non-exploration assets. This value ‘subjectivity’ 
highlights the difficulty in the analysis of grass-roots project transactions. Whilst 
there are many papers on reviewing valuation techniques for these types of projects 
(eg. Malone 1994, Grant, 1994, Appleyard, 1994, Goulevitch & Eupene 1994, Onley 
1994), there is understandably no research analysing these valuations or purchase 
prices of exploration projects which are later compared to the ultimate value of these 
properties after an intensive exploration program. 
 
1.9 Idealised Resource Companies 
The ‘idealized’ business cycle for a mining company is to explore and locate a 
mineral deposit, conduct pre-feasibility and feasibility studies to establish the 
economic viability of the exploitation of the deposit and then to proceed with its 
development. As each ore deposit is of finite life, the resource company is likely to 
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conduct an active exploration program to maintain a ‘supply’ of future deposits 
capable of exploitation to sustain the company’s viability and existence. 
 
Variations on this ‘idealized’ cycle may involve junior explorers selling exploration 
discoveries prior to development – a common practice in the Canadian industry. 
Alternatively, companies may specialise in downstream processing (smelting, 
refining and fabrication, in some cases) and may specialise in one or a selected 
number of commodities. 
 
As discussed Chapter 3, the opportunities for larger resource companies to grow in 
the resources sector can become limited given the size of the total world market for 
some commodities, particularly metals like gold and base metals. This is exemplified 
by the four largest global resource companies excluding oil companies (BHP 
Billiton, Rio Tinto, Anglo American and Xstrata) which have necessarily diversified 
across a number of commodities to attain earnings and cash flow levels capable of 
supporting their large market capitalisations and growth objectives. 
 
1.9.1 Traditional Resource Company Growth 
Resource companies traditionally have strategies encompassing project development 
to maintain or grow future earnings. Companies either discover or acquire mineral 
resources which may not be fully developed or offer expansion opportunities. 
Management then seeks to add shareholder value through the application of capital to 
projects that produce a positive NPV discounted at the company’s WACC or a 
generally higher, company specific hurdle rate. 
 
Apart from NPV accretive projects, Bartrop and White (1995) identified other key 
elements in acquisition targets in a survey across fifteen mining companies, as 
follows: 
• Minimum mine life – greater than five years, depending on size of company 
• Minimum gross revenue – generally applies to larger companies 
• Minimum size – variations to some degree on above two; 
• Cost position significant – projects which fall in the lowest quartile is the 
common ambition; 
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• Commodity – chosen on the basis of strategic fit or the project may be selected 
for commodities that are counter to market cycles; 
• Good access and close to markets (although less important with high value 
products such as gold); 
• Mining methods to be employed and where the company expertise lies – 
underground or open cut or a combination of both 
 
While the survey is now dated, it is likely to remain relevant as not surprisingly, the 
most important specification appears to be a minimum size, which translates into a 
minimum production rate over a minimum mine life. All companies acknowledge the 
risk of bringing short mine-life projects into production to find that unexpected 
technical factors undermine the project economics which cannot be recouped with 
profitable production in future years. Larger companies also apply minimum annual 
revenues to ensure the project will be material in their existing project portfolio. A 
strategic fit along with size and cost curve position appear to be the most important 
elements in determining project acquisition targets. 
 
1.9.2 Project Development De-risking 
The valuation of identified resources becomes increasingly objective, first with 
increasing geological confidence in the resource through further delineation and infill 
drilling, and second, through continual refinement of the costs associated with 
mining, milling and marketing as the project advances towards a feasibility study. 
The latter can be illustrated by the ‘trumpet curve’ notion (see Figure 7). The 
valuation of operating mines, or mines on care-and-maintenance, have scope for the 
greatest reliability, given that there is an historical basis for the mining method, 
metallurgical performance and value of a saleable product. 
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Figure 7. Trumpet curve – expected accuracy for a given project stage. 
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Based on Noakes and Lanz, (1993). 
 
This increasing confidence in the valuations derived from more advanced projects is 
likely to lead to lower levels of discount in the acquisition prices relative to the 
theoretical ‘true’ value of the project determined under the assumption of certainty, 
i.e. as if all operating risks could be known and quantified. In contrast, less well 
known projects will attract a greater discount given the risk inherent in the valuation 
process from less reliable parameters. This discount can take the form of higher 
discount rates in NPV valuations, the use of more conservative or a range of 
parameters in the valuation process and/or using sensitivity analysis or Monte Carlo 
simulations to test the financial robustness  of and the distribution of potential returns 
from a project.  
 
While a risk-adjusted valuation range is typical of a company’s approach to assessing 
potential acquisitions, it can also lead to major discrepancies between a company’s 
value of a project versus the value assigned to the project by the stock market. In 
particular, many stock market participants do not change discount factors to reflect 
the changing risk profile of the various stages of project development and hence, any 
discount simply reflects the time-value of money to first project cash flows. 
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 1.10 The Australian Stock Market 
The Australian Stock Market is operated by the ASX (Australian Securities 
Exchange Limited). It was formed in 1987 by legislation of the Australian Parliament 
which enabled the amalgamation of six independent stock exchanges that formerly 
operated in the various state capital cities. Each exchange had a history of share 
trading dating back to the 19th century (ASX website: http://www.asx.com.au). 
 
Approximately 41 per cent of the adult Australian population own shares, either 
directly (via shares or other listed investments) or indirectly (via unlisted managed 
funds), according to the latest Australian Share Ownership Study (ASX 2009a). The 
total ownership level has declined from 46 per cent when the study was last 
conducted in 2006, reflecting investor responses to recent market volatility. 
 
Figure 8 plots the market capitalisation of domiciled companies listed on the ASX 
(ASX 2009a) on a monthly basis since April 2002. The chart shows the market 
peaking at around $1.6 trillion at the height of the recent resources bull-run in early 
to mid 2007 and to the time when the first signs of the US subprime mortgage 
collapse started emerging. The market capitalisation of the market declined with the 
subprime collapse and after a brief recovery in early 2008, declined sharply to below 
$0.9 trillion with Global Financial Crisis. The recent recovery in the second quarter 
of 2009 has resulted in the market capitalisation moving back above $1 trillion, a 
similar level to the market back in 2005. 
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Figure 8. Market Capitalisation of the Australian Stock Market on a monthly basis 
since April 2002. 
 
Based on data from ASX (2009a). 
 
Figure 9 plots the total number of listed entities on the ASX excluding some minor 
exceptions (stapled securities, listed managed investments, etc.) since March 2002 
and also on a monthly basis. Figure 9 also plots the number of foreign companies 
which are also included in the total number of listed entities (ASX 2009b). 
 
The number of listed entities increased over the recent boom with listings increasing 
from below 1500 in March 2004 to peak at 2099 in July 2008 although the rate of 
growth decreased markedly after December 2007. This also corresponds to a time 
which is not long after the first signs of the US subprime mortgage collapse appeared 
(late August 2007). The stability in the number of listed foreign companies (65 to 85) 
indicates a minimal contribution of foreign companies during the resources boom 
and subsequent downturn. 
 
As mentioned earlier and derived from a separate ASX report (ASX, 2009), 
approximately 800 of the total number of listed entities are mining entities. 
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Figure 9. Total number of listed entities on the ASX on a monthly basis since March 
2002. Numbers of listed foreign companies are also plotted separately but are also 
included in the total numbers. 
 
Based on data from ASX (2009b). 
 
Figure 10 plots the capital raised on the ASX since July 2005. It is separated into 
capital raised from initial public offerings (IPOs) and capital raised on the secondary 
market (rights issues, placements, share purchase plans, etc.). In both cases there are 
monthly averages for each financial year to highlight broader trends. 
 
The two types of capital raisings highlight interesting trends which reflect factors 
occurring across all markets during this period. Using monthly average data for each 
year, in FY2006 there was a rush of IPOs, particularly in the mining sector and an 
average of almost $2 billion was raised monthly in FY2006. This declined modestly 
to $1.64 billion during FY2007 but then fell sharply to $933 million in FY2008 and 
then collapsed to $157 million in FY2009. This trend is not surprising given the 
difficulties of floating new companies in the wake of the US subprime mortgage 
collapse, itself ultimately leading to the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
In contrast secondary market raisings increased from FY2006 (monthly average of 
$2.36 billion) to FY2007 at average of $4.85 billion per month and then fell back 
briefly in FY2008 to average $4.22 billion per month before then surging in FY2009 
 38
to average $7.18 billion per month. As discussed in Chapter 3, a consequence of the 
Global Financial Crisis was the collapse of the debt markets, which forced many 
companies to the equity markets to raise capital to pay down debt given the 
uncertainty associated with refinancing near-term expiring corporate debt. 
 
Figure 10. Capital raised on the ASX through IPOs and Secondary Market Raisings. 
 
Based on data from ASX (2009b). 
 
In reviewing the 1990’s there were emerging trends in the growth of the various 
ASX industry sectors. This is demonstrated by the following chart which segregates 
the market into four arbitrary sectors (Resources, Manufacturing, Financial and 
Other Services) and compares the growth in each sector over a ten year period (see 
Figure 11). Table 2 below also summarises the percentage changes in these four 
sectors. 
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Figure 11. Change in market capitalisation by sector from June 1992 to June 2002. 
 
From the ASX (2003). 
 
Over this decade period, the domestic market capitalization increased by 253 per cent 
from $198 billion at the end of June 1992, to $700 billion as at end of June 2002 
(ASX 2003) while it also corresponded to a period of strong share market returns 
(13.5 per cent per annum gross return for the 10 years to December 2000 according 
to the ASX (ASX 2001). 
 
Table 2. Growth in the four sectors over the decade to June 2002. 
ASX components 30-Jun-92 30-Jun-02             Change
A$b A$b A$b %
Resources 69.2 103.3 34.1 49
Manufacturing 64.9 127 62.1 96
Financial 33.6 278.3 244.7 728
Other services 30.6 191.4 160.8 525
Total market 198.3 700 501.7 253  
From the ASX (2003). 
 
While the resources sector grew by 49 per cent over this period, it has been 
overshadowed by the growth in the Financial and Other Services area. In particular, 
there was the strong privatization push from the Federal Government which included 
the sale of the Commonwealth Bank, part of Telstra, the sale of Victorian power 
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utilities as well as demutualization of AMP and NRMA. The ‘Other Services’ 
classification also includes communications and media stocks which have also grown 
significantly. 
 
The decreasing size of the resources sector relative to the rest of market prior to the 
recent resource rally is also demonstrated in the charting of the market capitalization 
of the All-Industrials index and the All-Resources index since 1980 (Figure 12). 
 
The All-Ordinaries is an index made up of the weighted share prices of 
approximately 500 of the largest Australian companies. It was established by ASX at 
500 points in January 1980, and was the predominant measure of market 
performance until 2000. The companies are weighted according to market 
capitalisation (ASX 2003) but conveniently split into industrial and resource 
companies. The All-Resources index represents the metals and mining and energy 
components of this index while the All-Industrials index was all other stocks. The 
data has been derived from direct ASX data feed and has been manipulated by visual 
basic programs written by the author for this purpose. 
 
Figure 12. The market capitalisation of the industrial and resource components of the 
ASX from 1980 to 2001. 
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Raw data sourced from Stock Resource. 
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 In Figure 12 it is evident that at the end of 1980, the All-Resources component of the 
All-Ordinaries Index represented 45.9 per cent of the entire index. At the end of 1990 
it was 37.1 per cent but by the end of 2000 it was a mere 14.1 per cent of the All-
Ordinaries index. Both indices have since been modified or replaced by the ASX 
with the last comparable data set as at the end of June 2002. At this date, the All-
Resources Index was 14.5 per cent of the All-Ordinaries Index. 
 
Chart 13 plots the number of companies within the All-Ordinaries split into industrial 
and resource companies over the same time period. It also charts the percentage of 
resources stocks compared to the total number of stocks within the All-Ordinaries 
index. 
 
Figure 13. Number of industrial and resource stocks and resource stocks as a 
percentage of the All-Ordinaries Index on the ASX between 1980 and 2001. 
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Raw data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Ignoring the significant change in composition of the indices from 1999 (see below) 
and another restructure in 1987, the number of resource stocks in the All-Ordinaries 
Index exhibits a declining trend since 1987. This reflects a combination of: 
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• Replacement by new larger industrial stocks in the All-Ordinaries index, e.g. 
Telstra, Commonwealth Bank. 
• Consolidation of the index with takeovers and mergers of the larger resource 
companies, e.g. Norths, Ashton Mining, Comalco. 
• The collapse of some resource companies e.g. Western Metals, which has 
resulted in a significant diminution of the market capitalization of the 
resource sector ‘ 
 
Abnormalities in the trends in Figure 13 reflect restructuring of the indices. The most 
recent restructure was on the 1 April 2000 when the All Ordinaries increased from 
approximately 250 stocks to 500 stocks although the change appears in the chart in 
late 1999. At that time the All Ordinaries ceased to be an institutional benchmark and 
was replaced by the S&P/ASX 200 & 300 indices. At that time the All-Ordinaries 
became a ‘deep’ index which was representative of almost the entire market 
(covering approximately 99 per cent of the market capitalization of the market) but 
included stocks which are effectively untradeable due low liquidity, etc. It became a 
‘TV’ Index designed to show the movement of the whole market but not designed as 
an institutional benchmark. Its prior relevance was effectively replaced by the 
S&P/ASX 200 & 300 Indices. There was significant trading around 1 April 2000 as 
funds rebalanced their portfolios to match the new indices (pers comm. M. 
Hartmann, Macquarie Bank 2002). 
 
1.10.1 New Indices  
In March 2000, the ASX entered into a 15 year agreement with Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) Index Services under which S&P assumed the management of the ASX 
indices (All Ordinaries and the new benchmarks). The ASX states that it believed 
that partnering with an internationally renowned company such as S&P would bring 
longer-term benefits to ASX in terms of building awareness of the Australian market, 
attracting investment, and facilitating the development of ASX derivatives and 
Exchange Traded Fund businesses. (ASX 1999) 
 
The new benchmark became the S&P/ASX 200 Index. This includes stocks from the 
S&P/ASX 100 Index along with an additional 100 stocks selected with an emphasis 
on liquidity and investability. The index is designed to have a fixed number of 
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companies (200) in this index and if a constituent is removed, it will be replaced by 
another company in the S&P/ASX 300 Index. The S&P/ASX 200 Index represents 
approximately 89 per cent of the total market capitalisation of the Australian market. 
(S&P 2003). 
 
Table 3. The S&P/ASX main indices and codes. 
Index Name ASX code
S&P/ASX 20 XTL
S&P/ASX 50 XFL
S&P/ASX 100 XTO
S&P/ASX 200 XJO
S&P/ASX 300 XKO
S&P/ASX Midcap 50 XMD
S&P/ASX Small Ords XSO
All Ordinaries XAO  
From ASX (1999). 
 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is primarily focused on resource companies within 
the S&P/ASX 300 index given the greater universe for researching M&A activity. 
 
1.10.2 Global Industry Classification Standard 
On August 2, 1999 Standard & Poor's and MSCI jointly launched the Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS) which was claimed to ease the investment 
research and management process for financial professionals worldwide. Effective 
after the close on March 28, 2002, the Global Industry Classification Standard was 
restructured to consist of 10 economic sectors aggregated from 23 industry groups, 
59 industries, and 122 sub-industries covering over 25,000 companies globally. This 
was modified in 2003 to consist of 10 economic sectors aggregated from 24 industry 
groups, 62 industries, and 132 sub-industries (ASX, 1999, S&P 2003).  
 
Table 4. S&P/ASX 200 Index economic sectors, codes and weighting as at 9 June 
2009. 
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Index Description Index Code Weighting
Consumer Discretionary S&P/ASX 200 CONS DISC IX 3.96%
Consumer Staples S&P/ASX 200 CONS STAP IX 9.47%
Materials S&P/ASX 200 MATERIALS IX 26.07%
Energy S&P/ASX 200 ENERGYINDEX 8.26%
Financials S&P/ASX 200 FINANCINDEX 36.47%
Health S&P/ASX 200 HEALTHINDEX 3.77%
Industrials S&P/ASX 200 INDUSTR INDX 5.59%
Information Technology S&P/ASX 200 INF TECH IDX 0.53%
Telecommunication S&P/ASX 200 TELECOM INDX 4.42%
Utilities S&P/ASX 200 UTILITIES IX 1.47%
TOTAL 100.00%  
Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Resource stocks now fall within the Materials and Energy Sectors. However the 
GICS Materials Sector encompasses a wide range of commodity-related 
manufacturing industries. Included in this sector are companies that manufacture 
chemicals, construction materials, glass, paper, forest products and related packaging 
products, and metals, minerals and mining companies including producers of steel.  
 
This is highlighted in Figure 14 which diagrammatically portrays the relationship 
between S&P/ASX 200 index components and the resources and industrial divisions 
of the market. 
 
Figure 14. The ASX 200 Index and the components in the resource sector as at 15 
June 2009. The second chart splits the market between industrials (68 per cent) and 
resources (32 per cent). 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
The new index structure ‘weakens’ the resources sector as very few fund managers 
now compete with a resource index but rather focus on outperforming the Materials 
sector with its diversity beyond resource companies. Nevertheless, the five-year 
resource rally which ended June 2008 has reasserted the importance of resources 
which has returned to around 32 per cent of the market, and similar to levels back in 
the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
 
Figure 15 outlines the major components of the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index as at 
the 6 June 2009. Not surprisingly, the largest company weighting is BHP Billiton (45 
per cent) and combined with Rio Tinto (8 per cent), represents more than half the 
index. Excluding the oil and gas companies, (Woodside, Santos, Origin), Newcrest 
(6 per cent) and Lihir (3 per cent) are the next largest non-petroleum or utility 
companies. 
 
Figure 15. The major components of the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index.  
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Unfortunately a breakdown of the companies within the smaller (resource) indices is 
now not available unless additional subscription fees are paid to access the data.  
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2.0 Review of Applicable Financial Markets Theory 
 
This chapter reviews current stock market theory and its practical application to 
investment in mining securities. It is intended to provide an overview rather than a 
comprehensive review of financial economic theory given the breadth of the subject 
and keeping in mind that pertinent aspects will be drawn out in Chapter 3 and 4. It is 
also important to understand how stock market participants may interpret 
announcements regarding acquisitions as reflected in their subsequent investment 
actions and the movements, if any, of the share prices of the companies involved in 
the transactions. Price movements can be the initial signs that M&A activity is 
expected to add shareholder value.  
 
The chapter also briefly reviews valuation techniques used within the financial 
industry. It will argue that the stock market changes the way it values mining 
companies during different phases of an economic or commodity price cycle. These 
changing valuation methods can lead to companies trading at a range of discounts or 
premia to their inherent NPV valuations. The fact that companies periodically trade 
at a discount to their NPV valuations provides opportunities for resource acquisitions 
below fundamental value and this has the capacity to generate value for the acquiring 
company. 
 
Later, the chapter discusses the Australian legal framework for mergers and 
acquisition activity under the Corporations Act 2001 and other relevant legislation. 
In particular, it reviews strategies and trends in relation to schemes of arrangement 
versus traditional takeovers. 
 
The last part of the chapter reviews current research on acquisitions. Most of this 
research is directed at industrial companies involved in mergers and acquisitions in 
the US, and outlines the factors that have been deemed important in their success or 
failure. There is some Australian research on the analysis of M&A activity although 
where the analysis has involved event study methodologies; this has generally been 
applied to non-resource companies only. This reflects the limited applicability in 
analysing resource company M&A activity using incumbent methods.  
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 The breadth of the subject matter discussed in Chapter 2 reflects the background for 
subsequent discussions and analysis in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  Chapter 3 addresses 
resource market characteristics, Chapter 4 investigates resource share price 
movements while Chapter 5 presents a modified approach to event study 
methodology which has been applied to a set of transactions. 
 
2.1 Literature Sources 
Literature has been sourced from academic journals, general business and consultant 
papers, text books and finance and mining industry sources. However, there are two 
major issues that can ‘colour’ the research: 
• The first is that industry leaders in the financial sector can be extremely 
forthright in expressing views, particularly those written in some text books. 
A typical example is the argument that cash flows are the major driver of 
share prices rather than earnings per share. The author along with other 
researchers (e.g. Copeland, 1996) believes that the evidence is inconclusive 
while others will argue it is almost definitive (e.g. Stewart 1991). The author 
considers that different factors influence share prices at different times and it 
is difficult to be authoritative on one specific factor even though it may be a 
more prevalent factor than others. 
• Secondly, the effects of company announcements including profit and 
dividend releases, notification of impending acquisitions, increased capital 
expenditure programs, capital raisings, etc. are difficult to effectively analyse 
in isolation, particularly in studies seeking to incorporate statistically 
significant samples. This is because information may be linked with other 
factors that contribute to a price outcome but these factors may not be drawn 
out in the analysis. An example is that it is difficult to analyse the effect of 
the discount applied to the prevailing share price in unexpected equity 
raisings without some knowledge and analysis of the companies’ reasoning 
behind each raising, which may be difficult to obtain. To extend this example 
further, we may find that equity raisings for gold companies are conducted at 
a premium when the gold price is rising but later, when it is falling, they are 
conducted at a steep discount. An average of these results does not represent 
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an accurate analysis of the equity raising premium or discount relationship 
with gold price trends. 
In summary, market-related research is difficult and is likely to require a blend of 
quantitative as well as qualitative analysis. There is also an understated importance in 
simple observations of investment practices rather than theory postulation in 
isolation. 
 
2.2 Financial Markets Theory 
The purpose of stock market placement (investment) is to achieve a return on 
investment through either capital appreciation and/or income distributions. Reilly 
(1985) formally defines an investment as the current commitment of funds for a 
period of time in order to derive a future flow of funds that will compensate the 
placing unit for the time the funds are committed, for the expected rate of inflation, 
and also for the uncertainty involved in the future flow of funds. The importance of 
this additional compensation for risk is a critical assumption in modern portfolio 
theory. In fact Copeland et al. (1996) believe that at the limit if the supplier of capital 
does not receive a fair return to compensate for the risk he/she is taking, he/she will 
move his capital across nation borders in search of better returns relative to similar 
risk. If he is prohibited by law from moving his capital, he will consume more and 
invest less. 
 
Stewart (1991) terms capital flows seeking appropriate risk-adjusted returns as 
disintermediation. He believes disintermediation operates within the stock market in 
line with other markets but where returns are measured by a company’s earnings 
performance in relation to its capital structure. Changes in the return on capital are 
inferred to directly translate into the relative performance of the company’s share 
price. Stewart (1991) summarises this tendency of value (funds) to flow from low to 
higher-return companies by the following equation: 
 
Corporate return/ investors’ required return = market value/capital 
Or in symbols: r/c* = market value/capital 
 
This theory has important implications in that it links a company’s internal 
performance as expressed by the return of its earnings or cash flow to its external 
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share price performance. The required rate c* is termed the cut-off rate or cost of 
capital, and is the rate required by the company’s equity investors or shareholders 
because as Stewart (1991) states, it is the return they could achieve by investing in 
other, comparably risky opportunities. 
 
The market capital to book capital, or more correctly, replacement capital, ratio is 
know as Tobin’s q ratio and there is a body of research devoted to the q theory of 
investment and the q theory of mergers (e.g, see Yoshikawa, 1980, Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2002).  
 
Neoclassical theory of corporate investment is based on similar assumptions with 
management seeking to maximise the present net worth of the company as expressed 
through the market value of its shares. Tobin and Brainard (1977) outline how an 
investment project should only be undertaken if it increases the value of the shares. 
The securities markets appraise a project, its expected contributions to future 
earnings of the company and its risks. If the value of the project as appraised by 
investors exceeds the cost, then the company’s shares will appreciate to the benefit of 
existing shareholders. That is, the market will value the project more than the cash 
used to pay for it and an increase in the share price will correspond to this value. 
 
Therefore the rate of investment, i.e. the speed at which investors wish to increase 
the value of the capital stock, should be related, if anything, to q, the value of the 
capital relative to its replacement cost (Yoshikawa, 1980). Economic logic indicates 
that a normal equilibrium value for q is one for reproducible assets which are in fact 
being reproduced. Values of q above one should stimulate investment, in excess of 
requirements for replacement and normal growth, and values of q below one 
discourage investment. 
 
Market value to capital ratios are also discussed later in Section 2.5.5. However, the 
q approach has not been particularly useful in the resource sector and stems from 
variable project portfolios owned by many resource companies as well as the general 
discrepancy between the historical book value of mining assets and their value in 
terms of their net present value (NPV) as operating assets, or even more so, as 
exploration assets. Hence the q ratio at one time may reflect one particularly 
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attractive project but this may be atypical of future projects given the variability 
between all resource projects. There are also complications with the estimation of the 
q ratio as project lead and development timeframes may leave understated capital 
recorded on the balance sheet relative to market cash flow expectations upon project 
delivery. Hence, investors tend to prefer comparing resource company share prices 
with NPV valuations of their assets that are based on long-term commodity price and 
exchange rate assumptions. 
 
As a consequence, NPV valuations per share have been a common analytical tool for 
many years and share price premia or discount could be viewed as a q type measure 
where the replacement capital is the NPV of the project. A high NPV q (share price 
divided by NPV value per share) might reflect a combination of the NPV value and 
risk of the project (s) which may or may not be reflected in the discount rate, and 
also a market assessment of management’s ability to deliver shareholder value which 
may incorporate its track record of project delivery or operational performance and 
other factors, e.g. ability to secure financing, appropriate commodity hedging, etc. 
 
The discount rate has traditionally been estimated using weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) (Reilly, 1985). The equity component is generally derived from the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which in combination with the dividend 
growth and earnings models, represents the generally accepted methods for 
estimating risk adjusted discount rates for evaluating mining projects (Taheri et a, 
2009). However in financial markets there is now less rigour in NPV analysis as 
analysts commonly use benchmark discount rates across various sectors or may not 
even use NPV valuations in determining stock recommendations (Bartrop, 2009). 
Discrepancies between the ‘theoretical’ and market application of WACCs were 
highlighted recently with the Rio Tinto’s unsustainable debt burden after acquiring 
Alcan in 2007. The debt to fund this acquisition reduced the company’s WACC and 
conversely increased its NPV valuation. However, the market ignored this 
consequence and instead sold down the stock on the risk of company failing to meet 
its debt obligations and being forced into a dilutionary equity raising. Gold 
companies also consistently trade at a premium to NPV valuations derived using 
traditionally estimated WACCs and with individual valuations unrelated to the 
WACC derived NPV valuations. Therefore many analysts use a standard discount 
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rate of 5 per cent applied across all gold companies and then rank the share price 
premia or discount to the sector average NPV valuation to help determine trading 
recommendations.  This type of ranking removes the WACC variation across a sector 
as investors determine the merits or otherwise of the q NPV ratios. 
 
The NPV discrepancies between project valuation for corporate purposes and 
company NPV valuations for investment decisions reflect a number of factors 
including discount rates (corporate hurdle, WACC, benchmark), commodity price 
and exchange rate assumptions as well as resource, operational and cost parameters. 
In the author’s experience there has been an increasing preference for investors to 
seek standardized NPV valuations across all companies or as a sector such as gold 
above, so that they themselves can assess the probability of whether the value will be 
ultimately reflected in the share price and over what time period.  
 
2.2.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
The CAPM theory provides the basis for many applications within the financial 
sector and to a lesser degree, in the resource sector and is worth briefly reviewing for 
later discussion in this thesis. The model is based on determining a company’s cost 
of equity capital by estimating the difference in a company’s share price return with 
the return of the overall market using historical data. Reilly (1985) refers to it as an 
equilibrium asset pricing model. 
 
The model segregates the expected or required rate of return on an equity investment 
into a risk-free rate such as a Government bond plus a risk premium reflecting the 
additional risk required by investors firstly, to invest in the stock market (above the 
risk free rate) and secondly for the non-diversifiable risk of a particular company 
specific risks. This can be summarised as: 
 
 Rj = Rf + BBj(Rm – Rf) 
 
Therefore if: 
Rj = expected return on stock j 
Rf = risk free interest rate 
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Rm = expected return on a well-diversified portfolio of shares (such as 
the whole stock market) 
BBj = ‘Beta factor’ or relative volatility of the return on stock j 
compared to the market average 
 
It is evident that  adjusts the market risk premium above the risk free 
rate for the risk or volatility of returns of the specific company being assessed. 
)( fmj RRB −
  
In determining a risk-adjusted rate for an investment, Hull (2008) recommends: 
 
1. Take a sample of companies whose main line of business is the same as that 
of the project being contemplated. 
2. Calculate the betas of the companies and average them to obtain a proxy beta 
for the project. 
3. Set the required rate of return equal to the risk-free rate plus the proxy beta 
times the excess returns of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate. 
 
While the CAPM has a long history, there several shortcomings relevant to the 
resource sector which are worth highlighting and hence this thesis has investigated 
alternative pricing mechanisms using probability weighted changes in company 
value. The short comings discussed here are the relevance of the risk-free rate, beta 
(alpha) relationships given the commodity price leverage of resource companies, and 
embedded option value. 
 
2.2.1.1 Risk-free Rate 
Long-term Government bond yields (say 10 year, or even longer timeframes in the 
US) are often used as a risk-free rate in the model. In the resource sector, they often 
provide the best approximation of the life span of a resource project. Reilly (1985) 
points out that historically ‘risk-free’ type rates have been volatile and as evident in 
the current economic environment, it reflects the contrasting forces of Governments 
seeking to fund their various economic stimulus packages following the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
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Under CAPM the premise is that unless an investment compensates the risk with a 
higher return, an investor will always chose the least risky return and hence a deemed 
‘risk-free’ government bond. However, to segregate out the risk-free rate may not 
always be the case as: 
• Investors may allocate a proportion of their investments to the resource sector 
under diversification strategies irrespective of expected returns. In the most 
basic case, an index fund will hold stocks in a weighting corresponding to 
their weightings in an index. The promise of investment returns to investors is 
the ‘market return’. 
• Other investors may not view risk-free rate as additive in their expected 
investment return. Rather it is likely to be viewed as an absolute minimum 
expected return to encourage investment so that it reflects an ‘all or nothing’ 
parameter. Also in the case of investing in resource companies, a multiple of 
the risk-free rate is usually a prerequisite for encouraging investment on a 
stock by stock basis. 
 
The latter point is a subtle one but as outlined in Chapter 4, it means that the risk-free 
rate can be excluded from modelling the movement in a resource share prices as it 
will be inherent in a probability weighted value change causing the share price 
movement. 
 
However, the first point could explain variation in the equity risk premium, which 
appears to have declined over time. 
 
In the US, Kaplan and Ruback (1995) estimated a mean implied market equity risk 
premium of 7.78 percent from the inversion of cash flow analysis of a sample of 
highly leveraged transactions and state that this is comparable to historic arithmetic 
average market equity risk premia derived elsewhere. Bruce et al (1986) state that 
data from the Sydney Stock Exchange indicated an average risk premium of 6.5 
percent pa to the Commonwealth bond rate was earned during the 1973-1983 period 
by this market. Officer (1992) stated that for over 100 years the equity risk premium 
has averaged approximately 8 percent in Australia although around this time there 
are indications that the premium had reduced. 
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In the author’s experience over the last 10 years and while working at three 
investment banks, market analysts have lowered their equity risk premium from 6 per 
cent in the early 1990’s to around 4 per cent in the late 1990’s for valuing Australian 
companies. A 6 per cent equity risk premium was a ‘market standard’ for many years 
and based on the work of Officer (1992), Warren et al (2000) advised equity research 
analysts at one investment bank that an equity risk premium of 4 percent was now 
appropriate with supporting research on estimating historical excess returns as well 
as the premium implied from current market pricing.  
 
The recent trends in lowering the equity risk premium has been reactionary as NPV 
valuation methods have failed to correlate with equity prices and analysts have 
struggled to justify recommendations based on fundamental valuations. Lowering the 
equity risk premium (as completely moving away from WACC discount rates) has 
been a partial solution but this thesis will argue that the issue relates to the market 
focusing on different valuation techniques at different times and NPV valuations 
become less relevant during bull markets (see Section 1.6.6). 
 
2.2.1.2 Beta and Alpha Indices 
Recalling, the β  index is a measure of the sensitivity of a particular share price 
relative to changes in the return on the market portfolio. It is estimated by using the 
co-variance of the share return with the return of the market index, standardised 
(divided) by the variance of the market return, i.e. 
 
=jβ  covariance (j,market)/variance (market) 
 
Factors expected to influence the beta of a company include: 
• The non-diversifiable (systematic) risk component of a company’s activities, 
for example, higher risk resource companies versus retailers. 
• Gearing. Theoretically, a higher geared company will have a greater beta due 
to the excess earnings over interest costs in a growing economy and 
potentially vice versa in a contracting economy. 
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• Sensitivity of the company’s revenue to the economic or business cycle with 
a higher beta often reflecting greater earnings leverage to the movement in a 
cycle. 
The beta relationship of a particular share to the market is a fundamental element of 
the CAPM as it is deemed that the beta index explains the total difference in the 
returns of a stock relative to the market, i.e. the individual risk premium of a share 
equals the market premium times β . While this ability has been called into question 
on many occasions (see Rubinstein 2006, Mehrling 2005, Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho, 2004; Vuolteenaho 2002; French 2003, Markowitz 1999, Fama and 
French 1992) it is the relationship between resource stocks and commodity prices 
that is important to this thesis. The reader will appreciate that β  will constantly 
change given periods when Australian growth doesn’t match world growth and the 
performance of individual commodity prices doesn’t match the relative performance 
of the commodity complex as a whole. Hence, this thesis would argue that a constant 
such as β  would be expected to change frequently– perhaps more frequently than 
traditionally assumed with CAPM. 
The lack of accountability for this frequency (and CAPM in general) could be 
evident in alpha (α ) - a coefficient measuring the portion of an investment's return 
arising from specific (nonmarket) risk. It is distinct from the amount of return 
caused by volatility, which is measured by β  discussed above. For example, if a 
stock has aβ  of 1.5, it would be expected to gain a maximum of 15 percent when 
the index gains 10 percent. If, however, the stock actually gains 20 percent, the 
excess return above 15 percent represents the stock's alpha 
(http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries). 
 
2.2.1.3 Embedded Option Value 
One problem with the traditional NPV approach is that many projects contain 
embedded options. In resource companies this may reflect opportunities to expand 
existing plant, the potential to discover new resources through future exploration 
programs and also participate in more favourable commodity prices in the future. 
Typical NPV corporate valuations of projects are likely to include sensitivity analysis 
around a base case or use Monte Carlo simulations to highlight this variability.   
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 In M&A activity this embedded option value is evident in the valuation range often 
provided in Independent Expert’s reports with an upside case assuming a number of 
positive factors or the occurrence of events not in the low case. However, the 
presence of operational and other parameters underpinning the low case are 
necessary to allow the embedded option value to be able to attain the high case. 
 
Before continuing the discussion on embedded or real options, this thesis briefly 
reviews traditional option theory. As noted in Chapter 1, resource companies offer 
investors earnings, cash flow and resource/reserve value leverage to volatile 
commodity prices, where movements or expectations of imminent movements in the 
underlying commodity price can lead to enhanced movements in their share prices. 
On a first assessment, this could been attributed to option value but there are a 
number of factors that suggest this is not the case and this thesis argues that share 
price movements relate to probability weighted valuation changes (see Chapter 4) 
although there is no doubt resource companies have embedded options. In the 
following discussion, the reader should contemplate whether the market is using a 
sophisticated option pricing techniques to value, for example, the additional value 
created by a potential expansion of a plant to a resource company or alternatively, 
simply the probability weighted value of this occurrence. Empirical observation 
would indicate the latter and in the author’s experience option pricing is only 
prevalent in option markets where traders are using option pricing models to derive 
expected option values.  
 
2.2.2 Traditional Option Value Theory 
Traditional options are exchange traded put and call options with the valuation of a 
call option being the initial focus of the Black-Scholes model (Black & Scholes, 
1973). The model estimates the price of a call option as a function of five variables:  
• the current spot price of the underlying share, 
• the volatility of the share price (as measured by the standard deviation of the 
share’s return distribution), 
• the exercise price of the call, 
• the term to expiration, and, 
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• the risk-free rate of interest. 
 
This review looks at key elements of the formula rather than a detailed analysis of 
individual variables and for a detailed understanding of options theory the reader is 
referred to financial texts such as Hull (2008), Peirson (1990), Felmingham and 
Coleman (1995) and Reilly (1995). 
 
The formula for the price of a call option (W) is as follows: 
 
W = PN(d1)-Ce-rTN(d2) 
 
Where: 
 
W = price of the call option 
P = current share price 
C = exercise price 
 
N(d) is a cumulative standard normal density function with upper integral limit d and 
therefore N(d1) and N(d2) are probabilities with numbers between one and zero. 
 
In continuous time e-rT is an appropriate discount factor for the period T at a rate r. 
Therefore the term Ce-rT is the present value of the exercise price (C). 
 
Therefore under these groupings it is evident that the formula simply compares the 
present value of the exercise price with the current share price and probability 
weights both in accordance with the volatility of the share price. 
 
Peirson et al (1990) summarise the assumptions incorporated in the model, which 
have also come under scrutiny with the global financial crisis, particularly with 
respect to the severely diminished liquidity occurring in rapidly falling markets. 
Nevertheless, the assumptions are: 
• There exists a constant risk-free interest rate at which investors can borrow 
and lend unlimited amounts 
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• The share price follows a random walk in continuous time with a variance 
rate proportional to the square of the share price. The variance rate is a known 
constant. 
• There are no transaction costs, taxes or other sources of friction. 
• Short selling is allowed with no restrictions or penalties. 
• There are no dividends, rights issues or other complicating features. 
• The call is of the European type (i.e. exercise only at expiration date). 
 
While there have been a number of modifications to the formula to cope with various 
factors beyond the basis assumptions, Peirson et al (1990) highlight that a key 
assumption that share prices follow a random walk over continuous time as not 
necessarily being the case in real markets. They also note that the measure of 
volatility implies that the distribution of possible share prices at the end of any given 
time period (such as at the end of the option’s life) is lognormal. Nevertheless, they 
contend that both may represent reasonable approximations to actual behaviour. 
 
Option valuation methodology based on the initial research of Black & Scholes, 
(1973) is pervasive throughout the finance industry and in many cases becomes self 
fulfilling given most participants in options trading utilise algorithms derived from 
the Black & Scholes model. However, if the returns reflected in the price of the asset 
are not in equilibrium with the risk-free return over a defined time period then it is 
difficult to assume the application of the Black-Scholes equation.  
 
This latter point and the fact that resource shares can trade well below NPV 
valuations (implying a negative option value) as well as resource share price 
movements which often directly correlate to commodity price movements (see 
Chapter 3) indicate complexities in the application of traditional option methodology 
to resource shares. A negative embedded option reflecting the cost of a company 
being forced to close an existing mine could be argued to yield a negative option 
value but empirical observation of the market participants rarely supports this 
contention. However, it is the complication of applying specific parameters of a 
commodity price return distribution to the analysis of a resource company share price 
distribution that is likely to render the application impractical and unrealistic. 
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 As noted by Hull (2008, p266), the most widely used model of stock price behaviour 
is a generalised Wiener process adapted for expected stock returns  
 
SdzuSdtdS σ+=  
Where: 
=S stock price at time t 
=u expected rate of return on the stock 
=σ volatility of the stock price 
 
A Wiener process is a particular type of Markov stochastic process and can be used 
for modelling geometric Brownian motion as well stock prices and relates future 
prices (or particle positions) as a function of standardized normal distribution and the 
square root of the time. 
 
The application of a Wiener process is likely to have a limited application in the 
tracking of resource prices except for short intervals of time or during periods where 
there are no clear commodity price trends (share price drifts as described in Chapter 
3). The correlation of resource share price movements with commodity prices is 
independent of time and reflects trends, generally evident from underlying macro-
economic factors.  Further out in time, the risk of a trend being replaced with a new 
trend increases but this is more likely to reflect macro-economic changes rather than 
a function of share price volatility and time although the volatility is expected to 
remain relatively constant during a trend period. As further discussed in Chapter 3, 
commodity prices reflect a combination of supply/demand fundamentals and 
speculative investment with both leveraged to world growth expectations and which 
are generally more discernable in the daily price movements than the application of 
broader growth projections which affect the prices of industrial companies. However 
as discussed in Chapter 4, the correlation of commodity prices and resource share 
prices is better reflected in absolute price levels on a daily basis than in a comparison 
of share price and commodity price returns, a further complicating factor and 
requiring study periods to be within a single trend period.  
 
2.2.2.1 Embedded (Real) Options 
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Returning to the earlier discussion on embedded options, Cox et al (2000) argue that 
traditional option pricing theory is relevant to almost every area of finance and 
believe that virtually all corporate securities can be interpreted as portfolios of puts 
and calls on the assets of the firm. In a rather liberal interpretation, they cite an 
example in the valuation of contracts where the outcome to each party depends on a 
quantifiable uncertain future event. In an elementary form they consider a firm with a 
single liability of a homogeneous class of pure discount bonds. The stockholders 
have a “call” on the assets of the firm which they can choose to exercise at the 
maturity date of the debt by paying its principal to the bondholders. In turn, the 
bonds can be interpreted as a portfolio containing a default-free loan with the same 
face value as the bonds and a short position in a put on the assets of the firm. 
 
Cox et al (2000) and other researchers including Dixit & Pindyck (1995) and in 
mining, Lima & Suslick (2006) and Samis (1995) have applied option methodology 
to capital investment where alternatives occur in specific time frames and where 
there is a quantified return for a fixed investment cost and usually in the form of a 
NPV. As noted by Dixit & Pindyck (1995), the options are the opportunities to invest 
capital at specific times to achieve expected outcomes in the future. 
 
Cox et al (2000) utilize their binomial option pricing model and compare real options 
and financial options in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. A comparison of financial and real options. 
FEATURE FINANCIAL OPTION REAL OPTION
Underlying asset Traded stock Project. Non-traded asset. Trackable? Perfectly? *
Underlying asset price or value Known Estimated
Exercise price Known and constant Estimated and can change over time
Time to Expiration Known and fixed Estimated and can change over time
Volatility Estimated (from observable time series) and can change over time Estimated and can change over time
Interest rate Risk-free Risk-free?
“Leakage” Dividends; interest coupons Convenience yield; Income; Market share
Optimal exercise strategy
Decision to exercise exchange-traded 
financial options does NOT affect on the 
value of the underlying asset.
Decision to exercise the option often 
affects the future values of the 
underlying asset (investment).  
From Cox et al, (2000). 
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To translate specific project parameters or characteristic to a financial option 
variable, Cox et al, (2000) also offer a comparison in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Translating project characteristics and a financial option’s variables. 
Project’s Characteristic Financial Option’s Variable
Present value of assets to be acquired or project to be 
undertaken Asset price
Costs or expenditures required to acquire the assets or 
undertake the project Exercise price
Length of time decision may be deferred Time to expiration
Volatility of underlying asset or project Volatility
Time value of money to the company Riskless interest rate
Cash flows and yields paid by the asset and not 
captured by holding the option Cash dividends
 
From Cox et al, (2000). 
 
In general, while modified option methodology can certainly be applied to capital 
investment decisions, complexity often overshadows practicality, particularly in the 
confidence in the outcome, given the number of estimated parameters and their 
ability to vary over time. As discussed earlier, traditional option valuations in 
resource companies are likely to involve translating the relevant commodity price 
return distribution characteristics to the option price valuation (generally ignored in 
the earlier research) or at least using parameters derived from a single trend period. 
 
As indicated in Bartrop and White (1995), while future project options are 
appreciated at the time of project assessment, companies usually assess a defined 
project development route and may apply probability and sensitivity analysis to 
determine the robustness of the investment case. Unquantified option values (e.g. 
expansion potential, exploration success) may support a go-ahead for a marginal 
project but it is largely management’s discretion as to how this is assessed and most 
lack the expertise and inclination to apply option methodology. 
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This mirrors empiricism in current markets where investors are more likely to invest 
on probability weighted project returns that may or may not equate to an  option 
valuation for the same investment opportunity (see Chapter 4).  
 
2.2.2.2 Real Options Framework in Takeovers 
Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) developed a real option model to analyse stock 
returns in M&A activity in which the timing and terms of takeovers are endogenous 
and result from value-maximising decisions. It emphasizes the role played by 
efficiency and capital reallocation in the timing and terms of takeovers and examines 
the impact of growth options and disinvestment opportunities on the dynamics of 
mergers and acquisitions. 
 
In broad terms, in a takeover the more inefficient firm sells its assets to a more 
efficient one and thereby puts its resources to their best use. At the completion of the 
takeover, the merged entity can either invest in new assets or divest some of the 
acquired assets. The researchers note that investment decisions are viewed as sharing 
two important characteristics. First, there is uncertainty surrounding their benefits. 
Second, the decisions are at least partially irreversible. Hence, the decision to enter a 
takeover deal, expand operations, or divest assets can be regarded as the problem of 
exercising real options. 
 
Furthermore, the one essential difference between the option to enter the takeover 
deal and the options available to the merged entity after the takeover is that the 
former involves two firms. This implies that the timing and terms of the takeover are 
the outcome of an option exercise game in which each firm determines an exercise 
strategy, while taking into account the other firm’s exercise strategy. By contrast, the 
options to expand or divest represent standard investment decisions that can be made 
in isolation. Because the takeover surplus depends on the operating options available 
to the merged entity, the derivation of value-maximising strategies in Hackbarth and 
Morellec (2008) analysis proceeds in two steps. The first step determines the exercise 
strategies for the expansion and contraction options of the merged entity. The second 
step derives the equilibrium restructuring strategies, taking the optimal expansion 
and contraction strategies as given. 
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Hackbarth and Morellec’s (2008) research and their predecessors provides an 
interesting approach to analysing the behaviour of stock returns in M&A activity 
although the complexity and the nature of assumptions (e.g. the takeover surplus may 
not reflect the operating options available to the merged entity but rather a market 
size premium)  may render the process of limited predictive value. 
 
2.2.3 Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) is a multi-factor model which offers greater breadth 
than CAPM and is further discussed in Chapter 4. Reilly (1985) states that the APT 
contends that the expected return of an asset can be modelled as a linear function of a 
number of factors which are deemed to influence share price returns. Each factor has 
a specific beta-coefficient. He notes that arbitrage pricing theory has three main 
assumptions: 
 
1. Capital markets are perfectly competitive; including the ability of 
investors to short sell shares (Peirson et al, 1990) 
2. Investors always prefer more wealth to less wealth with certainty (risk 
aversion described earlier) 
3. The stochastic process generating asset returns can be represented as a K 
factor model. 
 
The K factor model is of the form: 
 
....+++++= oilpricemanagementepsgrowthrR mii ξδγβα  
 
Where 
=iR  the return on asset i during a specified time period 
iα = a constant, specific to asset i 
=mrβ expected returns based on the sensitivity of changes in the share price to 
changes in the market. 
 
These are followed by a series of factors which are deemed to influence the share 
price, for example epsgrowthγ , where γ  quantifies changes in the share price to 
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changes in earnings per share (eps) growth such that if 6.0=γ and eps growth 
accelerates by 10 per cent, then the share price would be expected to rise by 6 per 
cent. Factors included in this equation are typically focussed on broad economic 
variables such as industrial production, oil prices, inflation and wage growth but can 
include company specific factors. 
 
The arbitrage concept applies in the sense that if the price of the asset is not in line 
with the model estimate at the end of a specific period, then arbitrage opportunities 
will bring the share price back into line with the model forecast. 
  
Peirson et al (1990) presents the theory in its simplest case where the return on a 
particular security, i, can be described by the abbreviated equation. 
 
iiii eFFR +−+= )(βα  
 
Where 
iα = a constant, specific to asset i 
iβ = a measure of the ‘sensitivity’ of returns on asset i to ‘factor’ F 
F = a risk ‘factor’ which explains returns 
F = the expected value of F 
ie  = an error term which has an expected value of zero and is specific to asset i 
 
In this case using the risk ‘factor’ as F, the equation specifies that unanticipated 
variations in F will cause returns to change. If, as ‘expected’ F = F and  = 0 then 
= 
ie
iR iα . Therefore iα  is the expected return on asset i.  Importantly, it is changes in 
F from expectations that lead to a change in expected returns. In terms of , Roll 
and Ross (1980) describe this as a noise term, i.e., an unsystematic risk component 
idiosyncratic to the i asset. It is assumed to reflect the random influence of 
information that is unrelated to other assets.  
ie
 
In financial texts, the earlier formula is traditionally presented as follows: 
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ikkiiiR βλβλβλλ ++++= ....22110  
Where 
=iR  expected return on asset i 
=0λ the expected return on an asset with zero systematic risk; can be inferred as 
risk free rate 
=jλ  the risk premium for the jth factor; j=1,….k 
=ijβ assets i’s sensitivity measure for the jth risk factor; j=1,….k 
 
Roll and Ross (1980) believe APT offers a testable alternative to CAPM while 
Peirson et al (1990) note that the CAPM equation is really a special case of a single 
factor arbitrage pricing equation, the factor being the returns on the market portfolio. 
Nevertheless, this thesis would concur that APT offers a higher degree of 
sophistication which is more likely to cope with share price behaviour than CAPM 
and its single comparison to market portfolio returns. 
 
Lastly, value-at-risk (VaR) is a category of risk metrics (c.f. risk measure which is 
the process to estimate a risk metric) that describes probabilistically the market risk 
of a trading portfolio (www.riskglossary.com). This incorporates assessing 
probability distributions for various influences on a portfolio and is akin to a 
modified version of arbitrage pricing theory. The use of VaR has increased 
dramatically and applied to a broad range of assets, for example, BHP Billiton’s 
operating cash flow at risk (McCarthy, 2006) to investment bank currency trading 
positions or derivatives. This thesis views a probabilistic approach to share 
valuations and subsequent movements in share prices as a logical explanation based 
on empiricism and analysis outlined later in this thesis. 
 
2.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis – Aspects and Phenomena 
Research on the performance of bidders and targets in mergers and acquisitions are 
discussed later in this Chapter (see Section 2.7.4) but generally fall into two 
categories (Brailsford and Knights, 1998). The first category of studies deals with an 
examination of the effects of takeovers on share prices. The standard test involves 
the application of event study methodology which estimates the risk-adjusted 
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abnormal returns on ordinary equity shares before and after the takeover event. The 
second category of studies focus on changes in reported accounting numbers 
following a takeover and profitability ratios are often analysed.  
 
Brailsford and Knights, (1998) note that the arguments for the use of share prices 
stem from an underlying assumption about market efficiency and in a competitive 
market, prices should reflect an unbiased consensus about the value of information. 
The market efficiency cited is informational efficiency and forms the basis for the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH states that asset prices in financial 
markets should reflect all available information; as a consequence, prices should 
always be consistent with ‘fundamentals’ (Beechey et al, 2000). 
 
This section reviews the broad concepts of informational efficiency as its concepts 
are applicable in the analysis of share price movements and to special circumstances 
such as post announcement drift and price bubbles which are important to aspects of 
this research. Critics of EMH cite these circumstances as reflecting aspects of 
behavioural economics or behaviour finance with some justification although the 
shortcomings of the EMH are sometimes interpreted as simply misinterpretations of 
the model itself (Beechey et al, 2000). 
 
2.3.1 Informational Efficiency 
While Copeland et al, (1996) view market efficiency as equivalent to informational 
efficiency; in essence it is the assumption of an immediate response of the market to 
incorporate all relevant and publicly available information into a company’s share 
price. The implications as outlined by Peirson et al, (1990) are that share prices ‘fully 
reflect’ all available information and hence, implies that ‘mispricing’ opportunities 
are not available to investors. Indeed, the Securities Institute of Australia (1998) 
comments that a significant task of a security analyst/portfolio manager is trying to 
forecast the events that might cause latent ‘value’ to be crystallised in a company’s 
share price (events it describes as ‘catalysts for value’) but then EMH is theoretically 
expected to incorporate a probability weighted value for these outcomes. 
 
Peirson et al (1990) comment that there are logistical constraints to the dissemination 
information in the market and not all investors will simultaneously hear the latest 
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news which may be material to a company’s share price. This can lead to the creation 
of excess returns as well as by trading market over-reaction and under-reaction 
biased price reactions to new information. Both these cases highlight that 
information impounding into share prices may not be immediate as hypothesised by 
the EMH. 
 
Fama (1970) classified informational market efficiency into three forms which 
reflect available sources of information: 
 
1. Weak form efficiency. This implies that the information contained in the 
past sequence of prices of a security is fully reflected in the current 
market price of that security; 
2. Semi-strong form efficiency. This implies that all publicly available 
information is fully reflected in a security’s current market price; 
3. Strong form efficiency. This implies that all information, whether public 
or private, is fully reflected in a security’s current market price. 
  
Weak form is consistent with the Markov property of stock pricing discussed earlier 
(Hull 2008) while each successive form is cumulative with weak form efficiency 
implicit in semi-strong efficiency and so forth. Peirson et al (1990) state that an 
implication of strong form efficiency is that an investor cannot earn abnormal returns 
from having inside information. Hence, strong-form efficiency is unlikely to be 
widespread although there is ample evidence that it is lacking in the resources sector 
where increased trading volumes occur in the days leading to a material 
announcement by a company. Nevertheless most research is directed at supporting or 
discrediting EMH at a semi-strong efficiency level. 
 
Semi-strong-form market efficiency requires that security prices adjust 
instantaneously and without bias to the public announcement of information. 
Therefore abnormal returns should not be received from a subsequent analysis of this 
information and tests of the semi-strong form of the EMH analyse whether there are 
any post-announcement abnormal returns associated with the public release of 
information (Peirson et al, 1990). These tests can be part of event studies as 
discussed later in Section 2.3.2. 
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 Beechey et al, (2000) have reviewed a considerable amount of empirical research 
devoted to testing whether financial markets are efficient under the predictions of the 
EMH. Table 7 summarises some EMH predictions and the empirical evidence 
relating to each prediction from their selective survey. 
 
Table 7. Predictions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
 
From Beechey et al, (2000) 
 
As expected, Table 7 highlights mixed levels of support. There are also other areas 
where potential post-announcement abnormal returns or beta adjustments used to 
explain share price returns are called into question. These include post-
announcement drift, price bubbles, the size effect or small-firm effect and the 
dividend-yield effect discussed in the next sections. 
 
Empirical evidence from the author’s experience supports the contention that it is 
information that is ‘not yet in the market’ that will instigate investment or divestment 
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by certain portfolio managers, particularly in North America. Therefore the 
assumption that information is factored in the market implies that all facets of that 
information are ‘factored’ into the share price immediately following the 
announcement. In fact there are observable situations when material company 
announcements that would normally affect a companies share price are released after 
market one day (particularly on a Friday) and while the share price has not moved, 
investors reading the announcement on the following day do not invest as there is an 
assumption that the new information is indeed already factored into the share price. 
The question is whether this financial behaviour creates a self-fulfilling relationship 
in line with the EMH. 
 
While there is certainly empirical evidence that supports EMH, there are many cases 
in the author’s experience where it is not supported. These fall into three categories: 
 
• The logistical time for information to disseminate across market participants 
is certainly not instantaneous and depends on a variety of factors including 
the importance of the company within the market, the attention directed to it 
by market participants, additional media used for dissemination, timing of 
announcement, etc. 
• Certain information is complex and may take hours or days to determine a 
valuation impact and the timeframe for this analysis is likely to be variable. 
• Historically many portfolio managers in Australia will invest at least one day 
after an announcement given the time required for the sector analyst to 
present the recommendation to an investment committee seeking investment 
approval. 
 
Overall, the concept of a share price rapidly moving towards a price that reflects 
additional value emerging from an announcement is not unrealistic. However, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the full value of every announcement is always 
‘impounded’ instantaneously in the share price at the time of the announcement. 
Interestingly, Roll (1986) believes his hubris hypothesis whereby management in 
bidding companies pay too much in mergers and takeovers is consistent with strong-
form market efficiency while in the Australian context and around that time, Walter 
(1984) found evidence in Australian takeovers for semi-strong efficiency. 
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 2.3.2 Event Study Methodology 
The announcement of merger and acquisition activity represents an ‘event’ and the 
subsequent reaction by the participating companies’ share prices constitutes useful 
data in analysing the market’s initial perceptions to the overall success of the 
proposed transaction.  
 
Event study methodology is designed to statistically determine whether an event has 
caused cumulative positive or negative returns relative to normal expectations for the 
company’s share price in question relative to market movements. Peirson et al (1990) 
note that there are many variants of event-study methodology but, for each ‘event’ it 
is important to establish: 
 
• What is the information? 
• When was it announced? 
• Were there abnormal returns associated with its announcement? 
 
They note that an important concept is that first, the information provides 
information only if it differs from market’s expectations at that time. Otherwise, in 
an efficient market the effects of the information will already be reflected in the 
share price before the announcement. 
  
Second, it is important to identify accurately the event date because the market may 
react in anticipation of the announcement as investors revise their expectations. The 
market should also react at the time of the announcement to any unanticipated 
information. However, the market should not continue to react after the date of the 
announcement because its response should be instantaneous and unbiased. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to calculate the response of the market to the announcement, 
for example, as the percentage change in share price in excess of (or below) what 
would normally be expected to occur. 
 
MacKinlay (1997) has reviewed event study methods and outlines the procedures 
involved. The null hypothesis in event studies is that the event has no impact on the 
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distribution of returns. He also notes that the event window often includes the day of 
the announcement and the day following the announcement although in practice it is 
often expanded to multiple days. Andrade et al (2001) note that there are two 
commonly used event windows; the three days mentioned above or alternatively a 
longer window beginning several days prior to the announcement and ending at the 
close of the merger. 
 
The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the event 
window minus the normal return of the firm over the event window. The normal 
return is defined as the expected return without conditioning on the event taking 
place. For firm i and event date t the abnormal return defined by MacKinlay (1997) 
is:  
 
)/( tititit XRERAR −=  
Where 
=itAR  Abnormal returns for time period t 
=itR  Actual returns for time period t 
)/( tit XRE = Normal returns for time period t with  is conditioning 
information for the normal return model 
tX
 
MacKinlay (1997) also notes that there are two common choices for modelling the 
normal return – the constant mean return model where  is a constant, and the 
market model where  is the market return. The constant mean return model, as the 
name implies, assumes that the mean return of a given security is constant through 
time. The market model assumes a stable linear relationship between the market 
return and the security return. 
tX
tX
 
An estimation window needs to be defined in this type of model and MacKinlay 
(1997) states that the most common choice is using the period prior to the event 
window. He cites an example that in an event study using daily data, the market 
model parameters could be estimated over the 120 days prior to the event. Generally 
the event period itself is not included in the estimation period to prevent the event 
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from influencing the normal performance model parameter estimates. Recent returns 
analysis in mergers and acquisition by Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) focused on a 
90-day estimation period prior to a three day event window (one trading day before 
and after the announcement). In a recent Australian study Maheswaran and Pinder 
(2005) used a 70-day period either side of the announcement date using a modifed 
market model with the market return based on the All Ordinaries Accumulation 
Index. 
 
This thesis tailors an event study methodology for resource companies in Chapter 5 
as part of the analysis of resource mergers and acquisitions. Many recent takeovers 
involve schemes of arrangements (see Section 2.6.2.2) which can involve a gradual 
de-risking of the transaction and abnormal returns may not be evident due to positive 
incremental returns which are not individually abnormal but correspond to increasing 
market confidence that the target shareholders will agree to the scheme and which 
culminates with the final shareholder vote.  This is exemplified in the Xstrata plc 
scheme of arrangement with MIM Holdings Limited in 2003 and which delivered 
low cumulative abnormal returns relative to the final offer price premium over the 
30-day average share price prior to the initial announcement of a potential takeover 
(see Appendix 1). 
 
As a last word in this chapter on event study methodology, MacKinlay (1997) notes 
that economic models (e.g. CAPM, APT) have been used to constrain statistically 
based normal return models. He comments that while CAPM was common in event 
studies of the 1970s, market discrepancies with the CAPM question the validity of 
the CAPM restrictions imposed on the market model and hence the results of the 
studies may reflect the influence of these restrictions. However, as this risk is 
avoided by using an unconstrained market model, the use of the CAPM based event 
studies has almost ceased. 
 
Similarly, other studies have employed multifactor normal performance models 
motivated by the APT. MacKinlay (1997) notes that a general finding with APT is 
that the most important factor behaves like a market factor and additional factors add 
relatively little explanatory power. Overall, he reports that the gains from using an 
APT adjusted model versus the market model are small and not warranted. 
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 2.3.3 Post-announcement Drift 
Semi-strong information efficiency theory postulates that at the date of an event, the 
share price should respond instantaneously and without bias. In an event study as 
described above, this behaviour would manifest itself as a sharp change in the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) immediately following the announcement. 
Thereafter, the CAR measure should display no pattern because there should be no 
further abnormal returns associated with the announcement. 
 
However, Peirson et al (1990) note that one of the first anomalies to be documented 
was the tendency of the CAR measure to ‘drift’ in the period after the announcement. 
An example of ‘post-announcement drift’ is evident in Figure 16 which plots the 
CAR returns from 4 days before an announcement and 6 days after the 
announcement for two groups, one comprising companies which announced an 
increased profit and the other comprising companies which announced a decreased 
profit. The ‘post-announcement drift’ is evident in the CAR for the ‘profit decreased’ 
group as it continues to decline after the announcement. 
 
Figure 16. Post Announcement Drift. 
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From Peirson et al (1990). 
 
Figure 16 provides an example of the outcomes of event studies. In light of the 
previous discussion, it could be argued that the event window is too narrow. This is 
in line with the expected level of analysis that is likely to accompany a negative 
earnings release and which may stimulate further divestment given potential 
implications for the health of the business. The other implication is that the level of 
efficiency in the EMH is not as uniform as defined in the hypothesis. 
 
Within mergers and acquisitions, post announcement drift over short periods of time 
has not created research problems in analysing M&A event studies. However, long-
term negative drift (three to five years) can overwhelm a positive combined stock 
price reaction at announcement, making the net wealth effect negative (Adrade et al, 
2001). Chapter 5 summarises the results of the event studies conducted in this 
research including estimating the cumulative abnormal returns in 252-day post-event 
 76
periods. It is evident in this analysis that the returns are sometimes influenced by 
other factors not stemming from the M&A activity and hence, the influence of 
extraneous factors is likely to be greater over longer time periods. 
 
2.3.4 Price Bubbles 
There is a common hypothesis that share prices (and the prices of other assets) might 
display ‘bubbles’ on rare occasions. Various definitions of a ‘bubble’ have been 
proposed but it is generally stated that the following two features constitute a bubble 
Peirson et al (1990): 
1. Prices show a strong tendency to rise for a period, possibly followed by a 
decrease which may be quite sudden. 
2. As a result of the price rise, the price departs from the true, fundamental 
value of the asset. 
Peirson et al (1990) note that while the first of these features seems to be readily 
observable in real stock markets, (for example, the crashes of October 1929 and 
October 1987), the presence of rising prices does not necessarily imply the presence 
of the second condition. 
 
In reviewing asset bubbles, Hong et el (2008) note that they tend to tend to occur 
during periods of excitement about new technologies. As an example, the authors 
cite that in the U.S., speculative episodes have coincided with the following major 
technological breakthroughs: (1) railroads, (2) electricity, (3) automobiles, (4) radio, 
(5) microelectronics, (6) personal computers, (7) biotechnology, and most recently 
(8) the Internet. Interestingly, recent movements in resources and commodities prices 
are not mentioned!  
 
Early last decade, Froot and Obsteld (1991) noted that interest in bubbles had waned 
in part because econometric tests had not produced persuasive evidence that rational 
bubbles could help explain stock prices. They proposed that some behaviour of US 
stock prices may be explained by the presence of a specific type of rational bubble 
that depends exclusively on aggregate dividends. In contrast Topol (1991) describes 
a ‘fads’ model in which any investor sets his bid and ask prices according to an 
additive learning process. On one hand, an investor adjusts his price to a value that is 
calculated from an incomplete information set. This is ‘limited’ rational behaviour. 
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On the other hand, to capture some information believed to be held by the other 
investors, he also adjusts his price to the average prices of his nearest buyers and 
sellers. This is mimetic contagion. Stock price movement is then socially transmitted. 
 
In recent times Hong et el (2008) note that the ‘Internet bubble’ stimulated new 
research which arrived at two conclusions; the first is that differences of opinion 
between investors and short sales constraints are sufficient to generate a price 
bubble; and second, once a bubble begins, it is difficult for “smart” money to 
eliminate the mispricing (i.e., there are limits of arbitrage). Their research focuses on 
the role of advisors and their communication process with investors in generating 
divergence of opinion and asset price bubbles. In particular, while smart investors 
recognize the heterogeneity in advisors, naive ones take whatever recommendations 
they receive at face value. They believe that all advisors are well-intentioned in that 
they care about the welfare of their advisees and want to honestly disclose their 
signals to investors. 
 
A contributing factor to bubbles is potentially the inexperience of fund managers as 
identified by Greenwood and Nagel (2009) during the ‘Internet bubble’ or ‘Tech 
boom’. They found that young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing 
behaviour in their technology stock investments and this was amplified by large 
inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, momentum investing can lead to ‘bubble’ situations as 
exemplified by the uranium bull market where uranium company share prices 
factored in average enterprise values per resource pound for resources which were 
unlikely to be ever brought into production (Bartrop 2007). Personal discussions with 
many retail investors at that time suggested many investors did not anticipate that the 
companies would in fact bring these projects into production within a timeframe 
capable of delivering the expected value in the share price but rather were investing 
for short term gain on the momentum generated by an increasing (and probability 
manipulated) spot uranium price. While Topol’s (1991) ‘fads’ model could apply, the 
likelihood is that investors are simply drawn to speculative greed on a momentum 
run. 
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2.4 Market Dynamics 
This section provides an empirical review of participants and market dynamics which 
is useful in applying pragmatic realism to advancing financial theory. It reviews both 
the participants as well as trading approaches and concludes with a review of returns 
analysis which was common during the Tech Boom (2000-2002).  
 
The final section reviews acquisition concepts including the Australia legal 
framework and specific research on M&A activity. 
 
2.4.1 Share Price Movements 
Share price movements on the stock market represent the combined actions of 
thousands of participants placing buying or selling orders or simply holding on to 
earlier acquired positions. These actions are driven by a variety of factors which can 
be broadly classified under three areas. These are; changes in external expectations in 
the market; natural share market demand growth; and lastly, intra-market allocation 
decisions. Influencing factors within these broad subdivisions are summarised below: 
 
1. External Expectations 
• The perceived economic outlook and its implications on the future earnings 
and cash flow of companies; e.g. economic growth, inflation, etc. 
• The perceived relative risk and returns from other asset classes, eg. real estate 
or bonds versus equities. 
• Share investment driven by investor fear of missing out in share price rallies. 
This can be stimulated from recent strong share market returns and the 
investment can sometimes involve minimal analysis. 
2. Natural Demand 
• Superannuation fund investment growth 
• Growth in personal wealth 
• Increases in the availability of debt funding for equities 
• Increases in foreign investment, for e.g. in Australian resources during 
commodity booms 
• New securities issues, for example, IPO’s, placements, rights issues. 
3. Intra-market Allocations 
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• Perceived sub-sector performance expectations. 
• Stock-specific factors including dividend distributions or bonus share issue 
entitlement ex-dates. 
• Perceived technical (charting) and other, including commodity price driven, 
identified trading opportunities. 
• New securities issues, for example, IPO’s, placements, rights issues (can 
attract intra-market and external funds). 
 
The market is forward looking and hence it is perceptions that are important at a 
specific time. The forward looking timeframe is generally observed to be in the six to 
nine months range but this is variable and may be considerably shorter in times of 
high economic and market data volatility. 
 
2.4.2 Market Participants  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the market capitalisation of the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) is approximately A$1 trillion as at April 2009. The investors in this 
market range from individual retail investors, investment funds and superannuation 
funds, foreign investors (individuals or funds), companies and principal traders with 
investment banks. 
 
Lucy (2007) comments that Australia’s funds management industry is one of the 
most sophisticated in the world, and with an investment funds pool size of US$700 
billion, it is the largest in Asia and fourth largest in the world. Australia’s per capita 
average of investment in managed funds is valued at close to A$50,000, dwarfing all 
other nations (including the United States by 20 per cent) and reflecting an increase 
of around 115 per cent over the last five years.  
 
Industry funds are anticipated (according to projections performed by Rice Warner 
Actuaries as at June 2008) to grow from a share of the total superannuation market of 
19.0 per cent to about 25.7 per cent by 2023 (K. Boag, pers comm.). The Self 
Managed Super Fund (SMSF) market is forecast to remain the largest segment at 
26.2 per cent in 2023 but will grow slightly less strongly than the industry fund 
market. Together these two segments will represent over 50 per cent by 2023 of a 
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total forecast market of $4.77 trillion in nominal dollars. The remainder is dominated 
by the traditional life company/bank owned super funds with small contributions 
from public sector and retail funds. 
 
In 2003, the ATO (2003) reported that SMSFs comprised 20 per cent of the 
superannuation industry and, at 31 December 2003, had approximately $125 billion 
in assets under management. At that time there were around 300,000 self managed 
super funds, and the number of funds was growing at a net rate of about 2,200 per 
month. The average account balance of a self managed super fund is $235,000 and 
membership generally comprised either one member (21 per cent) or two members 
(65 per cent). 
 
While recent data are unavailable on the growth of SMSFs from the ATO, the earlier 
projections forecast that they will represent around 25 per cent of funds under 
management in 2023 and have an increasing presence in the market. 
 
Both direct retail investors and investors with SMSFs are likely to have different 
investment philosophies and flexibility in comparison to traditional industry and life 
insurance/bank owned funds and this has changed the trading activity evident in 
some market segments. This is particularly the case in the junior and mid-tier parts of 
the resource sector during the recent five year resources rally and which has involved 
increased higher risk investment as well as short-term trading. 
 
2.4.3 Short-Term Trading 
Over the last 10 years, the presence of the ‘day trader’ has influenced market trading 
patterns, particularly in some small to mid-sized resources companies. A ‘day trader’ 
typically uses internet based market data which can provide real time prices and an 
executable transaction platform. More sophisticated traders can utilise software 
which is designed to quickly identify emerging favourable share price trends.  
 
Transactions are executed quickly and efficiently and can be subsequently closed out 
within minutes if desired but many are closed out by the end trading for a particular 
day to avoid the risk of adverse NYSE movements overnight. Hence the important 
aspect of the ‘day trader’ is that he can capitalise on small profits quickly if there is a 
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belief that a stock price will move up (shorting is uncommon). An example of the 
influence of substantial ‘day trading’ is evident with the reporting of encouraging 
drill intersections by De Grey Mining Ltd on the 6th December 2003 (De Grey 
Mining, 2003). The encouraging drilling intersections were part of an exploration 
program investigating an early stage project which required further drilling to 
determine whether there was any potential for economic levels of mineralisation 
present. The total turnover on the day of the announcement and the subsequent two 
days totalled approximately 75 million shares. This contrasts with a total 59 million 
shares listed on the ASX by the company. Evidence of share price churning by 
traders is the fact that around 59 million shares were traded during a period when the 
share price increased by around 125 per cent and it is estimated that in most trades 
profits were sought in the 10 per cent to 50 per cent range.  
 
In a recent sample, Bartrop (2009a) noted that strong promotion of its Carnarvon 
Basis offshore Artemis Project by MEO Australia (ASX Code: MEO) had led to a 
strong increase in the share price and turnover of MEO rising from less than 10 cents 
to over 50 cents on daily volumes of several million share and up to in excess of 40 
million shares on a number of occasions. The market capitalization of MEO provided 
a ‘see through’ valuation of the Artemis project, which could be applied to its joint 
venture partner, Cue Energy (ASX Code: CUE). However, this valuation suggested 
that Cue’s other assets had a market valuation close to zero but in reality represented 
valuable producing interests in Oyong oil, Maari oil, the Oyong and Wortel gas 
projects and the company’s PNG interests. Cue Energy had not been actively 
promoting its Artemis project interest given its focus on its more advanced projects. 
 
Tate (2001) outlines the impact that traders can have on share price movements 
which include: 
• Trends are the cornerstone of trading and it is impossible to trade against the 
trend.  
• A controllable risk is the ‘time in the market’ which should be minimised. 
 
The ‘day trader’ has heightened volatility when there is positive news flow and the 
stock exhibits signs of a momentum run. In many cases there is a ‘pull back’ in the 
share price at the end of the day as a number of positions may be closed out. The 
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outcome can be a greater dissociation of a share price from the fundamental value of 
the company and reducing other investor confidence in the robustness of this 
fundamental value. 
 
2.4.4 Charting or Technical Analysis 
Benninga (2008) divides security analysts (and investors) into ‘fundamentalists’’ and 
‘technicians.’ Fundamentalists believe that the value of a stock is ultimately 
determined by underlying economic performance and financial issues are discussed 
in Section 2.5. Technicians, in contrast, assume stock prices are determined by 
patterns and believe that, by examining the pattern of past prices of a stock, they can 
predict future prices or trends. 
 
Interestingly, the concept of charting appears to undermine the presence of weak 
form efficiency in the market (see Section 2.3.1) as noted by Benninga (2008). 
 
The author contends that technical charting does have merits where there is potential 
for an underlying behavioural psychology in the share price movements. A readily 
observable case is when after extensive trading at a certain price level, a share price 
then falls. If the share price slowly increases again, it may meet a resistance at this 
original price level as earlier investors may decide that they can now ‘get their 
money back’. This ‘resistance level’ may require significant trading turnover to 
remove the initial investors and replace them with new investors which expect the 
stock to move higher and hence will maintain their investment for a further period of 
time. 
 
However, rather than refuting weak form efficiency, this example perhaps highlights 
the difficulties in applying ‘blanket theories’ across a complex market. 
 
2.4.5 The Interaction of Trading and Investment on Share Prices 
The trading pattern of a particular stock is influenced by the company’s marginal 
investor, which may vary in changing circumstances. While in Section 2.3.1, this 
thesis outlined a number of factors influencing investment decisions, the composition 
of the investor base can influence share trading patterns. In particular the presence of 
institutional investors can provide underpinning support at low share prices relative 
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to fundamental valuations but also may provide a cap in over priced scenarios. For 
example, a company’s share register may comprise 50 per cent institutional 
investors, 30 per cent long-term retail investors and 20 per cent active traders. If the 
stock price is volatile, active traders may trade the stock within say a 20 per cent 
price range based on positive or negative news flow. If the price becomes too low, 
say at greater than a 20 per cent discount to its fundamental value, then institutional 
investors may start purchasing shares. Conversely, if the shares are deemed to 
become overpriced, perhaps through the efforts of ‘day traders’, then institutional 
funds may provide a cap to further price increases through large volume sales. 
 
In comparison a junior resource company may have a shareholder base that only 
comprises traders and longer-term retail investors. In this case, the cap to any share 
price rally may be from the stalling of momentum runs as dictated by investment 
volumes and the increasing nervousness of short-term traders already holding the 
stock. The stalling may emerge from a diminishing number of new buyers and/or a 
material and easily observable departure from fundamental value. In relation to new 
company announcements, the number of potentially new buyers is a function of the 
effectiveness of the dissemination of this information as outlined below in Section 
2.3.6. 
 
On negative market news, the downside is a lack of fundamental value to investors 
which may lead to very low support levels for junior resource companies as investors 
may simply ‘move on’ and sell the stock almost irrespective of the price to realise 
cash for other investments. Hence, there is an expectation of greater volatility in the 
share price of smaller companies simply from the aspirations of the investor base. 
 
2.4.6 Algorithm Trading 
Kakade et al, (2004) note that in share trading it has been the relatively recent 
visibility of limit orders waiting for possible execution (i.e. market depth) that has 
opened the way to trading algorithms (algo) of all varieties that attempt to exploit the 
market microstructure. 
 
Computer trading using algorithms has been pervasive through the Australian market 
with most major investment banks having a set of ‘algo’ black boxes. Typical 
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computer trades involve VWAP (volume weighted average price) or OWT (one way 
trading) and may involve less liquid stocks or position building or selling where a 
number of orders need to be placed in the market over a period of time.  
 
In the case of the US, The Economist (2009a) reports that the average algo 
transaction size on leading stock exchanges has fallen from about 2,000 shares in the 
mid-1990s to fewer than 400 although the overall trading volume has soared.  
 
According to Wikipedia (1999), algorithmic trading may be used in any investment 
strategy, including market making, inter-market spreading, arbitrage, or pure 
speculation (including trend following). The investment decision and implementation 
may be augmented at any stage with algorithmic support or may operate completely 
automatically ("on auto-pilot"). It reports that a third of all EU and US stock trades in 
2006 were driven by automatic programs, or algorithms, according to Boston-based 
consulting firm Aite Group LLC. As of 2009, high frequency trading firms account 
for 73 per cent of all US equity trading volume. 
  
In 2006 at the London Stock Exchange, over 40 per cent of all orders were entered 
by algo traders, with 60 per cent predicted for 2007. American markets and equity 
markets generally have a higher proportion of algo trades than other markets, and 
estimates for 2008 range as high as an 80 per cent proportion in some markets. 
 
According to Schmerken (2009) the overall proportion of U.S. equity trading 
executed electronically increased to 36 per cent in FY2009 from 32 per cent in 
FY2008 on a volume basis. The increase follows a period in which algo trading 
strategies performed poorly in the lead up to the Global Financial Crisis with algos 
lacking a pattern of historic data that could accommodate the unprecedented levels of 
volatility experienced in late 2008. However, Schmerken (2009) notes that many 
algorithms have now been redesigned to take the new data patterns into account, and 
this has attracted the increased volumes in 2009. 
 
Algo trading is becoming an important aspect of mid-tier Australian resources 
companies, particularly where there is relatively low liquidity and executing may 
take several days or longer to fill substantial orders. It is generally the domain of 
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institutional orders, and therefore investments will be those that meet institutional 
criteria (minimum size, liquidity, minimum earnings and cash flow levels, etc.). The 
author believes that as a generalization, algo trading is likely to reinforce share price 
trends reflecting steadily increasing or decreasing share price movements. 
 
2.4.7 Share Price Impact from New Announcements 
Over the medium-term, shares are ‘expected’ to trade around their long-term 
fundamental value. However, individual share price movements can be related to 
underlying change in perceptions of the value of the company and often occur in 
‘steps’. Section 2.3.2 briefly reviewed event methodology while Section 2.3.3 
described post-announcement drift. This section discusses an empirical view of 
material share price announcements, particularly in relation to junior and mid-tier 
resources companies.  
 
In a material company announcement to the ASX, the factors affecting the 
subsequent share price movement include: 
 
1. the materiality of the potential difference in perceived news value versus the 
current share price, 
2. the conviction of market participants in the reliability of the news value, 
3. the market awareness of the presence of the announcement, 
4. the investability of the stock relative to its liquidity, and 
5. the state of the market at that particular time. 
 
In the first instance, the materiality is important in relation to relative upside in the 
share price and the risk involved with an investment. In this instance, a junior 
resources company may not attract increased investment unless say, drilling results 
substantially upgrade a project from its earlier status. Similarly, a small regional 
exploration success is unlikely to be material to a mid-tier company with operating 
assets. 
 
In the author’s experience, the conviction of the revaluation basis and overall market 
awareness are two key factors influencing potential movements in share prices and 
can be quite variable across the market for similar announcements from similarly 
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sized companies. A conviction factor often relates to prior market knowledge of the 
project and ability to recognise the significance of the new data while market 
awareness is the ability for a significant number of investors to be aware of the 
announcement. Both directly relate to the publicity conducted by the company and its 
promotional efforts as well as the profile of management. Frequent market 
announcements, presentations to and discussions with the investor/shareholder base 
as well as the financial community are extremely important as well as potential 
analyst and investor site visits. Market awareness and conviction also relate to the 
presence of a supporting broker and the breadth of the broker’s client base. 
 
A key factor affecting a company’s share price performance is the size of the pool of 
investment funds that can be directed towards investing in a particular company 
relative to the liquidity of that company. The former reflects its investability and as 
discussed earlier, often reflects size and operational attributes of the company. The 
liquidity can reflect both the size of the free float of a company as well as the degree 
of ‘tightness’ of the share holdings. A high proportion of shares owned by directors, 
management and friends can lead to higher share prices per given announcement due 
to an inability to execute orders without pushing up the share price although this can 
‘backfire’ where share price ‘jumps’ are too great and investors lack a comfortable 
level of liquidity. Company management setting future value propositions to the 
market that well exceed the current share price will also decrease liquidity with 
shareholders keen to ‘hang-on’ for longer term upside.  
 
The final factor is the state of the market at the time of the announcement as a strong 
bull market will illicit a greater share price appreciation than a falling market for a 
similar positive announcement. 
 
Hence, an equation to describe the potential share price movement by a company 
after a material announcement is: 
 
MSLIACfchangeS iinni )....(*Ρ=Δ  
Where: 
=Δ iS  Actual share price change of stock i 
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=Ρchange  Potential share price change reflecting the materiality of the news in an 
average market 
=nC  A measure of the confidence in the news 
=nA  A measure of the market pervasiveness of the news 
=iI The quantity of investment funds capable of being directed to stock i 
=iL A measure of the free float and shareholder ‘tightness’ or liquidity of stock i 
=MS A broad market factor depicting recent market sentiment, e.g. is the 
announcement in a rising or falling resource market? 
 
While the parameters are difficult and subjective to estimate, it nevertheless 
highlights that there are potentially five factors (or more) that influence how a 
company announcement is received by the market and the influence it may have on 
the company’s share price. Two of these factors relate to the company’s marketing 
campaigns and ability to disseminate information, two relate to stock specific 
attributes and the final reflects how the market is performing at the time of the 
announcement.  
 
Hence, the analysis of the share price reaction to news announcements, particularly 
in the mid tier and junior sector, is not solely dependent on the materiality of the 
news. This is an issue confronting the overall share price performance of some 
resource companies and research such as event analyses. 
 
2.5 Discussion of Financial Valuation Methods 
The influence of market participants in the setting of resource company share prices 
depends on a combination of the investment capability of ‘buy-side’ investors, the 
breadth of the ‘sell-side’ influence of the promoters and key brokers, and stock 
specific issues including the degree of ‘compellingness’ of the investment proposal 
and well as other issues alluded to in the previous section. However the attraction of 
the resource sector has varied over time and when the resource sector has moved out 
of favour, different valuation techniques generally emerge which present the sector 
in a poor light.  
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This section briefly discusses variations of returns analysis which underpins a 
significant proportion of the M&A activity following the Tech Boom (2000-2002) 
and which was designed to consolidate the industry to increase returns (through 
greater control of commodity supply) and to provide fewer but more attractive 
investments for global funds. The first part discusses the recent introduction of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IRFS) in Australia which change the 
accounting for goodwill in M&A activity. 
 
2.5.1 International Financial Reporting Standards 
The impact of the historical variation in accounting standards is evident with Choi 
and Lee’s (1991) examination of the effects on the market for takeovers and mergers 
with reference to whether national differences in the treatment of purchased goodwill 
are associated with differences in premia offered by U.K. as opposed to U.S. 
acquirers of U.S. targets. They found that merger premia associated with U.K. 
acquisitions to be consistently higher than those for U.S. acquisitions. Moreover, 
higher premia offered by U.K. acquirers appear to be associated with not having to 
amortize goodwill to earnings and this was demonstrated to affect managerial 
behavior. This is in line with the U.S. research by Robinson and Shane (1990) that 
presented qualified results of an association between acquisition accounting method 
and bid premia for target firms. In particular, the researchers found bidders were 
willing to pay for the benefits derived from the accounting method of pooling in 
comparison to the purchase method which generally led to goodwill amortisation and 
reduced future earnings. 
 
Australia adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005 
(AASB, 2004) and financial statements became comparable across many countries 
leading to increasing investment confidence by North American and European 
investors. Global companies such as BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto could now produce 
a single set of accounts rather than presenting a series of accounts compliant with 
various standards, e.g. US GAAP. 
 
With respect to M&A activity, the adoption of IFRS led to significant changes in the 
accounting for goodwill. Prior to the adoption of IFRS, Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) standard (AASB 1013 Accounting for Goodwill) required 
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goodwill on acquisitions to be recorded as an asset and amortised on a straight-line 
basis over a period not exceeding 20 years (c.f. early UK standards). Under IFRS 
(AASB 3 Business Combinations), goodwill with an indefinite life is not written off. 
However, companies must undertake annual impairment tests of the value of this 
goodwill. Like the annual impairment test for other assets, the recoverable amount is 
the higher of either the fair value less cost to sell; or value in use (i.e. the present 
value of future cash flows including disposal value).  
 
Bugeja and Gallery, (2006) report that the change to Australian and international 
goodwill accounting follows in the footsteps of changes made by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board to US standards. However, the UK Financial Reporting 
Standard 10 Goodwill and Intangible Assets continues to require amortization of 
purchased goodwill, with a maximum amortization period of 20 years. The useful 
life may be determined as greater than 20 years if it is expected that the durability of 
the acquired business will exceed 20 years and the value of goodwill can be regularly 
measured. This has a bearing on resource acquisitions by U.K. domiciled companies 
with Australian and other non-U.K. targets.  
 
Ernst & Young (2009) conducted an international study of over 700 transactions 
completed by IFRS compliant companies in Europe, Americas and Asia. Figure 17 
summarizes the allocation of the acquisition price to net tangible assets, identifiable 
intangible assets and goodwill in 13 different sectors. Apart from the oil and gas 
sector, resource companies are excluded from the survey. However the survey does 
provide an interesting and not surprising comparison with higher goodwill 
allocations in technology and consumer products while oil and gas companies had 
the lowest goodwill allocation percentages across the reviewed sectors. 
 
Figure 17. The allocation proportion of goodwill, intangible and tangible assets in 
acquisitions across various sectors. 
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From Ernst & Young (2009). 
 
In times of significantly decreasing commodity prices as recently experienced with 
the global financial crisis, annual impairments tests in resource companies are 
resulting in numerous impairment charges as evident in many resource company 
financial statements (e.g. BHP Billiton 2009, Rio Tinto 2009). 
 
Prior to the adoption of the IFRS, goodwill amortisation was a significant 
consideration in M&A activity because of the impact of amortisation charges on 
earnings. To compensate for amortisation and other non-operating aspects of 
earnings, analysts often estimated ‘adjusted earnings’. This process is designed to 
standardise reported net operating profit after tax and include adjustments to (Oliver 
1998): 
 
• Abnormal gains/losses net of tax 
• Foreign exchange gains/losses net of tax 
• Gains/losses from asset sales net of tax 
• Excess or inadequate depreciation 
• Amortisation of intangibles 
• Tax effect adjustments 
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• Adjustments for different reporting periods (eg. Adjust 31st December year 
end reporting years to years ending 30th June) 
 
Interestingly, Bugeja and Gallery, (2006) actually found that after studying goodwill 
of different ‘ages’, firm value is positively associated with goodwill purchased in the 
observation year and in each of the preceding two years, but not with goodwill 
acquired more than two years previously. They believe their findings suggest that 
only recently acquired goodwill is associated with the market value of equity, which 
indicates that the market rationally perceives ‘older’ goodwill as not having future 
economic benefits.  
 
Under the current IFRS regime the market appears to have increasing confidence in 
asset values reported each year and company management usually ‘flag’ material 
impairments prior to results reporting. Hence, the market focuses on ‘underlying 
earnings’ to reflect the operating performance of the company and ignore significant 
items unless they reflect unexpected and material asset write downs. Resource 
companies also typically provide earnings sensitivities to movements in commodity 
prices and exchange rates. This highlights a company’s earnings leverage to 
particular commodities and exchange rates as well as providing analysts and 
investors with a method of estimating short-term earnings based on these commodity 
price and exchange rate trends or expectations. This contrasts with the alternative of 
developing complicated company models to forecast earnings. 
 
Prior to the implementation of IFRS, it is interesting to note the potential impact of 
increasing globalization of markets as Land and Lang’s (2002) research led them to 
conclude that average earnings/price ratios (also known as earnings yield) across the 
countries analyzed in their paper (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
U.K., and the U.S.) had moved closer together from the 1987–1992 time period to 
the 1994–1999 time period. 
 
The inverse of the earnings yield is the price/earning (P/E) ratio and is the most 
ubiquitous ratio used in share price analysis. This thesis highlights the importance of 
the prospective earnings timeframe with regards to P/E ratios as these can be 
segregated into short-term earnings expectations (one year or less) and medium and 
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long-term P/E ratios which are deemed to reflect more sustainable earnings levels 
and are often capitalised to proxy for NPV valuations by overseas investors. 
 
In bull markets there is a tendency for the market to focus on increases in short term 
earnings and hence, short-term P/E ratios on the back of increases in contemporary 
commodity price and often irrespective of the perceived sustainability of these 
commodity prices. In less bullish markets, sustainable P/E ratios based on medium 
and longer term forecast earnings levels become more important in a similar manner 
to NPV valuations (particularly given their potential similarity). An old axiom in the 
resource sector was to Buy the sector at high P/E ratios and then Sell at low P/E ratios 
with earnings increases from rising commodity prices. However, it also highlights 
the expectations of contracting short-term P/E ratios.  
 
2.5.2 Returns Analysis  
Historically, that analysis of the return on equity was often applied to the analysis of 
industrial stocks by market analysts but with only fleeting application to resource 
companies based on the author’s experience. However, returns analysis in resource 
companies started to attract wider attention in the latter part of the 1990’s. During 
this time resource companies including BHP, Rio Tinto, WMC and Alcoa inter alia 
started highlighting their own return rates to provide data for the market to assess 
their managements’ performance. It was also a time that investment in the resource 
sector generally provided poor investment returns, particularly with mid-cap and 
junior companies which reported weak earnings due to low commodity prices. This 
resulted in many portfolio managers excluding these companies from their portfolios 
which then used higher investment weightings in BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and 
Woodside Petroleum to cover their resource exposure. Prior to this time, the 
Australian market generally provided greater support to the resources sector due to a 
number of factors including: 
 
• Less polarisation of the sector with a greater spread of mid-tier companies 
• A higher sector weighting in the overall market 
• The greater emphasis of specific commodity exposure 
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The latter point highlights the overall trend of the resource sector. During the 1970s, 
1980’s and the early part of the 1990’s commodities prices tended to be more 
independent of one another and reflected specific supply-demand fundamentals. 
With a greater number of mid tier companies, investors selected investments to meet 
their expectations with specific commodities, for example; 
 
• If the zinc price was expected to increase, they might invest in Pasminco Ltd. 
• If the copper price was expected to increase, they might invest in MIM Ltd. 
• If the iron ore price was expected to increase, they might invest in Norths 
Ltd. 
 
This assumption is now questioned in Chapter Three as a consequence of increasing 
investment in commodities by funds as well as the prevalent M&A activity over the 
last decade. 
 
Returns analysis primarily focuses on a company’s return on equity (ROE) and 
return on invested capital (ROIC) with the following key return measures: 
 
• Returns on Equity (NPAT/shareholders equity) 
• Returns on Invested Capital (NOPAT/Invested Capital)  
• Returns on Net Assets, Non-current or Total Assets (EBIT or EBITDA/Net, 
Non-Current or Total Assets) 
 
These return measures are based on profit and loss accounts with balance sheet data 
reflecting historical costs (ignoring writeoffs or revaluations) to view the business as 
an investment case in potentially flat commodity prices. As discussed earlier, 
resource companies can represent special case situations given the book value of 
mineral resources are unlikely to bear a relationship to their actual value in terms of 
their project NPVs. Indeed annual impairment tests often use NPV valuations to test 
the resilience of the book values of these assets.  
 
There have been many cases where mineral development projects as well as 
operating assets have failed to meet expected returns, or for that matter, the 
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company’s cost of capital. This can reflect periods of weak commodity prices but 
also unexpected technical issues that erode expected margins - a prime example 
being the Western Australian nickel laterite projects in the 1990s. As a consequence, 
the resource sector has frequently experienced significant writeoffs, for example, 
BHP Billiton’s FY2009 pre-tax US$3.6 billion writeoff of its Ravensthorpe nickel 
project (BHP Billiton, 2009) while unsuccessful exploration projects are constantly 
written off across the sector. The larger writeoffs are often ‘flagged’ to the market on 
a number of occasions and prior to the reporting of the results, therefore making it 
difficult to determine negative anomalous share price returns as a consequence of the 
writedown. Empirical evidence indicates that the market is focussed on earnings 
differences to expectations and management’s future business outlook and other 
items only if they are materially different from expectations. Returns analysis strictly 
requires the inclusion of past writeoffs in the total asset base (excluding normal 
depreciation charges), but the fact that resource companies may be forced to impair 
asset due to unexpected low commodity prices (for e.g. leading to a writedown in 
reserves and a consequence shortening of project life) are deemed to be outside the 
control of the company. However in times of strong commodity prices, the 
revaluation of asset bases is unusual (and restricted) and hence a long life company 
will experience a reduced asset base (and hence higher returns on the written down 
assets) over several commodity price cycles if new investment is ignored. 
 
Returns analysis has a special application in larger companies in determining key 
performance trends and contributions from individual business segments. Brailsford 
and Knights (1998) use a cash margin calculated as cash flow from operations 
divided by revenue but more typical calculations use earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) divided by sales revenue. Margins and asset turnover as outlined below can 
be plotted over time to provide segment trends. 
• Asset turnover (sales revenue/total assets) 
• Margin (EBIT/sales revenue) 
 
These variables have been plotted for WMC Limited in 2001 (Bartrop and Smith 
2001) in Figure 18 prior to its demerger and at a time returns analysis was in vogue 
for a resource sector competing for investor attention. 
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Figure 18. WMC Limited’s Divisional Returns Analysis. 
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From Bartrop and Smith, (2001). 
 
Each circle represents a WMC division and contains a cluster of points, each point 
representing a particular year from 1998 to 2005 (1998 – 2000 were actual and 2001 
to 2005 forecast). 
 
Lines indicating similar returns (iso-rets) based on EBIT/Total assets are plotted and 
demonstrate similar returns can be achieved at high margins with low asset turnover 
or at a high asset turnover with low margins. At the time of the analysis, the 
company’s best performing business was its joint venture in AWAC (Alcoa 
Worldwide Alumina Company) which incorporates higher margins with strong asset 
turnover. The newly formed Fertiliser division was one of the company’s poorer 
performing divisions, with weak margins and weak asset turnover. In fact this low 
asset turnover is also typical for the Copper-Uranium division and highlights the 
vulnerability of returns with high capital expenditure and volatile commodity prices. 
However, it is evident that the new divisions have not experienced the asset 
writedowns over a number of commodity price cycles as the alumina division.  
 
An advantage with long life assets is the ability for management over time and 
through normal depreciation to reduce the asset book values to levels where they 
generate sustainable returns (depreciation more or less matches sustainable capital) 
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and this return will be reflected in the share price of the company. Copeland et al 
(1996) believe that most companies across business cycles on average achieve a 
return on invested capital which is approximately equal to their cost of capital – 
perhaps a self fulfilling prophecy in the resource sector! 
 
2.5.3 Economic Value Add (EVA) 
During the late 1990’s, the financial industry embarked on measuring the Economic 
Value Add (EVA) of a company as outlined by Stewart (1990). EVA is calculated by 
taking the difference between a company’s rate of return on capital (r) and its cost of 
capital (c*) and then multiplying by the economic book value of the capital 
committed to the business: 
 
EVA = (rate of return – cost of capital) * capital 
Or 
EVA = (r-c*) * capital 
 
With Stewart’s (1990) focus on cash, he seeks to convert accounting entries to cash 
inflows and outflows including: 
• Converting accrual accounting to cash accounting (by adding accounting 
reserves that are formed by recurring, non-cash bookkeeping provisions such 
as deferred tax reserve) 
• Converting the liquidating perspective of lenders to the going-concern 
perspective of shareholders (as by capitalising R&D outlays and market-
building expenditures) 
• Converting from successful-efforts to full-cost accounting (as by adding back 
cumulative unusual losses, less gains, after taxes) 
The return is then calculated using:  
 
R = NOPAT/capital 
 
Where: 
NOPAT = net operating profit after tax and excludes financing charges 
Capital = equity and debt. 
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Stewart (1990) highlights a number of ‘corrections’ to accounting variables to bring 
them more in line with cash variables and the reader is referred to his work for 
greater detail. Within the finance industry in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s there 
was a trend to incorporate EVA analysis although it was termed Economic Profit. 
Using the WMC Limited example before Figure 19 outlines the economic profit 
contribution (NOPAT return on Invested Capital) for each WMC division and the 
Group’s total economic profit.  
 
Figure 19. Economic Profit Analysis of WMC Limited. 
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From Bartrop and Smith (2001). 
 
Each bar style represents a business segment of the company. Economic profit is 
defined as the NOPAT/Invested capital of each segment less WMC’s WACC 
multiplied by the invested capital of the division. Group Economic Profit is the sum 
of the divisions’ economic profits (1998 – 2000 were factual and 2001 to 2005 
forecast). 
 
The analysis again identifies poorly performing segments and the overall 
contributions to WMC’s total economic profit. EVA analysis has often been used to 
help management determine the importance of its various assets and therefore 
whether divestment of underperforming assets is warranted to improve group 
economic profit. From the stock market perspective, it is not necessarily the size of 
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the group economic profit but significant changes in the group economic profit that 
may occur from time to time, which are interpreted to correspond to major share 
price movements (positive or negative). However, it is difficult to differentiate this 
effect from fundamental changes in the more widely tracked earnings levels. 
 
2.5.4 Price to Book Value or Market Capitalisation to Book Ratios 
Price to book ratios or more commonly market capitalisation (ME) to book equity 
(BE) ratios (ME/BE or M/B or the inverse, BE/ME) were briefly discussed at the 
start of this chapter (Section 2.2) and are common factors used in the M&A analysis 
around the world, (for e.g. see Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2002, Andrade et al 2001, Fama and French 1995) and hence needs to be 
addressed more thoroughly in this thesis. Typical North American mergers and 
acquisition analysis can involve several thousand individual transactions (e.g. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson 2008, Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). It is also known 
as Tobin's q ratio although this is theoretically calculated by dividing the market 
value of a company by the replacement value of the book equity. 
 
Fama and French (1995) hypothesised that low BE/ME (a high stock price relative to 
book value) is typical of firms with high average returns on capital (growth stocks), 
whereas high BE/ME is typical of firms that are relatively distressed. 
 
In applying ME/BE or q ratios to resource companies there are a number of problems 
as partly highlighted in Section 2.2. These include: 
• There is a smaller amount of M&A activity relative to other international 
markets and hence, difficulties in establishing statistically meaningful 
relationships, 
• The discrepancy between ME/BE values relative to replacement values or the 
NPVs of a company’s operations. In Section 2.2 the q NPV ratio was outlined 
as a better measure. 
• The extent of resource company writeoffs can be significant and hence a 
ME/BE ratio on current book values can be attributed to a combination of 
past writeoffs and market premium with the extent of the contribution of 
either requiring a careful analysis. 
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• As with other companies, adjustments are also required for new development 
capital on projects where the book value has increased but earnings have yet 
to be earned. 
• The replication of past returns on new resource projects can be difficult given 
the variability of resource projects and unseen challenges emerging during 
development, commissioning and operating stages.  
 
However, in combining returns analysis with market value, Lowell et al (1998) 
plotted a company’s size as measured by its book equity against its market 
capitalisation to book value ratio. In plotting this data they developed a ‘Strategic 
Control Map’ (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20. Strategic Control Map. 
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From Lowell et al (1998). 
 
Lowell et al (1998) states that a company can be classified into four categories: 
1. Vulnerable. Companies in the lower left-hand quadrant are using a fairly 
small amount of financial capital to generate relatively low returns. Such 
firms frequently compete with mature businesses and focus largely on 
domestic markets. Their poor performance leaves them vulnerable: they may 
be acquired by competitors than can generate higher returns from the same 
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asset base, or they may simply become irrelevant in the global economy. 
Lowell et al (1998) state that they face a stark choice: dramatically 
improving the performance of their existing businesses or divesting them and 
reinvesting the capital in more attractive alternatives. 
2. Complete control. At the opposite extreme, companies in the upper right 
quadrant are generating high returns from a large capital base, and can 
therefore exercise complete control over their destinies. Such companies 
typically compete globally in industries that require distinctive skills. Their 
high multiples enable them to acquire competitors, and protect them from 
becoming acquisition targets themselves. The challenge they face is to 
maintain their stronghold against the onslaught of new competitors while 
simultaneously capturing new high return opportunities. 
3. Partial control through performance. Companies in the upper left-hand 
quadrant extract high returns from a relatively small amount of invested 
capital. They typically compete in very narrow, high-value added segments 
of an industry, where they exploit proprietary knowledge or skills. Because 
few competitors could do more with these financial assets, such companies 
have at least temporary control though performance. The challenge they face 
is to continue finding new products of geographic markets or segments in 
which to leverage their distinctive capabilities. If they fail, they will be 
acquired by others capable of taking their nationally based but world-class 
skills out into global markets 
4. Partial control through size. Companies in the lower right-hand quadrant 
possess scale but produce relatively low returns on capital. Notwithstanding 
their mediocre performance, their sheer size makes them globally relevant 
and more difficult to acquire; they have partial control through size. Such 
companies are likely to be seasoned participants in asset-intensive sectors, 
and they often expand by replicating their business in several geographic or 
product markets. The challenge they face is to improve their performance by 
divesting assets that produce lower returns and using the proceeds to capture 
opportunities with better prospects. Should they fail, industry leaders may 
well acquire them as consolidation candidates. 
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In essence, Lowell et al (1998) caution management that underperformance places 
their companies at risk of takeover unless they are either too big or too expensive (as 
measured by price to book value) to acquire. The ‘Strategic Control Map’ draws on 
Tobin’s q ratio analysis where the inference is that higher market rated stocks 
takeover lower market rated stocks in order to capture the inefficiencies in asset 
utilisation which are reflected in the lower market rating. 
 
Given the discrepancies in book value versus project value in resource companies, a 
more relevant ‘Strategic Control Map’ would involve charting the share price to 
NPV as a measure of market to book ratio (e.g. q NPV ratio) versus overall market 
capitalisation as a size measure. 
 
2.6 Acquisition Concepts 
Acquisitions are implemented to create value to the acquirer. In line with a North 
American approach to industrial companies, Bower (2001) notes that acquisitions 
occur for five reasons: 
 
1) To deal with overcapacity through consolidation in mature industries; 
2) To roll-up competitors in geographically fragmented industries; 
3) To extend into new products or markets; 
4) As a substitute for R&D; and 
5) To exploit eroding industry boundaries by inventing an industry. 
 
With regards to relevance within the resource sector, this thesis would substitute the 
above points with the following: 
 
1) To purchase assets cheaply relative to benchmark or fundamental valuations, 
which are likely to be re-rated in the future; 
2) The creation of synergies through the acquirer’s new asset mix and/or the 
application of different management skills; 
3) Removal of a competitor and consolidation for the purposes of supporting 
future commodity price revenue; 
4) As alternative to exploration as a growth option; and 
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5) To attract a market re-rating, e.g. through an increase in company size and/or 
increased diversity of assets. 
 
In the Australian resource sector, as discussed in Chapter 7, Numbers 1 and 4 are the 
most common underlying reason for a transaction while Number 4 typically is a 
reason behind many foreign takeovers of Australian companies. Number 2 occur on 
selected occasions in circumstances generally involving nearby assets. However, 
Number 3 has become more prevalent over the last decade as larger companies seek 
greater price commodity price control in comparison to the traditional view that 
resource companies were ‘price takers’. Number 3 can also be broadened out to 
removing competing investment opportunities. 
 
It is evident that most transactions involve a primary justification but will include 
secondary justifications as part of an overall ‘package’ of expected benefits. 
 
Acquisitions of listed companies generally involve the payment of a premium above 
the prevailing target’s share price to entice target shareholders to accept the offer. 
While a takeover (particularly a hostile one) is likely to involve a premium, mergers 
may not and a ‘merger of equals’ is a common phrase in both management’s 
parlance to justify a lack of a premium. 
 
The offer may comprise cash or acquirer scrip or a combination thereof and may also 
include additional ‘one off’ value in the form of special dividends, etc. The premia 
for cash offers are generally lower than scrip offers given the attractiveness of cash 
although in some cases institutional shareholders may prefer scrip (e.g. some 
investors in the 2000 Rio Tinto bid for Comalco) where the market strength of the 
acquiring company is significant. 
 
Traditional merger and acquisitions research notes that the acquisition of a listed 
company is normally structured to provide value to an acquirer above the purchase 
price in the form of a synergy (Sirower, 1997) (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21. Fundamentals of an Acquisition 
 
Based on Sirower (1997). 
 
Sirower (1997) defines synergy as increases in competitiveness and resulting cash 
flows beyond what the two companies are expected to accomplish independently .He 
defines the value of an acquisition to the acquirer in terms of discounted future cash 
flows as measured by: 
 
Value (NPV) = synergy – premium 
 
The premium paid to the shareholders of the target company erodes part of the 
synergy gained from the acquisition. Eccles et al (1999) refer to this premium as a 
‘value gap’ or an amount that can be paid to target shareholders while retaining a 
material benefit to the acquirer (See Figure 22). Brailsford and Knights (1998) list 
synergies as potentially including attributes such economies of scale, economies of 
vertical integration, complementary resources,  tax shields, effective use of free cash 
flows and improved efficiencies. One or several of these may be the underlying 
reason for transactions mentioned earlier but the realisation of synergies may not be 
the underlying reason for the transaction, e.g. as an alternative to exploration for 
company growth. 
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Figure 22. The Premium or Value Gap that can be paid to target shareholders in an 
acquisition. 
 
From Eccles et al (1999). 
 
Sirower (1997) notes that the common acquisition risk stems from the acquiring 
company’s management failure to fully understand and quantify the synergy before 
embarking on an acquisition. He notes also that it is the payment of an acquisition 
premium that sets up the unique business gamble and forces a consideration of the 
performance already embedded in a pre-acquisition share price versus the additional 
performance required to generate the synergy value. Eccles (1999) reiterates this 
concept by noting that the synergy value must be derived from new earnings growth 
and/or changes to the target company’s strategy beyond the potential growth 
previously reflected in the target company’s share price. The difficulty is establishing 
the expectations already impounded in the target company’s share price at the time of 
the acquisition. 
 
This thesis has adapted Figures 21 and 22 to highlight two common transactions in 
the resource sector. Figure 23 outlines a takeover where there are three components 
to the total value attained by an acquirer.  
 
The first component of value is the fact that the market value is below the 
fundamental valuation and as discussed earlier, this can occur when there are periods 
of commodity price weakness and little prospect of short-term improvement. In some 
circumstances, the premium paid to the target company shareholders can be less that 
the NPV valuation of the company using long-term commodity prices and exchange 
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rates or an alternative valuation measure such as North American multiples of market 
capitalisation per production, reserve and resource ounce in respect to gold 
companies. The role of an Independent Expert’s report in the target’s statement 
should be designed to reduce this risk but these reports may not sway investor 
sentiment at certain times. At the very least there is merger and acquisition activity 
outlined in Chapter 5 which is not offered at a premium to fundamental valuations, 
the most recent being Chinese Minmetals acquisition of Oz Mineral’s assets at the 
lower end of the Independent Expert’s valuations range (see Oz Minerals valuation 
booklet 2009). 
 
The second component is the value attributable to synergies from the merger and 
these are always likely to be present to some degree. At a minimum, there is likely to 
be management and Board rationalisation while higher synergies may involve 
sharing of infrastructure such as Rio Tinto’s utilisation of North’s iron ore rail and 
port infrastructure after its takeover of Norths in 2000 (Norths Limited, 2000) 
 
The last component reflects an increase market rating for the acquiring company as a 
consequence of the takeover. This may reflect a size rating or diversification of 
assets and while many researchers would attribute this to diminishing investment risk 
from a financial perspective, in many cases it reflects the increase in ‘investability’ 
of a company. This ‘investability’ has been discussed earlier (Section 2.4.7) and 
includes other factors such as index weightings and stock liquidity. 
 
Figure 23. Potential value creation in resource acquisitions. 
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The second example is depicted in Figure 24 and highlights two components of value 
creation in a ‘merger of equals.’ These are based on the synergies and the potential 
market re-rating, both described earlier. The market rerating potential of the 
combined entity versus the individual components of a merger has been a key 
‘selling point’ for the merits of the merger by company management. This is often 
not realised as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 24. Potential value creation in resource company mergers. 
Market re-rating due to 
increase in size, 
diversification and 
potential fewer 
alternative investments
Value to all 
shareholders
Synergies, e.g. costs 
saving, sharing of 
infrastructure, additional 
market premium
Market Value 
Company A
Market Value 
Company B
Synergy value
Premium from market re-rating
 
 107
 2.6.1 Synergy and Pricing Risk 
Chapman et al (1998) expect the synergies including potential operational economies 
to provide the prime sources of value creation in acquisitions although this value 
creation frequently fails to materialise. The authors believe that this typically stems 
from the acquirer’s management team being overly optimistic in its assessment of the 
cost savings and revenue enhancements to be derived from an acquisition as well as 
underestimating the time required to achieve them. 
 
Another aspect noted by Eccles et al (1999) is that when there is a lack of confidence 
in the value of the expected synergies, management may resort to emotive persuasive 
tactics like using clichés such as the transactions represents a ‘strategic deal’. An 
increase in management emotion may drive it to complete the deal at any cost; 
particularly because many successful executives have competitive personalities. 
 
Establishing a fair acquisition price can be problematic. This is highlighted in the 
general research by Eccles et al (1999) which surveyed 75 senior executives from 40 
companies across the world to determine how they derived appropriate acquisition 
costs in company takeovers. Interestingly, their survey found that the executives do 
not believe there is a single, correct price for an acquisition. Instead executives 
believe that different acquirers can afford to pay different prices for the same target 
in proportion to their companies’ perceived expectations of acquisition benefits, 
potentially revealing that a higher degree of subjectivity is quantifying synergies. 
The Eccles et al (1999) survey also found no relationship between the size of the 
premium paid for an acquisition and the success of the deal although there is little 
detail on the analysis conducted. 
 
Sirower (1997) has summarised his general findings or ‘lessons’ in the following 
points, which are based on previous research on the US industrial sector: 
1. Acquisition strategies, on average, destroy value for the acquirer 
2. Stock market losses on announcement of an acquisition are indicative of the 
long-term performance of the acquisition. 
3. Higher acquisition premia have a strong negative effect on acquisition 
performance. 
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4. The presence of multiple bidders has a negative impact on performance of the 
acquisition, but this effect is independent of the negative effect of the 
premium. That is, acquirers do not need to participate in a multiple-bidder 
contest to predictably overpay! 
5. Strategic relatedness moderates the value-destructive effect of the premium 
but has no independent effect on the performance of acquirers. 
6. The use of cash for acquisitions results in better performance than the use of 
equity (shares). 
7. Contested acquisitions lead to the payment of higher premia than uncontested 
acquisitions. 
8. Executing an acquisition through a tender offer versus a ‘friendly’ merger has 
no independent effect on performance, nor is there a difference in the 
premium paid. 
9. There is not a consistent relationship between the relative size of the 
acquisition and the acquirer’s performance. 
 
At this stage, previous research is mixed in its support for these ‘lessons’, and it is 
difficult to analyse Sirower (1997)’s supporting data. However, Andrade et al (2001) 
note that a myriad of events studies have demonstrated that mergers seem to create 
shareholder value, with most of the gains accruing to the target company. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also comment that synergies often correlate across 
firms and can contribute to the ‘merger waves’ discussed in Section 2.6.4. 
 
2.6.2 Australian Legal Framework for Mergers and Acquisitions 
Levy and Pathak (2009) provide an outline of the regulation and process in 
Australian mergers and acquisitions which is summarised here. They note that 
takeover bids are by far the most common form of acquisition of control of public 
companies in Australia, despite an increase in the use of schemes of arrangement for 
friendly acquisitions of public companies in recent years. The increased use of 
schemes of arrangements has been evident in resource company merger and 
acquisition activity and can offer advantages over more conventional takeovers. The 
most obvious are that once the Board of a target company agrees to the scheme, both 
Boards and management are theoretically working towards the implementation of the 
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scheme and there is generally a transfer of information between both companies 
enabling effective due diligence. 
 
The main source of regulation of takeovers in Australia is Chapter 6 of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth or Cth). Chapter 6 contains the central 
prohibitions and restrictions concerning the acquisitions of shares, permitted forms of 
takeover bid and sets out the information that must be given to shareholders and the 
stock market generally in connection with a takeover bid (Levy and Pathak, 2009). 
Historically, Casey and Eddey (1986) report that the evolution of takeover law 
followed the findings of the Eggleston Committee in 1969 with substantial 
amendments to takeover law in the Companies Act 1961, largely to provide 
shareholder protection in the market for corporate control. Later in the 1970s under 
the Commonwealth/State co-operative companies and securities legislative scheme, 
the statutory law on takeovers was contained in separate legislation, the Companies 
(Acquisition of Shares) Act 1980 and termed the Takeover Code.  This coincided 
with a period when takeover defence increased markedly and with an increased 
proportion of hostile takeovers, particularly with the corporate raiders (see Section 
2.6.4.). In the current legislation, Levy and Pathak, (2009) summarise the objectives 
set out in the Corporations Act. Section 602, which states that the purposes of 
Chapter 6 are to ensure: 
(a) the acquisition of control over a relevant entity takes place in an efficient, 
competitive and informed market; 
(b) the holders of shares or interests, and the directors of the company or 
responsible entity for the scheme: 
a. know the identity of the person who proposes to acquire a substantial 
interest; 
b. have a reasonable time to consider the proposal; and 
c. are given enough information to enable them to assess the merits of 
the proposal 
(c) as far as practicable, the holders have a reasonable and equal opportunity 
to participate in any benefits accruing to holders under a proposal under 
which a person would acquire a substantial interest in the entity; and 
(d) an appropriate procedure is followed as a preliminary to compulsory 
acquisition. 
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 These principles, commonly known as the Eggleston principles, embody the 
philosophy of the legislation and are critical to bear in mind when assessing any 
action of a bidder, shareholder or target company. A breach of the principles may 
lead to remedial action even if there would otherwise be no breach of any specific 
provision in Chapter 6 (Levy and Pathak, 2009). 
 
Other sources of regulation of takeovers in Australia are contained in the Foreign 
Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, the Trade Practices Act 1974, the Listing 
Rules of the Australian Securities Exchange and legislation dealing with specific 
industries such as banking, insurance and television and radio. Occasionally, special 
legislation may regulate the acquisition of shares in a company in a particular type of 
business or in a specific company.  
 
Chapter 6 contains a central rule which has two aspects: 
• A person must not acquire control of more than 20 per cent of the voting 
shares in a company unless the acquisition is in accordance with the 
legislation. The threshold of 20 per cent is regarded as the point just below 
where a person has sufficient voting power to control or influence the 
activities of the target company. 
• A person who has control of more than 20 per cent of the voting shares (but 
less than 90 per cent) must not acquire control of more shares unless it is 
done in accordance with the legislation. 
 
To avoid breaching the central rule, a person wishing to increase his or her 
shareholding must do so under one of the exceptions contained in s 611 of the 
legislation. The main exceptions are: 
• Formal takeover bids 
• Acquisition of not more than 3 per cent in a six month period (“creep 
provisions”) 
• Acquisitions approved by independent shareholders; and 
• Acquisitions resulting from a court approved scheme of arrangement 
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Lastly, the Takeovers Panel main role is to resolve disputes relating to takeover bids. 
It has broad power to declare circumstances ‘unacceptable’ if it considers the 
Eggleston principles have been contravened even if there is no illegality. The Panel’s 
constitutionality has been upheld by the High Court (Levy and Pathak, 2009). 
 
2.6.2.1 Takeovers 
A formal takeover bid may be off-market or on-market although on-market offers are 
relatively uncommon. The bidder must have given the target company and its 
shareholders a statement of certain prescribed information (called a bidder’s 
statement). The target’s directors must respond with another statement (called a 
target’s statement) 
 
There are volumes of research, published commentary and case law on takeovers and 
takeover regulations. However, this thesis only requires discussion of the broad 
procedural aspects to place merger and acquisition activity discussed in Chapter 5 in 
context. 
 
With regards to off-market takeovers, the process involves: 
• Takeover offers must be sent within two months of any public announcement 
of a proposal to make a takeover offer. The offers must be sent within a three 
day period and must be sent within 14 to 28 days after the bidders statement 
is sent to the target. 
• A bidder’s statement is usually in the form of a booklet and outlines the 
formal term of the offer, disclosures under the bidder’s statement and form of 
acceptance. It usually includes the key selling or marketing messages for the 
offer.  
• The offer period must last for at least one month but not more than 12 
months. 
• Within 15 days after dispatch of the offer, the target must lodge the target’s 
statement with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
and then send copies to the bidder, its shareholders and the ASX. 
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With regard to a market bid, the takeover bid is effected by an announcement made 
by a stockbroker on behalf of the bidder. The offer commences on the first trading 
day of the relevant securities exchange after the end of the 14 days after the day that 
the announcement is made (requiring 14 clear days to pass between the 
announcement day and the first day of the offer). 
 
Similarly for off market bids, the offer must be open for a period of at least one 
month and no more than 12 months. There is a similar requirement in the issue of 
bidder and target statements although the timeframe is compressed reflecting the 
capacity of the bidder to commence purchasing target shares after two weeks from 
the announcement. 
 
An important consideration is that the price specified in an offer announcement must 
equal or exceed the maximum consideration that the bidder or an associate provided, 
or agreed to provide, for a security in the bid class under any purchase or agreement 
during the four months before the date of the announcement (Levy and Pathak, 
2009). This aspect can affect the behaviour of target share prices after a failed bid, 
and particularly when the overall market later falls. 
 
The takeover documentation (both bidders and target statements) are important in the 
analysis of M&A activity, particularly if they include an Independent Expert’s report. 
The Independent Expert’s report places a valuation in the public domain which can 
compared to the recent share price performance. Major discrepancies may indicate 
poor promotion by the company as well as optimistic forecasts by the independent 
expert and the valuation itself may be influenced by whether the transaction is hostile 
or friendly.  
 
2.6.2.2 Scheme of Arrangement 
Instead of making a formal takeover bid, it is possible for a bidder to achieve control 
of a target company by effecting a scheme of arrangement, for example, Xstrata plc’s 
successful merger with MIM Limited in 2003. A scheme of arrangement is 
essentially an arrangement between the company and its shareholders which 
becomes binding once the statutory tests are met. Accordingly, it can be used to 
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compel all shareholders to transfer their shares to a bidder in exchange for cash or 
other consideration (Levy and Pathak, 2009; ASIC, 2008). 
 
The key steps summarised from Levy and Pathak, (2009) in undertaking a takeover 
by way of a scheme are generally as follows: 
• The target and bidder agree to implement the scheme under a binding 
contract usually called a merger implementation agreement; 
• A booklet satisfying the disclosure requirements in s 412 and under ASIC 
policy is prepared and settled with ASIC; 
• An application is made to court for a shareholders meeting to be convened, 
usually 28 days’ notice 
• At the meeting, the scheme is considered by the shareholders and must be 
approved by a majority in number of shareholders at a general meeting who 
represent 75 per cent in value of shares voted at the meeting 
• The matter returns to court for final approval; and 
• Finally, the scheme is implemented, usually by all shares in the target not 
held by the bidder being transferred to the bidder in exchange for payment of 
the consideration under the scheme. 
 
There is an important restriction on using a scheme of arrangement. Section 411 (17) 
provides that a court must not approve a scheme of arrangement unless: 
• It is satisfied that the scheme has not been proposed for the purpose of 
avoiding the takeover provisions in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act; or 
• ASIC produces a statement to the court that it has no objections to the 
scheme. 
 
Levy and Pathak, (2009) note that ASIC will only produce a no objection statement 
to the court if it is satisfied that all material information relating to the scheme of 
arrangement has been disclosed and the standard of disclosure in the explanatory 
memorandum is commensurate with that required under the takeover provisions; 
 
2.6.2.3 Dual Listed Company Mergers 
While not common, two high profile dual listed company mergers (DLCs) have 
occurred in the resource sector. These are the 1995 dual listing of CRA Limited and 
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RTZ plc to form Rio Tinto and the later 1998 dual listing of BHP Limited and 
Billiton plc to form BHP Billiton. The CRA/RTZ dual listed created considerable 
controversy in the Australian market as it was perceived that RTZ plc was 
conducting a surreptitious takeover of CRA Limited without paying a premium while 
there were perceptions that BHP Limited and Billiton plc ratio was too generous to 
Billiton plc shareholders (see Appendix 1). 
 
DLC structures are effectively mergers between two companies in which the 
companies agree to combine their operations and cash flows, but retain separate 
shareholder registries and identities (Bedi et al, 2003). 
 
The salient features have been summarised from Levy and Pathak, (2009) and 
readers are referred to their publication for more detail. These are: 
• The two companies retain separate corporate identities and separate stock 
exchange listings, though commonly the companies will adopt matching 
corporate names and identities. 
• Shareholders in each company continue to hold their existing shares and, 
accordingly, continue to receive dividends from the company in which they 
originally invested. The shareholders will, however, effectively have 
economic and voting interests in the merged group as a result of a contractual 
requirement that the distributions received by each group of shareholders 
(both regarding income and capital) must effectively be equalised on a per 
share basis and as a result of a joint electorate when voting on matters of 
mutual interest. 
• In order to equalise interests, the two companies will agree in the merger 
agreement on an equalisation ratio. Bonus shares are issued by one of the 
companies (or alternatively, shares are consolidated) so that the value of 
shares in each company is equivalent. 
• As the two companies remain separate corporate entities, they each continue 
to have a separate board of directors, but the board will comprise the same 
people. 
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Implementation of a DLC merger involves each company having shareholders 
meeting to pass resolutions, to approve the arrangement and to amend their 
constitutions to authorise the new arrangements concerning the unified board, voting 
procedures, takeovers and other matters. For Australian companies this will require a 
special resolution passed by the holders of 75 per cent of the shares represented at the 
shareholders meeting. 
 
2.6.2.4 Considerations between Takeover and Scheme 
Formal takeovers or schemes of arrangements offer different procedures which can 
be more advantageous in particular transactions. In particular, schemes of 
arrangement essentially involve co-operation with the takeover target so once the 
target board is agreeable, both companies work towards the implementation of the 
scheme. In contrast, takeover offers have more flexibility in changing the bid 
structure and lengthening or shortening the time period for the offer. 
 
Table 8 summarises key comparisons between takeover offers and schemes of 
arrangements. The key determination involves an assessment of the likely 
relationship with the target and the threat of competing bidders. 
 
Table 8. A comparison of Takeover Offers and Schemes of Arrangements. 
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Takeover Offer Scheme of Arrangement
Friendly  or hostile Friendly  or hostile Friendly
Control of transaction Bidder; defining timetable and process Target; as lodges explanatory memorandum and seeks court approvals
Due Diligence If hostile bid, due diligence may be limited to publically available data Access to target data usually part of transaction
Certainty Outcome may be partial ownership if desired Outcome is either success or nothing
Timing Can be less than 10 weeks but depends on circumstances Fixed minimum 10-14 weeks from announcement
Rigidity in structure Less rigid with flexibility to change terms mid way through process
Very rigid; to change terms may involve going back to 
court 
Ability to attain 100% threshold
The holders of at least 90% of shares must take 
positive action to accept the bid before the 
outstanding minority holdings can be 
compulsorily acquired
In order to obtain 100% ownership, a bidder needs 
only have a majority of shareholders by number 
present and voting at a general meeting who 
represent 75% by value present and voting to 
approve the scheme. Given that not all shareholders 
may vote, this may may mean a positive response 
from the holders of only 50%-60% of shares (or, in 
some cases, an even lower percentage) may be 
enough to achieve the necessary approval
Ability for shareholders to block 
transaction
A holder of 10% can prevent a bidder from 
getting to compulsory acquisition
Depending on how many shareholders vote, a 10% 
holding may not be enough to vote down a scheme.
Requirement for an independent 
expert's report
Only requires an independent expert’s report if 
the bidder and target have a director in common 
or the bidder has a relevant interest in 30% or 
more of issued shares when it makes the 
takeover over
The meet ASIC policy, schemes of arrangement 
generally require an independent expert's report.
Structural Flexibility Less flexible
Flexibility allows a number of transactions to be 
incorporated into the scheme include divestment of 
one part of the business or the paying of special 
franked dividends  
Based on Levy and Pathak, (2009); ASIC, (2008). 
 
While not discussed further, the principal advantages of DLC according to Levy and 
Pathak, (2009) relate to tax and include: 
• Shareholders do not trigger capital gains tax upon a disposal of shares. 
• Shareholders retain benefits of the tax treatment of dividends, e.g. a foreign 
company cannot pay franked dividends to an Australian resident. 
• The DLC enables each entity to retain its own assets and avoid triggering 
change of control provisions in contract and avoid a disposal (or notional 
disposal) of assets which may give rise to other taxes and costs. 
 
While these are important considerations, this thesis believes the ability to avoid a 
takeover premium and the co-operation between the boards of both companies are 
the likely underlying reasons for the DLCs leading to the creation of both Rio Tinto 
and BHP Billiton. 
 
2.6.2.5 Anti-Competitive Regulations 
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As a final word under Australian legal framework and which is also prevalent in 
global resource acquisitions has been the sanctioning of mergers and takeovers by 
the competition regulators. This was most recently published in the withdrawal of 
BHP Billiton’s offer for Rio Tinto, and partly based on the fact that the European 
Commission (EC) antitrust authorities withheld clearance unless BHP Billiton abided 
by a number of remedies (BHP Billiton 2008)(see Appendix 1). The regulations in 
the U.S. are termed antitrust law and enforced by the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and most global mergers and acquisitions by larger companies require both EU and 
DOJ approval.  
 
Brailsford and Knights (1998) note that the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) has become increasingly outspoken on mergers and 
acquisitions in some industries, particularly in banking, which has continued today. 
Major issues confronting both the ACCC and Treasury now often relate to foreign 
investment in Australian resources projects, particularly when it relates to sovereign 
backed companies. The most recent example of this has been the limitations placed 
on Chinalco’s potential investment in Rio Tinto as well as its proposed direct 
investments in some of its key assets. While an outcome was not required given the 
eventual rejection of the deal by Rio Tinto management, the ACCC and Federal 
Treasury had to rule on the Chinese Minmetals purchase of Oz Mineral in early 
2009. This deal was ultimately rejected on defence grounds given the proximity of 
Prominent Hill to the Woomera weapons testing area and Minmetals was instead 
allowed to purchase the other assets of the company (Oz Minerals, 2009).  
 
2.7 Financial Economic Research 
There is a considerable body of financial economic research that investigates aspects 
of mergers and acquisitions in North American companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq. The 
research often utilises data from the Centre of Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
While this research tends to focus on the share price performance of bidders and 
targets, some research also considers accounting profitability measures and trends. 
 
The structure of this section involves outlining Australian research and then 
incorporates the relevant findings with the broader global research on various topics. 
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These include: merger waves, scrip versus cash offers, takeover hostility, acquirer 
performance, characteristics of acquirers and targets, toeholds, independent experts 
reports and defence strategies. 
 
The thesis also has three sections (2.7.2 Scrip versus Cash Offers and Premia; 2.7.3, 
Friendly versus Hostile Takeovers and 2.7.4 Performance of Bidders and Targets on 
Announcement) which have overlapping data given research often addresses all these 
issues together. 
 
2.7.1 Australian Research 
Australian research increased in the 1980s with the spate of high profile takeovers by 
the corporate raiders (Bond, Brieley, Holmes a Court, Parry, Skase and Spalvins), 
which delivered greater benefits to both target and acquiring shareholders in 
comparison to bids by non-raiders (Brailsford and Knights, 1998). These authors 
note that the culmination of this 1980s activity was the unsuccessful attempt by 
Holmes a Court to acquire control of BHP in 1986. 
 
Walter (1984) comments that the Australian evidence on takeovers was incomplete at 
that time with only one major study completed by Dodd (1976) and this appeared 
inconsistent with overseas evidence at that time. Walter’s (1984) research examined 
takeovers between 1966 and 1972. 
 
Bishop, Dodd and Officer (1987) examined a later period (1972-1985) using an event 
study methodology similar to Walter (1984). With a similar but more extensive 
scope, they researched the returns to shareholders of target and bidding firms in 
successful, unsuccessful and withdrawn takeovers and including multiple bidders as 
well as companies involved in partial takeovers. They estimate that net gains from 
this takeover activity during this period to be around $7.2 billion. 
 
The returns to the shareholders of the bidding firms in corporate takeovers was 
investigated by Bellamy and Lewin, (1992) who also criticized earlier studies for a 
lack of control of information or wealth transfer effects arising from the method of 
payment used in the acquisition. 
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Bugeja & Walter (1995) investigated explanations for cross-sectional differences in 
the size of the premia paid to target shareholders in a sample of 78 Australian 
takeovers between 1981 and 1989. They tested the following factors: removal of 
inefficient target management, the resolution of agency costs of free cash flow, the 
provision of financial slack to allow the target to undertake profitable investments as 
well as the impact of target managerial ownership (proxied by director’s 
shareholdings) and bidder ownership of the target.  
 
One of the researchers’ criteria in the study was that neither the target nor the bidder 
was a mining company. Bugeja & Walter (1995) comment that this exclusion was in 
line with most previous Australian takeover research and this stems from the fact that 
mining companies are considered by researchers to have systematically different 
financial, operating and risk characteristics. This exclusion of mining companies 
continued with da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinbeck, and Walter, (2000). 
 
Brailsford and Knights (1998) focused on other measures to further investigate the 
performance of acquiring companies following a takeover as well as examining the 
relationship between financial performance and various financial and non-financial 
measures which proxy for possible sources of change in firm performance. 
 
The effects of takeover resistance by target companies on the wealth of their 
shareholders were studied by Maheswaran and Pinder (2005). The researchers used 
binomial testing to determine whether the deal characteristics in their 133 target 
companies would be expected to occur by chance. 
 
Eddey and Casey (1987) and (1989) researched defence strategies under the 
Takeovers Code in the 1980s (see Section 2.6.2 above) and in the latter, analysed the 
motives behind director recommendations in takeover bids. Eddey (1993) reviewed 
the influence of the independent expert’s report in takeover bids. This was later 
reassessed by Bugeja (2005). 
 
Brailsford and Knights (1998) researched the financial and non-financial 
performance of a selection of takeovers between 1981 and 1992. 
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Le and Schultz (2007) investigated the impact of toeholds on bidder abnormal 
returns on takeover announcements by Australian listed companies between 1997 
and 2004. The Australian literature is largely consistent with takeover 
announcements having no significant impact on bidder shareholders’ wealth (Walter 
1984; Bellamy & Lewin 1992; Bugeja & Walter 1995). 
 
Bellamy and Lewin (1992) and da Silva Rosa et al (2001) researched payment 
methods and bid outcomes.
 
Bugeja (2001) investigated the effect of independent expert reports in Australian 
takeovers in a series of papers and included work on independent expert fees (Bugeja 
et al, 2005) and  the independence of recommendations from firms with the target as 
a client (Bugeja, 2005). 
 
In related research Bugeja and da Silva Rosa, (2008) researched the influence of 
changing tax legislation on takeover payment methods with the tax deferral using 
scrip offers from December 1999 while Bugeja and Gallery, (2006) investigated the 
market value of goodwill of different ‘ages’. 
 
2.7.2 Merger Waves 
Andrade et al’s (2001) summary paper notes that there are two most consistent 
empirical features of merger activity over the last century: 1) mergers occur in 
waves; and 2) within a wave, mergers strongly cluster by industry.  
 
These waves are presented in Figure 25 derived from their paper focused on North 
American takeover activity. It displays two different measures of annual merger 
activity. The dotted line represents the number of firms acquired during the year 
expressed as a fraction of the beginning-of-year number of firms in CRSP. The solid 
line provides a sense of the values involved, obtained by dividing the aggregate 
dollar value of mergers over the year by the total beginning-of-year market 
capitalisation of firms listed on CRSP. 
 
Figure 25. Aggregate Merger Activity. 
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From Andrade et al (2001). 
 
The 1990s was the greatest takeover wave in history and Dong et al, (2006) report 
that in the 1993-2000 period the total value of transactions was US$4.35 trillion 
(2001 dollars). This was significantly higher than the total value of transactions in 
the preceding 15 years of US$1.18 trillion (1978-1993). 
 
The wave features suggested to Andrade et al (2001) that mergers might occur as a 
reaction to unexpected shocks to industry structure. They considered that the industry 
shock of deregulation became the dominant factor after the late 1980’s and accounts 
for nearly half of the merger activity since that time within the North American 
market. In broad terms Schleifer and Vishny (2003) characterise the takeovers of the 
1990s as often being friendly, while they were generally hostile during the 1980s, 
and involved ‘‘conglomerates’’ in the 1960s. Casey and Eddey (1986) also note that 
the 1980s marked a period of increased hostility in Australian takeovers. 
 
Walter (1984) cites that Walker (1973) estimated that 38 per cent of firms listed on 
the Sydney Stock Exchange at some stage in the 1960 to 1970 period were subject to 
a takeover bid and that four out of five bids were successful. 
 
In the Australian resource sector, this thesis would concur with the concept of merger 
waves. These are presented in Chapter 5 although ‘opportunities’ rather than 
‘shocks’ may be more relevant. As discussed later, on a global basis the Australian 
market is less relevant than the North American and London markets and can 
experience times when companies have lower valuations than global peers. This 
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presents acquisition opportunities to overseas companies that can attain higher 
market ratings on Australian company assets in their home markets. This concurs 
with Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) who show potential North American 
market value deviations from fundamental value for both acquirers and targets can 
rationally correlate with M&A activity. They believe that merger waves and waves 
of cash and stock purchases can be rationally driven by periods of over- and under 
valuation of the market. However, in the Australian situation this may sometimes 
reflect macroeconomic influences which affect the total market relative to global 
market peers. 
 
Table 9 highlights that the North American market has also experienced considerable 
consolidation in both the Metals and Mining and Oil and Gas sectors during the past 
three decades. 
 
Table 9. Top Five Industries Based on Average Annual Merger Activity. 
 
From Andrade et al, (2001). 
 
2.7.3 Scrip versus Cash Offers and Premia 
Andrade et al (2001) have summarised the general features of mergers and 
acquisitions over the three decades in Table 10. They note that a key difference in the 
mergers in the 1990s over the 1980s was that around 70 per cent of all deals in the 
1990s involve scrip compensation, with 58 per cent entirely stock financed. These 
numbers are approximately 50 per cent more than in the 1980s. They suggest that the 
predominance of stock financing probably relates to the virtual disappearance of 
hostility in the takeover market. 
 
The authors define a bid as hostile if the target company publicly rejects it, or if the 
acquirer describes it as unsolicited and unfriendly. They note that only 4 per cent of 
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transactions in the 1990s involved a hostile bid at any point in time, compared to 14 
per cent in the 1980s, and the success rate of hostile bidder was low at acquiring less 
than 3 per cent of the targets. Consistent with this more ‘friendly’ atmosphere, the 
average transaction in the 1990s involved only one bidder, and 1.2 rounds of bidding, 
far less than during the 1980s (Andrade et al, 2001). 
 
Table 10. Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics by Decade, 1993-1998. 
 
From Andrade et al, (2001). 
 
Fuller et al, (2002) studied the returns for firms that acquired five or more public, 
private and/or subsidiary targets within a short period for time, and hence, any 
variation in returns were deemed to be due to the characteristics of the target and the 
bid. With a sample of 3,135 takeovers in 1990 to 2000 period, they found that when 
bids are partitioned by the method of payment (cash, stock, or a combination of the 
two), they found that acquisition of public targets results in insignificant bidder 
returns for cash or combination offers but significantly negative returns to the 
acquirers when stock is offered.  
 
However, for private and subsidiary targets, acquirer returns are significantly 
positive regardless of method of payment. The acquirer returns which accompany 
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bids for private firms and subsidiaries are greater for bids financed with equity than 
for bids financed with cash.  
 
Fuller et al, (2002) also partitioned the returns to acquirers on the relative size of the 
target compared to the bidder and found that for public targets, as the relative size for 
the target increases, the returns become more positive for cash offers, more negative 
for stock offers, and change little for combination offers. However, for both 
subsidiary and private targets, there is a positive relationship between the target’s 
relative size and the acquirers’ positive abnormal returns. As the relative size of the 
target increases for private acquisition, returns to the bidder using stock are greater 
than if the bidder had used cash. 
 
A summary of explanations offered by Fuller et al, (2002) are as follows: 
1. Bidders receive a better price when they buy non-public firms potentially 
reflecting lower liquidity (increase difficulties in buying and selling private 
firms). 
2. The presence of a bidding company’s influence on target management as a 
blockholder (large shareholder) therefore ensuring expectations are met on 
performance and better returns from stock offers. 
3.  The tax deferral opportunity from stock offers in comparison to cash offers 
and hence the capacity to accept a discount price for the firm equal to the 
value of deferring the tax. 
 
The overall findings support other research (e.g. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004) that suggests a bid with stock reveals that the acquirer views that its stock as 
being overvalued. It also supports the notion that a bidder should make cash offers 
when there is high uncertainty about its own firm’s value, and stock offers when 
there is high uncertainty about the target’s value. This is supported by Dong et al 
(2006). 
  
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, (2004) believe that cash mergers are not better than 
stock mergers but rather that cash mergers are more likely to occur in undervalued 
markets. They note the potential for market price misvaluations in the two 
components of pricing of a company - a firm specific component and a market-wide 
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component. Given that fiduciary responsibility requires the target management to 
accept any offer when based on its information, yields more than the standalone 
value, it has a dilemma in determining the degree of overpricing of the bidder and 
expected synergies relative to its own mispricing. Hence, in bull markets, targets are 
more likely to over estimate the value of the bidding stock and expected synergies 
relative to its own mispricing and are therefore more likely to accept a scrip offer – 
hence the appearance of merger waves. They also note that it is not the case that 
increasing scrip merger activity ultimately leads to market crashes, but rather it is 
that market crashes are preceded by increasing scrip mergers. 
 
Interestingly, although somewhat dated, Walter (1984) noted in his Australian study 
of takeovers between 1966 and 1972 that target shareholder returns are normal or 
below normal prior to a bid, whereas bidders exhibit above average returns 
supporting the concept of an overvalued bidder. When the bid is made, target 
shareholders typically receive significant positive excess returns; whereas bidder 
shareholders gain no additional benefit. 
 
 
Table 11 presents a summary of the abnormal returns for targets and bidders under a 
number of scenarios for 78 Australian transactions between 1981 and 1989 from 
Bugeja and Walter (1995). The abnormal returns were estimated as the cumulative 
market adjusted abnormal returns for a 60-day period prior to a takeover 
announcement till one day following the announcement. The authors defined a 
rejected takeover if target management recommended shareholders reject the offer at 
the initial recommendation in the Part B or Part D statement.  
 
Their research identified some key factors that they believe potentially influence the 
size of premia and included: 
• Removal of inefficient target management. 
•  Managerial Ownership of the Target Firm. 
• Bidder share ownership in the target firm. 
• Free cash flow of the target firm 
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• The level of bidder and target firm financial slack (reserve borrowing 
capacity). 
 
These are discussed in later sections in Chapter 2 and Chapter 7. 
 
Table 11. Abnormal returns around the takeover announcement. 
 
* indicates significance at 0.10 level 
** indicates significance at 0.05 level 
*** indicates significance at 0.01 level 
The t-statistic of the test that the mean return equals zero is in brackets. 
From Bugeja and Walter (1995). 
 
Over varying event windows (60, 20, 10 and 1 day(s) prior to the announcement and 
1 day past the announcement), average target CAR were 16.03 percent, 16.88 
percent, 16.29 percent and 9.61 percent respectively. Their suggestion is that the size 
of the event window is not critical outside a 2-day window which is potentially 
influenced by information leakage. 
In terms of bidder performance over the same event windows (60, 20, 10 and 1 
day(s) prior to the announcement and 1 day past the announcement), average bidder 
CAR were -1.80 percent, 1.26 percent, 0.91 percent and 0.68 percent respectively. 
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In reviewing Table 11, target CAR are increased if the transaction is successful and 
target management rejects the offer. It does not appear important whether the 
payment is by cash or scrip although it was lower if it involved a mixed payment of 
both. 
 
Earlier work by Bishop et al, (1987) presented evidence that those shareholders of 
successful bidding firms gained positive abnormal returns before the announcement 
of the bid (mean CAR of +6.0 per cent for all acquiring firms) and no abnormal 
returns after the bid. For unsuccessful bidders, similar pre-offer positive excess 
returns were also observed but the target abnormal returns continued post-
announcement date of bid closure. These were attributed to "greenmailers", that is, 
target shareholders holding out for a higher price for their shares from a subsequent 
bidder or a company friendly to the target. 
 
Bellamy and Lewin (1992) found that with a sample of 210 bidding firms none of the 
daily abnormal returns were significant using event studies for the ten days before 
and after the takeover announcements. However, when the sample was partitioned 
between cash and tender (scrip) offers, they found that the shareholders of bidding 
firms using cash offers earned a significant positive abnormal return of 1.3 per cent 
on the day after the takeover announcement and for a 21-day period around the 
announcement the CAR was 0.84 per cent. By contrast, when share exchange offers 
were tested, a significant negative abnormal return of -2.97 per cent was earned by 
bidding firm shareholders on the day of the takeover announcement. This supports a 
general hypothesis that cash offers are more likely to be associated with abnormal 
positive returns as well as the perceived ‘overvalued status’ of takeover scrip when 
used in a takeover. 
 
This contrasts with the more recent work of da Silva Rosa et al, (2000) who found 
that the abnormal returns earned by Australian bidders and targets over the bid 
announcement period are not significantly associated with the proposed type of 
payment. However, these researchers found that over the long-term post-bid period, 
bidders who offer shares significantly under-perform regardless of the bid outcome 
(perhaps also reflecting overvalued status). Importantly, the result is after controlling 
for firm size, survival bias and method of return computation. Finally, the size of the 
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target relative to the bidder firm and the variability of bidding firms' share price prior 
to the bid announcement were both positively associated with the probability of a 
share offer. 
They summarize their research to date as indicating:  
• Firms involved in cash bids generally attract higher abnormal returns but the 
evidence on the relative impact of tax considerations and the information 
content of the medium of exchange remains uncertain;  
• The positive abnormal returns to acquirers in cash bids are not as high in 
percentage terms as the returns earned by cash offers to targets and the 
returns are not consistent or robust across all countries. They note that the 
Australian evidence indicates that estimates of the abnormal returns to bidder 
firms are sensitive to small changes in the event-window around the bid 
announcement date;  
• The relative performance of merged firms in the long-term over the post-
acquisition period is empirically predictable by the medium of exchange: 
firms in cash offers earn higher returns than firms involved in share offers. 
This result contradicts reasonable expectations of market efficiency but is 
robust to biases that may have been present in earlier studies; and  
• There is no evidence that changes in capital structure affect firms' equity 
values around the bid announcement period.  
With respect to bidders only, Le and Schultz’s (2007) investigated a dataset of 122 
takeover announcements made by Australian listed companies between 1997 and 
2004 inclusive and found on average that there were no significant bidder abnormal 
returns in response to takeover announcements. However, they did find a 
significantly positive association between the presence of toeholds/toehold size and 
bidder abnormal returns (see Section 2.7.7 below). 
 
Bugeja and da Silva Rosa, (2008) studied 194 Australian takeovers between 1996 
and 2003 to determine whether there was an influence of a change in taxation 
legislation. The change meant that from December 1999, shareholders who disposed 
of shares in Australian takeovers in exchange for scrip could elect to defer capital 
gains taxation until the disposal of the shares received. Their results show that, 
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subsequent to the regulatory change, there is a significantly higher probability that 
equity will be offered as consideration where target shareholder capital gains are 
greater. They believe that this finding confirms the importance of shareholder level 
taxation in explaining corporate acquisition structure and adds to previous European 
and US evidence on factors associated with payment method choice in takeovers.  
 
While this thesis would concur with these findings from empirical observation, the 
issue tends to confound other research on shareholder returns using scrip versus cash 
payments. 
 
2.7.4 Friendly versus Hostile Takeovers 
Takeovers are often segregated into friendly or hostile, depending on how the 
target’s Board reacts to the offer. As outlined below, considerable research has been 
focused on the returns to acquirers and targets in either situation but Schwert (2003) 
points out that public announcement of proposed takeovers are really just part of the 
negotiating strategies, and there are problems in distinguishing between hostile and 
friendly transactions. 
 
He notes that private negotiations may be hostile or friendly prior to any 
announcement and in some cases these negotiations break down and one of the 
parties decides that public information about the potential bid would enhance its 
bargaining position. For example, bidders might choose to reveal their intentions to 
put stockholder pressure on target managers. Likewise, targets might reveal a 
takeover attempt to attract alternative bidders.  
 
Schwert’s (2003) research reviews 2,346 takeover contests in the U.S. between 1975 
and 1996 using both share price and financial performance analysis. His conclusions 
were that most of the characteristics of takeover offers that are related to hostility 
only seem to reflect strategic choices made by the bidder or the target firm to 
maximise their respective gains from a potential transaction. 
 
Healy et al (1997) analysed US industrial takeovers between 1979 to mid 1984 by 
categorizing the sample of takeovers into two types: 
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1. Friendly transactions that typically involved stock payment for firms in 
overlapping businesses, and which they called ‘strategic’ takeovers; and 
2. Hostile transactions that generally involved cash payments for firms in 
unrelated business, which were labelled as ‘financial’ takeovers. 
 
Their inference was that strategic takeovers have several potential advantages over 
financial transactions which included related business synergies, and the opportunity 
to conduct a more accurate valuation of the target company. The use of scrip also 
reduces the cost of valuation mistakes because the shareholders of the target 
company partially bear some of the consequences of errors. They concluded that 
friendly takeovers were also less likely to experience disrupted production after the 
takeover in comparison to hostile transactions which also had the potential to destroy 
the target firm’s intangible assets. 
 
Healy et al (1997) measured a company’s performance by using the acquiring firm’s 
pre-tax operating cash flow returns on beginning assets which was also adjusted for 
contemporaneous industry performance. This measure was used to avoid distortion 
by variations in takeover accounting and financing. In summarising the results of the 
analysis, the researchers state that strategic takeovers generated substantial gains for 
acquirers whereas financial transactions broke even at best. They highlight the 
importance of conducting accurate due diligence on the target and the downside if 
competing bids emerge. 
 
In the U.K. Shoenberg and Thornton (2006) report that recent hostile transactions 
involved average bid premiums in the region of 35 per cent to 45 per cent while they 
found 52 per cent of contested takeovers unsuccessful from their small (56) sample 
between 1995 and 1999. In Australia, Maheswaran and Pinder (2005) reported that 
38 per cent of 133 takeover bids from January 1992 to June 2001 were considered 
hostile while 62 per cent were classified as friendly. Furthermore the 38 per cent 
decreased to 24 per cent for the companies that maintained their hostility. Their 
definition of hostility is defined as when the takeover bid is unsolicited by the target 
management but as noted here and at the commencement of this section, this 
‘hostility’ can change over the course of the takeover. 
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2.7.5 Performance of Bidders and Targets on Announcement 
The typical performance of bidders is summarised by Sirower (1997) in his general 
review of U.S. bidding companies where he found 59 per cent of these bidding firms 
had a total market adjusted return (performance) decreasing on the acquisition 
announcement. Furthermore, the returns for 71 per cent of these underperforming 
companies were negative over the next 12 months. In line with Eccles (1999), 
Sirower (1997) notes that this continuing underperformance demonstrates that the 
market is good at quickly predicting the potential success of acquisitions. 
 
Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2004) note that on news a takeover, the share price of the 
target firm usually rises sharply, while that of the acquiring firm usually falls but the 
joint value may or may not rise. This evidence of bidder and combined bidder-target 
discount has been taken to imply that takeovers often just redistribute rents from 
acquirers to their targets or that they even destroy rents. They propose a 
‘competitive’ model which presents takeovers as being privately and socially 
efficient and relate bid premia to target specifications. 
 
Table 12 from Andrade et al, (2001) summarises announcement period abnormal 
returns for both acquirers and targets, as well as for the acquirer and target combined 
and using a three-day event window for the target and acquirer combined. 
Interestingly, the combined acquirer-target returns are similar across the three 
decades, ranging from 1.4 per cent to 2.6 per cent, and averaging 1.8 per cent overall 
for 3,688 completed mergers. In addition, the authors note that the combined average 
abnormal returns over this event window are reliably positive, suggesting that on 
average, mergers do create shareholder value. Even when the event window is 
expanded to begin 20 days prior to the merger announcement and end on the merger 
closing date, the combined average announcement period abnormal return is 
essentially identical at 1.9 per cent. However, they note that the statistical precision 
is considerably reduced as the event window is lengthened to an average of 142 days, 
and this estimate cannot be reliably distinguished from zero.  
 
Table 12. Announcement Period Abnormal Returns by Decade, 1973-1998. 
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Note. Statistical significance at the 5 percent level is denoted by a. 
From Andrade et al, (2001). 
 
The data indicated target firm shareholders are clearly winners in merger 
transactions. Table 12 highlights that the average three-day abnormal return for 
target firms is 16 per cent, which rises to 24 per cent over the longer event window. 
Andrade et al, (2001) report that both of these estimates are statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. In 1998, the median equity market value for target firms was US 
$230 million, such that a 16 per cent announcement period abnormal return 
corresponds to US $37 million for target firm shareholders over a three-day period.  
 
Another comparison benchmark is the average annual return for all U.S. publicly 
traded firms, which is around 12 per cent. Therefore over a three-day period, target 
firm shareholders realize a return equivalent to what a shareholder would normally 
expect to receive over a 16-month period (Andrade et al, 2001). 
 
Finally, the authors also report that the average announcement period abnormal 
return estimate for target firms is remarkably stable across decades. This is 
interesting in the light of the evidence on clustering of merger activity. Each decade 
is associated with merger activity concentrated in different industries, but the target 
firms consistently have abnormal returns of 16 per cent in the announcement period. 
Together, these two observations suggested to Andrade et al, (2001) that merger 
premia are fairly similar across different types of merger transactions. 
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Within the Australian context, Bugeja and Walter (1995) note that previous 
Australian research found abnormal target returns of approximately 20 per cent in 
both successful and unsuccessful takeovers in the takeover announcement period. 
 
More recently, Le and Schultz (2007) provide a comprehensive review of bidder 
shareholder returns on takeover announcements (see Table 13). The authors note that 
the findings vary significantly depending on time periods, windows examined, 
geographical locations, and in some cases, event study methods. Nevertheless, they 
find that the Australian literature is largely consistent with takeover announcements 
having no significant impact on bidder shareholders’ wealth in comparison to mixed 
evidence from the US market.  
 
Table 13. Empirical Evidence on the Bidder Shareholder Wealth Effects of Takeover 
Announcements. The table summarises the findings from event studies that examine 
the bidder shareholder wealth effects of takeover announcements. The categories are: 
study shows the reference for the study, period studied shows the years over which 
the study is conducted, return interval shows the frequency over which abnormal 
returns are computed, event window shows the period over which cumulative 
abnormal returns are calculated where 0 is the date, week or month of the takeover 
announcement, CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return for bidding firms 
over the event window and finally, country shows the geographic location from 
which the sample in the study is drawn. 
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Note: 
 *** Significant at 1% level; 
** Significant at 5% level; 
* Significant at 10% level; 
a CAAR is calculated using the standard market model; and 
b CAAR is calculated using the 0/1 market model. 
From Le and Schultz (2007). 
 
Recapping on the importance of the various event study methodologies in the 
findings, Le and Schultz (2007) have summarised the methodologies in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Summary of Event Study Methodologies. Study refers to the reference for 
the study. Method refers to the event study methodology employed to examine 
wealth effects. Window refers to the period for which cumulative abnormal returns 
are calculated. Return Interval shows the frequency for which returns are computed. 
CAAR shows the reported average cumulative abnormal bidder return over the event 
window. 
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Note: 
 *** Significant at 1%; 
** Significant at 5%; and, 
* Significant at 10%. 
From Le and Schultz (2007). 
 
Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) conducted a short-term event study using an event 
window of the 3-day period immediately surrounding the merger announcement date, 
a 90-day estimation period prior to the event period on a database of 1,086 takeovers 
of publicly traded U.S. firms between 1985 and 2002. They report the same general 
patterns that have been reported previously in the literature with the returns to 
shareholders of acquiring firms are slightly negative, reaching –0.52 per cent on 
average (compared to -0.7 per cent in Table 12 above). The authors visually outline 
the relatively symmetrical distribution of the cumulative abnormal returns for 
acquirers in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. Acquirers CAR frequency distribution. 
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From Hackbarth and Morellec (2008). 
 
Similarly, in the Australian context and using a dataset of 122 takeover 
announcements made by Australian listed companies between 1997 and 2004, Le 
and Schultz (2007) found on average that there were no significant bidder abnormal 
returns in response to takeover announcements. 
 
The authors also report that the returns to shareholders of target firms during the 3 
trading day event-window averaged 18.21 per cent (compared to 16.0 per cent in 
Table 12) and reaffirming that target abnormal returns are economically large. The 
skewed cumulative abnormal returns frequency distribution are presented in Figure 
27.  
 
Figure 27. Target CAR frequency distribution. 
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From Hackbarth and Morellec (2008). 
 
Andrade et al, (2001) comment that acquiring firm shareholders appear to come 
dangerously close to actually subsidizing takeover transactions. However, they note 
that the full sample results hide an important distinction based on financing of these 
transactions. In particular, they find that mergers financed with stock, at least 
partially, have different value effects from mergers that are financed with cash.  
 
They present a view that from the acquiring firm’s perspective, stock-financed 
mergers can be viewed as two simultaneous transactions; a merger and an equity 
issue. On average, equity issues are associated with reliably negative abnormal 
returns of around -2 to -3 percent during the few days surrounding the announcement 
and this is perceived to reflect the likelihood of bidder overvaluation by the market 
discussed earlier. Therefore Andrade et al, (2001) highlight that it is important to 
separate the stock-financed mergers from the others before making final judgement 
on the value effects for shareholders, especially for acquiring firms. 
 
Andrade et al, (2001) have summarised average announcement period abnormal 
returns for sub-samples split on the basis of whether any stock was used to finance 
the merger transaction in Table 15 and indicate that a negative announcement period 
stock market reaction for acquiring firms is limited to those that finance the mergers 
with stock. Acquiring firms that use at least some stock to finance their acquisition 
have reliably negative three-day average abnormal returns of -1.5 per cent, while 
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acquirers that abstain from equity financing have average abnormal returns of 0.1 per 
cent which are indistinguishable from zero. 
 
Table 15 Announcement Period Abnormal Returns for Sub-Samples, 1973-1998. 
 
Note. Statistical significance at the 5 percent level is denoted by a. 
From Andrade et al, (2001). 
 
Andrade et al, (2001) also report that target firm shareholders also do better when 
there is not equity financing. The three-day average abnormal return for target firms 
is 13 per cent for stock-financed mergers and just over 20 per cent for mergers 
financed without stock (Table 15). They believe that this is not a manifestation of 
larger deals having smaller premia and a greater tendency to be stock-financed 
because after controlling for deal size, they found the difference remains (1.3 per 
cent for large stock deals and 17.8 per cent for large non-stock deals). They note that 
financing method also has a significant impact on inferences about overall value 
creation from mergers. The combined average abnormal returns for stock-financed 
mergers are zero, suggesting that this subset of mergers do not increase overall 
shareholder value. On the other hand, the combined three-day abnormal returns for 
mergers financed without any stock are reliably positive at 3.6 per cent.  
 
Andrade et al’s, (2001) equity raising concept provides a convenient and logical 
explanation as to the different returns experienced by acquirers using stock as 
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payment. This differs from Fuller et al, (2002), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004, Dong et al (2006), etc. who proposes that acquirer underperformance relates to 
perceptions that bidder management view their stock as being overvalued. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 also suggest that the use of stock as payment relative 
to cash becomes prevalent in bull markets. Elsewhere, Bugeja and da Silva Rosa’s, 
(2008) note in Australian takeovers that changes to taxation legislation in 1999 have 
encourage bidders to offer stock as payment.  
 
In summary at least there is a general consensus that acquirers who pay with scrip 
tend to under perform at the time of the announcement relative to bidders that offer 
cash. Stock payment may also lead to long-term under performance relative to cash 
offers although this is less conclusive as discussed in the next section. 
 
2.7.5.1 Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
There are few studies which have investigated long term returns from mergers with 
the most recent being the work of Loughran and Vijh (1997). These researchers 
investigated mergers in the 1970-1989 period and estimated that during a five-year 
period following the acquisition, on average, firms that complete stock mergers earn 
significantly negative excess returns of -25.0 per cent whereas firms that complete 
cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns of 61.7 per cent. They 
also note that over the combined pre-acquisition and post-acquisition period, target 
shareholders who hold on to the acquirer stock received as payment in stock mergers 
do not earn significantly positive excess returns. 
 
These findings support the research of da Silva Rosa et al, (2000) who found that 
over a long-term post-bid period, bidders who offer shares significantly under-
perform regardless of the bid outcome (perhaps also reflecting overvalued status) 
 
However, Andrade et al, (2001) note that studies like the above are fraught with 
methodological problems given that to measure long-term abnormal returns reliably, 
one must first be able to measure long-term expected returns precisely and they 
consider that no one has provided a convincing way to do this. Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan’s (2004) concept of merger waves with an increasingly prevalence of 
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scrip bids replacing cash bids as the market moves higher could lead to a similar 
finding and reflect ‘bull market’ valuation errors. 
 
2.7.6 Characteristics of Acquirers and Targets 
There are a number of theories that relate to the characteristics of acquirers and 
targets or the success of M&As, particularly based on North American transactions 
over the last few decades. Theories are supported or discredited with statistical 
analysis of large data sets (usually thousands of transactions) that are drawn over a 
number of years (often a decade) and formulae manipulating ME/BE ratios or 
derived from event analysis. 
 
Theories draw on aspects of the following factors: 
• Tobin’s q theory of mergers 
• The impact of Agency 
• Hubris in bidding management 
• Bootstrapping of target earnings and other  
• Theories of misvaluations 
 
The main aspects regarding the above factors are described below. 
 
2.7.6.1 The q-theory of Mergers 
The q-theory of investment states that a firm’s investment rate should rise with its q 
ratio (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) while the q-theory of mergers translates this 
concept to mergers which involves an acquirer with a high asset valuation purchasing 
a target with low asset valuation (Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008). However, 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswathathan (2004) extend this concept to simply ‘overvalued 
firms buy undervalued firms’. Andrade et al, (2001) report that in 66 per cent of all 
mergers between 1973 and 1998, the acquirer’s q exceeded the target’s q (see Table 
10). . 
 
Jovanovic and Rousseau’s (2002) research concluded that: 
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(i) A firm's M&A investment responds to its q more (by a factor of 2.6) than its 
direct investment does, probably because M&A investment is a high fixed 
cost and a low marginal adjustment cost activity; 
(ii) The typical firm wastes some cash on M&A's, but not on internal investment 
(i.e., the "free cash flow" story works, but it  explains only a small fraction of 
mergers); 
(iii) The merger waves of 1900 and the 1920's, 1980's, and 1990's were a 
response to profitable reallocation opportunities, but the 1960’s wave was 
probably caused by something else. 
 
Their analysis is based on a model which treats mergers and acquisition as a form of 
reallocating capital and compares the process with the "disassembled" capital market 
such as equipment and machinery. 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008) challenge this conventional view of who buys 
whom based on q analysis. They note a pattern of research that suggests that ‘high 
buys less high’ might be a better description of their data than ‘high buys low’. They 
believe that in economic terms, bidders and targets are quite similar and on average, 
are less than a decile apart on market-to-book valuations. This holds regardless of 
adjustment for industry valuation effects. Thus, rather than characterising most 
merger transactions as high buys low, they believe a better description would be like 
buys like. 
 
The authors base their analysis on the property rights theory of the firm with a central 
theme that complementary assets should be bound together under common 
ownership. When there are significant complementarities between assets, then 
placing the assets under control of a single firm reduces the hold-up problems and 
underinvestment that results from the incomplete contracting. The concept that 
mergers reflect the desire to place complementary asset under common control is a 
central feature of their model. 
 
Essentially, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008) propose that firms search for a 
merger partner with potentially complementary assets. There are three key factors 
which are central to their analysis: 
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(i) Search-firms initiate standard investment projects and at the same time, firms 
search for Pareto-improving asset combinations with other firms. Firms 
cannot contract on the creation of distribution of the surplus generated by the 
asset combination. Placing assets under common control is the only way to 
realize the synergies from asset combinations. 
(ii) Scarcity - when firms find an acceptable partner, they then bargain over the 
available surplus from the merger. Whether a firm accepts or rejects a 
particular partner depends on whether it prefers the terms of the current offer 
to the expected net gains from waiting, which in turn are determined by the 
likelihood of future merger opportunities, as well as the expected surplus 
from future transactions. 
(iii) Complementarity - This determines how the surplus is created. The authors 
assume that gains from the merger are related to how the firms complement 
one another. Mergers are expected to create a greater surplus if the partners 
are a ‘better match’ along one or more dimensions, for e.g. leading to better 
production or better technology. 
 
Overall the researchers believe that the market-to-book ratio contains two parts, one 
for the stand-alone value for the firm and one from the net present value (NPV) of 
future merger activity. The NPV in the stand-alone firm arises from the skill or 
quality of the characteristics inherent in the firm. However, the NPV related to 
merger arises from the relative bargaining power of the merger firms, not from any 
inherent investment opportunities they bring to the newly merged firm. This is 
because unlike investment, a merger must be negotiated. Therefore, the benefit each 
party receives depends on its negotiating position, which in turn depends on each 
firm’s ability to locate another merger partner. Since both firms are necessary for the 
merger, the firm with the relatively more scarce assets will more easily locate 
another merger partner and therefore will garner more of the merger gains. 
 
Therefore the higher relative scarcity causes a firm to have a higher ex ante market-
to-book ratio, regardless of whether it is the bidder or the target in a particular 
transaction. Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) note that a theory of complements is 
the natural opposite of the q-theory. The q-theory of mergers suggest that mergers 
are about substitution; the acquiring firm substitutes the target’s poor management or 
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inappropriate use of assets with superior management and direction to better extract 
value from those assets. In the q-theory of mergers, the most value is created by 
pairing the worst performing assets with the best managers whereas the opposite is 
presented in the above case. 
 
Table 16. Levels and Differences in Bidder and Target Tobin’s q. Scaled M/B 
Difference is the difference between acquirer ln(Market-to-book) and target 
ln(Market-to-book) divided by the standard deviation of the ln(Market-to-book) for 
the acquirer’s industry in the year of acquisition. The units are in percent for a 
standard deviation, that is 100 is one standard deviation. 
 
 
From Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008). 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008) developed a sample of 3,400 merger 
transactions that were announced between 1980 and 2001 between publicly listed 
bidders and targets in the U.S. Figure 28 depicts the density distribution of the 
difference in market-to-book valuations for bidders and targets. Positive values 
correspond to high buys low transactions and the authors report that these occur 
roughly 60 per cent of the time. The plot shows that the mean value of the difference 
is positive, which indicates that on average, high market-to-book acquirers purchase 
lower market-to-book targets. 
 
However, they point out that the region to the left-hand size of the origin on the x-
axis corresponds to the roughly 40 per cent of the time in which the market-to-book 
of the acquirer is below that of the target. This low buys high result supports the 
findings in Rhodes-Kropf et al, (2005). 
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 Figure 28. Distribution of Market-to-Book Spreads. This graph shows the 
distribution of the difference between the acquirer M/B ratio and the target M/B 
ratio. The area to the left-hand size of the origin on the x-axis is the 40 per cent of the 
distribution for which the acquirer’s M/B is lower than that of the target. 
 
From Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008). 
 
Indeed, the evidence in Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) is consistent with this view 
with evidence that in a significant proportion of mergers the target firms’ plants are 
more efficient than those of the acquirer. In these cases, the productivity of the 
acquirer’s plants subsequently increases after the merger. The findings suggest that 
asset redeployment from low q to high q firms need not be the driving force behind 
mergers even if mergers are driven by efficiency considerations. 
 
The authors extended the research by examining the joint distribution of acquirer and 
target market-to-book ratios. Using a bivariate distribution enabled observation of 
which types of firms are most often involved in mergers. Table 17 groups the 
population of bidders and targets into bins according to annual NYSE breakpoints of 
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the market-to-book distributions. The i, jth cell in Table 17 reports the frequency of 
mergers occurring between targets in decile i and bidders in decile j.  
 
Table 17. Acquirer and Target Market-to-Book Ratios Using NYSE Deciles. Decile 
breakpoints are based on the distribution of M/B ratios for NYSE traded firms. Each 
cell counts the number of mergers from 1980 to 2001 between publicly traded 
bidders and targets in that decile pairing. The deciles are numbered from 10 to 1 in 
descending order of M/B. Pearson’s χ2 test for independence of bidder and target 
M/B ratios has a value of 854.91, with an associated p-value of 0.00. The mean 
acquirer lies in the fourth decile, while the mean target lies in the fifth decile of the 
M/B distribution. The mean difference is eight-tenths of a decile. 
 
 
From Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008). 
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, (2008) point out that the breakpoints are recomputed 
annually to reflect changes in the distribution of market-to-book ratios for all NYSE 
firms. Hence, any clustering that appears in the table is not a result of time-series 
clustering of merger activity. The table illustrates a high degree of correlation 
between bidder and target market-to-book ratios; Pearson’s χ2 test for independence 
of bidder and target market-to-book ratios has a value of 854.91, with an associated 
p-value of 0.00. In fact, the mean difference is eight-tenths of a decile, meaning that 
the average transaction couples bidders and targets that are no more than one decile 
apart in the distribution of market-to-book ratios. 
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Table 17 highlights a number of issues. First, while targets’ assets are valued less 
than acquirers’ assets, targets on average are valued more highly than the average 
firm. This can be seen by noting that most of the activity occurs in the upper left-
hand region of the table. Thus, both acquirers and targets tend to be in the high 
market-to-book deciles. Second, the prevailing wisdom that high buys low is borne 
out by the fact that most mergers lie below the main diagonal; these correspond to 
mergers in which the acquirer is in a higher market-to-book decile than the target. 
Finally, the finding of most interest to the authors is that merger activity seems to 
cluster down the main diagonal. This is the ‘like buys like’ diagonal. This means that 
in many cases, bidders and targets come from nearby points of the market-to-book 
distribution, indicating that if anything, although bidders have slightly higher market-
to-book ratios than targets, their asset valuations are generally quite similar. The 
table indicates why most research has focused on the high buys low result, as 
acquirers do tend to have slightly higher market-to-book ratios than targets. 
However, Table 17 also suggests that something may be driving firms with similar 
market-to-book ratios to merge. 
 
2.7.6.2 Agency 
Agency problems are summarised by Brailsford and Knights (1998) to reflect 
management which undertakes shareholder wealth decreasing transactions in order to 
gain personal benefit. They note that managerial theory of the firm argues that the 
interests of management are best achieved through growth and that acquisitions offer 
a speedy and cost-effective route to growth. However, growth for the sake of growth 
can be a wealth reducing strategy. 
 
Eddey and Casey (1989) cite that it is generally too costly to align perfectly the 
interests of directors and shareholders through bonding and monitoring contacts, 
hence the existence of residual agency costs. In their research studying 400 
Australian takeover bids it was encouraging that they concluded that overall, 
directors have acted in a manner consistent with shareholder interests, even though 
personal wealth effects are greatest for directors of bid-accept targets. 
 
2.7.6.3 Misvaluations 
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Schleifer and Vishny’s (2003) propose a model based on a belief that financial 
markets are inefficient, so some firms are valued incorrectly. In contrast, managers 
are completely rational, understand stock market inefficiencies, and take advantage 
of them, in part through merger decisions. Dong et al (2006) concurs that these 
effects stem from the efforts of bidders to profit by buying undervalued targets for 
cash at a price below fundamental value, or by paying equity for targets that, even if 
overvalued, are less overvalued than the bidder’s offer. 
 
Schleifer and Vishny (2003) consider that their model helps explain who acquires 
whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences of mergers, 
and merger waves. They also make several predictions:  
(1) Acquisitions are disproportionately for stock when aggregate or 
industry valuations are high, and for cash when they are low; 
(2) The volume of stock acquisition increases with the dispersion of 
valuations among firms;  
(3) Targets in cash acquisitions earn low prior returns, whereas 
bidders in stock acquisitions earn high prior returns; 
(4) Bidders in stock acquisitions exhibit signs of overvaluation, such 
as earnings manipulation and insider selling; 
(5) Long-run returns to bidders are likely to be negative in stock 
acquisitions, and  positive in cash acquisitions; 
(6) Despite negative long-run returns, acquisitions for stock serve the 
interest of the long-term shareholders of the bidder; 
(7) Acquiring a firm in another industry may yield higher long-run 
returns than a related acquisition; 
(8) Management resistance to some cash tender offers is in the 
interest of shareholders; 
(9) Managers of targets in stock acquisitions are likely to have 
relatively short horizons or, alternatively, get paid for agreeing to 
the deal. 
 
Interestingly, they point out that a model of stock-market-driven acquisitions falls 
into the rapidly growing field of behavioural corporate finance, which includes 
corporate policies such as debt and equity issuance, share repurchases, dividends and 
 148
investment as a response to market mispricing. This thesis would agree that there is a 
significant amount of empirical evidence that appears consistent with this view. 
 
Dong et al (2006) surmise that target overvaluation encourages target management to 
voluntarily accept expropriative offers in order to cash out. Bidder and target 
misvaluation measures should affect expropriation opportunities and managerial 
incentives, and therefore transaction characteristics including the means of payment 
(stock versus cash), the form of the offer (merger versus tender offer), bid premium, 
hostility of target to the offer, success of the bid, and event-period returns. The 
misevaluation hypothesis also implies bidders’ offers will tend to be overvalued 
relative to targets. 
 
Massa and Zhang (2009) studied the impact of ‘‘style investing’’ in takeovers and 
argue that if the bidder belongs to an investment style in line with the target this may 
be more popular with the market, leading to an increase in the bidder’s value. By 
using data on the flows in mutual funds, the authors constructed a measure of 
popularity, which relies directly on the identification of sentiment-induced investor 
demand, rather than being a direct transformation of stock market data. They believe 
they show that differences in popularity between bidder and target help to explain 
their pairing. 
 
The merger with a more popular target generates a halo effect from the target to the 
bidder that induces the market to evaluate the assets of the less popular bidder at the 
(inflated) market value of the more popular target (reverse bootstrapping, see Section 
2.7.5.5). They also note that both bidder and target premiums are positively related to 
the difference in popularity between the target and the bidder. However, the target’s 
ability to expropriate the gain is reduced by the fact that its bargaining position is 
weaker when the bidder’s potential for asset appreciation is higher. 
 
2.7.6.4 Hubris 
Roll (1986) presents the hubris hypothesis as an explanation of corporate takeovers. 
He considers that hubris on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms 
can explain why bids are made even when a valuation above the current market price 
represents a positive valuation error. Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too 
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much for their targets. He also argues that the evidence supports the hubris 
hypothesis as much as it supports other explanations such as taxes, synergy, and 
inefficient target management. 
 
Hietala et al, (2003) further develops Rolls (1986) work by highlighting that it is also 
possible that managers obtain private, non pecuniary benefits from control and 
acquisitions that do not benefit shareholders. Such managers may knowingly overpay 
if the private benefits of doing so outweigh the pecuniary costs. They postulate that 
the private benefit of consumption decreases as managers own a larger share of a 
firm's cash flows (or equity) until at some point management obtains effective voting 
control and can then increase private benefit consumption. 
 
The authors also show that it is often not possible to use target and bidder stock price 
movements to infer the market's estimates of synergies, bidder overpayment, and 
changes in bidder and target values except in two generic cases. These are when a 
sole bidder mounts an unsuccessful takeover attempt and the other occurs when the 
acquisition contest includes exactly two bidders. These issues are discussed further in 
Chapter 5 in the discussion of takeover premia and discounts in resource 
acquisitions. 
 
In using CEO overconfidence as assessment of potential hubris, Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) conducted a novel study using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs’ 
personal over-investment in their company (personal option positions) and their press 
portrayal. They found that the odds of making an acquisition are 65 per cent higher if 
the CEO is classified as overconfident using their criteria. The effect was largest if 
the merger was diversifying and did not require external financing. The market 
reaction to merger announcement (-0.90 per cent) is significantly more negative than 
for non-overconfident CEOs (-0.12 per cent). 
 
An interesting consequence of bidder management hubris is potentially ‘Winner’s 
Curse’ which represents a disequilibrium behaviour in which bidders systematically 
overbid and thus earn a negative payoff upon winning. However, studying the level 
of competition in 308 takeovers that were announced in the 1989–1999 period and 
comparing the level of competition to the takeover returns, Boone and Mulherin 
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(2008) found their analysis did not support winner’s curse and that on average under 
a tender process, increased competition did not lead to overpaying. 
 
2.7.6.5 Bootstrapping 
The management of acquiring companies often use statements that imply a 
transaction will be earnings per share (eps) positive as strong support for an 
impending acquisition. As noted by some authors (Peirson et al, 1990, Meyers, 1976) 
it is possible to deliver this eps growth through the funding mix, particularly through 
debt and its tax deductible interest. Hence, they argue that there may not be any 
economic benefit from the acquisition as measured against cost of capital measures. 
 
The importance of eps growth is the ability for the acquirer to ‘bootstrap’ or re-rate 
the earnings of the target company if the acquirer is trading on a higher P/E multiple. 
However, bootstrapping can also apply to other aspects, for example in cross-border 
mergers, where there are different corporate governance standards as researched by 
Martynov and Renneboog (2008) or as noted later this thesis, mine production 
where, for example, gold production is sourced from a range of higher and lower 
quality gold mines. As discussed earlier (Section 2.7.5.3), there is also the scope for 
‘reverse bootstrapping’ as outlined by Massa and Zhang (2009) where the acquirer is 
re-rated in line with the higher rating of the target’s assets. 
 
While theoretically if a transaction is eps positive but lacks economic benefits,  
bootstrapping will not occur (Peirson et al, 1990; Stewart ,1991; Sirower, 1997), and 
the merged company market P/E ratio will reflect a weighted average ratio of each 
earnings contribution prior to the transaction. However, in reality this is generally not 
the case and this is supported by the importance for transactions to be reported as eps 
positive to gain market support. Bootstrapping is an important shareholder value 
creation tool for resource acquisitions and is discussed when reviewing transactions 
in Chapter 5.  
 
2.7.7 Independent Expert’s Reports 
As noted in Section 2.6.2.4, an independent experts’ report is only required in a 
takeover if the bidder and target have a director in common or the bidder has a 
relevant interest in 30 per cent or more of the issued share when it makes the 
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takeover offer. However they are generally required to meet ASIC policy with a 
scheme of arrangement. Australian research has been focused on the influence of an 
independent experts report on bid premia and the commissioning of a report is often 
linked with endogenous factors given the requirements listed above. 
 
Eddey (1993) conducted an empirical examination of independent expert reports in 
takeover bids using 170 reports that were issued in the 364 cash-based bids that 
occurred between January 1988 and December 1991. He found that bid premia 
offered in takeover bids where an expert’s report was issued were not significantly 
lower than bid premia in other bids. He attributed this to the independent experts 
acting as a countervailing influence on bidders holding a superior pre-bid bargaining 
position. However, recent work by Bugeja (2005) contradicted some of these 
findings by Eddey (1993) and his research indicated that target premiums are lower 
where an expert report is required.  
 
Bugeja’s (2005) results also confirmed a higher frequency of price revisions where 
an expert indicates that the offer is 'not fair'. However, the associated increased offers 
were insufficient to raise the price to the level in takeovers without expert reports. 
 
Bugeja’s (2005) cites Matolcsy (1995) who provides a descriptive study of the 
providers of expert reports and the common valuation methods used. Using 323 
expert reports between 1988 and 1993, the data indicates that no single firm 
dominates the expert report market and that the main providers of independent expert 
reports are the large accounting firms. The main valuation techniques used are asset-
based valuation methods (31 per cent) and capitalized earnings (27 per cent). 
Discounted cash flows are used in 8 per cent of bids. This contrasts with the 
independent experts reports in resource company M&A which are likely to include 
discounted cash flows as a priority (see Chapter 5). 
 
In the U.S., Kisgen et al, (2009) report that over the period 1994–2003, 80 per cent of 
targets and 37 per cent of acquirers obtain a third-party assessment of the fairness of 
a merger or acquisition. These fairness opinions did not affect deal outcomes when 
used by targets, but they affect deal outcomes when used by acquirers. Their findings 
were that the deal premium is lower in transactions if the acquirer obtains a fairness 
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opinion, and is further reduced if multiple advisors provide an opinion. However, the 
acquirer’s announcement-period return is 2.3 per cent lower if the acquirer has a 
fairness opinion, especially if the acquirer pays a high premium, indicating that 
investors are skeptical of these transactions. 
 
Further work by Bugeja et al (2005) and Bugeja (2005a) found that the fees charged 
by independent experts for their reports were not influenced by previous client 
relationships with the target nor was there any statistical difference in the rate at 
which experts with other business dealings with the target, including the target’s 
auditor, provide an opinion that agrees with that of directors. However, Bugeja 
(2005a) states that the capital market reaction around the release of reports produced 
by auditors are viewed as non-independent. This is in line with the defensive stance 
taken by Grant Samuel in criticism of independent expert reports at that time 
(Sydney Morning Herald 2005). Grant Samuel is responsible for many independent 
expert reports in the Australian resource sector.  
 
2.7.8 Acquiring Toeholds or Strategic Stakes in Takeovers 
One of the options for bidders is to acquire a strategic stake in a target company prior 
to announcing a formal bid and as mentioned in Section 2.6.3, this can be up to 20 
per cent of the voting shares. Bugeja and Walter’s (1995) research highlighted a 
correlation between bidder’s interest and premium offered to target shareholders (see 
Table 11 earlier) while Eddey and Casey (1989) suggest that directors of target 
companies are more likely to recommend bid acceptance if the bidder has a 
substantial toehold position. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Le and Schultz’s (2007) research used a dataset of 122 
takeover announcements made by Australian listed companies between 1997 and 
2004 inclusive, and while they found no significant bidder abnormal returns to 
takeover announcements on average, there was a positive association between the 
presence of toeholds/toehold size and bidder abnormal returns. 
 
Eddey and Casey (1989) note that it is generally in the interests of individual target 
shareholders to accept the bidder’s offer when the bidder is a major shareholder to 
avoid remaining in a minority position, even if the individual shareholder believes 
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that the bid undervalued the target (the ‘Prisoners Dilemma” from game theory 
where various players have an incentive to act one way yet have individual 
incentives to act in another). Reasons for this include: the fact that individual 
shareholders may not be able to command a premium for relinquishing control, the 
difficulties for target management to implement an auction process, the possibility 
that locked in minority shareholders may face the risk that the bidder will manage the 
target in a manner that disadvantages minority shareholders, and lastly, the authors 
cite research which suggest that in partial bids, the returns have been the lowest for 
those shareholders who did not accept the bid. 
 
2.7.9 Takeover Defences and Target Resistance 
Maheswaran and Pinder (2005) report that there are two generally cited hypotheses 
as to why target companies resist takeover bids, namely; shareholder interest and 
managerial entrenchment. The first states that the target management will only resist 
takeover bids if they believe that the bidder’s offer is below the target’s true market 
value. In this setting, bid resistance is a bargaining tool that is used by management 
to increase the wealth of target shareholders by improving the terms of the takeover.  
 
In contrast, the management entrenchment hypothesis states that target management 
will resist takeover bids that threaten their power, reputation or company-specific 
human capital. In this setting, bid resistance is a defensive ploy used by self-
interested management, which results in a decrease in the wealth of target 
shareholders.  
 
Shoenberg and Thornton (2006) remind us that there are both pre-bid and post-bid 
defences. They note the best pre-bid defence is simply management pursuing 
corporate strategies that will maximise shareholder value, thereby reducing the 
incentive for any change in control. Other pre-bid defences include altering the 
capital structure and voting rights (many anti-takeover amendments found in the US 
are restricted under UK law and in Australia), placing friendly blocking stakes or 
increasing gearing levels to discourage the possibility of a highly leveraged buy outs 
and also poison pill strategies with ‘golden handshakes’ for the CEO and senior 
management. There is also the capacity to enhance public relations to build loyalty to 
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the existing management as well as realising hidden values within the firm. (Clarke 
and Brennan, 1990) 
 
Casey and Eddey (1986) report that in nearly every contested takeover, target 
company directors state that the consideration offered by the bidder is inadequate in 
that it undervalues the target company. Defensive tactics, directors invariably argue, 
are designed either to force the bidder to raise its bid premium, to entice a market 
auction for control, or to defeat all current offers until a more acceptable offer is 
received. Their later research (Eddey and Casey 1989) finds some support for the 
shareholder interest hypothesis where they find that bid premia on bids that target 
directors recommend be rejected are statistically significantly lower than the premia 
on bids that target directors recommend be accepted. 
 
Bugeja and Walter (1995) also examined the impact of target director 
recommendations on the wealth of target shareholders around the takeover 
announcement. They found that the cumulative average abnormal returns are higher 
for bids that directors reject than for bids that directors accept. However, the 
difference in cumulative average abnormal return between the two groups is not 
statistically significant. Hence they believe that the overall Australian evidence on 
shareholder interest versus management entrenchment hypotheses to be inconclusive. 
This is supported by Maheswaran and Pinder (2005) who also report that both the 
Australian and U.S. research are inconclusive from their review. 
 
In summary Maheswaran and Pinder’s (2005) research found that bid resistance 
increases target shareholder wealth in the post-announcement period and that the 
probability of bid hostility increases with the target’s size, decreases with the target’s 
performance and is unrelated to the size of the premium offered by the bidder. They 
also found that bid hostility decreases the probability of bid success, increases the 
probability of bid revision and has no effect on the probability of competing bidders 
entering the market. 
 
In the U.K. Shoenberg and Thornton (2006) found statistical analysis indicated that 
that ‘white knights’ and ‘management buy outs’ were the most effective takeover 
defences and suggested that other commonly employed defence tactics, including the 
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lobbying of stakeholders and regulatory appeals, have a weak and indecisive impact 
on bid outcome. Furthermore, once in a contested situation, the capacity of 
executives to use takeover defences either to entrench themselves or to boost the bid 
premium for shareholders was found to be limited.  
 
2.7.10 Final Comment 
Overall there has been substantial research covering many aspects of M&A activity 
with some significant contributions from Australia, albeit with non-existent studies 
on resource merger and acquisitions. However, much of the research has been 
inconclusive with only a handful of axioms to be fully supported. This includes: 
strong target returns on offer announcement, acquirer underperformance with stock 
rather than cash payment, higher bidder q ratios relative to targets and increased 
stock offers in bull markets. Elsewhere there are many considerations that may or 
may not apply to particular takeovers. 
 
As Zollo (2003) states ‘It is particularly striking and at the same time disheartening, 
then, to observe that, after almost four decades of work, and the massive output 
produced, the guidance that academia can offer to practicing managers involved in 
these complex processes is still rather slim.’ 
 
A quest for this thesis is to provide firmer outcomes in Australian resource sector 
M&A. 
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3.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESOURCE SECTOR 
Resource companies are linked on a global basis by the international pricing of 
commodities and by the fact that all large and many mid-tier resource companies 
own assets across a number of countries. This globalization has led to more cross-
border M&A activity than in any other sector.  
 
This chapter provides a framework for the evolution of the resource sector in a global 
and Australian context. It outlines the current components of this sector, reviews key 
historical features which have influenced sectoral trends leading to its current 
structure as well as discussing the increasing correlation of specific commodities 
with the broader commodity market trends. 
 
3.1 Global Resource Sector 
The global resource sector within the global stock market has broadly evolved from 
the development of the mineral assets in mineral-rich countries; viz, Australia, 
Canada, South Africa and Chile. The world-class assets in these provinces lead to the 
establishment of a number of dominant companies which have further grown by 
exploring for and acquiring mineral deposits. 
 
Two of the four largest companies, BHP (now BHP Billiton) and CRA (now Rio 
Tinto Limited), had modest origins in Broken Hill but the later development of their 
Pilbara iron ore deposits and with the traditional funding out of London, provided 
these companies with a base to later grow through mineral exploration and 
acquisition. Brazilian Vale S.A. was established to develop the iron ore deposits in 
Minas Gerais, Brazil and has recently increased acquisition activity to diversify its 
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commodity and country exposure, the most notable was the acquisition of Canadian 
Falconbridge in a contested takeover in 2007. The relatively recent listing of China 
Shenhua Energy, at rank four, is based on Chinese coal mining and it is now starting 
to seek joint ventures and acquisitions in foreign countries, particularly by funding 
new development projects. The fifth, Xstrata plc, has grown to its position almost 
entirely through acquisitions. 
 
Historically, companies were formed to fund and manage the development of 
mineral deposits and seek further growth through additional exploration activities, 
but in recent times, acquisitions have become an increasingly attractive option. Long-
life assets with low operating costs are coveted by all companies and industry 
consolidation has almost stemmed from a ‘scramble’ of larger entities to acquire 
these assets, particularly where they have a capacity to secure lower-cost funding. 
However, given the scarcity factor in quality deposits, a legacy of over-paying for 
acquisitions may not be a problem in a regime of increasing commodity demand 
from emerging world economies. The pain of a ‘write-down’ is only temporary when 
one has acquired the ‘prize.’ 
 
As at 29 September 2009 the market capitalization of the global mining sector was 
US$1.15 trillion based on the Bloomberg Global Mining Index, which incorporates 
the top 85% stocks by market capitalization in sub-indices. This is dwarfed by some 
other market sectors and even appears relatively modest in comparison to the size of 
some large companies such as Microsoft Corporation (MSFT; market capitalization 
of US$222 billion) or Exxon Mobil Corp (XOM; US$323 billion). 
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Table 18. The mining sector as a proportion of world stock markets. 
US$ billion
World Stock Market $34,220
Mining Sector $1,150 3.4%
Top 5 companies $525 1.5%
Top 20 companies $893 2.6%
 
Data from Stock Resource. Sorting of leading mining companies is based on market 
capitalizations as at 28 September 2009. 
 
The global mining sector itself is dominated by a number of large companies with 
the top five comprising almost half of the sector by value, while the top 20 
companies comprise almost 80% of the sector (Table 19). 
 
Table 19. The top five and twenty companies as a proportion of the entire global 
mining sector capitalisation. 
US$ billion
Mining Sector $1,150
Top 5 companies $525 45.7%
Top 20 companies $893 77.6%
 
Data from Stock Resource. Sorting of leading mining companies is based on market 
capitalizations as at 28 September 2009. 
 
This polarization is evident by charting the market capitalization of the top 25 
companies (Figure 29). The four largest companies are at least twice the size of their 
nearest rivals while BHP Billiton stands out as the largest resource company with a 
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market capitalisation of US$173 billion. The darker bands indicate companies with 
major Australian listings including the dual listed BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto. 
 
Figure 29. Major Companies within the Global Mining Sector. 
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Data from Stock Resource. Sorting of leading mining companies is based on market 
capitalizations as at 28 September 2009. 
 
At present, the global mining sector is dominated by the diversified miners which 
comprise around half of the sector. The other half is split roughly between gold, base 
metals and to a lesser extent coal, with smaller platinum group metals (PGM), 
uranium and potash sectors. Figure 30 represents this sector split based on the top 25 
global resource companies as at 29 September 2009.  
 
Figure 30. Global mining sector split based on dominant commodity exposure(s) as 
29 September 2009. 
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Diversified, 52.7%
Coal, 9.8%
Gold, 12.9%
PGM, 4.2%
Base metals, 14.9%
Uranium, 1.9%
Potash, 3.5%
 
Based on market capitalisation data presented in Figure 31, Author’s sector 
allocation based on a combination of revenue source, asset base and market 
perceptions. 
 
This domination by diversified miners has dramatically changed over the last seven 
years. Figure 31 charts a similar graph for 15 July 2002. It highlights roughly four 
equal splits between the diversified, gold and aluminium sectors and both the base 
metals and PGM sectors. In particular the combined aluminum and base metal sector 
represented around 34% of the entire sector, where the individual dominant base 
metals can be segregated out. In comparison, in Figure 30, the entire base metals 
sector including the aluminium sector is represented by 14.9% of the top 80% of the 
global resources sector.  
 
Figure 31. Global mining sector split based on dominant commodity exposure(s) as 
at 15 July 2002. 
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Derived from JPMorgan (2002) sector splits. 
 
While this was partly influenced by changing commodity prices and market 
perceptions of the attractiveness of particular segments at different times, the logical 
conclusion is that the base metal sector has been largely acquired by the diversified 
miners. This is supported by the fact that three large recent takeovers involved Rio 
Tinto taking over Canadian Alcan in 2007, Vale taking over Falconbridge in 2006 
and BHP Billiton taking over WMC Resources in 2005. The influence of the 
consolidation by the diversified miners during the early stages of the recent 2002 – 
2008 resources boom is evident in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32. Sector size in the Global Resources 2002 – 2006 based on market 
capitalisation of component companies. 
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Derived from Gambardella (2002 – 2006). 
 
Figure 32 plots the total market capitalisation of companies within sectors as defined 
by analysts with JP Morgan during this period (including the author). The large 
increase in the diversified sector in 2005 and 2006 reflects their share price increases 
(e.g. a 72% increase in the global mining industry to US$791 billion as at 31 
December 2005 compared to 31 December 2004 according to PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers, 2006), additions to the sector (e.g. Russian Kazakhmys plc) as well as 
takeovers by the diversified sector of base metal companies, e.g. Inco by Vale. 
Nevertheless Figure 32 reiterates the recent dominance trend of the diversified sector 
which has in part, stemmed from M&A activity in other sectors.  
 
3.1.1 Australian Resource Sector 
Chapter 1, Section 6.0 provides an introduction to the Australia resource sector 
within the overall Australian Stock Market. Table 20 presents the market 
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capitalisation of the S&P/ASX 200 Resource sector as a percentage of the total 
market capitalisation of this index. While the mining sector and the resource sector 
are often used interchangeably in the market, readers will recall that the resource 
sector includes the oil and gas sector, i.e. part of the energy sector. Table 20 also 
splits out this component but retains the coal and uranium sectors to be comparable 
with earlier global mining sector terminology. 
 
Table 20. Market capitalisation of the S&P/ASX 200 Index and the resource sector. 
A$ billion
S&P ASX 200 Index $1,226
Resource sector $497 40.6%
Ex - oil  and gas $407 33.2%
 
Data from Stock Resource. 
 
Figure 33 ranks the top 25 Australian resource companies in terms of market 
capitalisation as at 30 September 2009. It also colour codes the key commodity 
sectors of these companies. Not surprisingly, the sector is dominated by BHP Billiton 
and Rio Tinto and to a lesser extent, Woodside Petroleum. These companies polarize 
the sector and many investors including larger funds may only hold positions in these 
stocks to meet adequate exposure to the sector for portfolio diversification. 
 
Figure 33. Top 25 Australian resource companies. 
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Data from Stock Resource. 
 
The next part of the sector is dominated by oil and gas producers (or providing 
service to this industry) but includes gold producer, Newcrest and new iron ore 
producer, Fortescue Metals. The rest of the top 25 companies comprise a mixture of 
coal, gold, uranium and oil and gas producers. Figure 34 provides a split of the 
market-capitalization-weighted commodity exposure of all the 59 resource 
companies within the S&P/ASX 200 Index comprising the S&P/ASX 200 Resources 
sector. 
 
Figure 34. S&P/ASX 200 Resources Sector broad commodity split. 
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Diversified, 62.0%
Coal, 1.8%
Oil and gas, 18.2%
Iron ore & steel, 6.1%
Gold, 5.3%
PGM, 0.5%
Base metals, 4.0%
Uranium, 2.1%
  
Market capitalisation data from Stock Resource. Author’s allocation to commodity 
exposure as per Figure 30.  
 
Not surprisingly, diversified miners dominate the entire sector with the second 
largest sector comprising the oil and gas sector. The thesis has segregated out iron 
ore and steel producers from the diversified miners. This sector has evolved initially 
from the spin out from OneSteel and Bluescope Steel from BHP Billiton but more 
recently with increasing iron ore prices, the emergence of a new iron ore sector lead 
by Fortescue Mining. 
 
Figure 35 excludes the oil and gas sector to rebalance the remaining sectors in line 
with the global mining split of Figure 30, although Figure 34 segregates out iron ore 
related companies from diversified mining despite the fact that iron ore mining is a 
major earnings contributor to diversified miners. 
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 Figure 35. S&P/ASX 200 Resources Sector broad commodity split and excluding oil 
and gas related companies. 
Diversified, 75.8%
Coal, 2.2%
Iron ore & steel, 7.5%
Gold, 6.5%
PGM, 0.6%
Base metals, 4.9%
Uranium, 2.5%
 
Again, the diversified miners overshadow the other sectors. As discussed in Chapter 
6, the takeover of many Australian base metal and gold companies during the 1990s 
and earlier this decade has enabled sectors such as coal, uranium and PGMs to 
feature more prominently in the index. 
 
3.2 Major events over the last 20 years 
This thesis investigates M&A activity over the past 20 years or so, commencing with 
the bull run leading to the October 1987 stock market crash. It identifies a number of 
recognizable disruptive events such as the 1987 crash, the Asian Crisis, the recent the 
Global Financial Crisis and the related interim periods of recovery during which 
share prices increased or drifted after a sharp fall.  
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Figure 36 plots the log of the HSBC 100 Mining Index over this period along with 
the segregated periods. The log of the index is used given the large size of the recent 
resources rally which overshadows past cycles if the raw data are used. 
 
Figure 36. Historical periods in the resource sector during the study period. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
The periods are identified in Table 21 along with start and end dates. Defining these 
distinct periods is important in later correlation analysis as long-term studies have 
often demonstrated suboptimal beta-adjusted segment returns compared to the 
market average (e.g. in the Australian resource sector: Ball 1986, Ball and Brown 
1980) 
 
Table 21. Defined periods over the last 23 years. 
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Period S tart E nd Months
86‐87 bull run 4 August 1986 19 October 1987 14
1987 recovery 29 October 1987 11 J anuary 1990 27
90‐92 drift 12 J anuary 1990 10 J une 1992 29
92‐96 bull run 18 November 1992 8 May 1996 42
As ian C ris is 25 J une 1997 27 August 1998 14
98‐2000 bull run 28 August 1998 13 J anuary 2000 17
Tech boom drift 14 J anuary 2000 18 October 2002 33
R esource boom 21 October 2002 19 May 2008 67
G lobal F inancial C ris is 27 May 2008 5 December 2008 7
2009 recovery 8 December 2008 24 S eptember 2009 9  
 
The important periods are discussed below given events during these periods often 
influenced investing behaviour. 
.  
3.2.1 1987 Crash 
In 1986, the U.S. economy was experiencing a ‘soft landing’ as economic growth 
slowed from a period of high growth. The stock market advanced significantly, with 
the Dow peaking in August 1987 at 2722 points or 44% over the previous year's 
closing of 1895 points (www.wikipedia.org). 
 
Shiller (1987) reports that the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index fell 22.6% (508 
points) on Monday 19 October 1987, which was unprecedented in stock market 
history for a single day, with the worst preceding fall being 12.8% on Monday 28 
October 1929. By the end of October, stock markets in Hong Kong had fallen 45.8%, 
Australia 41.8%, Spain 31%, the United Kingdom 26.4%, the U.S. 22.68%, and 
Canada 22.5%. In Australia the 1987 crash is also referred to as Black Tuesday 
because of the timezone difference. 
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 In a summary of the months leading up to the 1987 crash, the Motley Fool (1997) 
noted that US bond yields had risen from 7.28% to 10.22% in the preceding nine 
months, which was close to the longer-term historical average return from stocks at 
that time. This increasing yield was driven by increasing fears of inflation, the falling 
US dollar, the widening trade deficit, and rising oil prices. This trend reached a 
crescendo in mid-October with increasing tensions in the Persian Gulf when Iranian 
missiles hit a U.S.-flagged tanker off of the coast of Kuwait. Only five months 
before, an Iraqi missile hit the U.S. frigate Stark, killing 37 sailors. 
 
Other aspects included decreasing confidence in Wall Street given the famous insider 
trading scandals, with traders Milken, Boesky, Siegel, and Freeman revealing an 
‘unfair market’ with a level of corruption and unfair practices.  There was also an 
influence from program trading and portfolio insurance. 
 
Around the time of the crash, Shiller (1987) conducted a survey of both individual 
and institutional investors inquiring about their behavior during the crash. He reports 
that nearly 1000 responses were received and the main results show that: 
 
1. No news story or rumor appearing on the 19th October or over the 
preceding weekend was responsible for investor behavior, 
2. Investors' importance rating of news appearing over the preceding week 
showed only a slight relation to decisions to buy or sell, 
3. There was a great deal of investor talk and anxiety around October 19, 
much more than suggested by the volume of trade, 
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4. Many investors thought that they could predict the market,  
5. Both buyers and sellers generally thought before the crash that the market 
was overvalued, 
6. Most investors interpreted the crash as due to the psychology of other 
investors, 
7. Many investors were influenced by technical analysis considerations, 
8. Portfolio insurance is only a small part of predetermined stop-loss 
behavior, and  
9. Some investors changed their investment strategy before the crash.  
 
On reviewing the results of Shiller’s (1987) survey and the events outlined earlier in 
the lead up to the 1987 crash, one can conclude that there were a number of 
simultaneous events leading to a loss of confidence on the state of the stock market 
and that while the timing of the crash was not pre-determined, it was not necessarily 
unexpected with hindsight analysis at that time.  
 
3.2.2 Asian Crisis 
On 2nd July 1997 the Thai baht’s peg collapsed and the baht lost roughly 15% of its 
value against the U.S. dollar. The financial markets of East and South-East Asia – in 
particular Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea – subsequently 
headed in a similar, downward direction during late 1997 and early 1998. Baig and 
Goldfajn (1998) note that the crisis became full-blown and intense foreign exchange 
and stock market turmoil spread in the entire region, culminating in the collapse of 
the Korean won. News of economic and political distress, particularly bank and 
corporate fragility, became common place in the affected countries. Park and Song 
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(2001) noted that these Southeast Asian countries also experienced a significant 
decline in their stock prices as well as a sustained, steep depreciation of their 
currencies 
 
The Asian crisis is interesting in that one line of investigation into its causes is the 
‘herd’ mentality of investors and the potential viewing of these economies as being 
closely linked. Clavo (1996) cited in Baig and Goldfajn (1998) comments on global 
investors and argues that since it is too costly for investors to address the state of 
each economy, it is optimal for them to pull out of a group of related markets 
simultaneously when they post signs of nervousness in just one of them. 
 
Park and Song (2001) report that prior to the crisis there were a number of disturbing 
economic trends emerging in these economies which include: 
• With the exception of the Philippines, all had experienced a slowdown in 
economic growth in 1996. 
• They had also seen their current account deficits rise substantially. As a 
percentage of GNP, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand saw 
their current account deficits deteriorate substantially. 
• The countries had experienced large foreign capital inflows in the 1990s. 
• The real exchange rates in all four countries appreciated markedly: from 
7.6% in Indonesia to 11.9% in the Philippines between 1990 and the first half 
of 1997. 
• The countries accumulated large external debts. 
• The rates of inflation in these countries except Malaysia were high in 1996 
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Hence, these authors suggest that the currencies of these Southeast Asian countries 
may have been susceptible to a speculative attack which caused the contagion. This 
has also been referred to as the ‘wake-up call’ effect. 
 
The Asian crisis influenced Australian resource markets as the demise of these 
export orientated countries was likely to reduce demand for Australian commodities 
and hence commodity prices. Prior to this time, some of the countries were referred 
to as part of the Asian Tigers reflecting their previous strong economic growth.  
 
3.2.3 Tech Boom 
In the second half of the 1990’s, the production of commodities was viewed as ‘old 
world’ and the attention was focused on the technology sector and the capacity for 
the internet to revolutionise retail and commercial business practice. The "dot-com 
bubble" (or sometimes the "I.T. bubble") is deemed a speculative bubble covering 
the 1998–2001 period, with a peak on 10th March 2000 when the NASDAQ peaked 
at 5132.52 (www.wikipedia.org). 
 
While resource shares were left in the doldrums, technology shares delivered 
outstanding performance, particularly with companies that appeared to have little 
prospect of short-term earnings. Foster et al. (2002) noted that analysts needed 
metrics to assess profitability issues but price-earnings multiples for companies 
reporting negative net income are not interpretable. Therefore variables such as the 
market to revenue ratio and revenue growth percentages were deemed applicable to a 
broad set of high-tech companies in their early years by these authors.  
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Selected percentages of high-tech firms with negative net income in the 1990-2000 
period range are presented in Table 22 and pose medium-term sustainability issues. 
 
Table 22. Selected percentages of high-tech firms with negative net income in the 
1990-2000 period. 
Sector 1994 1997 2000
High Tech Australia 62.3% 76.5% 68.1%
USA 39.5% 51.5% 62.8%
Non-High Tech Australia 37.9% 40.9% 40.3%
USA 32.1% 35.7% 41.0%  
From Foster et al (2002). 
 
These results are consistent with the high-tech sector being “high-risk” in a relative 
sense and in many respects, similar to exploration companies. Foster et al. (2002) 
found that in the Australian high-tech sector there was a premium to being a large-
scale player. They interpret that economies of scale is the main reason for this 
premium and again, there are similarities with the resources sector. 
 
During this time when global markets experienced a massive allocations of funds 
into high-tech companies, commodity prices were approaching all time lows; 1998 
saw an oil price as low as $10bbl, and mining companies were struggling to survive 
with copper prices at about US90 c/lb (Doyle et al., 2007). 
 
3.2.4 2002 – 2008 Resource Rally 
This five-year resources rally is the strongest and longest resource rally on record. 
Referring to the HSBC 100 Mining Index, on a global basis it is deemed to 
 174
commence in October 2002 during the time immediately following the  ‘tech wreck’ 
in which investors returned to old world technologies given their recent losses in the 
technology sector. It is also deemed to end around the 26 May 2008 with early onset 
of the Global Financial Crisis. However, the Australian resource rally is defined as 
commencing 2nd July 2003 and peaking on 19th May 2008. 
 
The rally was fuelled by a perceived increasing industrial demand from China and 
other emerging economies and while real demand was increasing, this demand was 
enhanced by additional investor speculative demand. In the early years increasing 
demand was in the face of relatively stagnant supply given the resource sector had 
remained in the doldrums for a number of years.  
 
Share prices rose an amazing 403% from the 2nd July 2003 to peak on the 19th May 
2008 as measured by the S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index. Over the same period the 
LMEX commodity index increased by 246% (Figure 37).  
 
Figure 37. The S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index and the LME LMEX commodity 
index. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
However, these returns are dwarfed by the performance of global mining companies 
as measured by the HSBC Global Diversified Mining and the HSBC Global Mining 
100 indices which increased by a massive 849% and 593% respectively (Figure 38). 
Figure 38 highlights the size of the rally relative to the performance of these indices 
over the preceding 15 years. It also shows the steepness of the fall in resource shares 
during the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent 2009 recovery. 
. 
Figure 38. The five and half year resource and commodity rally as evident with the 
HSBC global mining indices. 
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 From Bartrop (2009). 
 
Resource shares increased as commodity prices increased as evident in Figure 37 
with the LMEX index reflecting a composite of base metal price movements. 
However bulk commodity prices (iron ore, thermal and metallurgical coal) all 
increased over successive years in the boom reflecting strong spot prices impacting 
annual benchmark price negotiations. Figure 39 charts the increase in the Pilbara iron 
ore fines settlement price,which increased by 369% from the 2003 settlement price 
(applying for the year commencing 1 April 2003) to 2008 settlement price (for the 
year commencing 1st April 2008).  
 
This price increase improved the economics of many marginal or subeconomic iron 
ore deposits across Australia and helped create the iron ore sector discussed in 
Section 3.1.1 earlier. There was a similar occurrence in coal prices with the 
emergence of new coal companies, e.g. Felix Resources. 
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Figure 39. Australian Pilbara iron fines settlement price.  
 
Data sourced from Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton annual settlement price ASX releases. 
 
Garnaut (2006) refers to the boom as a “China boom” in comparison to the earlier 
“Japan boom” from the late 1950s to 1973 and the still earlier “United States-
Germany” boom in the two decades preceding the First World War. He believes that 
the Chinese growth has a greater impact than the U.S. during its period of rapid 
industrialization due to: 
• The nature of rapid, internationally-oriented economic growth associated with 
“catching up” with the technologies, institutions and metal intensity applied 
in the most advanced economies. 
• China has a much larger population (almost twice as large) than all of the 
established advanced economies taken together. 
• It has a low per capita domestic endowment of most economically valuable 
natural resources 
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 One of the major themes during the 2002-2006 Resource Boom has been the concept 
of applying metal intensity-of-use per capita to Chinese growth and actively 
promoted by the major diversified miners (e.g. BHP 2009, Rio Tinto, 2008). Figure 
40 outlines typical examples with steel and aluminum by plotting each metal usage 
per capita versus GDP per capita for China and its more developed neighbours. The 
bullish interpretation is that small increases in the wealth of the Chinese will lead to 
similar trends of increasing metal consumption but when this is applied over the 
Chinese population (1.4 billion) it translates into a large additional demand for 
commodities.  
 
Figure 40. Metals demand and economic growth in Northeast Asia (using PPP 
exchange rates for China). 
 
 
From Garnault and Long (2006). 
 
During the boom the major resource companies promoted a ‘new era’ in commodity 
demand and provided analysis supporting their themes. These themes generally 
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became more sophisticated as the boom progressed as presented in broad 
chronological order below.  
1. A change from the long-term declining trend of real commodity prices 
entering a period of rising real commodity prices similar to the 1960s. 
2. The sustainability of China’s high (+10%) annual compound growth rates for 
GDP given its low base and the ambitions of the Chinese Government. 
3. The increasing intensity-of-use of metals per capita described above and the 
impact of applying this across a large population base. 
4. The impact of urbanization where the metal consumption (primarily steel) 
increased as workers moved from rural areas to the cities in search of 
employment. This primarily involved the construction of high-rise apartments 
to house this migration. 
5. Lastly, China was only one of a number of countries following this 
development route, with India not far behind.  Urbanisation itself was 
applicable to large population bases in both Africa and South America. 
 
An important contributor to rising commodity prices was the influence of investment 
funds. Indeed Goodyear (2006) noted that while China and other economies were 
increasing their commodity demand due to industrialization, this demand and 
subsequent prices were being exacerbated by the presence of speculative funds in the 
market – investment that had not been experienced to the same degree in past 
commodity booms.  
 
The belief that the rapidly developing economies of China and India provided long-
lasting fundamentals led to the establishment of many commodity funds and several 
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commodity indices, particularly given that it was argued that commodities provided 
portfolio diversification benefits (Schneeweis and Spurgin, 2000). 
 
Doyle et al. (2007) report that out of global pension funds assets under management,  
estimated at US$18.6 trillion, around US$80 billion is estimated to be invested in 
commodities at that time. In their survey the researchers found that given many fund 
managers regard commodities as an asset class, institutional investors were expected 
to build an exposure of at least 5 per cent (equivalent to US$930 billion) to them 
although this had only partially happened to date. 
 
Figure 41 plots the estimated increase in global funds invested in commodity 
indexes. While the detail is scant, data appear to exclude futures which are likely to 
further significantly influence commodity pricing.  
 
Figure 41. Funds Investing in Commodity Indexes. 
 
From the Wall Street Examiner (2008). 
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 Data on fund investment in commodity related products are difficult to obtain, 
particularly given the secrecy surrounding hedge-fund investments. From the thesis 
perspective, it is likely that commodity investment accelerated commodity price 
increases during the bull run but then the unwinding of these positions during the 
Global Financial Crisis is likely to have exacerbated their fall. It also contributed to a 
greater correlation in the movement between individual commodity prices and a 
greater overall response to macro-economic events as discussed in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2.5 Global Financial Crisis 
The Global Financial Crisis impacted all financial and commodity markets in 
response to frozen credit markets and a scramble to rebuild damaged balance sheets 
by financial institutions which itself involved a global asset sell off and repatriation 
of funds back to the U.S. 
 
In the 2009 ABARE conference, World Bank Lead Economist Andrew Burns, 
presented a succinct reminder as to why we are in the current position (Burns 2009). 
Bluntly, he stated: 
‘The US-based financial crisis has raised costs, reduced access to credit, increased 
uncertainty and destroyed wealth worldwide. This has sparked an unprecedented 
deep and synchronised global recession.’ 
 
The initial signs of a developing market correction were felt as early as August 2007 
when there was a collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market after several years 
of unregulated growth (see Figure 42). This market comprised collateralized debt 
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obligations (CDOs) and the falling collateral values (i.e. US house prices) lead to 
rapidly diminishing and uncertain CDO values. As CDOs comprised the investment 
assets of many global banks, funds and other institutions, each experienced a rapid 
reduction in asset values. This impact and the subsequent necessary restoration of 
balance sheets created a withdrawal of capital from the markets, a dramatic reduction 
in lending and the government bail out of a number of large banks, primarily in the 
US and UK.  
 
Figure 42. The growth in US collateralised debt obligations.  
 
From Burns (2009). 
 
As highlighted in Figure 43, the collapse of Lehman Brothers Investment Bank in the 
U.S. was a major event in September 2008 which led to a dramatic increase in 
spreads between the 3 month US LIBOR rate and the US Federal funds rate. 
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Figure 43. The spread between 3-month US Libor and the US Federal Funds Rate. 
 
From Burns (2009). 
 
Figure 44, also from Burns (2009) highlights the synchronised fall in world stock 
markets in US dollar terms. 
 
Figure 44. Worlds stock market falls in US$ terms.  
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 From Burns (2009). 
 
A generally rapid response by many Governments has involved lowering domestic 
interest rates and announcing a series of stimulus packages to encourage domestic 
growth. The relative size of some of these packages is presented in Figure 45 and 
highlights the dominance of the Chinese package.  
 
After a period of inventory run down followed by restocking, the Chinese economy 
has exhibited evidence of the effectiveness of its US$935 billion infrastructure 
related expenditure which has contributed to a stronger than expected recovery in 
commodity prices and the resource sector.  
 
Figure 45. Relative size of stimulus packages by country. 
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 From Tulpulé (2009). 
 
In the latter part of 2007 the implications of the subprime mortgage collapse were not 
fully appreciated by the global resource markets as the less liquid commodities such 
as the bulk commodities (iron ore and coal) continued to exhibit strength. Senior 
executives of both BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto promoted a ‘decoupling’ of China 
from the US and western world economies claiming China’s domestic demand would 
maintain robust commodity demand (e.g. Rio Tinto 2008). This led to a strong share 
price performance of the diversified miners and smaller iron ore and coal producers 
in comparison with the share prices of resource companies exposed to the falling 
spot-traded LME commodity prices. It also potentially created an unprecedented 
confidence in resource share investment beyond the levels experienced in earlier 
cycles. 
 
While base metal prices continued to fall during the first half of 2008, the last 
significant commodity rally has been oil on market perceptions that it would reach 
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US$200 per barrel in the short term. However it peaked at US$145.18 per barrel 
(Nymex WTI) on 14 July 2008 and subsequently fell below US$100 per barrel by 
mid September 2008. 
 
The ‘decoupling’ of China from the western world was initially borne out to be 
incorrect (The Economist, 2009) as evidenced by the 33% and 44% falls in the 
negotiated iron ore prices for Hamersley fines and lump ore respectively for the year 
commencing 1 April 2009. Earlier, LME commodity prices experienced a nadir in 
late November/early December 2008 but had commenced a slow period of recovery 
by the time the bulk negotiations had largely been settled  
 
3.2.6 2009 Recovery 
Spot LME base-metal prices continued to strengthen in the second half of 2009 
reflecting a higher than expected level of commodity demand from China and later 
support from increasing commodity investment by hedge and commodity funds. In 
particular, there were encouraging signs of a slow but sustainable economic recovery 
in the US and Europe and market sentiment was boosted on the 26 September 2009 
when Federal Chairman Bernanke commented that technically, the US was out of 
recession (Bloomberg 2009).  
 
Indeed, the bulk commodity negotiations in 2010 have also resulted in strong 
increases in all the bulk commodity prices (e.g. iron ore price have increased by 80-
90 per cent; ChinaDaily 2010) although these prices are now on a new quarterly 
basis rather than annual contracts.  
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3.3 Commodity Market Size Constraints 
The ability for the global resources sector and individual subsectors to grow in size is 
largely constrained by the industries in which the companies operate. This has 
influenced company strategies to deliver growth, particularly during the latter part of 
the 1990s and earlier this decade (Asian Crisis – Tech Boom) when a size premium 
was evident and reflected the perceived historical poor returns from the mining 
industry (see Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 earlier). 
 
To appreciate commodity market size constraints, Table 23 outlines world traded 
production in each metal for the calendar years 2007 and 2008 derived from the 
various metal study groups, USGS (2009) or ABARE as well as ABARE production 
forecasts for 2009 and 2010 where these have been made. The production data on 
bulk commodities are for traded production rather than integrated production while 
base metals exclude intermediate products, e.g. alumina production is not segregated 
out from final aluminium production. Table 23 also lists the compound annual 
growth rates (CAGR) of production over longer timeframes. 
 
Table 23. World traded production of commodities. 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 CAGR Timeframe Data source
Precious Metals
Gold (t) 2,475 2,415 2,473 2,501 -0.4% 10 ABARE
Silver (t) 19,795 na na na 1.8% 8 ABARE
Non-ferrous Metals
Aluminium (kt) 38,000 39,700 36,114 38,228 4.6% 10 U.S. Geological Survey/ABARE
Copper (kt) 15,464 15,458 15,587 16,157 2.2% 11 International Copper Study Group/ABARE
Zinc (kt) 11,143 11,752 10,909 11,345 2.6% 6 International Lead and Zinc Study Group/ABARE
Lead (kt) 3,607 3,913 na na 3.2% 8 International Lead and Zinc Study Group/ABARE
Nickel (kt) 1,429 1,386 1,197 1,264 1.6% 10 International Nickel Study Group/ABARE
Tin (kt) 335 333 na na 3.9% 8 U.S. Geological Survey
Uranium (kt) 43.3 50.0 56.1 58.8 7.8% 10 ABARE
Bulk Commodities 
Thermal seaborne coal trade (Mt) 607 704 690 730 7.4% 10 ABARE
Metallurgical seaborne coal trade (Mt) 227 235 207 213 7.5% 10 ABARE
Iron ore (world exports, Mt) 829 887 914 998 7.1% 10 ABARE  
 
The 2007-2009 production data (2009 is grossed for full year production estimate) is 
then multiplied by the relevant commodity prices deflated to 2005 prices using the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis U.S. GDP deflator to provide a weighted average 
gross production value in Table 24.  
 
To determine an approximate stock market value for these commodities, this thesis 
utilizes data reported by JP Morgan in the 2002-2006 period (Gambardella 2002-
2006) as these define a time period around the commencement but prior to the 
heights of the 2002-2008 resources boom.  
 
The thesis utilized Enterprise Value/Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortisation (EV/EBITDA) multiples to derive a market value given the greater 
robustness of this valuation technique across a rising market relative to P/E ratios. 
Figure 46 plots EBITDA margins for the sectors over this approximate 4.5 year 
period with the weighted average based on the market capitalisation of each sector at 
that time. While the chart is cluttered with the number of sectors, the weighted 
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average EBITDA margin (black line) during the period has been between 30% and 
40% except as the boom accelerated during 2006. The average EBITDA margin over 
the period was 33% and is in line with PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) analysis of 
the top 40 global mining companies which display EBITDA margins of 31% and 
36% for the calendar years 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
 
Figure 46. EBITDA Margins for global sectors between February 2002 and June 
2006 including the weighted average margin based on the market capitalisation of 
each sector. 
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Data sources from Gambardella (2002-2006). 
 
Similarly, Figure 47 plots the EV/EBITDA multiples for each sector and the market 
capitalisation weighted average across the same time period. Given the forward 
looking nature of the market, EV/EBITDA multiples are rolled forward to the next 
year approximately 3-4 months prior to the end of the financial year. The chart 
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highlights the divergence in multiples for the various sectors with extremes of the 
gold sector relative to some base metal sectors. It also highlights a declining multiple 
in 2006 as the resources boom takes hold. Again while Figure 47 is cluttered with the 
various sectors, the weighted average EV/EBITDA multiple tends to range between 
6 and 8 for most of the time, with an average over the period at 6.9. 
 
Figure 47. EV/EBITDA multiples for global sectors between February 2002 and 
June 2006 including the weighted average margin based on the market capitalisation 
of each sector 
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Data sources from Gambardella (2002-2006). 
 
Lastly as EV or enterprise value represents the market equity plus net debt, Figure 48 
plots the sector net debt to market capitalisation across the same time period. With 
increasing share prices leading to the increasing market capitalisation of resource 
companies in comparison to relatively static debt levels, the net debt to capitalisation 
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(cap) ratio decreased as the boom advanced. The weighted average net debt to cap 
was 24% over the period although it averages 27% prior to 2005. 
 
Figure 48. Net debt to market capitalisation for global sectors between February 
2002 and June 2006 including the weighted average margin based on the market 
capitalisation of each sector 
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Data sourced from Gambardella (2002-2006). 
 
The weighted average data from Figures 46 to 48 have been applied to the gross 
revenues derived in Table 23 and which have been indexed to 2005 commodity 
prices to provide approximate market values for each commodity (Table 24). While 
estimation is only approximate given a number of errors including non-listed 
producers, producers of intermediate products, integrated producers of non-traded 
commodities, etc. the total market capitalisation of the global resources sector at 
US$930 billion in 2005 is not too dissimilar from current estimates of US$1.15 
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billion outlined in Section 3.1 and further correlation is not warranted given the basis 
for this estimation.  
 
Table 24. Average potential sector values. 
Weighted Average 
Revenue per year for 
2007-2009 (US$m)
EBITDA 
Margin
EBITDA 
(US$m)
EBITDA 
multiple
Industry value 
(US$ million)
Industry equity 
value (US$ 
million)
CAGR Timeframe Data source
Precious Metals
Gold (t) $60,479 33% $19,958 6.9 $137,710 $111,056 -0.4% 10 ABARE
Silver (t) $8,025 33% $2,648 6.9 $18,273 $18,273 1.8% 8 ABARE
Non-ferrous Metals
Aluminium (kt) $74,018 33% $24,426 6.9 $168,540 $168,540 4.6% 10 U.S. Geological Survey/ABARE
Copper (kt) $99,235 33% $32,747 6.9 $225,957 $225,957 2.2% 11 International Copper Study Group/ABARE
Zinc (kt) $25,157 33% $8,302 6.9 $57,282 $57,282 2.6% 6 International Lead and Zinc Study Group/ABARE
Lead (kt) $5,434 33% $1,793 6.9 $12,373 $12,373 3.2% 8 International Lead and Zinc Study Group/ABARE
Nickel (kt) $32,913 33% $10,861 6.9 $74,942 $74,942 1.6% 10 International Nickel Study Group/ABARE
Tin (kt) $3,422 33% $1,129 6.9 $7,792 $7,792 3.9% 8 U.S. Geological Survey
Uranium (kt) $5,522 33% $1,822 6.9 $12,573 $12,573 7.8% 10 ABARE
Bulk Commodities 
Thermal seaborned coal trade (Mt) $40,664 33% $13,419 6.9 $92,592 $92,592 7.4% 10 ABARE
Metallurgical seaborne coal trade (Mt) $30,915 33% $10,202 6.9 $70,394 $70,394 7.5% 10 ABARE
Iron ore (world exports, Mt) $34,419 33% $11,358 6.9 $78,371 $78,371 7.1% 10 ABARE  
 
The individual potential market value for each commodity sector is presented in 
Figure 49. This highlights the dominance of both the copper and aluminium sectors. 
 
Figure 49. Potential market size of the various resource sectors based on Table 24.  
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What is evident is that most of the potential copper market capitalisation is present in 
the diversified resource companies as with nickel and similarly this trend is occurring 
in aluminium. Gold and uranium and to a less degree, zinc (and lead), have remained 
relatively independent and are the next logical targets for consolidation. Elsewhere, 
the iron ore sector and to a lesser degree, the coal sector have both grown with the 
emergence of higher commodity prices (see Figure 39 for iron ore prices) and again 
more so in the case of iron ore, the presence of numerous deposits which have now 
become economic. 
 
Another factor promoting diversification strategies are anti-competitive or as referred 
to in the U.S., anti-trust considerations. While in Australia, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) now has this jurisdiction, in 
Europe it is the European Commission and in the U.S. it is the U.S. Justice 
Department and US Federal Trade Commission. The European Commission has been 
the most difficult to appease in recent times with the undisclosed conditions placed 
on BHP Billiton’s bid for Rio Tinto in 2008 in a statement of objections (BHP 
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Billiton 2008a) and the recent desire for both companies to merge their Western 
Australian iron ore interests. In the latter case, BHP Billiton has been arguing to 
abandon the annual benchmark negotiations for iron ore in favour of an index linked 
to spot prices to assist in gaining support from the commission (Bloomberg, 2009).  
 
It is not uncommon for the US Department of Justice or European Commission to 
request divestiture of key assets in M&As and this was evident in the 1999 Alcoa 
Inc. merger with Reynolds Inc. where anti-trust authorities forced Alcoa to divest 
Reynold’s alumina assets as a condition for allowing the merger to take place (see 
EU, 2000). This was unexpected and Reynold’s interest in the Worsley Alumina 
refinery was considered a key attraction to the merger but both US and European 
anti-trust agencies were concerned at the potential control by Alcoa of almost 50% of 
the world-wide trade in untied alumina sales. 
 
Moreover, there are other restrictions on M&A activity including sovereign risk and 
other factors such as the recent Australian Department of Defence rejection of state-
owned China Minmetals from buying the Prominent Hill mine from OZ Minerals in 
March 2009 in light of its location on the Woomera rocket testing range (SMH, 
2009). 
 
As a final comment, it is not only commodity sector size overlain by anti-trust 
considerations but also sovereign risk issues and the obvious lack of a strategic 
shareholder (i.e. open register) that leave M&A opportunities relatively limited on a 
global scale. In fact the scarcity of attractive and executable M&A targets requires 
increased compromise or non-participation. In addition, the growth imperative is 
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now placing pressure on companies to monitor worldwide exploration discoveries 
and seek an early foothold in promising advanced exploration projects which could 
lead to world-class discoveries as discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
3.4 Size Premia and Market Consolidation 
While individual acquisitions and mergers have been justified by a variety of factors, 
there are generally two main reasons which have validated the majority of past 
acquisitions and mergers: 
1. to gain an increase in market capitalisation; and 
2. to gain market share in specific commodities 
 
While both strategies have been employed in justifying M&A activity, this thesis 
believes that transactions in the mid to late 1990’s and earlier this decade were 
primarily by companies seeking to gain increased market relevance. This trend has 
moved to one of embarking on M&A activity due to target scarcity and an impetus 
that any remaining targets will soon be acquired. 
 
Prior to the late 1990s, there was an increased focus on asset quality and the creation 
of synergies. From the mid 1990s, but with increasing relevance during the tech 
boom, there was focus on M&A activity to control commodity supply as resource 
companies, then under pressure as ‘destroyers of capital’ with poor returns, 
recognized the pitfalls of being price takers. Lastly the A$/US$ depreciated in 1997 
and remained below 0.65 for a number of years without a corresponding adjustment 
in the share price of some resource companies which created cheap takeover targets. 
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These trends are discussed more fully with the M&A data in Chapter 5 but further 
background is required on size premia, the increasing correlation of various 
commodity prices and finally, the A$/US$ exchange rate. 
 
3.4.1 Size Premium 
Earlier this decade there was a well recognized size premium within the resources 
sector, perhaps accentuated during the Tech Boom. This is likely to reflect a number 
factors occurring at that time including 
• The increasing polarization of the resources sector with domination by BHP, 
RIO and Woodside 
• Portfolio diversification easier with larger companies, i.e. less analyst 
research coverage required. 
• Increased liquidity, particularly for global resource investors which have 
minimum company size and liquidity constraints 
• Generally underweight positions within the resource sector 
 
On a global scale Figure 50 plots a cross-sectional view of P/E multiples based on 
the then consensus prospective 2001 earnings of resources companies versus 
company market capitalisation in US dollar terms. While many of these companies 
have since been taken over, there is a clear trend of increasing prospective P/E ratio 
with increasing size of market capitalisation.  
 
Figure 50. Comparison of market capitalisation and prospective 2001 P/E  
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 Adapted from Bartrop (2001). 
 
In the Australian resource sector at that time, NPV per share premia or discounts to 
actual share prices also reflected a similar trend of increasing premia for large 
companies as seen with BHP, RIO, CMC (Comalco) and WMC  in Figure 51.  
 
Figure 51. Share price premium (discount) for the resource sector in 2000.  
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From Bartrop (2000) and based on uniform commodity price and exchange rate 
assumptions. 
 
However, evidence for these size premia is now not compelling in both global and 
domestic resource companies. Figures 54-57 chart the top 26 global resource 
companies in terms for P/E and P/CF ratios. To partially compensate for companies 
with varying June or December financial year ends, Figures 52 and 54 plot consensus 
earnings and cash flows per share for FY10 (financial year 2010) for June year end 
companies and CY09 (calendar year 2009) for December year end companies 
respectively. Similarly, Figures 53 and 55 plot consensus earnings and cash flows per 
share for FY11 for June year ends and CY10 for December year ends. The rational is 
that the market is forward looking but the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has 
impacted 2009 calendar year earnings and cash flows and hence CY10 and FY11 
earnings and cash flows provide forecasts beyond the GFC. The consensus earnings 
and cash flows have been derived from Bloomberg. While historically there were 
adjustments to compensate for variations in financial reporting (see Section 2.5.1), 
these are now rarely observed.  
 
Figure 52. Company P/E based on FY10 or CY09 earnings forecasts versus market 
capitalisation. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource, Prices as at 9 October 2009. 
 
Noting the differing vertical axes, Figure 53 below outlines a tighter cluster of P/E 
ratios reflecting the impact of the GFC on some companies in Figure 52. 
Interestingly, the large companies trade at relatively consistent multiples despite the 
size variation. BHP has been regarded as trading normally around an average P/E of 
15x over many years by market analysts as evident in Figures 50 and 54 and on a 12 
month forecast. A comparison with the 2001 chart (Figure 50) shows smaller 
companies tended to trade below 15x earnings in relation to size, whereas Figure 53 
shows they trade around a 15x P/E, their positioning likely to reflect company 
specific attributes (e.g. growth or takeover prospects). 
 
Anglo American’s slight premium over Xstrata is likely to at least partially reflect 
Xstrata’s threat of launching a takeover. As at 9th October 2009, Xstrata was under 
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"put up or shut up" ruling by UK regulators, and must make a formal takeover offer 
by 20 October 2009 (Onstad, 2009)  
 
Figure 53. Company P/E based on FY11 or CY10 earnings forecasts versus market 
capitalisation 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160 $180 $200
Market Capitalisation (US$billion)
P/E ratio
(FY11 or CY10 eps)
BHP
Val
e
RIO
Shenhua
Xstrata
Anglo American
Barrack
GoldCorp
Potash
Freeport
Southern Copper
Anglo Platinum
Alumina
Newcrest
Alcoa
Norilsk
Grupo Mexico
Teck
Impala
Lihir
FMG
Newmont
Cameco
Paladin
ERA
OZL
 
Data sourced from Stock Resource, Prices as at 9 October 2009 
 
Figure 54. Company P/CFPS based on FY10 or CY09 cash flow forecasts versus 
market capitalisation 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource, Prices as at 9 October 2009. 
 
Again the cluster in Figure 54 decreases in Figure 55 as the timeframe is moved 
forward one year. 
 
Figure 55. Company P/CFPS based on FY11 or CY10 cash flow forecasts versus 
market capitalisation. 
 202
05
10
15
20
25
30
$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160 $180 $200
Market Capitalisation (US$billion)
P/CFPS multiple
(FY11 or CY10 CFPS)
BHPVale
RIO
Shenhua
Xstrata
Anglo American
Barrack
GoldCorp
Anglo Platinum
Southern Copper
Potash
Freeport
Norilsk
Newmont
Teck
Grupo 
Alcoa
OZL
Cameco
FMG
Newcrest
Impala
Lihir
ERA
Paladin
 
Data sourced from Stock Resource, Prices as at 9 October 2009. 
 
Again the three top companies trade at similar price to cash flow levels in FY11 or 
CY10 at around 10x. In Figures 52 to 55 there is an empirical trend of decreasing 
ratios for the next tier companies (Anglo American and Xstrata) which may reflect a 
poorer quality asset base while many of the base metal companies also trade at price 
to cash flow ratios lower than the top four companies. 
 
However when outliers are included this is not the case as presented in Table 25. 
Table 25 also highlights the poor correlation of the P/E and P/CF ratios to company 
size. Nevertheless Table 25 does indicate that a gold premium is present in both sets 
of multiples. Despite the limited number of gold/platinum group metal producers, as 
outlined in Section 3.1, the top 25 companies constitute more than 80% of the global 
sector.  
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Table 25. Sector average P/E and P/CF multiples. The Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficients to total group company market capitalisation are also 
presented  
Sector Number
P/E FY10 or 
CY09 eps
P/E FY11 or 
CY10 eps
CFPS FY10 or 
CY09 cfps
CFPS FY11 or 
CY10 cfps
Gold 6 31.0 22.6 17.6 14.4
Basemetals 8 72.1 18.8 18.0 12.7
Diversified 5 19.4 14.4 11.1 9.1
Uranium 3 25.5 16.8 18.9 12.6
Pearson coefficent to 
company size -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2  
 
In the Australian resource sector Figure 56 charts the P/E based on FY11 or CY10 
EPS against the log of company market capitalisation given the polarization of the 
sector. This includes energy companies (oil, gas and utilities/services). Nevertheless 
there is no clear relationship between sectors although one can argue that most base 
metal companies trade below RIO and BHP while most gold companies trade at 
multiples above these companies at this time. 
 
Figure 56. Australia resource companies plotted on P/E ratios based on FY11 or 
CY10 consensus earnings against the log of their market capitalisation. 
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Market capitalisation based on share price as at 15 September 2009. Data sourced 
from Stock Resource. 
 
In summary, while there has been a size premium reflected in P/E ratios and NPV 
per share premia earlier this decade, current available data do not support the 
presence of this premium bearing in mind that the data represents one point in time. 
There is some evidence of a gold premium and while this may reflect the current 
outlook for the gold price, historically gold companies are noted to trade at a 
premium to other resource stocks.   
 
There are number of reasons why the size premia may have diminished during the 
resources boom and these include: 
• Increased takeover activity has left the fewer remaining companies vulnerable 
to M&A activity and their share price incorporates part of a possible takeover 
premium 
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• The removal of many of the larger companies by M&A activity has elevated 
the status of mid tier companies. Some of these companies are developing 
new projects and are yet to generate sustainable earnings and cash flows. 
 
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.3.5), this thesis discussed the size or small-firm effect 
whereby the returns on the shares of small companies exceed the returns on the 
shares of larger companies, both before and after adjusting for beta-risk. This is 
neither supported nor questioned in this analysis as this analysis is seeking to 
establish the presence of company premia relative to size and not investment returns 
over a defined time period. 
  
3.5 Commodity Investment 
Commodity price trends are important in the analysis of resource companies share 
price movements given their influence over earnings and cash flow levels and the 
value of their mineral resources and prospects. Crowson (2006) notes that, while 
most mineral products are traded globally, there are often mismatches between 
regional needs and production. Hence, commodity prices reflect region-specific 
supply-demand dynamics as well as macro-economic issues. However, there is 
overwhelming evidence that commodity prices are increasingly behaving in unison 
globally rather than in a fashion that would be suggested by specific supply-demand 
fundamentals. 
 
This thesis does not review individual commodities and readers are referred to 
Crowson (2006), (1998), ABARE (2009) and USGS (2009) publications. However 
USGS (2009a) has developed leading and coincident indicators of metal price trends 
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which utilize economic data primarily derived from the US. These are summarized in 
Table 26.  
 
Table 26. Components of the USGS metal industry indicators (leading and 
coincident). 
Leading Index Parameter Source
1 Average weekly hours, primary metals Bureau of Labour Statistics, NAICS 331
2 Weighted S&P stock price index, machinery, construction and farm and industrial (30 December, 1994 = 100) Standard & Poors, USGS
3 Ratio of price to unit labour cost USGS, NAICS 331
4 JOC-ECRI metals price index growth rate Journal of Commerce and Economics
5 New orders, primary metal products NAICS 331 & 335929: 1982$
6 Index of new private housing units authorised by permit US Census Bureau
7 Growth rate of US M2 money supply, 2005$ Federal Reserve Board, Conference Board
8 Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) Institute for Supply Management
Coincident Index
1 Industrial production index, primary metals Federal Reserve Board, NAICS 331
2 Total employee hours, primary metals Bureau of Labour Statistics, NAICS 331
3 Value of shipments, primary metal products US Census Bureau, NAICS 331 & 335929: 1982$  
From USGS (2009a). 
 
The USGS is primarily interested in providing trends for the major metals, viz 
copper, aluminium and steel (scrap) prices. Figure 57 is adapted from USGS (2009a) 
and highlights the most recent trends in the indices 
 
Figure 57. Primary metals: Leading and Coincident Indexes, 1987-2009. 
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 Shaded areas are business cycle recessions. Asterisks (*) signify peaks (the end of an 
expansion) and troughs (the end of a downturn) in the economic activity reflected by 
the indices. From USGS (2009a). 
 
The USGS (2009a) note that metals are key inputs in durable goods manufacturing 
and construction, which account for almost a quarter of gross domestic production 
final sales. Therefore, the primary metals leading index also gives early signals of 
major changes in activity for the overall U.S. economy (see Figure 58).  
 
Figure 58. Primary Metals Leading Index and Composite Indices of Leading and Co-
incident Indicators for the U.S. Economy. 
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 Shaded areas are business cycle recessions. U.S. Leading and Co-incident indices 
from the Conference Board (CB). From USGS (2009a). 
 
The research by the USGS (2009a) in developing the leading and coincident metals 
indices and their usefulness in predicting the overall direction of the U.S. economy 
verifies the perception that the demand for and hence price of industrial commodities 
are leveraged to economic growth and therefore so are the companies that produce 
these commodities. It is not surprising to find in that report that commodities 
influence a significant portion of the world economy, and can be viewed as the 
largest ‘non-financial’ market in the world (Doyle et al, 2007). On an academic front, 
Roberts (2009) identified peaks and troughs in the inflation-adjusted prices for 14 
metals, using monthly average data from January 1947 through December 2007. He 
found that the duration of contraction and expansion phases are not purely random 
and have some degree of cyclicality with contractions generally persisting longer 
than expansions (in contrast to macroeconomic cycles) and that long-term real prices 
have been trendless. 
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3.5.1 Fund Investment 
As mentioned earlier, fund investment has increased dramatically over the last six 
years (see Figure 41 earlier), particularly in response to the belief of a ‘paradigm 
shift’ with the rapid increase in commodity demand from China and other emerging 
economies. Schneeweis and Spurgin, (2000) in their academic review of the 
investment benefits of LMEX (the LME Base Metal Index) argue that previous 
research has shown that commodity investing has the ability to: 
1. Diversify a portfolio against economic events such as unexpected commodity 
price increases that may put pressure on stocks, bonds and other traditional 
investments. 
2. Capture natural sources of return that are available from commodity investing 
and may not be easily captured using other investment vehicles. Examples of 
these sources of return include scarcity return and convenience yield. 
3. Exploit pricing inefficiencies that may exist in commodity markets 
opportunistically through active management. 
 
While these are assumptions discussed below, the establishment of LMEX has 
facilitated that ability to invest in the base metal complex. However a key factor in 
the increased trading of commodity related products as been the overall easier 
facilitation of investment with exchanges moving largely to screen trading e.g. ICE 
Futures closed its open-outcry trading floor in 2005, LIFFE has become a fully 
electronic exchange, and the LME launched the ‘LME Select’ trading system 
alongside floor and telephone trading in 2000 (Doyle, 2007).  
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Domanski and Heath (2007) point out that it is the commercial investors seeking to 
hedge their production or consumption and not necessarily profit seeking financial 
investors who provide liquidity in commodity derivatives markets. This thesis notes 
the similarity to gold hedging where one participant (central banks lending gold at 
lease rates) is willing to accept a lower return due to the necessity of having reserve 
holdings for other reasons. 
 
Schneeweis and Spurgin, (2000) outline the three separate sources of return: price, 
roll and collateral return, which can be derived from investing in commodity futures 
and commodity indices. They note that normally in financial markets, opportunities 
for (risk-free) arbitrage exist when the futures price deviates from the relevant spot 
price plus the cost of carry, e.g. the cost of financing a position in the spot market. 
However, the scope for arbitrage in commodity markets may be limited by 
constraints on uncovered short selling. In particular, the stock of commodities 
available for lending is generally small for energy and base metals. This limitation 
may allow the difference between forecast spot prices and corresponding futures 
prices to fall below the cost of carry – an infrequent  situation known as 
backwardation. 
 
Gorton et al’s (2007) research based on data between 1969 and 2006 found that the 
price measures, such as the futures basis (spot price of asset less futures price of 
contract used), prior futures returns, and spot returns reflect the state of commodity 
inventories and are informative about commodity future risk premia. The excess 
returns to Spot and Futures Momentum and Backwardation strategies stem in part 
from the selection of commodities when inventories are low. 
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 An important issue is that while futures prices converge towards spot price as the 
delivery date is approached, the initial futures pricing may reflect other factors not 
purely related to commodity price expectations, e.g. ability to short sell, financing 
costs and risks, state of market (contango or backwardation). Domanski and Heath 
(2007) report that intuitively, one might expect large inflows of funds into 
commodity markets to cause prices to rise sharply, possibly to higher levels than are 
justified by economic fundamentals. Their prima facie evidence seemed to support 
this view, as financial activity has broadly increased in parallel with prices during the 
past four years. However, the results of empirical work on the impact of the growing 
presence of financial investors on commodity prices are less clear-cut and they noted 
that several recent studies had indicated that commodity price changes have led to 
changes in investor interest rather than the other way around. This thesis would agree 
with this latter proposition. However, as a consequence of increased investment, of 
the rigidity of some investment funds, of futures ‘roll’ considerations and of the size 
of commodity investment, there are factors influencing futures pricing beyond the 
supply/demand factors affecting the 3-months and spot prices under threatened 
futures delivery scenarios. This is highlighted in a functioning market perspective 
outlined by Doyle et al. (2007) in their UK Financial Services Authority research.  
 
In terms of the actual commodity investment Doyle et al. (2007) report that given 
that many of the investors lack the necessary expertise or desire to take on-exchange 
positions directly, they are more likely to pay a third party to manage their 
commodity exposure. There are typically three main vehicles for investors to do this: 
• index funds; 
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• hedge funds; 
• commodity trading advisers. 
 
The authors report that one large, unnamed multinational bank has estimated that as 
much as US $200 billion is invested in commodity markets. They estimated that 
most of this investment is made via index funds (approximately 40% and growing), 
hedge funds (about 30%) and commodity trading advisors (about 20%), and each of 
these sectors is expected to grow in investment size over the coming years. This is in 
a market estimated to have increased six fold to $8 trillion by the end of June 
2007 in response to the surge in investor interest in commodity investments (BIS, 
2007). 
 
Index funds enable investors to ‘buy the market’ in a single investment; those 
running the funds take on the expense of trading and researching the individual 
commodities in the index. Buying the market also ensures a balanced and diversified 
basket of commodities – losses from one should be counterbalanced by gains from 
another. Index funds are long only, and all their transactions relate to futures, hence  
there is no physical ownership of the underlying inventory involved. Index funds buy 
a forward position, then sell it as it approaches expiry, and use the proceeds from the 
sale to buy forward by one or two months again or as it is generally referred to 
‘rolling’ their  position. 
 
Doyle et al. (2007) note that being un-leveraged and only long, index funds are 
susceptible to poor performance in falling or contango markets, or both – a key issue 
noted by this thesis given their growing size and perhaps somewhat in part naive 
 213
investors group! Index funds contrast with hedge funds given flexibility to sell short 
as well using leverage to increase yield. 
 
Index funds grew dramatically in the five years to 2007 with the number of funds 
continuing to increase. Key features of some major funds are as follows (Doyle et al, 
2007): 
• The largest is the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) which was 
launched in the 1980s and by the early 1990s had grown to US$1billion 
assets under management. In 2001 its value was in the range of US$4-5 
billion, and in 2007 had increased to US$55-60 billion. The fund is heavily 
energy weighted (see Table 27). 
• Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index which has an estimated US$10- 15billion 
assets under management. 
• Deutsche Bank Liquid Commodity Index (<US$5 billion) was launched in 
2003 with just six highly liquid commodities. 
• Rogers International Commodity Index (<US$5 billion) was launched in 
1998 and is the widest ranging and currently consists of 35 commodities. 
 
The component weightings of these funds are outlined in Table 27. 
 
Table 27. Weightings by component of several large index funds. 
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Index Fund DBCI AIG GSCI Rogers
Components 6 19 24 35
Energy Complex 55% 33% 69% 44%
Industrial metals 13% 18% 11% 14%
Precious metals 10% 8% 2% 7%
Agriculture 23% 30% 12% 30%
Livestock nil 10% 5% 5%
 
Adapted from Doyle et al (2007). 
 
In terms of index roll, passive index funds will normally roll contracts at a time 
dictated and hard-wired into their investment agreements with customers. Typically 
this will take place over a five-day period where 20% of contracts are rolled each 
day. Doyle et al. (2007) comment that rolling periods for indices have become 
predictable to the rest of the market, which means the market can move against them. 
The notional amount of commodities underlying the investments of index funds is 
very large. They cite the example that taking the GSCI on its current (2007) asset 
allocation, 3.96% of an estimated US$60 billion is invested in copper. At the then 
market prices (about US$7,020/tonne) this equated to about 340,000 tonnes, or more 
than twice the amount of copper currently in LME warehouses. 
 
These positions create massive amounts of open interest (i.e. contracts that are ‘live’ 
– having not yet come to expiry or closed out), and while the large monthly rolls seen 
with these indices create large amounts of trading, in real terms some of the 
participants that Doyle et al. (2007) interviewed expressed concerns that liquidity in 
the nearby (i.e. front contract months) has become tighter in some markets. During 
the roll periods there are many funds trying to roll around the same months, so they 
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need an equal number of counterparties heading in the opposite direction; as 
counterparties dry up, future prices will rise, and ‘spot’ prices will fall. 
 
Doyle et al. (2007) reported that survey participants have admitted that the effect of 
US$55+ billion of investment cannot be ignored and will have some effect on price. 
However, gauging the extent of this effect is difficult with such a significant roll of 
futures contracts causing a move in the market but only in the short term mainly in 
the week of the roll, and there is an expectation that markets tend to correct 
afterwards. Survey participants also agreed that price movements were being 
exaggerated following fund investments, and that news relating to market 
fundamentals are affecting the price of certain commodities much more than they 
would have done before such speculative investments became widespread.  
 
The rolling of futures positions can also result in a profit or loss for these funds 
depending on the structure of the forward curve at the time. Figure 59 from Doyle et 
al. (2007) demonstrates how this relationship works. If the market is in 
backwardation (forward price curve declining) index funds earn a positive ‘roll 
yield’, or ‘roll return’, if the market is in contango (forward price curve rising), then 
they will lose money through a negative roll yield.  
 
Figure 59. Forward curve structure and the effect on roll yield. 
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 From Doyle et al. (2007). 
 
In times of strong backwardation index funds derive much of their gains from roll 
yield. As some commodities have shifted into contango investors have begun to 
question if this is the right time to be entering the commodity markets. At the time of 
their research in a period with increased fund inflow and ongoing strong commodity 
markets Doyle et al. (2007) noted their survey participants expressed a variety of 
concerns including: 
• The risks of the roll period mentioned earlier reducing liquidity, 
• High commodity prices leading to potential investor losses, 
• Index fund rigidity in contract rolls as for example when an index fund may 
continue to roll forward positions despite a contango and accrue a negative 
yield, and 
• Increased commodity allocation to actively managed funds and fund 
themselves changing roll strategies (e.g. DBLCI becoming more active in the 
trading of futures during roll periods). 
 
3.6 Commodity Price Correlations 
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During the 2002 – 2008 resources boom and increased commodity investment 
outlined earlier, there was an expectation that commodity prices were likely to move 
increasingly together in a ‘complex’ rather than individually. In Chapter 4, it is also 
argued that resource company share price movements have become more 
synchronous with movement in commodity prices rather than pre-emptive as evident 
in the 1990s and earlier.  
 
To test the potential of an increasing correlation of commodity prices with one 
another over time, this thesis used the copper price as the base price series for testing 
the other base metals and precious metals. Copper is often regarded as the bellwether 
of the metals given its relative large market size and liquidity. Indeed, Kasriel and 
Schap (2001) note that focusing on copper prices for determining broader market 
trends gains credibility from the facts that copper plays an important role in the 
manufacture of a broad range of goods and that the copper purchases must occur 
early in the process. 
 
To test for correlation changes the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient 
has been calculated for base metals and precious metals against the copper price over 
the periods defined in Figure 36 and Table 21. To observe the correlation changes 
over these periods, the coefficients have been plotted for 3-month LME primary 
aluminum, lead, nickel, tin and zinc in Figure 60.  
 
Figure 60. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for daily base metal 
prices for 3-months future delivery against the copper price on a similar basis over 
the defined periods from Table 21 (see Table 28 below). 
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Futures prices sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
This thesis suggests that Figure 60 does indicate an increasing correlation between 
all metals, particularly over the last 7 years in comparison to the 1990s and late 
1980s. This is expected given the increasing presence of financial investors in 
commodities, led by the conviction of a structural change in commodity demand 
from China and other emerging economies. As outlined with the Asian crisis 
(Section 3.2.2) this could reflect the ‘grouping’ of base metal investments to avoid 
individual metal supply/demand analysis (similarly to individual analysis of Asian 
economies) or simply the overwhelming expectation of Chinese and other emerging 
economic demand to ‘swamp’ the necessity for individual commodity analysis or a 
combination of both. 
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The other important factor which is continually stressed through this thesis is the 
timeframe for analysis. Table 28 outlines the data presented graphically in Figure 60 
which outlines the relatively high base metal price correlations to the copper price 
but also the variability during some periods. Table 28 also presents the correlation 
coefficients of the entire 1986-2009 period for each of the metals with copper. Again, 
while relatively high, there are periods when the correlation for individual metals has 
been stronger. 
 
Table 28. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for daily base metal 
prices for 3 month future delivery against the copper price on a similar basis over the 
defined periods from Table 21. 
Period
3 Month P rimary 
Al LME
3 Month Pb 
LME
3 Month Ni 
LME
3 Month S n 
LME
3 Month Zn 
LME
86‐87 bull run 0.92 0.73 0.95 na na
1987 recovery ‐0.08 0.47 0.40 0.74 0.05
90‐92 drift 0.89 0.86 0.80 0.68 0.44
92‐96 bull run 0.95 0.78 0.91 0.67 0.78
Asian C ris is 0.82 0.90 0.88 0.95 ‐0.04
98‐2000 bull run 0.94 0.01 0.74 0.78 0.64
Tech boom drift 0.87 0.14 0.68 0.89 0.89
R esource boom 0.96 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.80
G lobal F inancial C ris is 0.98 0.87 0.96 0.97 0.96
2009 recovery 0.86 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.84
Total (1986‐2009) 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.87  
 
In contrast Figure 61 plots the correlation coefficient with gold and silver against 
copper, this time using spot prices for gold and silver. Despite differences between 
using spot and futures base metal prices, this thesis would suggest the correlation is 
not as convincing which is not surprising given the different attributes of gold.  
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Figure 61. Spot gold and silver prices versus the daily copper price based on 3 month 
future delivery. 
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Gold provides hedges against currency debasement and devaluation, in particular, the 
US dollar, although these after often lumped under the general term as an ‘inflation 
hedge’. Most of the gold that has ever been mined is still in existence (jewellery or 
hording, particularly central bank reserves), and hence, the price is not as sensitive to 
declining world production levels as that of the industrial metals. Silver is somewhat 
different with industrial applications (e.g. photography) as well as hedging 
characteristics and many North American investors (and to a lesser degree 
elsewhere) follow the silver market.  
 
There is a myriad of literature on gold and gold investing and readers are referred to 
the World Gold Council for further information (http://www.gold.org/). The 
relationship between the gold price and the strength of the US dollar is well 
recognized and Figure 62 plots the US dollar gold price with the EUR/USD 
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exchange rate. The euro (EUR) replaced the European Currency Unit (ECU) on 1st 
January 1999 (1:1 parity) and is the second largest reserve currency and the second 
most traded currency in the world after the U.S. dollar (BIS, 2007). 
 
Figure 62. Gold price in US$ terms and the EUR/USD exchange rate. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Empirical observation of Figure 62 presents a clear inverse relationship of the US 
dollar gold price and the strength of the US dollar. As evident, the gold price has 
increased since 2001 but with acceleration during 2005 and later in 2007. At this 
time commentary was directed at the increasing US budget and current account 
deficits (twin deficits) and overall risks to the state of the US economy, e.g. high oil 
prices, terrorism (BBC News, 2005).  
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The gold price can be linked to industrial metal prices through firstly, the relative 
strength of the US dollar against other currencies, and secondly, by the inflationary 
impact of increasing industrial metal prices. In the first the instance, all US dollar 
denominated prices of metals generally increase with US dollar weakness while in 
the second, increasing metal prices may be stimulated by higher demand from China 
and other emerging economies and which may be unrelated to US dollar strength.  
 
Figure 63 outlines the correlation co-efficients between gold and silver over the 
defined periods. As expected from the differing gold and silver price characteristics 
discussed earlier, there are a range of correlations with some periods showing strong 
correlations. 
 
Figure 63. The correlation between gold and silver prices over the same intervals as 
Figure 61. 
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Silver investors can follow the gold/silver ratio which reportely for 4,500 years has 
been below 16:1 except since the 1980s (Bullionvault, 2009). It is now 60:1 and 
some investors expect an increase in the silver price or fall in gold price to ultimately 
restore the ratio to historical long-term levels, although the reasons why it should do 
so are unstated.  
 
3.7 The Australian/US dollar exchange rate 
The importance of resources to Australia was recently highlighted by Mr. Marius 
Kloppers CEO of BHP Billiton in a Minerals Week presentation (BHP Billiton, 
2009a) when he noted his company presently contributed to: 
• 8% of Australian GDP 
• 130,000 direct employees (supporting further 200,000) 
• Significant indigenous employment 
• A$21 billion tax revenue per annum 
• A$150 billion in mineral commodity exports per annum 
 
Not surprisingly, Australia is viewed as being a resources-rich nation and key 
exporter of raw materials to the rest of the world. Pitchford (1993) notes that the 
prices of commodities have far greater amplitude of fluctuation than do prices of 
final goods and services. This has attracted significant investment over the last seven 
years, as Australian dollar mineral assets are viewed as being leveraged to economic 
growth in Asia. Pitchford (1993) notes that with fluctuations in international 
commodity prices being the most important shocks affecting the Australian 
economy, the Australian dollar is in effect a commodity currency.  
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Figure 64 charts the AUD/USD exchange rate and the LME spot copper price (in 
USc/lb) since 1996. There are observable correlation trends, particularly at the start 
of the resources boom and later from the start of 2007 until the correction following 
the Global Financial Crisis. The recent appreciation of the AUD with increasing 
copper prices is also evident.  
 
Figure 64. AUD/USD exchange rate and LME Spot Copper Price. 
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Data sources from LME, RBA. 
 
In the past, the strength in the Australian dollar has often been related to the gold 
price, however, Figure 65 indicates an overall stronger correlation with the copper 
price. 
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Figure 65. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for the AUD against the 
copper price for 3-month future delivery and the spot gold price calculated on daily 
prices over the previously defined periods. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Blundell-Wignall et al. (1993) also report that peaks and troughs of the world 
commodity price cycle are highly correlated with Australia’s terms of trade and 
overall, the terms of trade is one of five important factors that they have recognized 
as influencing the Australian dollar exchange rate. The other four are: 
• Net foreign indebtness 
• Domestic investment booms that could not be financed adequately out of 
domestic saving; 
• Real interest rate differentials; and 
• Speculative factors not based on any ‘fundamentals’ 
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Kearns and Manners (2004) research has suggested currency speculators have been 
profiting on the movements of the Australian dollar that given as a group of 
speculators, they appear to have a long foreign currency futures position when the 
futures price is rising and appear to be short when the price is falling. In particular 
they were short during the depreciation of the Australian dollar in 1997 at the time of 
the Asian crisis. 
 
Figure 66. Futures price and net speculator positions in the A$ 
 
From Kearns and Manners (2004). 
 
As a ‘commodity currency’ the Australian dollar is responsive to increasing 
commodity prices and Figure 66 suggests that the observable trends of currency 
speculation often correlate with events in commodity markets. The BIS (2007) in its 
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Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 
noted that transactions with institutions such as hedge funds, mutual funds, pension 
funds and insurance companies, more than doubled between April 2004 and April 
2007 and contributed more than half of the increase in aggregate turnover. 
Importantly, factors underlying the strength of this segment included strong investor 
activity in an environment of trending exchange rates and low levels of financial 
market volatility, a trend shift among institutional investors with a longer-term 
investment horizon towards holding more internationally diversified portfolios and a 
marked increase in the levels of technical trading.  
 
This type of investment activity is likely to re-enforce Australian dollar exchange 
rate trends in regimes of increasing or decreasing commodity prices, and hence like 
the earlier discussion on the increasing correlation among commodity prices (Section 
3.6), increase its commodity currency status. 
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4.0 Resource Company Share Price Movements 
 
Although now somewhat dated, there have been several papers written on the long-
term underperformance and/or higher risk nature of the Australian resources sector 
relative to its industrial counterpart. Ball and Brown (1980) found that while mean 
returns were similar between industrial and resource stocks over a 21-year period, 
resource investors were not compensated for the risk attached to resource stocks and 
this risk was not as diversifiable as expected. Further research on this topic (Ball 
1986) questioned the ability of the CAPM to explain the discrepancy. 
 
McDonald (1993) optimistically attempted to explain the risk-return discrepancy 
with the marginal investor deemed to be a ‘global investor’. Therefore he argued that 
the risk associated with Australian resource stocks could be adequately diversified 
away against a well-diversified portfolio such as the Morgan Stanley Capital Index 
(MSCI) and therefore lowering the apparent domestic cost of equity. While this 
research is now more than ten years old, it reiterates a longer-term debate over a 
perceived risk-return discrepancy in resources. 
 
However given the long study periods involved (e.g. 21 years), this thesis would not 
expect superior returns from a ‘Buy and Hold’ strategy in the resource sector. 
Chapter 3 mentions that until recently, commodity prices have been falling over the 
longer term (30 years) in real terms and hence resource sector earnings growth has 
been dependent on aggregate production volume increases and/or operating cost 
savings. This is likely to be difficult to achieve in the future  in a regime of 
increasing costs and possibly decreasing real commodity prices trends as well as in 
light of the unreliability of exploration to deliver new production growth (see 
Chapter 6). Therefore a common investment strategy has been to overweight the 
sector in times of rising commodity prices (reflecting periods of world growth in 
industrial production) and underweight the sector during other periods. This can be 
complemented by long-term investment in a select group of diversified companies to 
meet portfolio diversification. 
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Ord (1998) simply explains the performance of the Australian resource stocks as a 
function of the ups and downs in the theory of gambling (prospect theory) and that 
the CAPM is inadequate in explaining its past performance. While some aspects of 
resource investment have similarities to gambling, particularly in relation to junior 
explorers and the risk of mineral discovery (discussed in Chapter 6), there is a 
rational investment proposition in backing specific management teams as well as 
discriminating among exploration projects. In a diversified exploration portfolio, 
there is an argument that exploration companies can offer skewed returns. For 
example, if one project delivers a material mineral discovery it may result in multiple 
increases in the share price whereas discovery failure is deemed the status quo and 
while the share price may modestly weaken, investors will be more interested in the 
timing of the next exploration project and the company’s available funding. 
 
This chapter seeks to explore the mechanisms of share pricing in resource companies 
and advance a probabilistic weighted value model with a decay factor. It has 
similarities with the arbitrage pricing theory (APT – discussed in Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.3) approach but with more flexibility given changing rather than constant 
probabilities of success.  
 
4.1 Share Price Movements 
This thesis has discussed aspects of the movement of share prices in Chapter 1 
(Section 1.6.1) and supports the adage that movements in the share prices of resource 
companies are predominantly stimulated by perceived changes in the valuation of the 
company on a per-share basis. While this concept is expanded later in this chapter, it 
is prudent to review some of the other definitions that were also outlined with 
Chapter 1. 
 
This thesis refers to events which lead to perceived changes in company valuations 
as share price ‘drivers’. There is an important distinction between ‘drivers’ and 
sustainable changes in company valuations as a share price driver may or may not 
lead to an actual underlying change in the fundamental valuation of the company – it 
may be only perceived at the time of the emerging driver. 
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The mechanism is interpreted to involve a continuous process stimulated by 
emerging share price drivers along the following steps: 
5. A share price driver emerges resulting in a market perception that the 
company fundamental valuation may change. 
6. Share price movement (positive or negative). 
7. Ongoing assessment as to the credibility and sustainability of the new 
valuation. 
8. Potential refinement of the share price movement (positive or negative). 
 
This mechanism employs the Bayesian probability theorem which involves reasoning 
and learning with uncertain statements. To evaluate the probability of a hypothesis, 
the Bayesian analyst specifies a prior probability, which is then modified depending 
on a range of possible future events.  As noted in its Wikipedia definition 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_probability) Bayesian probability interprets 
the concept of probability as "a measure of a state of knowledge", in contrast to 
interpreting it as a frequency or a physical property of a system. 
 
In its broad definition, Wikipedia notes that there are two views on Bayesian 
probability that interpret the state of knowledge concept in different ways. According 
to the objectivist view, the rules of Bayesian statistics can be justified by 
requirements of rationality and consistency and interpreted as an extension of logic. 
According to the subjectivist view, the state of knowledge measures a "personal 
belief". While there is no doubt that subjectivity permeates investment decisions, 
particularly in response to persuasive company management or promoters, it is 
expected that ultimately an objectivist view will prevail in market pricing. 
 
One of the derivations of Bayesian probability theory is Cox's theorem which is 
worth briefly discussing given that there is a natural inclination to assume that it 
applies in the emerging driver/implied value/value refinement model. Arnborg and 
Sjödin (1999) highlight that a key axiom in Cox’s theorem is that the plausibility of a 
proposition determines the plausibility of the proposition's negation:  one decreases 
as the other increases. Because "a double negative is an affirmative", this becomes a 
functional equation  
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stating that the function (f) that maps the probability of a proposition to the 
probability of the proposition's negation is an involution, i.e., it is its own inverse.  
However, this is not the case in the proposed three-step emerging driver/implied 
value/value refinement model given negative information does not necessarily 
enhance the probablility of the proposition. 
 
In a simple case, let us assume that there is an increasing copper price which acts as a 
driver for resource company A Limited. As mentioned in Chapter 1, changes in value 
can often be segregated between: 
• An expectation of a material change in future earnings and cash flow levels 
leading to an increase in the value of the asset base of the company; and/or 
• A change in the value ascribed by the market to the value of this asset base. 
 
Of course changes in the first point can lead to changes in the second although this is 
more generally not the case. As cited in Chapter 1, a market rerating for a particular 
sector may occur due to an event (driver) such as a highly priced takeover of another 
company within the sector, or an overall market rerating perhaps due to decreasing 
official interest rates which leads to an increasing attractiveness of investing in 
equities, etc. 
 
In Chapter 1 this thesis discussed an example involving company A Limited which is 
a copper concentrate producer. The expectation is that an increasing copper price will 
increase the value of A Limited and its share price in response to: 
• Increased earnings and cash flows from higher copper prices from A 
Limited’s operating copper mines 
• The increased value of A Limited’s unmined copper reserves, resources and 
copper exploration programs (reflecting increased future earnings and cash 
flows and takeover attractiveness) 
• Increasing attractiveness of the copper sector relative to other resource 
segments and the market in general. 
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The summation of these effects can be ascribed νΔ  is the change in value stemming 
from the share price driver, which, say, could have been an overnight increase in the 
LME copper price. However, the total change in value ( νΔ ) may not be fully 
impounded into the share price due to uncertainties and these include: 
• The perceived sustainability or longevity of the copper price increase 
• The implications for further increases or decreases 
 
The market will assign a probability to these factors and hence the change in value, 
νΔ  will be probability weighted according to the confidence the market has in the 
above two items. Hence, the change in share price (S) can be described as: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
 
Where: 
=ΔS  The change in company value reflected in the change in the company share 
price 
=Δ )( νP The probability weighted change in value 
 
This is a relatively simple process leading to the change in value of a resource 
company as expressed through its share price from an emerging share price driver. 
However, it is important to note that the two separate factors may be quite unrelated 
– the perceived change in value and the probability that this value change is real, 
sustainable and capable of being expressed in the share price. 
 
This latter point is evident in the earlier discussion on the share price impact from 
new announcements (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.7). In that section this thesis argued 
than the following equation could describe the potential share price movement by a 
company after a material announcement as: 
 
MSLIACfchangeS iinni )....(*Ρ=Δ  
 
Where: 
=Δ iS  Actual share price change of stock i 
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=Ρchange  Potential share price change reflecting the materiality of the news in an 
average market 
=nC  A measure of the confidence in the news 
=nA  A measure of the market pervasiveness of the news 
=iI The quantity of investment funds capable of being directed to stock i 
=iL A measure of the free float and shareholder ‘tightness’ or liquidity of stock i 
=MS A broad market factor depicting recent market sentiment, e.g. is the 
announcement in a rising or falling resource market? 
 
In this discussion, these factors would all constitute part of the probability weighting 
for the announcement to be a share price driver. In fact a typical assessment by an 
investor might be to determine the relevance of the details in the announcement and 
then briefly consider the above factors in terms of whether the announcement will 
deliver a sustainable appreciation in the share price.  
 
Furthermore the author reports that in the course of interacting with many fund 
managers and investors over 15 years, their observed modus operandi in assessing 
potential investment opportunities firstly involves an assessment as to ‘what is the 
value proposition?’ and secondly, ‘How likely will it be achieved?’ This thesis 
argues that these are the two key components in any investment proposition and 
seeks to address both factors – the potential return as a consequence of the value 
driver and the probability of actually achieving it. In combination they impart a 
probability weighted value change largely responsible for share price movements. 
 
Nevertheless, driven value changes are difficult to verify in the broader market where 
individual shares and the market as a whole are consistently bombarded with 
probability weighted value changes as well as undiversifiable economic factors. 
However, M&A transactions can remove a significant proportion of the background 
‘noise’ to outline the proposed market dynamics as discussed in the next section. 
 
4.1.1 Model Evidence in M&A Transactions 
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The most obvious evidence of this segregation into two components is in M&A 
activity.  The share price driver is often the announcement of the impending takeover 
or merger offer with the value reflected in the bid premium above the current share 
price. In a common M&A scenario the share price will match the bid price less a 
discount due to: 
• The risk that the takeover will not succeed, e.g. not meeting minimum 
acceptance conditions, not receiving Foreign Investment Review Board of 
Australia (FIRB) approval, etc. 
• The risk that the bidder cannot fund the takeover if there is a cash component. 
• The return required by arbitragers to purchase stock on market and accept the 
takeover offer. 
 
But adding a premium due to: 
• The prospect of the offer price being increased. 
• The prospect of a competing bidder emerging. 
 
In terms of constraining these variables further, we can investigate schemes of 
arrangements as outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6.2). Schemes of arrangements 
essentially involve a friendly transaction that requires target shareholders’ and the 
Court’s approval (see Table 8 for a comparison with takeovers). This means that the 
ability to increase the offer price is severely limited (see Section 2.6.2), the 
timeframe is generally at least 10 to 14 weeks and the outcome is either complete 
success or failure. Furthermore an Independent Expert’s report is required to ensure 
that there is a reasonable level of disclosure. 
 
Therefore, overall it is reasonable to assume that the presence of an Independent 
Expert’s report will significantly mitigate the risk of bidder not being able to 
complete the transaction (e.g. financing issues will be disclosed, FIRB approval 
granted if required, etc.) while the scheme itself is likely to be viewed by the market 
as limiting the scope for any increases in the offer by the bidding company. 
Therefore, the share price will match the bid price less: 
• The return required for arbitragers to purchase stock on market and accept the 
takeover. 
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 But adding: 
• The prospect of a competing bidder emerging. 
 
This thesis has drawn on two M&A examples to highlight the proposed emerging 
driver/implied value/value refinement model but it is pointed out that these cases are 
not particularly special in broader M&A activity and this model is commonly 
observed elsewhere. 
 
4.1.1.1 Case 1, Xstrata plc Scheme of Arrangement with MIM (Holdings) 
Limited 
The first case is the successful takeover of MIM (Holdings) Limited by Xstrata plc 
via a scheme of arrangement in 2003. This case is used in other analysis in this thesis 
and is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
On the 21 November 2002, MIM Limited (MIM) announced that it was in 
discussions with Xstrata plc (Xstrata) in relation to a transaction that could lead to a 
change in control of MIM. Several months later on the 26 March 2003, MIM 
announced that it was still continuing these discussions with Xstrata (MIM ASX 
Releases, 2002, 2003). 
 
On the 7 April 2003, MIM and Xstrata announced a proposed transaction under 
which Xstrata, through a wholly owned subsidiary, would acquire all the shares in 
MIM for $1.72 cash per share. This valued MIM at $3.4 billion (net of debt) or $4.9 
billion including MIM’s net debt position. 
 
In this thesis, the time period between 21 November 2002 and the formal offer 
announced on the 8 April 2003 is referred to as the ‘discussion period’. This period 
corresponds with the period of greatest uncertainty given that Xstrata had indicated 
that it sought to acquire MIM but had not indicated the price or terms of the potential 
acquisition and the MIM Board had not indicated its level of co-operation. 
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MIM stated that a scheme approach was required by Xstrata to enable Xstrata to 
secure the funding necessary to offer MIM shareholders cash for their shares (MIM 
2003). The timetable for the scheme of arrangement is presented in Table 30. 
 
Table 30. Key Dates for the Scheme of Arrangement. 
Event Date
Date and time for determining eligibility to vote a the Scheme Meeting: Friday 6 June 2003
Scheme Meeting of MIM shareholders: 10.00am Friday 6 June 2003
Court hearing for approval of the scheme: Thursday 12 June 2003
Suspension of trading in MIM shares: Thursday 12 June 2003
Record Date for determining entitlements to Scheme Consideration: Thursday 19 June 2003
Implementation of Scheme: Friday 20 June 2003
Despatch of cheques for Scheme Consideration: Friday 20 June 2003  
From MIM (2003). 
 
The scheme of arrangement is deemed friendly given the Board resolved by a 6:1 
majority that the scheme was in the best interests of shareholders and recommended 
that shareholders vote in favour of the scheme in the absence of a superior 
competitive bid. The only dissenting executive director on the Board (MIM 2003) 
was MIM’s Managing Director, Mr. Vince Gauci.  
 
In the 2003 Xstrata takeover of MIM, the MIM share price followed a path which 
reflected the changing probabilities of firstly, an offer emerging, and secondly, the 
likely success of that offer. The profile of the share price and annotated events are 
presented on Figure 67. 
 
Once the offer price of $1.72 had been announced on the 8th April 2003, the minimal 
share price discount to the bid price appears to reflect solely the required a return for 
an investor (fund) from purchasing the shares on market and then waiting for the 
scheme to be approved and then accepting $1.72 terms in large volumes. At that 
point in time it was considered highly unlikely that a competing bidder would 
emerge as: 
• The transaction had progressed to the stage where Xstrata had gained MIM 
Board approval and MIM had been considered by the market to have been ‘in 
play’ for the previous 4.5 months. 
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• The MIM Board had previously and with limited success attempted to solicit 
third party interest in bidding for the company. 
• The deemed quality of MIM’s assets (2nd tier) and the size of Xstrata in 
market capitalisation terms left few potential counter bidders (Anglo-
American and Vale were considered the only potential contenders) 
• Xstrata had negotiated a break-fee with a cap of $51.7 million. 
 
At the highest probability of success, the share price traded at approximately a 1.5 
per cent discount to the offer price and this commenced on the 11 April 2003. Hence, 
with the consideration paid on the 20 June 2003, there was potentially a two month 
holding cost. The interest holding costs at that time along with brokerage could 
potentially leave a margin of 1 per cent or less for the transaction and therefore large 
purchase volumes were required to deliver material profits to fund managers. This 
thesis believes the market was perhaps optimistically assigning a probability of 100 
per cent to the success of the transaction at this time – an expectation managed by 
Xstrata. Therefore under the formula: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
 
It can be argued that: 
=ν $1.72 offer price less costs (1.5%) = $1.695 (Trading range:  $1.69-$1.70) 
=P  100% 
 
Figure 67. The MIM share price and interpreted changing bid probabilities. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource, MIM ASX releases, 2002, 2003. 
 
 
During mid-May 2003 there was an increasing groundswell of opposition from retail 
investors to the proposed merger and given the voting requirements relating to a 
scheme of arrangement, there was a chance that retail investors could vote down the 
scheme. Recapping from Chapter 2 (Section 2.6.2), a scheme of arrangement 
requires more than 75 per cent of shareholders (irrespective of the size of individual 
shareholdings) to vote for the proposal. As evident on Figure 67, from the 14 May 
2003, the share price fell to a low of $1.54 before then recovering as Xstrata 
embarked on an aggressive public relations exercise to promote the merits of its bid. 
 
With the offer set at $1.72, the only variable changing is the probability of bid 
success or:  
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
If we assume that a share price of $1.69-1.70 reflects =P 100%, then a share price 
fall to $1.54 suggest that P must have fallen to 91 per cent before recovering to 100 
per cent after the scheme meeting on the 6 June 2003 (Table 30). 
 
The likely success of the bid as expressed to fund managers by Xstrata management 
provided the confidence to these fund managers to purchase MIM in the large 
volumes at the modest discount to the offer price to profit from then accepting the 
offer price. This process means the success of the transaction becomes self fulfilling. 
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 4.1.1.2 Case 2, Competitive bidding for Norths Limited 
The second case involves the competitive bidding for Norths Limited (Norths) 
between Rio Tinto Limited (RIO) and Anglo-American plc (Anglo-American) in 
2000. Analysis of the takeover is also presented in Chapter 5 and Appendix 1. 
 
On 23 June 2000, RIO announced its intention to make a takeover offer for all the 
listed shares of Norths that it did not already own for cash of $3.80 per share. The 
offer was made by Rio Tinto Investments Pty. Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
RIO and valued Norths at A$2.80 billion (Rio Tinto, 2000). RIO also announced that 
it had acquired a 14.5 per cent interest (106,894,910 shares) in Norths through recent 
on-market purchases of North shares at an average of A$3.80 per share. 
 
The company announced that it had received FIRB’s approval for the acquisition on 
the 24th July 2000 (Rio Tinto 2000a) and in the following month it received approval 
from the European Commission (EU) and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) (Rio Tinto 2000b). These approvals were key conditions of the 
bid. 
 
RIO’s bid for Norths was targeting potential synergies between the iron ore 
operations of both companies in the Pilbara region of Western Australia (Rio Tinto 
2000, Wisenthal, 2000, Counsel, 2000). It followed a breakdown in negotiations 
between the companies over access to Rio Tinto's extensive railway infrastructure 
near North's controlled Robe River iron ore operations. On behalf of the Robe River 
Associates, North had been seeking access to Rio Tinto's Hamersley's rail facilities. 
This was estimated to save around $350 million of the total $1 billion cost of 
developing the 20 million tonnes per annum West Angelas mine. RIO’s Hamersley 
Iron also had limited additional capacity at its port facilities in Dampier and the 
economics of expanding this port were not as attractive as expanding North’s Cape 
Lambert port (Counsel, 2000). 
 
The takeover also offered product and geographical diversification with North’s 
pellet production and presence in North America and at that time there was also a 
threat that Norths was about to bid for Brazil’s second biggest iron ore producer, 
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Caemi (Counsel, 2000). The importance of North’s iron ore assets to RIO was 
highlighted by RIO’s CEO at that time when he stated ``By combining our 
companies' iron ore businesses, we will become the world's second largest producer 
with diversified resources, products and markets," (Rio Tinto, 2000). 
 
On 22 July 2000, Anglo American announced it would make a competing offer for 
Norths Limited with a cash bid of $4.20 per share which would be payable after 
Norths paid a 5 cent dividend. In response to the competing offer from Anglo 
American, RIO announced that it was lifting its bid to $4.75 and declared its offer 
unconditional on the 3rd August 2000 (Rio Tinto, 2000c).  
 
The increased bid proved successful and RIO announced it had completed 
compulsory acquisition procedures on 10 October 2000 (Rio Tinto, 2000d) 
 
This background is to highlight the underlying strategic reasons for RIO’s acquisition 
of Norths relating to the Pilbara iron ore synergies, the diversification opportunities 
but also the timing constraints. It was also known that Anglo American was 
interested in acquiring iron ore assets, and particularly in establishing an iron ore 
presence in Australia. 
 
In the 2000 bidding war between RIO and Anglo-American for Norths, at each 
announcement the Norths’ share price over shot the most recent bid price on the 
expectation (probability) that a higher bid would later emerge (Figure 68). 
 
Figure 68. Norths’ share price and bid levels. Note the successive over running by 
the share price at each announced bid price before trending towards that bid price. 
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Share price data sourced from Stock Resource, Norths, Rio Tinto & Anglo-American announcements.  
 
 
With the market capitalisation size of the bidding companies and the presence of 
cash bids, it is difficult to envisage that there were other material influences on the 
Norths’ share price apart from the probability-weighted value of successive new bids 
emerging.  
 
Each share price driver (prospect of impending bid, bid announcement, prospect of 
overbidding, etc.) leads to a share price change corresponding to the earlier equation: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
 
This is evident in the subsequent share price premium to the revised bids outlined in 
Table 31. The higher premium after the Anglo American offer reflects a higher 
probability that RIO would overbid Anglo American’s bid but that Anglo American 
was unlikely to overbid the second RIO bid.  
 
Table 31. Temporary share price premiums following the initial and revised offers 
outlined in Figure 67. 
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Date Bidder Price Peak share price premium to revised offer
Average 5 day premium 
following revised offer
23-Jun-00 Rio Tinto $3.80 4.2% 3.7%
22-Jul-00 Anglo American $4.20 7.9% 5.8%
3-Aug-00 Rio Tinto $4.75 4.2% 0.8%  
 
This method of ascribing a probability-weighted value leading to share price changes 
is logical and hence, is unlikely to be restricted to M&A activity. This thesis would 
argue that it is in fact evident throughout the market. 
4.1.1.3 Case 3, Anchor Resources Limited 
In the above case study with the three offers for Norths the share price exhibited a 
period of declining probability over time that each successive offer would be 
trumped by a new higher offer. This declining probability over time is evident 
elsewhere in the market including junior explorers although again it is difficult to 
identify non-confounding examples. 
Anchor Resources Limited (ASX code: AHR) provides an interesting case study that 
meets the requirement of being largely non-confounding. The company listed on the 
ASX on the 4 July 2007 after raising approximately $3 million in cash on a portfolio 
of gold, uranium and tin exploration projects in eastern Australia. However, the 
company was relatively unique in that it was unable to materially advance its 
exploration projects for at least 12 months due to an inability to secure the services of 
drillers and rigs during the resources boom. Therefore, the performance of its share 
price reflected a declining perception of any short-term exploration success as the 
initial IPO investors became increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress and which 
was exacerbated with a backdrop of alternative investment opportunities. Hence, 
while the probability of exploration success on the company’s exploration tenements 
hadn’t declined, there were declining expectations that any potential value of this 
exploration could be realised within an acceptable timeframe. As in the North’s 
example above, the probability of an outcome is influenced by time – the market 
deems that the longer it takes to achieve an outcome, the less likely this outcome will 
occur. 
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This thesis makes the assumption that the share price for Anchor at any specific time 
largely reflected the summation of its ‘cash on hand’ per share as well as a 
probability -weighted value of the potential for a mineral discovery on its tenements 
within an acceptable time frame. While this is a reasonable assumption, it may not 
necessarily be the case given that with ongoing lack of progress or in other cases, 
exploration failure, the market may assume the remaining funds are ‘wasted’ without 
achieving the desired outcome or spent on existing futile projects. In these cases, the 
market may not value the share of a company at its full cash-backing value. 
The broader market was increasing in value during the resources boom but its overall 
impact on the decline in the Anchor share price has been ignored. 
Figure 69 plots the value of the share price value above its net cash backing over the 
first year following the IPO. It is evident that over time the ‘probability of success 
within an acceptable timeframe’ diminishes and is virtually non-existent after 12 
months. This type of waning is also observable in the market in other circumstances 
and reflects increasing investor dissatisfaction when investments are not put to their 
intended use and do not yield expected returns within an acceptable timeframe. This 
waning also reflects an increasing opportunity cost given the presence of alternative 
investments which increase in attractiveness over time in comparison to an existing 
non-performing investment. 
Some readers may be tempted to think of this behaviour as reflecting some form of 
declining option value in the share price with an expiry date of 12 months but this 
argument is neither well supported (nor necessary) as: 
• The shape of the wane or decline does not match a typical option profile that 
can be derived from a Black and Scholes model (see Chapter 2, Section 
2.2.2). 
• Applying an option valuation methodology with an expiry date in 12 months 
is relatively artificial as the exploration prospectivity has not changed within 
this timeframe. 
Both these points can be addressed with a probability-weighted value model given 
the value of the exploration tenements has not changed over the timeframe, only the 
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probability that the initial investors will reap a potential return within a desired 
timeframe. As time passes, the opportunity cost in comparison to other investments 
and accumulating losses in the current investment are likely to lead to further 
divestment, exacerbating the share price decline. 
Figure 69. Anchor Resources share value in excess of cash backing and modelled 
probability decay. 
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Share price data sourced from Factiva. 
Figure 69 plots the share value in excess of the cash backing versus the time after the 
IPO in proportions of one year. The blue diamonds represent modelling done by the 
author to replicate the declining probability level over the 12 month period. This is 
based on an approximate exponential continuous rate of compounding as follows: 
C = A ert 
Where  
=C  The amount after compounding 
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=A The initial amount 
ert = Continuous compounding factor at an interest rate of r over time t. 
The modelling in Figure 69 assumes that the market’s expectations in the likelihood 
of Anchor achieving a discovery is equivalent to the excess value (XVt) at time t 
above the net cash backing per share. The model assumes that XVt is equal to XV at 
time zero (XVt=0 ) less the excess continuously compounded value of XV over the 
time period (t) less XVt=0  such that: 
( )000 === −−= trtttt XVeXVVXXV   
or 
rt
ttt eXVVXXV 002 == −=  
Where 
=tXV  Excess Value at time t 
==0tXV  Excess Value at the start (t=0) 
rte  = continuous compounding factor for an interest rate r over time t 
While the equation presents a broad fit (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.88) and 
the only unconstrained variable is the interest rate, which, to achieve a ‘best fit’ in 
this model had to be placed at 70 per cent. This rate is not unreasonable given the 
high-risk nature of junior explorers and the fact that expected returns are normally in 
excess of 100 per cent. 
Therefore: 
=rte the exponential of r =70% pa multiplied by t (which is the proportion of 1 year) 
Using the model, it is possible to model the share price using the cash backing at any 
one time and the modelled premium above cash backing. This is compared to the 
actual share price in Figure 70 below. 
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Figure 70. The Anchor modelled and actual share price over the period under review. 
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Returning to the original equation: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
Where: 
=ΔS  The change in company value reflected in the company share price 
=Δ )( νP The probability weighted change in value 
 
In the case of Anchor, with no new share price drivers, the decline in the share price 
can be attributed to the declining expectation of imminent exploration success with 
the probability at time t derived from: 
 
0
00 )2(
=
== −=
t
rt
tt
t XV
eXVXVP  
 
And νΔ is the potential for exploration success within an acceptable timeframe. 
Hence, it can be argued that at any point in time, the share price is: 
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Where: 
=tSP Share Price at time t 
=tIV Intrinsic Value of the company per share at time t. In the case of Anchor, this 
could be cash backing but in other companies, the share price prior to the emergence 
of the share price driver could be a reasonable approximation. In other situations it 
may be some other form of valuation, e.g. NPV valuation. 
 
Adapting the earlier formula leads to the following derivation: 
 
)( νΔ+= PIVSP tt  
 
Where again: 
 
0
00 )2(
=
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t
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eXVXVP  
 
In most cases, given that share price drivers occur frequently, e.g. daily commodity 
price changes, the ‘wane’ or decline estimated in the equation above is small and can 
be ignored. However, this equation is important because it encompasses an expected 
return which itself includes a risk-free rate of interest. For example the 70 per cent 
return used in the Anchor modelling includes a risk-free rate which, in this case, may 
be assumed to be around 7 per cent. However, the return implicit in an 
assessed )( νΔP will generally far exceed the risk free interest rate and therefore 
separate consideration of the risk-free rate is not warranted. In the case of most 
resource companies, if )( νΔP is only expected to lead to a share price movement 
return at around the risk free rate then there is an expectation that it would not trigger 
a share price movement at all. 
While the single Anchor case does not prove the declining expectation model, it is 
encouraging that it can be modelled by simply using continuous compounding 
prevalent in financial analysis. The decay shapes are also commonly observed in the 
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short term share price patterns of other similar companies. This is highlighted in 
Figure 71 which models specific share price trends for Cougar Metals (ASX Code: 
CGM) in the five years from listing. The annotations include the return r used in the 
modelling and the average percentages that the declining expectation values 
represents of the total modelled share price. Unlike Anchor, Cougar has been active 
in its exploration activities, is more likely to be influenced by commodity price and 
resource market movements and the analysis is over a longer time period. 
Nevertheless, the decay modelling does appear to contribute to the share price trends 
presented in Figure 71. 
 Figure 71. The share price of Cougar Metals Limited (ASX Code: CGM) and 
modelled share prices based on the declining expectation model above.  The 
annotations show the average percentage of the share price reflected by the declining 
expectation value, and the K constant and the expected return rate used in the 
modelling. 
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Share price data sourced from Stock Resource. 
The market assessment of the rapidly declining expectation of achieving success 
within an acceptable timeframe has exacerbated the funding problems of junior 
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explorers. As discussed later in Chapter 6 and 7, this in itself is likely to stem from 
the low probabilities of exploration success and high minimum costs to attain 
satisfactory degrees of certainty.  
 
4.2 The Relevance of NPV Valuations 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6.5) this thesis noted that the traditional 
measures of the value of companies are based on the following relative and/or 
absolute parameters:  
• Prospective earnings (one or two-year horizon) as a function of share price 
(short-term price earnings ratio) 
• Sustainable earnings levels as a function of share price ( medium and long-
term price earnings ratio) 
• Prospective cash flows excluding capital items (one or two-year horizon) as a 
function of share price (a short-term price to cash flow ratio) 
• Sustainable Cash flows excluding capital items as a function of share price 
(medium and long-term price to cash flow ratio) 
• Prospective dividend yield as a function of share price 
• Sustainable dividend yield as a function of share price 
• Aggregate NPV valuations of company assets or total company cash flows 
• Option valuations 
 
Share price drivers described earlier generally reflect an event that impacts some or 
all of the above parameters e.g. a commodity price movement or an announced 
increase in dividend may stimulate a share price movement reflecting the probability-
weighted value relating to the sustainability of the increase in earnings or of higher 
dividend yields. As noted in the preceding section, less tangible parameters such as 
expectations of exploration success may experience probability decay over time in 
relation to investors’ expected returns and the initial probability level. 
 
One of the key observations outlined in Chapter 1 is that a driver influencing a 
company’s share price frequently changes and as highlighted in Chapter 3, is often 
daily movements in commodity prices. Bartrop and Guj (2006) hypothesise that, on 
trend over a full cycle, resource shares tend to ultimately trade around NPV values. 
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One may, however, argue that in fact NPV values often follow share prices given 
that they are responding to the same drivers.  
 
An earlier interpretation states that the share price – NPV premium simply reflects 
the time lag required for updating of NPV valuations by the market. An example of 
this lag is when there is an upwards movement in commodity prices. This upward 
movement will not affect long-term commodity prices in NPV valuation models until 
investment bank commodity analysts consider the price changes are sustainable and 
reflect realistic long-term forecasts. Hence, as further price increases occur such as 
during the recent Resources Boom, analysts become more confident of upgrading 
long-term forecasts but remain behind current spot prices. Alternatively, a site visit 
to an operation by analysts may result in new production forecasts that are reported 
to the market at the time of the visit but are also later incorporated in valuation 
models with new results published to the market in general. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Bartrop and Guj (2006) highlighted examples of BHP 
Billiton and Rio Tinto which suggested that companies with established and forecast 
cash flows tend to trade in a cyclical manner around the cumulative Net Present 
Value (NPV) valuation of their assets in line with changing short-term valuation 
parameters. This is reproduced in Figure 72. 
 
Figure 72. BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto share prices and average broker NPV 
valuations. 
 
 
From Bartrop and Guj (2006). 
 
However, the following discussion supports the argument that the market strives for 
a quick assessment of the probability-weighted value imparted by say an overnight 
increase in a commodity price and while ideally this would involve an NPV 
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recalculation, this is generally not practical. Instead the market assumes a 
relationship between the percentage change in share price and that of the 
corresponding commodity price movement, which is often one to one as discussed 
later.  
 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.6.4) also briefly discussed bull markets where momentum 
investing can lead to ‘bubble’ situations with further discussion in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.3.4) . In the resource sector this generally relates to commodity price runs. Chapter 
1 highlighted uranium company share prices as an example where during 2007 
average enterprise values were factoring in more than US$20/lb U3O8 for Australian 
uranium explorers with no producing mines despite the fact that their uranium 
resources were in many cases unlikely to ever be brought into production. The 
increase in uranium share prices was a direct response to the increasing uranium 
price and there was certainly no market data on the NPV value of the projects of 
various uranium juniors (Bartrop 2007). 
 
A common difficulty in the analysis of share price movements is establishing a 
consistent information base across the market. Otherwise it can be validly argued that 
share price movements may simply reflect the influence of inhomogeneous 
information levels across market segments. Bartrop and Guj (2006) suggest that this 
may be partially overcome by utilising market consensus NPV valuations, but Sally 
Malay Mining (Sally Malay) offers a special case in its disclosure to the market. 
 
 Case 4, Sally Malay Mining Ltd. 
Sally Malay listed on the ASX in July 2001 after a conducting an IPO to fund the 
Bankable Feasibility Study of the Sally Malay nickel project in east Kimberley, 
Western Australia. In the company’s prospectus the Chairman states that the 
company has a simple philosophy and singular focus, this being to expeditiously take 
the Sally Malay Project through Bankable Feasibility Study and subject to a 
favourable study outcome, bring it into production as rapidly and cost-effectively as 
possible (page 3, Chairman’s Letter, Sally Malay Mining Prospectus 2001). 
 
This thesis reviews the period between 22 July 2003 and 9 April 2004. During this 
time there were some significant announcements including feasibility study 
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confirmation that the project was economic and reported on the 20 August 2002. 
Construction commenced from that time through to commissioning in August 2004. 
The company also conducted several placements with the most significant being a 
$5.85 million placement announced on the 27 June 2003 and a $10 million 
placement announced on the 12 November 2003. A $52 million Project Finance 
Facility was announced on the 13 March 2003 to fund most of the project 
development. The only other significant event during the period was the securing of 
additional debt as announced on the 14 October 2003. The references for these 
reports are summarised in Table 32. 
 
In the period under review, Sally Malay management took the unusual step in 
reporting regular NPV valuations of the project to the market along with the basis for 
commodity price and exchange rate assumptions in the reports outlined in Table 32. 
The valuations provide a benchmark to compare the share price during this period of 
time, particularly given: 
• The commodity price and exchange rate forecasts were in line with market 
expectations at that time. 
• The company has the most reliable information on future operating 
parameters and hence should provide the market with the most reliable NPV 
valuations. 
• The valuations were available to all market participants. 
• The company’s revenues and earnings would be dominated by nickel 
production and sales in the future and therefore the share price can also be 
compared with the nickel price during the period under review. 
 
Table 32.The various reports outlining the NPV data reported by the company to the 
ASX. 
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Date Company Report (ASX releases) 
24-Jul-01 Prospectus
31-Jul-02 June 2002 Quarterly Report
20-Aug-02 Sally Malay Project - Bankable Feasibility Study Delivered
31-Oct-02 September 2002 Quarterly Report
31-Jan-03 December 2002 Quarterly Report
30-Apr-03 March 2003 Quarterly Report
31-Jul-03 June 2003 Quarterly Report
1-Aug-03 Construction of plant commenced 
14-Oct-03 Sally Malay - Construction Advances, Additional Senior Debt Made Available & More Mineralised Nickel Sulphide Ground Acquired
31-Oct-03 September 2003 Quarterly Report
30-Jan-04 December 2003 Quarterly Report
1-Aug-04 Commissioning of plant  
 
 
The NPV valuation data are presented on a per-share basis and include a corporate 
base case using the company’s longer-term forecast commodity prices and exchange 
rates and a spot priced case based on spot commodity prices and exchange rates at 
the time of the valuation. 
 
Figure 73 and 74 chart the Sally Malay NPV per share valuations with the corporate 
base case in the former and the NPV calculated using spot commodity prices and 
exchange rates in the latter. The LME spot nickel price is also charted in both 
figures. 
 
Figure 73. Sally Malay share price, spot LME nickel price and NPV estimations by 
the company at long-term forecast metal prices and exchange rates at particular 
times. 
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Share price data sourced from Factiva, See Table 32 for references. 
 
Observation of both Figure 73 and 74 highlight a correlation of the share price with 
the LME spot nickel price. This was expected given the leverage of the company’s 
future earnings and cash flows as well as the value of its previously uneconomic 
resources to the nickel price. The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient 
between share price and nickel price is 0.92 but increases to 0.93 if the period from 
the 7 January 2004 is excluded (this period has a coefficient of 0.32).  
 
Figure 74. Sally Malay share price, spot LME nickel price and NPV estimations by 
the company at spot metal prices and exchange rates at time of valuation. 
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Share price data sourced from Factiva, See Table 32 for references. 
 
In both figures in the time period between 22 July 2003 and 9 April 2004 the Sally 
Malay share price is observed to have more or less tracked the nickel price higher to 
a peak in December 2003. After this peak the nickel price weakened and fluctuated 
along with the share price. 
 
In terms of the corporate base case NPV valuation (Figure 73) it is noted that: 
• The share price initially traded below the NPV, moved higher as the nickel 
price moved higher and then generally traded above the corporate base case 
NPV. 
• In the 6 October - 9th October 2003 period the share price increased by 39 per 
cent to 72 cents and then range traded between 66 cents and 71 cents for the 
following 13 days while a flat trending NPV fell from 59 to 45 cents per 
share (24 per cent) less than a week later on the 13 October 2003. 
• From the 29 to 31 January 2004 the NPV increased from 45 to 68 cents (51 
per cent) while the share price continued to fall from its peak of 94 cents at 
the start of the month to a low of 70 cents (26 per cent) from 6 to 10 February 
2004. 
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Figure 73 which charts the Sally Malay NPV using spot commodity prices and 
exchange rates at the time of each valuation by the company, and similarly, the 
following observations are made: 
• The share price generally traded below the NPV throughout the period under 
review. 
• Similarly on the 6 October to the 9th October 2003 the share price increased 
by 39 per cent to 72 cents and then range traded between 66 cents and 71 
cents for the following 13 days while a flat trending NPV fell from 98 to 93 
cents per share (5 per cent) less than a week later on the 13 October 2003. 
• From the 29 to 31 January 2004 the spot based NPV increased from 92 to 104 
cents (13 per cent) while the share price continued to fall from its peak of 94 
cents at the start of the month to a low of 70 cents (26 per cent) from 6 to 10 
February 2004. 
 
While it can be argued Sally Malay represents one emerging nickel producer out of 
the Australian mining sector, the share price behaviour is similar to that experienced 
in BHP and Rio Tinto as outlined in Figure 72 where the share price moves with 
changing short-term valuation parameters. It also supports the concept of share price 
movements reflecting probability-weighted value changes driven by commodity 
price movements. 
 
It can also be argued that while the corporate base case valuation provides a level of 
comfort for investors in relation to the share price, in reality it has provided minimal 
influence on the share price movements during this period. In contrast the valuation 
NPV estimations based on spot metal prices and exchange rates at time of valuation 
could provide an upper case if the commodity prices and exchange rates were 
considered sustainable at the time of the valuations. 
 
Instead, it is evident that the share price tracks the nickel price higher, particularly 
where there are clear nickel price trends. This could reflect two interrelated factors: 
• Firstly, a simple reflection of the expectation of increased short-term earnings 
and cash flows, albeit that earnings and cash flows would not be material 
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until the 2H FY 05 – some 12 months after the nickel price peaked during the 
period. 
• As the nickel price moves higher, there is increasing confidence of the 
reliability or sustainability of the NPV valuations that were calculated at 
previously lower spot nickel prices increases. 
 
With the nickel price movements as the share price driver, it is logical that the 
increasing share price is reflecting a probability-weighted value increase attributable 
to both of the above, but most likely to higher sustainable earnings and cash flows. 
The probability level falls after the peaking nickel price in late December 2003 with 
the share price falling and exhibiting volatility in line with the nickel price. 
 
This will ultimately lead to an increase in the value of the company as a whole 
(earnings/cashflows, reserves, resources and exploration assets), which can be 
approximated with an updated NPV valuation. 
 
4.2.2 Case 5, MIM (Holdings) Limited NPV Valuations 
Continuing the analysis on the influence of NPV valuations, this section reiterates the 
minimal relevance of the long-term NPV valuations in short-term share price 
movements. This is irrespective of whether the valuations have the rigour and 
widespread dissemination in independent experts’ reports or estimated and published 
by stockbroking analysts. 
 
Figure 75 plots the MIM share price between 1994 and 2003 along with selected 
analysts’ NPV valuations. The NPV valuations are taken from leading brokers and 
are likely to reflect the general market view of other analysts’ valuations at these 
times – in the author’s experience the range of market analyst NPV valuations at any 
one time is generally not that large as partly verified in Figure 75. 
 
Figure 75. MIM share price between 1994 and 2003 along with a representative 
stockbroking analyst NPV valuations over this period. 
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Data sourced from Factiva, Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Macquarie, UBS Warburg. 
 
It is evident that the share price can trade well below broking analysts’ NPV 
valuations which themselves are below the independent experts’ valuations (low 
value of $1.72: MIM 2003) immediately prior to the Xstrata merger offer. This thesis 
would argue that this deems that the market is not utilising traditional option value in 
pricing the share price, say in addition to a static NPV value given that traditional 
option valuations cannot be negative. An alternative view is that an option value can 
be negative under real option theory if an option outcome is perhaps a less negative 
NPV such as in the case of the cost of mine closure in comparison to continuing to 
operate the mine incurring more substantial losses. However, during the period there 
was never any expectation that MIM would be closing significant mines – as 
discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3), from the Asian crisis through to the 
tech boom including the 1998-2000 bull run. Other companies’ share prices can trade 
at discounts to market or company sponsored valuations at particular times, e.g. BHP 
Billiton and to a lesser extent, Rio Tinto in Figure 72 and also most base metal 
companies during the Asian crisis and at other times.  
 
This thesis argues that this ‘lack of interest’ period corresponds to the market 
assigning a low probability that commodity prices would materially increase in the 
short to medium term to stimulate share price movement. Hence, one could argue 
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that irrespective of whether an investor was focussing on valuations based on 
sustainable earnings or cash flows or NPVs, etc. using long-term commodity price 
assumptions, the valuations are discounted because of a perceived low probability of 
an imminent recovery in commodity prices to meet the valuation assumptions. In the 
case of MIM, this probability starts to increase around the start of the Resources rally 
in 2002 where there are early signs of increasing Chinese commodity demand as well 
as a likely sector rotational shift out of tech stocks at the end of the Tech boom. 
However, in the case of MIM, the share price increase was also stimulated by the 
announcement of takeover discussions with Xstrata. Nevertheless, in an economic 
recovery it is likely that the probability will increase that a company will attain long 
term valuation measures and hence the combined probability weighted value of these 
measures will increase and lead to a higher share price. 
 
Figure 76 plots the share price discount to the mid-point of the valuation range 
estimated by Grant Samuel for the MIM-Xstrata Scheme of Arrangement (NPV 
range, $1.70 - $2.24, mid point $1.97 per share; MIM, 2003). The high and low 
valuation points were calculated using NPV valuations supported by market 
multiples and comparative transactions. The low point ($1.70 per share) represents 
the base case while the high valuation reflects a number of more optimistic factors 
including a higher conversion of resources to reserves, metallurgical recovery 
enhancements, etc. While the MIM share price was trading in cycles, it was clearly 
trading below the base case valuation of $1.72 for some years. Figure 76 also plots 
the 3-month forward copper price as MIM has often been considered a copper play in 
the Australian market. The copper price tended to drift sideways and lower over this 
period. Interestingly, Xstrata and MIM announced their discussions at the low point 
in the copper price. 
 
Figure 76. MIM NPV Premium/Discount to the Independent Valuation Mid Point 
Valuation ($1.97) and the 3-month forward copper price. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource, LME 
 
4.3 Commodity Price Movements and Resource Share Prices 
The empirical relationship between commodity price movements and share price 
movements is well recognised in the market and typified by the Zinifex share price 
(offset by one day due to timing differences between LME metals closing prices and 
the ASX market) and the LME zinc price in Figure 77. The share price movements 
correspond quite accurately to the zinc price movements and although as annotated, 
there was a period in 2007 when the market was unsure whether the zinc price could 
sustain a US$1.50/lb support level. This lead to a softening Zinifex share price until 
the zinc price did in fact start to move higher.  
 
Figure 77. The Zinifex share price and the LME zinc price between April 2006 to 
May 2007 and prior to first US sub-prime mortgage crisis signs which emerged in 
August 2007. The share price is offset by one day to account for the timing 
difference between the LME zinc price close in London and the ASX market. 
 261
$0.00
$5.00
$10.00
$15.00
$20.00
$25.00
19-Apr-06
03-May-06
17-May-06
31-May-06
14-Jun-06
28-Jun-06
12-Jul-06
26-Jul-06
09-Aug-06
23-Aug-06
06-Sep-06
20-Sep-06
04-Oct-06
18-Oct-06
01-Nov-06
15-Nov-06
29-Nov-06
13-Dec-06
27-Dec-06
10-Jan-07
24-Jan-07
07-Feb-07
21-Feb-07
07-Mar-07
21-Mar-07
04-Apr-07
18-Apr-07
02-May-07
Zinifex Share Price (A$/share)
$0.00 
$0.50 
$1.00 
$1.50 
$2.00 
$2.50 
Zinc Price (US $ per lb)
Zinifex closing share price (lhs) Zinc price (rhs)
Probability increases
 that zinc price will remain 
above US$1.50/lb
 
Data sourced from Factiva, LME 
 
Figure 78 also plots the Zinifex share price and zinc price in two data series: one 
leading up to and around the zinc price peak ending on the 29 December 2006 (red 
squares) and a second following the peak and during a subsequent period of a falling, 
stabilising and later recovering, zinc price (see Figure 77). The evident strong 
correlation (R2 =0.8683) in line with the generally rising zinc price supports the 
earlier contention by this thesis that the commodity price correlations are strongest 
where there are increasing or decreasing price trends. 
 
Figure 78. Scatter plot of Zinifex share price and the LME Zinc Price. The two 
populations reflect the relationship price to around the peaking zinc price to 29 
December 2006 (red squares) and the period following where the zinc price fall and 
stablised before later recovering (blue triangles).  
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Data sourced from Factiva, Stock Resource. 
 
Using the probability-weighted value model: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
a cursory observation would be that the declining probability weighting (P) reflecting 
the uncertainty in the zinc price after 1 January 2007 has led to a less sensitive 
relationship (blue triangles) than prior to this date (red squares) when there was a 
stronger correlation between the zinc price and the Zinifex share price. In fact using 
the linear regression equations annotated on Figure 78, it is evident the share price 
sensitivity decreased by over three times after 1 January 2007. While the νΔ per zinc 
price move is likely to have remained the same over both periods, clearly the 
uncertainty of the zinc price trend has lead to a significant lowering of P given the 
uncertainty of the sustainability of zinc price movements after 1 January 2007. 
 
4.3.1 Case 6, Intec Limited. Share Price Relationship with Zinc 
The relationship between commodity price and share price movements can vary and 
depends on factors such as the production credibility and imminence of commodity 
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production. An example of this was presented by Intec Limited (Intec 2007) in its 
analysis of its share price movements relative to the zinc price.  
 
The company owned the Hellyer zinc mine in Tasmania and was involved in two 
main projects: the retreating of the Hellyer tailings to produce a zinc concentrate 
(HZCP) and the development of a processing technology for the extraction of zinc 
and other metals from waste products (e.g. Electric Arc Furnace dusts from steel 
mills) and concentrates (Intec Process technology and Hellyer tailings reprocessing).  
 
Figure 79 is derived from the Intec (2007) report and plots the zinc price and the 
Intec share price between December 2004 and May 2007. While the company was 
concerned at its collapsing share price from December 2006, its analysis provides an 
interesting review of the relationship of the zinc price to the company’s activities. 
 
Figure 79. Intec (ASX Code: INL) share price the following night LME zinc price 
close. 
 
 
From Intec (2007). 
 
The company also presented the correlation coefficients for its share price and zinc 
price movements over four separate time periods (see Figure 80). 
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The company reported that prior to its announcement on the 6 April 2006 of the 
HZCP, the Intec share price showed no relationship to the LME zinc price 
(R2=0.00006). This would suggest that while Intec held the tailings resources for 
some years, it was the proposed commercialisation with a credible partner 
(Polymetals Limited) that stimulated the market to ‘factor’ Intec’s leverage to the 
zinc price in its share price.  
 
Following the announcement of the HZCP, the Intec share price responded to the 
previous day’s LME zinc price as evident in the blue line and diamond-shaped data 
points (R2=0.761). The company also reports that following the announcement on 1 
December 2006 that the commissioning phase of the HZCP was complete and that 
production had commenced, the market responded with a step change in the Intec 
share price. It noted that while the relationship (i.e. the slope of the line) between the 
Intec share price and the LME zinc price remained almost the same, the Intec share 
price was revalued to a higher figure. Again, throughout the period from 1 December 
2006 as the LME zinc price increased and then decreased and the Intec share price 
followed suit. This can be seen in the green line and round data points (R2=0.8255). 
This thesis would argue that this rerating reflects an increased probability of the 
company meeting its anticipated production cash flows and also a de-risking of the 
project. However, what is important is that the slope of the line did not appreciably 
change – after the share price ‘jump’. These key issues which are discussed later, are 
interpreted by this thesis to reflect the inability of the market to assess an accurate 
relationship between commodity price movements and a company’s earnings and 
cashflow (and valuation) leverage.  
 
Figure 80. Correlation coefficients for the Intec share price and the zinc price for four 
periods.  
 
 265
 
From Intec (2007). 
 
With respect to Intec, the company was particularly concerned that following the 
close of the March 2007 Quarter, the relationship between the Intec share price and 
the LME zinc price had broken down (R2=0.5338; red line and triangular data 
points). While the reasons for this are outside the scope of this thesis, in the author’s 
opinion this reflected a lack of confidence that the company could fund the 
development of the Intec Hellyer Residues Project (incorporating the Intec process). 
 
4.3.2 The relationship between share price changes and commodity price 
changes 
In the experience of the author, the relationship between commodity prices 
movements and share price movements has not been researched to any significant 
level (let alone recent research on the share price performance of resource 
companies) outside unpublished reports in the finance sector. Many resource 
companies regularly report their earnings sensitivity to changes in commodity prices 
and exchange rates (e.g. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Oz Minerals, Alumina, etc.) and 
investors can assess the relationship for any forthcoming half year or even loosely 
track the earnings with commodity price changes as they occur. 
 
In this section, this thesis seeks to highlight two observed phenomena; firstly that the 
correlation between share and commodity prices is stronger than the correlation of 
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the returns on both parameters, and secondly, that the commodity price-share price 
movement relationship doesn’t change as commodity prices increase in a given 
)( νΔP relationship. 
 
4.3.2.1 Case 7, MIM Ltd Share Price and Copper Price Relationship 
Figure 81 plots the MIM share price and the LME spot copper price over the period 
from 30 October 1989 to the 31 December 2002 (recall that MIM was merged with 
Xstrata in mid 2003). Empirical observation of Figure 80 highlights the appearance 
of a strong correlation of the MIM share price and the LME spot copper price albeit 
the Pearson correlation coefficient is estimated at 0.61. However further observation 
of Figure 81 suggest that the pre-emption of the movement of the MIM share price of 
future copper price movements varies over time and in fact in the few years prior to 
2003, it was almost contemporaneous. 
 
Figure 81. MIM daily share price and LME Spot Copper Price from 30 October 1989 
to the 31 December 2002. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
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Overall, the ‘forecasting’ ability of the market is likely to vary over time and hence 
the response time of MIM’s share price movements is likely to vary over time in 
relation to copper price movements. Figure 82 plots the company’s reported earnings 
sensitivity to commodity prices and A$/US$ exchange rate movements. As evident, 
the company’s earnings are most sensitive to the copper price. Readers will also 
recall that significant earnings were also generated by coal sales and while 
company’s earnings are also sensitive to changes in the coal price, coal prices are 
generally negotiated yearly and do not impart the share price volatility evident with 
copper price movements. The company has also grouped its thermal and coking coal 
exposures under one category (coal) despite each coal market having different 
characteristics (steel making versus power generation). 
 
Figure 82. MIM’s reported earnings sensitivities from 1995 to 2002. 
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Based on data sourced from MIM fact books & results presentations for the years 1995, 1996,1997, 
1998,1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 
 
Figure 83 is a plot of the MIM daily share price versus the LME copper price for the 
period from the 30 October 1989 to the 31 December 2002 similar to the period in 
Figure 83 above. The copper price is offset by one day to match the overnight LME 
closing price impacting the share market activity in the following day in Australia 
due to the time difference. While the study period is longer than in the Zinifex 
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example cited earlier (see Figure 78), it is argued that there are a number of point 
clusters which represent specific )( νΔP  relationships holding for limited time 
periods. 
 
Figure 83. Scatter plot of the MIM share price versus the LME spot copper price. 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Now if the daily MIM share price and copper price returns are plotted on a scatter 
plot, the overall relationships are not evident and the data have limited analytical 
value (see Figure 84). As event methodology (see Chapter 5) typically involves 
returns analysis, the dispersion evident in Figure 84 is likely to render analysis using 
returns of limited value.  
 
Figure 84. Scatter plot of daily MIM share price returns and LME spot copper price 
returns (offset by one day). 
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Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Again, while this analysis of MIM represents one example, the author argues that this 
type of ‘returns pattern’ is typical for most resource companies and which has 
impeded event studies and other financial analysis in the past which have relied on 
analysis of share price returns.  
 
4.3.3 Consistency of Share Price Relationships at Increasing Commodity 
Prices 
Researchers and investors could logically assume that the share price reactions may 
diminish with successive increases in commodity prices. This could stem from 
perceived mean reversion in the commodity prices (although the author proposes that 
any reversion in commodity prices is more likely to be around the marginal cost of 
production) and hence at extreme commodity prices relative to historical trends, 
there is an increasing risk that the prices will retrace towards historical trends . This 
is likely to reflect expectations of supply increase as more marginal projects become 
viable with increasing prices and conversely with decreasing commodity prices, 
some projects will become unviable and placed on care and maintenance therefore 
reducing the overall commodity supply. There is also the consideration of the 
 270
increasing A$/US$ exchange rate in line with increasing commodity prices which 
can undermine the increasing margins from the higher commodity rates as discussed 
in Chapter 3 (Section 3.7) and similarly mitigate falling margins in times of 
decreasing commodity prices. 
 
However, this may be offset by increases in valuations stemming from the fact that 
as commodity prices increase, companies may lower reserve cut-off grades or 
consider treating previously uneconomic ore stockpiles, with earnings and cash flows 
not moving incrementally at the same rate as the commodity price. There is also an 
increase in the gross value of the company’s remaining resources. 
 
An expectation is that the combined impact of these items would involve share price 
movements that increase with declining sensitivity to commodity prices moving 
higher (or lower) but potentially punctuated by step changes where marginal 
resources suddenly became viable or new expansions became economic, etc. 
 
This thesis has assessed this expectation for several companies by plotting the daily 
share price change divided by the commodity price change versus the commodity 
price level (see Figures 85, 86 and 87). The expectation is that if there is a changing 
relationship, this will be reflected in a change in the distribution of data points at 
different commodity price levels. 
 
Figure 85 uses the same data as in Figure 77 and plots the share price change for the 
preceding day over the LME zinc price change. While the distribution is broad, it 
suggests there is no relationship between the zinc price level and the response of the 
share price movement relative to the zinc price movement. This is also supported by 
the data points around the linear regression in Figure 78. 
 
Figure 85. The daily percentage change in the Zinifex share price divided by the 
daily change in the preceding day’s LME zinc price close versus the LME zinc price. 
The chart plots the data outlined previously in Figure 77.  
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Data sourced from Factiva, LME. 
 
Unfortunately the data in Figure 85 can get distorted due to low percentage changes 
in one variable which creates large swings in the ratio, for example there are a 
number of share price movements which have been five times or greater than the 
zinc price movement. An alternative is presented in Figure 86 which indexes the 
previous day’s share price or zinc price to 100 and applies the percentage change to 
100 and then adds this to the previous day’s index. For example a 5 per cent increase 
in the share price would result in an index of 105 (5% x 100 + 100) while a zinc price 
change of 10 per cent would result in an index of 110 (10% x 100 + 100) and a ratio 
of 105/110 or 95.5 per cent. This means that on that day the share price movement 
reflected 95.5 per cent of the zinc price movement overnight (London LME close).  
 
Figure 86. The percentage change in the share price from the preceding day (offset 
by one day) multiplied by 100 and added to 100 to index the change. This is divided 
into the change in the LME zinc price calculated on the same basis to give a 
percentage change of the share price change over the zinc price change. 
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Data sourced from Factiva, LME. 
 
In both Figures 85 and 86 it is evident that over the time period considered, there is 
no discernable change in sensitivity as the zinc price increases, albeit that there are 
less data at higher zinc prices, which reflects the limited number of instances in 
which zinc prices exceeded US$170/lb. It is also interesting that the relationship in 
Figure 86 using indexed data suggests a value of around one to one (or plus or minus 
5 per cent) for a share price movement responding to a zinc price movement.  
 
However, the indexing has an effect of creating a central tendency towards a one to 
one share price-zinc price relationship given many small movements or zero 
movements will lead to 100 divided by 100 or one. Figure 87 removes data which 
has a less than 3 per cent movement either side of one to exclude days where there 
are no or minimal movement in one or both variables (ignoring cases of large equal 
movements in both variables). As expected from the distributions in Figures 85 and 
86, there is not a difference that would warrant a change of the average one to one 
relationship. 
 
Figure 87. The effect of removing daily movements of the indexed share price 
movement divided by the indexed zinc price movement which are less than 3 
percent. 
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Data sourced from Factiva, LME. 
 
Lastly to test the reverse situation, Figure 88 plots the Zinifex share price change 
(indexed) over the zinc price change (indexed) along with a 7-day rolling average of 
this relationship. It also plots the Zinifex share price using the second Y axis. While 
there is increased volatility earlier in the time period, it is evident that as the Zinifex 
share price increases, on the whole there isn’t a material change in the share price 
movement relative to the zinc price movement.  
 
Figure 88. The Zinifex share price change (indexed) over the zinc price change 
(indexed) along with a 7-day rolling average of this relationship. The Zinifex share 
price is plotted using the second Y axis. 
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Data sourced for Factiva, LME. 
 
The charts shown in Figure 89 continue the same theme developed in Figure 86 and 
plots the share price change (indexed) over the commodity price change for a number 
of companies with varying commodity exposure. These are Minara Resources 
(nickel), Mincor Resources (nickel), Newcrest Mining (gold), Lihir Gold (gold), 
Alumina (alumina/aluminium) and CBH Resources (zinc). The thesis contends that 
in all these charts there is little evidence of declining share price sensitivity at high 
commodity prices. If this wasn’t the case, and despite the central tendency with small 
or zero movements, significant movements would be apparent with congregations 
above or below the 1.0 line at greater commodity prices. However, all that is 
apparent is that there are fewer data points at higher commodity prices, which is 
expected given that many record commodity price highs were only achieved in the 
recent Resources Boom. 
 
Figure 89. Charts of share price movements (indexed) divided by commodity price 
movements (indexed) for Minara Resources (19 April 2006-17 May 2007), Mincor 
Resources, (8 July 1997-20 December 2012), Newcrest Mining (15 May 2006-19 
May 2007), Lihir Gold (19 April 2006-15 April 2007), Alumina (21 September 
2006-10 February 2007) and CBH Resources (26 August 2005-8 June 2007). 
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Data sourced from Factiva, LME. 
 
This thesis proposes that under the general relationship: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
 
P and ν remain relatively constant despite the opposing forces of mean reversion risk 
or more likely the increasing risk of over supply occurring (and to a lesser extent, 
A$/US$ appreciation/depreciation) versus increased company value with increasing 
commodity prices. This thesis would argue that the observed linear relationship 
simply reflects the market maintaining the same relationship that is evident at lower 
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commodity prices. This relationship will change when a new share price driver 
emerges and could stem from a change in the trend of the commodity pricing itself. 
. 
4.3.4 Commodity Price Influences and the Global Resource Indices 
As outlined in Chapter 2, (Section 2.2.2) the application of a Wiener process is likely 
to have a limited application in tracking of resource prices except for short intervals 
of time or during periods where there are no clear commodity price trends (share 
price drifts as described in Chapter 3). However it is evident from above, that 
resource shares follow a Markov process otherwise the most likely observable 
relationship would be a declining share price sensitivity to further increases (or 
decreases) in commodity prices. 
 
The question is then whether commodity prices follow a Markov process and can be 
modelled as geometric Brownian motion variables. This thesis considers that as 
evident through the movement of resource share prices, there is also a limited 
application of a Wiener process except for short intervals of time or during periods 
where there are no clear commodity price trends  As noted in Chapter 3, commodity 
prices are influenced by their own supply/demand fundamentals as well as the 
general macro-economic outlook and the influence of speculators and these factors 
are likely to results in prices trending in a common direction most of the time. 
 
On a broad scale the correlation outlined in Chapter 3 between the base metal prices 
has also been applied to the global HSBC Diversified Mining and 100 Mining 
indices and the copper price as outlined in Table 33. 
 
Table 33. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for HSBC Diversified 
Mining and HSBC 100 Mining Indices with the 3 months forward copper price over 
the defined periods from Chapter 3, Table 21. 
 277
Period Months
HS BC  Divers ified  
Mining  Index
HS BC  100 Mining  
Index
86‐87 bull run 14 na 0.91
1987 recovery 27 ‐0.46 0.44
90‐92 drift 29 ‐0.18 0.00
92‐96 bull run 42 0.67 0.58
As ian C ris is 14 0.92 0.93
98‐2000 bull run 17 0.70 0.71
Tech boom drift 33 ‐0.04 ‐0.30
R esource boom 67 0.91 0.92
G lobal F inancial C ris is 7 0.95 0.96
2009 recovery 9 0.96 0.95
For total period  (1986‐2009) 259 0.93 0.93
  
The daily data highlights a strong overall correlation between the global mining 
indices and the copper price although there are some individual periods exhibiting 
higher correlation coefficients than others. The series of coefficients are also plotted 
on Figure 90 and reiterate two key periods of low correlation, not surprisingly, 
during the Tech Boom drift and approximately a decade earlier in the 90-92 drift. 
Overall, it suggests that where there are clear trends (up or down), the correlation 
between the copper price and these international indices is higher compared to 
periods of share price drifts which reflect relatively directionless copper price 
movements. 
 
Figure 90. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients for HSBC Diversified 
Mining and HSBC 100 Mining Indices with the 3 months forward copper price from 
Table 33. 
 278
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
86-87 bull
run
1987
recovery
90-92 drift 92-96 bull
run
Asian Crisis 98-2000 bull
run
Tech boom
drift
Resource
boom
Global
Financial
Crisis
2009
recovery
Period
Pearson Correlation
 Co-effficent
HSBC Diversified Mining HSBC 100 Mining
 
Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
As highlighted with Zinifex, MIM and Intec, the correlation of stock price 
movements to specific commodity price movements is well observed and often 
provides the basis for investing in some resources stocks depending on the 
supply/demand fundamentals of the commodities. Well known current and historical 
(over last 20 years) Australian resource ‘leverage plays’ are listed in Table 34 with 
associated key commodities. 
 
Table 34. Australian resource ‘commodity leverage plays’. 
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C ompany AS X  C ode K ey C ommodities
Aberfoyle ABF C u, Zn
Acacia  R esources AAA Au
Alumina   AWC Al
Anaconda  Nickel ANL Ni
Ashton Mining AS H Diamonds
C entaur Mining C TN Ni
C entennial C oal C E N C oal
C omalco CMC Al
Delta  Gold DGD Au
E R A E R A U
Felix R esources F LX C oal
F ortescue Mining FMG Fe
G reat C entral Mines GCM Au
Iluku R esources ILU Mineral S ands
Macarthur C oal MC C C oal
MIM (Holdings ) MIM C u, Zn, C oal
Newcrest Mining NCM Au
Normandy Mining NDY Au
Norths NBH Fe
Oxiana OXR Au, C u
Oz  Minerals OZ L C u, Zn
Paladin E nergy PDN U
Pasminco/Z inifex PAS /Z F X Zn
P lutonic  R esources P LU Au
Portman Mining PMM Fe
R enison Goldfields R GC Mineral S ands
S avage R esources S VR C u, Zn
Western Metals WMT Zn
WMC   WMC Ni,C u
WMC  R esources WMR C u  
 
Many of the companies in Table 34 have been involved in takeovers and mergers and 
are analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4 Relationship with CAPM and APT 
The proposed two factor model presents difficulties segregating valuation changes 
from probability weighting changes and in most cases there is a combination of both 
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leading to a share price movement. Nevertheless, this segregation may not be 
important in many instances given their leverage to commodity prices which as a 
sector, is the major driver of returns. However, as discussed, the sector is varied, 
ranging from junior explorers to larger diversified resource companies such as BHP 
and RIO. 
 
Junior explorers represent a high risk – high return end of the spectrum given the 
high risk associated with mineral discovery (See Chapter 6). However the changing 
probability weighting of discovery success over time is difficult to assess given the 
difficulty in separating the potential for a changing view of the company’s prospects 
as new exploration results emerge out of the exploration program. 
 
The diversity of junior exploration companies also creates an enormous challenge in 
analysis. This includes factors such as the perceived prospectivity of the project 
portfolio and advancement, variation in the fundamentals of the commodities sought, 
management experience and expertise, available and future funding, cash burn rate, 
the prospective of merger and acquisition activity and the timing of particular events 
relative to the overall market performance and sentiment. 
 
Companies share prices become increasingly correlated to commodity prices as they 
move to producer status. As the production status diversifies then the correlation 
towards copper prices increases relative to other factors (the bellwether as discussed 
in Chapter 3) and globally (especially China or USA) relevant macro-economic 
variables. 
 
The range of company status and size leads to varying correlation with the broader 
market. Table 35 lists the beta coefficients for fifteen producers and fifteen explorers 
derived from the Centre for Research in Finance at the Australian Graduate School of 
Management (AGSM) and available at Commsec (www.comsec.com.au) as well as 
from Bloomberg (2009). 
 
Table 35. The market capitalisation, main commodity exposures and betas of 15 
explorers and 15 producers. 
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Company ASX Code Market Capitalisation (A$m) Main Commodity Beta
1 Beta2
Explorers
Anchor Resources AHR $5 Sb 0.94 na
Icon Resources III $8 W 0.93 1.55
Pioneer Resources PIO $16 Au 0.92 1.13
Gunson Resources GUN $19 Ti, Zr 0.92 0.73
Signature Metals SBL $25 Au 0.95 1.33
Sipa Resources SRI $38 Au 0.95 1.04
Jindalee Resources JRL $38 U 0.91 1.32
Venturex Resources VXR $40 Cu 0.91 1.30
Western Desert Resources WDR $65 Fe 0.91 0.75
Gryphon Minerals GRY $88 Au 0.92 1.22
Energy Metals EME $109 U 0.91 0.92
Rex Minerals RXM $163 Cu 0.91 0.55
Perseus Mining PRU $467 Au 0.91 1.21
Cudeco CDU $770 Cu 0.92 1.26
Producers
Terramin Australia TZN $114 Zn, Pb 1.07 1.47
Perilya PEM $190 Zn, Pb 1.11 1.82
Avoca Resources AVO $441 Au 0.96 0.80
Panoramic Resources PAN $455 Ni 1.01 1.46
Independence Group IGO $469 Ni, Au 0.98 1.45
Minara Resources MRE $975 Ni 1.16 2.27
Panaust PNA $1,334 Cu, Au 0.93 1.87
Equinox Minerals EQN $2,641 Cu 0.93 1.30
Oz Minerals OZL $3,558 Cu 0.95 1.26
Alumina AWC $3,965 Al 1.22 1.62
Lihir Gold LGL $7,509 Au 0.94 0.77
Fortescue Mining FMG $11,505 Fe 0.95 1.37
Newcrest Minerals NCM $16,146 Au 0.95 0.70
Rio Tinto RIO $38,115 Fe, Cu, Al 1.23 1.21
BHP Billiton BHP $123,302 Fe, Cu, Oil 1.03 1.30
Beta1 Derived from Commsec, 2009 accessed 4 November 2009
Beta2 Derived from Bloomberg, 2009 accessed 4 November 2009  
Empirical observation of the data does not impart confidence in terms of company 
attributes and this relationship to the broader market. The data derived from 
Commsec appears incorrect but is highlighted given that Commsec is the largest 
online retail broking house (over 200,000 accounts, J. Rickward, pers comm. 2006) 
and this thesis suggests that this data is not used at all by these account holders.  
This thesis is not embarking on a discussion on the merits of the estimation methods 
used in these beta estimations nor the time frames involved, statistical dispersion, etc. 
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However it is noted that junior explorers can be regarded as venture capital 
investments and their betas are likely to reflect either their exploration success or 
perhaps declining cash backing and are independent to a large degree of the broader 
market trends. Hence the estimation of the beta for a junior explorer may simply 
reflect the market’s movement relative to a static or declining share price and 
therefore the future applicability of this beta may be more dependent on the direction 
of the broader market than stock specific factors. 
Elsewhere there is a priori expectation that larger companies will have a beta value 
approaching that of the broader market (i.e. 1) simply given their higher weightings 
in the broader market indices. Figure 91 charts the beta values presented in Table 35 
against the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of the companies. As 
evident, there are no discernable trends between the explorers and the producers 
while the AGSM data derived from Commsec (2009) doesn’t appear convincing in 
suggesting most of the listed resource companies are market insensitive. 
Discrepancies have been noted elsewhere and there have been a number studies 
addressing the ‘small-firm effect’ in industrial companies with expectations from the 
CAPM (e.g Fama and French, 1995; in Australia, Halliwell et al, 1999, Beedles et al, 
1988). 
Figure 91. Beta estimations versus the natural logarithm of the company market 
capitalisation for 15 explorers and 15 producers on the ASX. Major companies are 
listed between the two data points in line with their market capitalisation. 
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As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 2.7.1), mining companies were excluded from most 
previous Australian takeover research because they are considered by researchers to 
have systematically different financial, operating and risk characteristics (Bugeja & 
Walter, 1995, da Silva Rosa et al, 2000). This thesis has calculated the Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficient between resource and industrial indices over 
the time periods (including the 1987 crash) outlined earlier.  
 
The ASX All Resources and All Industrials indices have the longest data series but 
were discontinued from the 3rd July 2002. The S&P/ASX 100 Resources and 
Industrial indices data series commenced on 17th February 2002 while the S&P/ASX 
200 Resources and Industrial indices data series commenced on the 3rd April 2000.  
 
Table 36. Pearson product moment correlation coefficient between resource and 
industrial indices over the time periods defined in Table 21, Chapter 3.  
 
 284
 Period Number of data All Resources versus All Industrials
S&P/ASX 100 Resources 
versus S&P/ASX 100 
Industrials
S&P/ASX 200 Resources 
versus S&P/ASX 200 
Industrials
86-87 bull run 316 0.92
October 1987 crash 7 0.93
1987 recovery 576 0.74
90-92 drift 629 0.86
92-96 bull run 906 0.83
Asian Crisis 307 -0.38 -0.47
98-2000 bull run 360 0.42 0.38
Tech boom drift 721 0.37 0.40
Resource boom 1461 0.90 0.90
Global Financial Crisis 140 0.86 0.87
2009 recovery 202 0.82 0.82
For period 1986-2009 0.69 0.77 0.68  
Italic means data for part of period only. 
 Data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
The correlation coefficents presented in Table 36 highlight a varying degree of 
correlation between the resource and industrial sectors of the ASX over the defined 
periods. It is evident that in strong bull resource bull runs, the correlation increases 
and may reflect a strong international attraction to the Australian market in general 
given the benefit of an appreciation A$/US$ during these periods as well as the 
implications of a strong resource sector for the broader economy (mining services, 
increased employment, etc.). 
 
However it is also evident that the 1990s experienced a period of declining 
correlation of the resource sector to the industrial sector and therefore broader market 
and this reflected a period of declining relevance in the lead up to the Tech Boom 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3).This period corresponded with growth in the industrial 
sector with the listing of companies such as Commonwealth Bank, Telstra, and 
demutualization of AMP and NRMA as discussed in Chapter 1. To highlight the 
growth of the industrial sector relative to the resources sector, Figure 92 is 
reproduced from Figure 12 in Chapter 1 and charts the growth in market 
capitalisation of both indices.  
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Figure 92. The market capitalisation of the industrial and resource components of the 
ASX from 1980 to 2001. 
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Primary data sourced from ASX data feed. 
 
Recalling from Chapter 1, at the end of 1990 the resource sector comprised 37.1 per 
cent of the All-Ordinaries index but by the end of 2000 it was a mere 14.1 per cent. 
At the end of the All-Resources data series discussed earlier, the All-Resources 
represented 14.5 per cent of the All-Ordinaries in early July 2002. 
 
Recalling from Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1) the CAPM uses a beta coefficient to ratio 
up the market risk less the risk free rate to account for the non-diversifiable 
sensitivity of a specific company to the market in general according to: 
  
 Rj = Rf + BBj(Rm – Rf) 
 
Where: 
Rj = expected return on stock j 
Rf = risk free interest rate 
Rm = expected return on a well-diversified portfolio of shares (such as 
the whole stock market) 
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BBj = ‘Beta factor’ or relative sensitivity of return on stock j compared 
to market average 
 
While )( fmj RRB −  adjusts the market risk premium above the risk free rate for the 
sensitivity of returns of the specific company being assessed, it is certainly 
questionable as to whether is the right parameter to assess the non-diversifiable 
risk of resource stocks over the longer term. In fact Table 36 suggests that  may 
largely reflect the non-diversifiable risk of the entire resource sector during different 
periods, for example in strong resource bull markets the  will contract but expand 
in other periods such as in the Tech Boom.  
jB
jB
jB
 
In summary, the beta values outlined Table 35 and Figure 91 do not provide a 
significant degree of confidence in relation to the predictive non-diversifiable risk 
component of individual stocks given the lack of any relationships with company 
size or producer status and simply appear to be manifestations of events occurring at 
the time of the regression analysis. The varying correlations of resource and 
industrial indices over time are also likely to reduce confidence in the long-term 
effectiveness of beta values.  
 
Finally, in terms of the relevance of the risk free interest rate (Rf), as discussed in 
Section 4.1.1.3,  the probability-weighted value model )( νΔ=Δ PS , proposes that 
the probability weighted value )( νΔP  incorporates an expected return well in excess 
of the risk free rate otherwise investors would not be induced to invest. Hence it is 
not deemed relevant as a separate variable in the analysis in this thesis.  
 
4.4.1 A Comment on Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3), this thesis discusses Arbitrage Pricing theory (APT) as a 
multi-factor model which contends that the expected return of an asset can be 
modelled as a linear function of a number of factors which are deemed to influence 
share price returns. Each factor has a specific beta-coefficient with the K factor 
model in the form as follows: 
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....+++++= oilpricemanagementepsgrowthrR mii ξδγβα  
 
Where 
=iR  return on asset i during a  specified time period 
iα = a constant, specific to asset i 
=mrβ Expected returns based on the sensitivity of changes in the share price to 
changes in the market 
 
The model as noted in Section 2.2.3 can be viewed as an extension or special case of 
the CAPM. 
 
On first observation, there are similarities with the probability-weighted value model, 
however, there are two key areas of differentiation: 
• Firstly, APT estimates the expected return from an asset given the 
application of constants against various factors deemed to be of influence in 
deriving this return. However in the probability-weighted value model, the 
model share price is estimated and then a return is estimated from this model 
share price. As outlined earlier, regression analysis of parameters such as 
resource share prices versus commodity prices is far more meaningful than 
comparing the returns of these parameters. 
iR
• Secondly, an aspect of the probability-weighted value model is the fact that 
the probability weights are constantly changing as can the values. There are 
not a set of constants which can apply indefinitely and while there are 
commodity price correlations for many resource companies, a constant 
relationship may not be present for long. In a sense, APT may apply over 
specific time horizons with the constants reflecting probabilities applicable at 
a particular time to specific share price drivers.  
 
Hence, a multifactor probability weighted value model would be: 
 
......)(()(()( 3322111 ++++= − ννν PPPFVSP tt  
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Where: 
=tSP Share price at time t 
=−1tFV Fundamental value at time t (pre emerging driver share price, net cash 
backing, other valuation) 
=+++ ...)(()(()( 332211 ννν PPP Various value changing events and their associated 
probabilities reflecting the sustainability, deliverability or scope for further changes 
in relation to each value event. 
 
However, as mentioned at the outset, there is normally only one dominant share price 
driver operating at one particular time although drivers can change rapidly. 
 
In relatively stable circumstances probability weights (P) can wane through 
discounting according to a compound interest formula with the expected interest 
rates the key variable and according to the following equation:  
 
0
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Where  
=tP probability value at time t 
== rtt eXV 0 the excess value (XV) over a fundamental share price value multiplied by 
the exponential function of the time period and expected interest rate 
 
This can be applied to derive a share price at time t as follows: 
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Where: 
=tIV Intrinsic Value of the company per share at time t 
 
Hence an APT model could be developed with a series of waning constants 
multiplied by variables (values from specific share price drivers) but this appears to 
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over-complicate the model and to reiterate, empirical market observations suggests 
that only one share price driver operates predominantly at one time. 
. 
4.4.3 Rejection of the Market Application of Option Pricing Theory 
This thesis discussed option valuation in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2). Some researchers 
could argue that the share price performance in both Cases 1 and 2 represent a 
function of option pricing. Recalling, the formula for the price of a call option (W) is 
as follows: 
 
W = PN(d1)-Ce-rTN(d2) 
 
Where: 
W = price of the call option 
P = current share price 
C = exercise price 
 
N(d) is a cumulative standard normal density function with upper integral limit d and 
therefore N(d1) and N(d2) are probabilities with numbers between one and zero. 
 
In continuous time e-rT is an appropriate discount factor for the period T at a rate r. 
Therefore the term Ce-rT is the present value of the exercise price (C). 
 
Recalling that under these groupings the formula simply compares the present value 
of the exercise price with the current share price and probability weights both in 
accordance with the volatility of the share price. 
 
While this thesis is arguing that the share price movements reflect the impact of 
probability weighted value stimulated by share price drivers, there is a logic that 
option pricing may account for some of the phenomena evident in the pricing of 
resource stocks, say in addition to a fundamental valuation such as an NPV 
valuation. However, this thesis argues that there are number of points (outlined 
below) that reduce this likelihood. These are: 
• The complexity of option pricing calculations negates the pricing estimation 
by the majority of market participants and apart for small specialised 
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investment bank teams involved in the pricing of exchange traded options, 
there is minimal overlap with the main market participants. 
• The authors empirical observation of market participants such as fund 
managers and other investors indicates that they do not contemplate option 
valuations but rather partake in a process involving an assessment of the 
probability of attaining value from current or anticipated share price drivers. 
• Periods when share prices can trade at a discount to NPV valuations (whether 
market consensus or derived from independent experts) would imply negative 
option values. This would have to reflect negative real option values such as 
the cost of closing mines and which do not fit the likely scenarios at the time 
of the share price trading at discount to NPV valuations. 
• There are numerous incidents where the variables involved in option pricing 
struggle to explain these incidents. This chapter cites the overshooting of bid 
prices in the Norths takeover or the falling MIM share price during a period 
of potential bid failure as most easily explained by falling probabilities of 
expected outcomes. 
• Lastly, all resources companies can experience resurgence in share prices in 
response to increasing commodity prices and this can be after an extended 
period of share price drifting. Again, a probability weighted value function 
offers a simpler explanation than option theory which may be deemed to 
reflect a sudden change in the time period to expiry! 
 
In summary, this thesis argues that the complexity of option pricing is not necessary 
nor observable in the pricing of resource shares although of course it can be ‘made to 
fit’ by a change in parameters such as probability distributions, time to expiry, etc. 
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, (Section 2.2.1.3) there is one area where option 
pricing may be of value although it is not apparent in market behaviour or in 
valuations that highlight the option value. This is the embedded option value that is 
evident between the low and high valuations presented by Independent Experts in 
takeover documents. Tables 37 and 38 present the independent expert valuations 
produced by Norths as defence for the RIO takeover (Norths 2000) and MIM’s 
valuation for its merger with Xstrata (MIM, 2003). 
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Table 37. Independent Expert’s low and high valuation for Norths in defence of the 
takeover offer from RIO. 
Valuation Valuation
Low High Low High
Interest US$ US$ A$m A$m
Rober River Iron Associates 53% 1218 1419
Iron Ore Company of Canada 56.1% 450 510 750 850
Total iron ore assets 1968 2269
Minera Alumbrera 25% 120 140 200 233
Northparkes 80% 125 145 208 242
Zinkgruvan 100% 200 220 333 367
Lake Cowal gold project 100% 35 45
Yakabindie nickel project 100% 20 30
Regional exploration 100% 47 73
Total base metal assets 843 990
Energy Resources of Australia 68.40% 375 440
North Forest Products 100% 340 380
Hedge book -15 -10
Corporate overheads -85 -85
Total other businesses 615 735
Total enterprise value 3427 3994
Cash at 30 June 2000 97 97
Loans and amounts receivable (net) 116 116
External borrowings at 30 June 2000 -94 -94
US bonds -200 -200 -333 -333
Net debt -214 -214
Value of net assets 3213 3780
Shares on issue (millions) 737.2 737.2
Net value per share 4.56 5.13
Net value per share - diluted for options 4.34 5.09  
From Norths, (2000).  
 
Table 38. Independent Expert’s low and high valuation for MIM for its proposed 
merger with Xstrata. 
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   Valuation (US$m)    Valuation (A$m)
Low High Low High
Coal Operations 2,000.0 2,310.0
Mount Isa Mining Operations 1,425.0 1,750.0 2,375.0 2,920.0
Alumbrera - 50% interest 360.0 400.0 600.0 670.0
McArthur River - 75% interest 80.0 100.0 130.0 160.0
Ravenswood 40.0 50.0
Total value of operations 5,145.0 6,110.0
Exploration and Technology 130.0 185.0
Discontinued operations -90.0 -80.0
Corporate overheads -220.0 -200.0
Total enterprise value 4,965.0 6,015.0
Hedge Book -260.0 -230.0
Dividend paid in March 2003 -25.0 -25.0
Net debt (excluding Alumbrera project net debt) -1,277.0 -1,277.0
Value of net assets 3,403.0 4,483.0
Shares on issue (millions) 1,997.7 1,997.7
Net value per share 1.70 2.24  
From MIM, (2003).  
 
In both these valuations and which is typical for most independent expert valuations 
for resource companies, the experts present high and low valuations. The difference 
between the high and low valuations represents a combination of potential 
production increases, more optimistic resource to reserve conversion, a potential 
element of lower risk exploration success as well as modestly higher commodity 
prices (and corresponding higher A$/US$ exchange rate).  
 
While not discussed by the Independent Experts or attributed by the market in the 
company share prices, there is clearly an option value that should be additional to the 
lower valuations. The high valuation levels represent a 17 per cent and 32 per cent 
increase in the low valuations for Norths and MIM respectively, and hence an option 
value would reflect a portion of this increase adjusted for perceived time to delivery 
of the parameters and higher commodity prices. 
 
It is disappointing that this value is not recognised by the independent experts or the 
market in general and may reflect the complexity in its estimation. It also does not 
support a strong option valuation component in resources share prices. Nevertheless 
company management recognise this project ‘embedded option value’ as highlighted 
by Goodyear (2006) with the market ultimately assigning value when )( νΔP is 
material within a short to medium term timeframe.  
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5.0 Resource M&A Analysis 
 
Analysis of M&A activity based on the share price performance of the involved 
companies is often difficult due to the complexity of the stock market and the 
interaction of a multitude of factors that can affect the share prices at any particular 
time. While Chapters 2 and 3 discussed market valuations and recent market trends, 
as outlined in Chapter 4, it is often earnings and cash flow leverage to desirable 
commodities that leads to strong share price performance. 
 
This thesis reviews the bulk of the major M&A activity over the past twenty years. It 
incorporates a review of 30 transactions which are deemed to be the more important 
in the evolution of the Australian resource sector over this period and includes the 
takeover and merger of household names such as Comalco, Norths, MIM, Normandy 
Mining, CRA, Plutonic Resources, etc.  
 
One of the key findings outlined Chapter 3 is the fact that mining shares do well in 
certain periods but not in others, reflecting their leverage to world growth and levels 
of industrial production. As also noted in Chapter 3, the mining ‘non-performance’ 
periods in the Australian market have tended to correlate with either the emergence 
of new technology (the Tech Boom) or with periods when the competition for capital 
has been greatest with the privatisation of many Government-owned enterprises (e.g. 
Telstra, Commonwealth Bank) or the demutualisation of mutual or co-operatives 
companies (e.g. AMP, Pivot). Hence, this thesis would argue that an important factor 
in the success or otherwise of M&A activity in mining companies depends on the 
performance of the target company at the time of the transaction which itself may 
reflect market attitudes to the resource sector at that time.  
 
Therefore, irrespective of the characteristics of the companies involved in M&A 
activity, it is important to review the timing of the transaction with respect to the 
commodity price cycle and the performance of the Australian and International 
resource markets in general. This aspect, which is discussed later in this Chapter,  
can significantly contribute to the success of M&A activity. 
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5.1 Transaction Analysis 
To characterise M&A transactions, this thesis has identified or estimated a number of 
parameters described in this section. Individual transaction summaries are presented 
in Appendix 1 which provides an overview of the transaction, views of market 
sentiment at that time as well as brief review of the assets of the companies involved. 
It has become evident to the author that information on transactions becomes 
increasingly more difficult to source as time elapses and Appendix 1 can provide a 
useful record of these transactions for future research. An example is the RTZ – CRA 
merger creating a dual listing in 1995. Information on the actual transaction is no 
longer available on company websites, ASX releases only extend back for 10 years 
and there are very few media reports from around that time. In this case it was the 
accumulated research of the author that provided details of the bonus issue and 
capital structure of both companies at that time. 
 
Another difficulty which is a limiting factor is the ability to source share price data 
for the relevant companies at the time of the transaction. This is particularly the case 
for companies where the ASX code has been reused for different companies (ASX 
codes can be reused after 7 years). The main source of data for analysis has been 
Bloomberg which collates data independently. However ASX share price data have 
been sold to third party suppliers and discussions with Premium Data Support 
(Author’s personal email comm. 1 January 2010) indicates that these data are only 
available from around 1995.  
 
The transaction analysis outlined in Appendix 1 can be separated into two broad 
categories of data estimation and collation utilising Microsoft Excel 2003.  
 
The first investigates the offer and participants by collating four sets of data, namely: 
• Transaction characteristics which include offer price, premium to a 30-day 
average price, composition of the offer, offer values, target director 
recommendations and takeover completion. If there are multiple bids, these 
are generally independently documented. Also the offer size is adjusted for 
material interests previously held by the bidder in the target. 
• Final offer price relative to the mid point of an independent valuation if an 
independent valuation has been commissioned and the range of the high 
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valuation above the low valuation as a percentage of the low valuation 
(valuation spread). 
• Company sizes relative to each other and the final offer size to bidder size. 
The company sizes are estimated using shares on issue for each company at 
that time and the closing share prices of each company prior to the first 
announcement event window. The size estimations exclude the value of 
issued options or net debt positions of each company. Foreign share prices are 
translated into A$ using prevailing spot exchange rates at that time. 
• Primary and secondary commodity focus of the target and bidder. The 
primary commodity focus is based on the company’s production or asset 
base, but can also include market perceptions at that time as noted by the 
author.  
 
The second data estimation involves event analysis methodology outlined in the next 
section and involves estimation of abnormal returns and changes in t-statistics in 
regression analysis. This involves: 
• Estimating cumulative abnormal returns for the target and the bidder at an 
event window at the time of the initial announcement and potentially, 
subsequent material announcements. This is translated into in an A$ value 
using the market capitalisation values outlined above. 
• Estimating cumulative abnormal returns in a 252-day post-event period for 
the bidder and the value of these returns based on the initial market 
capitalisation of the bidder. 
• A change in the observed t-statistic of key index and commodity price series 
in the regression analysis in the 252-day post-event period relative to the 252-
day estimation period. 
 
As a general comment, share price data series are adjusted over time for company 
issues, splits, etc. to provide a meaningful data series over time. In some cases the 
share prices from the data series are different at the times of the transactions from the 
share prices recorded with the offer details. In these cases, the actual share prices 
have been extracted from takeover documents and media reports (references are at 
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the end of each transaction in Appendix 1). Nevertheless, the share price data series 
are valid for the event analysis conducted in Appendix 1. 
  
Specific data from Appendix 1 have been extracted from the separate transaction 
workbooks for analysis outlined later in this in Chapter. These data and definitions 
are summarised in Table 39. 
 
Table 39. Data collated in analysis in Appendix 1. 
Parameter Definition
Date Initial annoucement of impending offer or transaction
Target Target company
Primary commodity Primary commodity that investors consider the basis for their investment in the Target
Bidder Bidder company
Primary commodity Primary commodity that investors consider the basis for their investment in the Bidder
Type of takeover Takeover, Scheme of Arrangement or Dual Listing
Initial premium to 30 day average Initial offer price premium to 30 day average share price prior to the annoucement (note: this is not a VWAP)
Final Premium to 30 day average Final offer price premium to 30 day average share price prior to the annoucement (note: this is not a VWAP)
Final offer value (A$m) Total shares of Target times the value of offer. Scrip offers based on share prices prior to initial bid.
Competitive The transaction is competitive if there are more than one bidder.
Hostile If the offer is rejected at the annoucement of the initial offer it is considered hostile.
Final bid to mid point on 
Independent valuation
Independent valuers typical provide a high valuation and a low valuation to present a range. This 
measures the ratio of the final offer price to the average of these valuations.
Valuation range from low value This measures the different in the high valuation from the low valuation as a percentage of the low valuation.
Target size as percentage of 
Bidder 
This is the estimated market capitalisation of the Target divided by the estimated market 
capitalisation of the Bidder. The Target size may be adjusted for material prior Bidder interests in 
the Target.
Target CAR at event (s) This is the cumulative abnormal returns experienced by the Target at bid announcement(s).
Change in Target value due to CAR 
(A$m)
This is the cumulative abnormal returns estimated above by the estimated market capitalisation of 
the Target prior to the initial offer announcement.
Bidder CAR at event (s) This is the cumulative abnormal returns experienced by the Bidder at bid announcement(s).
Change in Bidder value due to CAR 
at event (A$m)
This is the cumulative abnormal returns estimated above by the estimated market capitalisation of 
the Bidder prior to the initial offer announcement.
Bidder CAR in post event period There may be specific factors which have influenced the M&A activity, and which may create a unique value proposition for the bidder.
Change in Bidder value due to CAR 
in post event period (A$m)
This is the cumulative abnormal returns estimated in a 252-day post event period normally 
commencing when the takeover is close to completion and there is a high degree of certainty.
Bidder changes in senstivity - Key 
Index
This is the change in observed t-statistic for the Bidder from the estimation period to the post event 
period. The index is selection based on relevance to the Bidder.
Key Index This is the key index from above.
Bidder changes in senstivity - Key 
Commodity
This is the change in observed t-statistic for the Bidder from the estimation period to the post event 
period. The commodity is selection based on relevance to the Bidder.
Key commodity This is the commodity index from above. In the case of gold, it may be expressed in US$ or local currency.
Value in Australia
This is value of the offer that is primarily retained in Australia. This would include an Australia ASX 
listed and domiciled company acquisition. While Newmont, Anglo Gold, Alcoa, etc. are ASX listed, 
they are not considered to be 'Australian' in this context.  However BHP Billliton and Riot Tinto are 
considered 'Australian'.
Value offshore
This is where the company is predominantly by non-Australians and are traded on foreign 
exchanges but may have 'token' listings on the ASX, e.g Anglo Gold, Newmont,  Xtrata, 
Homestake Mining Company, etc.
Scrip The final value of the offer payment in Bidder scrip.
Scrip or cash The final offer comprises an alternative between Bidder scrip and cash.
Cash The cash value of the final offer.
Foreign scrip The final offer comprises foreign scrip as defined in 'Value offshore' above.  
 
5.1.1 Event Analysis and Application to Resource Companies 
In Chapter 2, (Section 2.3.2) this thesis reviewed event study methodology which has 
the aim to determine whether an event or announcement caused an abnormal 
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movement in the stock price of a company. The abnormal returns (AR) are calculated 
as the difference between the actual return and the expected return on a stock. The 
stock’s expected return is typically measured using the market model and which 
relies only on movements in a relevant stock market index to estimate the expected 
returns for a particular company’s share price if the event were not to occur. 
Reiterating from Chapter 2, the null hypothesis in event studies is that the event has 
no impact on the distribution of company share price returns.  
 
The methodology utilised in this thesis adapts Benninga’s (2008) prescriptive 
approach for a two factor model. However, a discussion of single factor market 
model is firstly warranted to provide the background to the model. An estimation 
window is used to estimate the deemed returns from a stock under ‘normal’ 
circumstances from the regression of the stock returns and the returns of the market 
index. Hence, for stock i the expected return can be expressed as: 
 
Mtiiit rr βα +=  
 
Where  and represent the stock and the market return on day t and the 
coefficients 
itr Mtr
iα  and iβ are estimated by calculating an ordinary least-square 
regression over the estimation window. 
 
Once the above is established, the impact of an event on the return on a stock in an 
event window can be defined as: 
 
)( Mtiiitit rrAR βα +−=  
 
Where  is the abnormal return representing the difference between the actual 
return and the expected return predicted by the earlier formula at time t. Lastly the 
abnormal daily returns during the event window can by summed to establish a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) defined as: 
itAR
itr
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Benninga (2008) extends the single factor model to a two-factor model where it is 
assumed that the stock returns are for example, a function of both a market and an 
industry factor: 
 
tIndustryiIndustryMtiMarketiit rrr ,ββα ++=  
 
This thesis has generally used a two-factor model although this may be extended to 
three factors but in some cases a single factor model has been used in the estimation 
period for resource companies. This is logical because as outlined in Chapters 3 and 
4, the share price movements of resource companies often correlate strongly to 
movements in relevant commodity prices as well as overall market movements. 
Hence, this thesis considers that an ideal estimation period involves regression of 
share price movements with a relevant index, e.g. Australian Gold Index, S&P/ASX 
300 Resources Index etc. and the relevant commodity price movements such as the 
spot gold price. 
 
However, as noted in Chapter 4, in the case of resource companies, the correlation of 
stock price returns and the returns from the movement of commodity prices exhibit a 
poor correlation. This is demonstrated in Table 40 which outlines regression analysis 
in a 252-day estimation period for Savage Resources prior to the takeover offer from 
Pasminco, while Table 41 presents a similar outline for Comalco Resources prior to 
Rio Tinto’s takeover bid. 
 
Table 40 compares the observed t-statistic for the returns and the actual data for the 3 
month forward LME zinc price, the ASX Accumulation All Resources Index and 
ASX Other Metals Index against the stock price returns on a daily basis. With a 
critical t-value at 1.969 (5 percent level) it is evident that Savage Resources stock 
returns cannot be considered to be significantly correlated with the returns from the 
zinc price or the All Resources Index – a consideration that would not be shared with 
most market participants at that time (see Appendix 1 for company profile). 
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However, regression of the actual data provides significantly higher observed t-
statistics where all parameters would be considered significant. 
 
Table 40. Observed t-statistic in regression analysis of commodity price and index 
price returns and regression of price and index data in a 252-day estimation period 
from 30 October 1997, prior to the Pasminco offer for Savage Resources.  
Parmeter Using Daily Price Returns Observed t-statistic
Using Daily Prices 
Observed t-statistic
3mth forward LME zinc price 0.57 2.78
ASX Acumulation All Resources Index -0.15 6.23
ASX Other Metals Index 7.76 14.35  
 
A similar situation is evident with major aluminium producer, Comalco where there 
is a non significant relationship between the stock returns and the returns from the 3 
month forward LME aluminium price. However, using the actual daily prices, there 
is a significant relationship (Table 41). 
 
Table 41. Observed t-statistic in regression analysis of commodity price and index 
price returns and regression of actual price and index data in a 252-day estimation 
period from 9 March 1999, prior to the announcement of a Rio Tinto offer for 
Comalco Resources. 
Parmeter Using Daily Price Returns Observed t-statistic
Using Daily Prices 
Observed t-statistic
3mth forward LME aluminium price 0.45 4.65
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index 3.08 7.58
ASX Other Metals Index 2.61 16.97  
 
As evident from the Chapter 4, and the discussion above, regression of returns in an 
estimation window with resource companies may not produce results which are 
consistent with market expectations. While Table 40 and 41 present data on only two 
resource companies, these data are consistent with the data observed with most 
resource companies. 
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In this research, the testing of the multi-factor market event analysis model for 
resource companies found that the model could be substantially improved by 
drawing on the analysis discussed in Chapter 4. Recalling, Section 4.3 identified that 
comparing the absolute level of share prices and commodity prices provided a better 
correlation than comparing share price and commodity price returns. Adapting this to 
the multi-factor model involves using the regression analysis in the estimation period 
to estimate the sensitivity of share price movements to a number of factors and then 
using these factor coefficients to estimate a ‘theoretical share price’ series.  In most 
cases, the factors are derived from the regression of daily commodity prices and 
index levels with the daily share price of a resource company and are tested against a 
critical t value for significance. 
 
The daily returns from the theoretical share price series can then be compared to the 
actual share price returns to determine abnormal returns. Importantly, these abnormal 
returns can be tested using a separate standard error measurement (Steyx used in 
Microsoft Excel) of a comparison of theoretical returns versus the actual returns and 
not the standard error derived in the original regression used to determine factors for 
estimating the theoretical share price. 
 
While the procedure will become clearer in the next section on its practical 
application, essentially the developed methodology involves: 
1. Using regression analysis in a 252-day estimation window to determine 
factors which are significant and their slope and intercept values. 
2. Calculate a theoretical data price series based on the daily parameters and the 
slope values and intercept (if significant). 
3. In the event window(s) compare the stock price returns with the returns 
calculated from the theoretical share price series. 
4. Test these returns for significance by dividing by the standard error of the 
regression of the theoretical share price series returns and the actual share 
price returns and then compare this value to the critical t value. 
 
The attraction of the methodology is that the theoretical share price is likely to be a 
more meaningful measure of the impact of movements of the significant factors 
whereas individual factors are prone to changing relationships. In Chapter 4, these 
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were interpreted as changes in both probability weighted value changes where both 
probability and the value can independently change over time.  
 
5.1.2 Methodology 
Similar to Benninga’s (2008) two-factor market model approach, this research 
utilises Microsoft Excel’s LINEST array function for ordinary least-squares 
regression. LINEST produces an Excel block output of statistics outlined below.  
• The slope of each parameter 
• Standard error of the slope 
• Intercept 
• R2 (a measure of how well the regression fits the observed data ranging from 
0 to 1 for a perfect fit).  
• Standard error of y values 
• F statistic (observed F-value is a measure of the significance of the regression 
as a whole and can be compared against a critical F-value) 
• Degrees of Freedom 
• SSxy which is the summed product of observations from the mean 
• SSresidual which is the residual sum of squares 
 
Readers interested in a description of LINEST and the block output are referred to 
Benninga (2008), Microsoft Excel Help or Tushar-mehta (2009).  
In determining significant coefficients, the coefficients are divided by their 
respective standard errors which yields an observed t-result, or 
abs(coefficient value)
Oberved t result = corresponding standard error  
 
The comparison of the absolute value (abs(coefficient value)) of this t-result with the 
corresponding critical t-value determines whether the coefficient should be treated as 
zero.  The critical t-value is calculated with the formula =TINV(0.05, d.f.), where 
0.05 corresponds to the 95 per cent confidence level and d.f. is the degrees-of-
freedom for the regression (Tushar-mehta, 2009). With 252-day estimation windows, 
the degrees of freedom for the regressions are normally above 248 given the small 
number of factors. 
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If the coefficients and intercept are significant using this  methodology then they are 
used to estimate a daily theoretical share price by multiplying the daily data by the 
significant coefficients and adding the intercept. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the daily returns from the actual share price movements and 
theoretical price movements are then independently regressed to determine a 
standard error. This research has used the Excel STEYX function which estimates 
the standard error of the predicted y-value for each x in the regression. 
 
Appendix 1 provides a summary of the regression statistics for each transaction as 
well as the STEYX values to provide readers with the data to assess the robustness of 
the regressions.  
 
Finally, to determine whether abnormal returns are significant the actual returns less 
theoretical returns are divided by the standard error of the regression of the returns 
estimated using STEYX as outlined above. This value is then compared to a critical 
t-value estimated using the Excel TINV function described earlier. If the return 
divided by the standard error exceeds the critical t-value then it is considered 
significant, if not it is ignored. 
 
Lastly, a regression using the same parameters in the estimation period is conducted 
in the post-event period to determine changes in the observed t-results to provide an 
estimate of any changes in the sensitivity of movements in the company share price 
to movements in the various parameters after the transaction. 
 
5.1.3 Event Windows and Parameters 
The event studies use the following windows or periods: 
• Estimation window: 252 days (i.e. a full year in trading days terms) prior to 
Event window 
• Event window: 3 days – one day prior to event, event day and one day post 
the event day, although sometimes this window is extended by a day or two 
to capture share price movements related to the event  
• Post-event window: 252 days which generally commences at the time there is 
a high level of market certainty that the transaction will proceed. 
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 This thesis has explored factors of significance to share prices using multiple 
regression analysis on factors including relevant commodity prices and selected 
Australian and International indices depending on the characteristics of the 
companies involved in the transaction.  
 
The indices used in this study also depend on the timing of the transaction. As 
outlined in Chapter 1 (Section 1.10.1) the ASX in conjunction with Standard and 
Poors introduced the S&P/ASX 100, 200 and 300 series of indices which generally 
replaced the earlier indices. The now defunct ASX Other Metals index was 
particularly relevant to companies that were considered ‘pure metal plays,’ while the 
ASX Gold index was important to the significant gold sector during the 1980s and 
1990s, but both ceased being recorded in mid 2002. The ASX All Resources Index 
also ceased being recorded at the same time, so their values are only available  prior 
to 2002. 
 
The recent S&P/ASX resource indices are mostly dominated by BHP Billiton and 
Rio Tinto apart from the S&P/ASX Mid Cap Resources and S&P/ASX Small Cap 
Resources indices. The last two indices are not ideal with the former comprising only 
a few companies (it was less than 6 in early 2009, but its current breakdown is not 
freely available) and the latter is distorted by a large component of oil and gas 
companies. 
 
The international indices utilised in the present research include the MSCI Metals 
and Mining Index, HSBC Global Mining Index, the FTSE 350 Mining Index, the 
Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index, the JST Gold Mining Total Returns Index 
(Johannesburg) and the S&P/TSX Global Gold Index. The choice of index has been 
in accordance with the profile of the companies involved in the transaction. These 
indices also display different longevities with the FTSE 350 Mining Index, HSBC 
Global Mining Index and the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index having data 
extending well back into the early 1990s.  
 
The most common regression has involved the copper price given its status as a 
bellwether of the metals because of its relatively large market size and liquidity (see 
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Chapter 3, Section 3.6). Like the other base metals, there has been frequent testing of 
the differences in the significance between the 3-month forward price and the spot 
price and, similarly to gold, is priced in both US$ or in the domestic currency. The 
results of this analysis are presented later in this chapter. 
 
An area of difficulty is dealing with commodities involved in annual benchmark 
price negotiations such as iron ore and coal. Typically iron ore companies are more 
sensitive to movements in the copper price (as a bellwether reflecting global 
economic activity) than say spot iron ore prices out of India, etc. As an example, the 
regression of Norths against the ASX All Resources Index and the three month 
forward LME copper price indicated a greater sensitivity to both than to the Indian 
spot iron ore price despite the company’s high exposure to iron ore. A similar 
situation applies to spot coal prices and part of the reason is likely to involve the 
difficulties most market participants have in obtaining spot iron ore and coal price 
data. 
 
Overall, the broadest factors which are least influenced by the transaction and the 
share price performance of the participants are selected for estimating a theoretical 
share price series. In some cases, a series of regressions are used to test a variety of 
factors and ideally the final selection includes at least one commodity price series 
and one share price index series. 
 
5.2 Transaction Summaries 
The following table lists the transactions investigated in this thesis with individual 
transaction details and data summaries presented in Appendix 1. Each transaction 
summary includes a reference list which largely comprises company announcements 
and media reports at the time of the transaction. 
 
This thesis has focused on 30 transactions and while these represent the majority of 
the more significant transactions over the last 20 years in the Australian resource 
sector, there are more that have not been analysed as a consequence of data 
availability and time constraints. Nevertheless the selection of the 30 transactions 
attempts to provide representative coverage of issues considered important in the 
analysis. These include: 
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• Mopping up minority interests in subsidiaries 
• Foreign takeovers of Australian subsidiaries 
• Competitive takeovers 
• Dual listing and mergers. 
• Mid and small cap Australian takeovers 
 
It is also important that the transactions are not subject to complicating factors which 
confound the analysis or are difficult for the market to interpret (e.g. unduly 
complicated bids) or reflect short-term market fads such as the two-year uranium 
boom ending in 1997. 
 
Table 42. Transactions analysed and presented in Appendix 1.  
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Date of 
announcement Target Bidder Type
19-Mar-01 Billiton plc BHP Dual Listing
09-Oct-95 CRA RTZ Dual Listing
05-Jul-06 Excel Coal Peabody Energy Merger
14-Nov-95 Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie Normandy Mining Merger
07-Apr-03 MIM Xstrata Merger
14-Nov-95 Northern Flinders Mines Normandy Mining Merger
14-Nov-95 PosGold Normandy Mining Merger
18-Jun-97 QNI Billiton plc Merger
24-Jul-98 RGC Westralian Sands Merger
03-Mar-08 Zinifex Oxiana Merger
28-Apr-98 Aberfoyle Western Metals Takeover
03-Sep-99 Acacia Resources Anglo Gold Takeover 
27-May-02 AurionGold Placer Dome Takeover 
23-Feb-05 Austral Coal Centennial Coal Takeover 
24-Jul-06 Aztec Resources Mt Gibson Iron Takeover 
25-Feb-00 Comalco Rio Tinto Takeover 
23-Feb-07 Consolidated Minerals Palmary Enterprises Takeover 
17-Jan-96 Gascoyne Sons of Gwalia Takeover 
11-Dec-01 Hill 50 Harmony Gold Mining Takeover 
14-Aug-95 Homestake Gold Australi
 
aHomestake Mining Compa Takeover 
29-Oct-07 Jubilee Mines Xstrata Takeover 
05-Sep-01 Normandy Mining Newmont Takeover 
23-Jun-00 Norths Rio Tinto Takeover 
28-Nov-96 Placer Pacific Placer Dome Takeover 
23-Dec-97 Plutonic Resources Homestake Mining Compa Takeover 
28-Aug-00 QCT Resources BHP Takeover 
09-Nov-07 Rio Tinto BHP Billiton Takeover 
07-Apr-03 Savage Resources Pasminco Takeover 
21-Aug-97 Wiluna Mines Great Central Mines Takeover 
28-Oct-04 WMC Resources BHP Billiton Takeover  
 
The total value of these transactions is A$240 billion although this figure is 
dominated by the 1997 BHP Billiton bid for Rio Tinto. If this attempted takeover is 
excluded from the list then the total value of the transactions analysed is A$60 
billion. 
 
To extend the analysis in several areas, this thesis has listed a further 22 transactions 
as outlined in Table 43 which contribute a further A$8.2 billion of transactions. The 
author believes that combined with the 30 analysed transactions, the total would 
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cover more than 90 per cent of transactions and more than 95 per cent of the value of 
resource transactions over the last 20 years. 
 
Table 43. Additional transactions not analysed in Appendix 1. 
Date Target Main Commodity Exposure Bidder
Main Commodity 
Exposure Value (A$m)
16-Jan-91 Carr Boyd Au Ashton Mining Diamonds 50
16-Apr-92 ACM Au, Ni, Zn WMC & Normandy Au, Ni, Cu, Al 260
07-Apr-94 Aztec Mining Zn, Au PosGold Au 287
10-Apr-96 Golden Shamrock Au Ashanti Au 372
22-Nov-96 Ashton Mining Diamonds ADEX Diamonds 14
09-Dec-97 Eagle Mining Au Great Central Mines Au 229
12-Jan-99 Great Central Mines Au Normandy Mining/Yandal Gold Au 463
25-Feb-99 Abednego Nickel Ni ANL & Glencore Ni 64
31-Jul-00 Ashton Mining Diamonds Rio Tinto Diamonds 522
19-Dec-00 Newhampton Goldfields Au Harmony Gold Mining Au 54
26-Feb-03 Abelle Au Harmony Gold Mining Au 155
03-Jun-03 Darymple Resources Au, Ni LionOre (now Xstrata) Ni 162
12-Jan-05 Portman Fe Cliffs (US based) Fe 605
09-Oct-06 Leviathan Resources Au Perseverance Mining Au 46
18-Oct-06 Ballarat Goldfields Au Lihir Gold Au 350
27-Feb-07 Summit Resources U Paladin U 1,160
19-Jul-07 Kimberley Diamonds Diamonds Gems Diamonds (UK) Diamonds 300
26-Sep-07 Resource Pacific Holdings Coal Xstrata Coal 960
28-Oct-07 Perseverance Au Northgate Minerals Au 282
17-Dec-07 Allegiance Mining Ni Zinifex Zn 775
19-Mar-08 Equigold Au Lihir Gold Au 1,100
02-Dec-08 Fusion Energy U Paladin U 18  
 
The following sections present and discuss the findings of the data analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Transaction Values  
The 52 transactions plotted in order of decreasing value are presented in Figure 93. 
The overshadowing impact of the potential BHP Billiton bid for Rio Tinto (A$181.5 
billion) is evident in the chart even though the Y axis has a maximum value of $12 
billion. This is the only transaction study that was not completed because BHP 
withdrew its offer on the 25 November 2008 and is therefore used in some analysis 
and not in others. 
 
The average transaction values are: 
• $1,340 million (51 transactions and excluding the 2007 BHP Billiton bid for 
Rio Tinto) 
• $4,804 million including the 2007 BHP Billiton offer for Rio Tinto (52 
transactions)  
 
Figure 93. The 52 transactions in descending order of transaction value. 
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Categorising the transactions into value ranges highlights that the most common 
transaction size range was from $250 million to $500 million representing more than 
27 per cent of all transactions and more than half (51.9 per cent) of the transactions 
were less than $500 million in value (Figure 94). This is in line with expectations 
given the size distribution of companies in the sector and tendency for companies to 
acquire smaller companies than themselves (see later in the Chapter). 
 
Figure 94. Frequency distribution of transaction values in value ranges for the 52 
transactions. 
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Figure 95 charts the total value of the transactions in the value ranges presented in 
Figure 94. In combination with Figure 94, it is evident that a few high-value 
transactions dominate the total value of the 52 transactions. 
 
Figure 95. Total transaction values for each value range for the 52 transactions 
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5.2.1.1 Transaction values in commodity sectors. 
This thesis has grouped company commodity exposure into seven commodity 
groups, viz: 
• Uranium 
• Mineral sands 
• Gold 
• Diversified/iron ore 
• Diamonds 
• Coal 
• Base metals 
 
In this categorisation, iron ore producers are grouped with diversified miners because 
historically most diversified miners have large iron ore production bases in their 
commodity mix. This has changed in recent years where increasing iron ore prices 
have encouraged the establishment of pure iron ore producers (e.g. Portman Mining, 
Mt Gibson, Aztec Resources, etc.). An alternative is to group these companies in a 
bulk commodity category, but this would not separate coal transactions which have 
also become more prevalent in recent years. Hence, the diversified category is a 
broader group which involves iron ore and associated commodities and including 
companies ranging from BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Norths through to Mt Gibson 
Iron and Consolidated Minerals. 
 
Figure 96 plots the number of transactions in each of the target commodity categories 
outlined above. Not surprisingly, the gold sector has experienced the greatest level of 
rationalisation on a number of transactions basis and is followed by the base metals 
sector. This also largely reflects the number of companies operating in these sectors. 
 
Figure 96. Number of transactions in each commodity category. 
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Figure 97 charts the total transaction value for each commodity group along with the 
average transaction size for the group excluding the 1997 BHP Billiton bid for Rio 
Tinto. These data are also outlined in Table 44. 
 
Figure 97. Total and average transaction values for each commodity group. 
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A review of the uranium data shows that transaction values are skewed by the 2007 
Paladin takeover of Summit Resources which is likely to reflect the euphoria with the 
uranium boom. Interestingly Summit’s main projects are in Queensland where 
uranium mining remains banned. The only mineral sands transaction is the 1998 
merger of RGC and Westralian Sands which has been included for later merger 
analysis.  
 
Overall, the diversified and base metal average transaction sizes are similar while the 
average gold transaction has a lower value of $650 million. This reflects the typical 
company sizes in these commodities and as discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3) 
there are commodity market size constraints which can limit the size of companies 
operating within each sector. The evolution of these commodity sectors over time is 
discussed later. 
 
Table 44. Total and average transaction values for each commodity group. 
Commodity group Number of transactions Total transaction value (A$m)
Average transaction size for 
sector (A$m)
Uranium 2 $1,178 $589
Mineral sands 1 $470 $470
Gold 23 $14,944 $650
Diversified/iron ore 5 $12,551 $2,510
Diamonds 3 $836 $279
Coal 4 $4,283 $1,071
Base metals 13 $34,061 $2,620  
 
In comparing target commodity exposure with bidder commodity exposure, it was 
not surprising that 90 per cent, including all the gold companies had a similar 
exposure. Companies with differing exposures tended to involve a larger bidder (e.g. 
Xstrata/MIM or Ashton Mining/Carr Boyd) seeking diversification into new specific 
commodities. 
 
5.2.1.2 Trends in Australian M&A activity 
M&A activity in Australian since 1990 can be broadly separated into three 
significant phases: a first period between 1995 and 2000, a second period between 
2002 and 2004 which occurred at the early stages of the 2002-2008 resource boom 
and a thirdly, a more recent period from 2006 to 2008 which occurred towards the 
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end of the resources boom. This is evident in Figure 98 which plots the number of 
transactions and total value of the transactions on a calendar year basis since 1991. 
 
Figure 98. Number of transactions and total value per calendar year since 1991. 
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To recap on the defined periods in Chapter 3, Table 21 has been reproduced here as 
Table 45 as the market sentiment at these times is important in understanding the 
rationale for a significant portion of the M&A activity.  
 
Table 45. Defined periods over the last 23 years. 
Period S tart E nd Months
86‐87 bull run 4 August 1986 19 October 1987 14
1987 recovery 29 October 1987 11 J anuary 1990 27
90‐92 drift 12 J anuary 1990 10 J une 1992 29
92‐96 bull run 18 November 1992 8 May 1996 42
As ian C ris is 25 J une 1997 27 August 1998 14
98‐2000 bull run 28 August 1998 13 J anuary 2000 17
Tech boom drift 14 J anuary 2000 18 October 2002 33
R esource boom 21 October 2002 19 May 2008 67
G lobal F inancial C ris is 27 May 2008 5 December 2008 7
2009 recovery 8 December 2008 24 S eptember 2009 9  
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To compare the frequency of transactions against the Australian resource indices, 
Figure 99 charts the ASX Accumulation All Resources Index (ending on 5 July 
2002) and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index (commencing on 1 January 2003) 
along with the year transaction numbers presented in Figure 98. 
 
It is evident that the peaking number of transactions appears to correlate with lower, 
albeit temporary, points in the Australian indices apart from the period in the latter 
part of the 2002-2008 Resources Boom. 
 
Figure 99. Total transaction value per year and Australian Resource Indices. 
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Index data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
This tends to be supported in Figure 100 which charts total transaction value per year 
and the two Australian resource indices. 
 
Figure 100. Total transaction value per year and Australian Resource Indices. 
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Index data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
The next sections discuss the various commodity groups outlined earlier. 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Trends in Australian gold takeovers 
The number gold transactions each year are plotted on Figure 101 along with the 
ASX Gold Index and the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index multiplied by 10. The 
Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index has been used due to the incompleteness of the 
ASX Gold Index over this period and is multiplied by 10 times to increase the value 
of the index so that trends are more comparable with the ASX Gold Index. 
 
Figure 101 displays a high number of transactions in the mid 1990s after the gold 
indices peaked in 1994 and declined in 1995 before peaking again in 1996 and then 
declining into the Asian Crisis. Between 1990 and 2004 there was a period of activity 
albeit at reduced number levels which resumed again from 2006. 
 
Figure 101. Number of annual gold transactions, ASX Gold Index and Philadephia 
Gold and Silver Index multiplied by 10. 
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Index data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Figure 102 below illustrates that 2001 was the peak year in transaction value at $4.5 
billion and included the Newmont takeover of Normandy Mining. The transaction 
number peak in 1996 evident in Figure 101 also coincides with a significant 
transaction value of almost $3.5 billion with the Normandy Mining merger (see 
Appendix 1). In other years the activity was below $1.5 billion. 
 
Figure 102. Value of annual gold transactions,ASX Gold Index and Philadephia Gold 
and Silver Index multiplied by 10. 
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Index data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
In both Figures 101 and 102 the ASX Gold Index appears to increase from 2000 
relative to the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (multiplied by 10). Figure 103 
plots the ASX Gold Index converted to US$ to highlight the effect of the declining 
A$/US$ exchange rate during this period. Figure 103 also overlays the value of 
foreign transactions on the total transactions on a year by year basis. 
 
Figure 103. Value of annual gold transactions including transactions involving a 
foreign bidder highlighted in green. The ASX Gold Index has been converted to a 
US$ basis using daily spot exchange rates while the Philadelphia Gold and Silver 
Index has been multiplied by 10 for comparison. 
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Index data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
Figure 103 is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, contrary to some market opinions, 
during the Tech Boom Australian gold shares were, after adjusting for the exchange 
rate, generally priced in accordance with their global peers. At that time it was 
considered that share prices had fully compensated for a higher Australian dollar 
gold price due the overall lack of market interest in Australian resource shares. 
Essentially Figure 103 highlights that it is likely that all global gold shares were at a 
nadir in 2001. 
 
Secondly, Figure 103 outlines the dramatic increase in foreign takeovers of the 
Australian gold sector from the mid-1990s through to the end of 2003. In fact all the 
takeovers in the late 1999 to end 2003 period were carried out by foreign bidders at a 
time the gold indices were at low levels. Hence while these six transactions 
(AngloGold – Acacia; Harmony – New Hampton Gold Fields, Hill 50 and Abelle; 
Newmont – Normandy, and Placer Dome – AurionGold) accounted for only 26 per 
cent of the total number of gold transactions, they accounted for 60 per cent of the 
$15 billion in M&A transactions or $9 billion of takeovers of the Australian gold 
sector. With this surge of foreign activity in the late 1990s through to the end of 
2003, it is little wonder that the ASX abandoned the ASX Gold Index series. 
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Interestingly most of the gold transactions by value involved payment by scrip (e.g, 
Newmont – Normandy, Placer Dome – AurionGold; AngloGold – Acacia) which 
meant that the bidders didn’t fully capture the lower equity values at that time with 
cash bids. The only exception was Harmony Gold in its spate of takeovers involving 
Hill 50, Abelle and New Hampton Gold Fields. 
 
It can also be argued that the Australian gold sector experienced a significant period 
of consolidation in 1996 and beyond which eventually ended up in foreign ownership 
with few exceptions, although the most notable exception is Sons of Gwalia which 
went into administration in 2004. 
 
5.2.1.2.2 Trends in Australian base metals sector 
Trends in base metals M&A are different from gold described above and are 
dominated by fewer but generally larger transactions. Figure 104 plots the ASX 
Other Metals Index doubled to provide an easier comparison to the S&P/ASX 300 
Resources Index from 2003. Transactions numbers are low and are generally only 
one per year, if occurring at all, except for  two transactions occurring in 1998 and 
2007. 
 
Figure 104. Number of annual base metals transactions,ASX Other Metals Index 
(doubled) and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index. 
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Indexed sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
When compared to Figure 105, the five dominant transactions are evident and all 
occur later than 2000. In 2001 BHP conducted its merger with Billiton plc, in 2003 
Xstrata took over MIM, in 2004 BHP Billiton took over WMC Resources in a bid 
prompted by Xstrata and in 2007 Xstrata took over Jubilee Mines. Lastly Oxiana and 
Zinifex merged in 2008. Three of the five dominant takeovers stemmed from the 
acquisitive nature of Xstrata plc. 
 
Apart from Rio Tinto successfully buying out the minority interests in Comalco with 
its cash or a less popular alternative scrip offer in 2000, most of the Australian 
takeovers have met with mixed success. The Pasminco takeover of Savage Resources 
and the Western Metals takeover of Aberfoyle appear to reflect opportunistic cash 
bids in 1998 following the Asian crisis while the more recent Zinifex takeover of 
Allegiance in 2007 was timed at the top of the market. 
 
Figure 105. Value of annual base metals transactions,ASX Other Metals Index 
(doubled) and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index. 
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Indexed sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
5.2.1.2.3 Trends in Australian diversified/iron ore sector 
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The trends in M&A activity in the diversified and/or iron ore companies appears 
relatively straightforward. Figure 106 outlines five transactions with the dominant 
being the 1995 dual listing of RTZ and CRA. As discussed in Appendix 1, this deal 
involved a bonus share issue to CRA shareholders and hence timing was not critical. 
The 2000 takeover of Norths by Rio Tinto appears a time of moderating lower share 
prices but as also outlined in Appendix 1, involved strategic factors in the 
consolidation of the Pilbara iron ore projects. 
 
More recent M&A activity has involved consolidation in the iron ore sector (e.g. 
2006 Mt Gibson takeover of Aztec Resources) and foreign companies investing in 
the sector (2005 Cliffs partial takeover of Portman Mining, and 1997 Palmary 
takeover of Consolidated Minerals). Increased foreign investment in and growth in 
the iron ore sector has been in direct response to perceived growth in iron ore 
demand from the industrialisation of China and other emerging economies as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 106. Value of annual transactions for diversified/iron ore companies with the 
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index. 
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Indexed sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
5.2.1.2.4 Trends in Australian other commodity sectors 
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In the remaining commodity sectors, there are few and generally sporadic 
transactions. Figure 107 plots the coal transactions and, from the 2000 takeover of 
QCT Resources by BHP and Mitsubishi, most coal transactions reflect foreign 
acquisitions of domestic coal producers. These include the 2006 Peabody Energy 
takeover of Excel coal and the 2007 Xstrata takeover of Resource Pacific Holdings. 
An exception is the 2005 takeover of Austral Coal by Centennial Coal, although this 
was later sold to Xstrata. 
 
Figure 107. Value of annual coal transactions with the ASX Accumulation All 
Resources Index and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index. 
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Indexed sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
As mentioned earlier the uranium sector has experienced significant consolidation 
during the 2006 – 2007 uranium boom, particularly by Canadian company Mega 
Uranium. In Table 42 this thesis notes the 2007 $1.2 billion takeover of Summit 
Resources by Paladin as well as the small 2008 takeover of Fusion Energy. 
 
There were three diamond takeovers during the period of this analysis, namely: the 
1996 takeover of ADEX by Ashton Mining, the 2000 Rio Tinto takeover of Ashton 
Mining itself and the 2007 takeover of Kimberly Diamonds by UK Gem Diamonds. 
Ashton’s takeover of ADEX was opportunistic given its knowledge of the Argyle 
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Diamond mine, while Rio Tinto potentially had its hand “forced” when DeBeers 
announced a hostile takeover of Ashton Mining in 2000. Kimberly Diamonds was 
facing financial difficulties and negotiated a friendly deal with Gem Diamonds.    
 
The only mineral sands deal analysed is the 1998 merger of RGC with Westralian 
Sands which reflected rationalisation in a subdued resource market after the Asian 
Crisis and before the 1998-2000 Bull Run had commenced. 
 
5.2.1.2 Takeover style trends in Australian M&A activity 
The research in Appendix 1 covers the analysis of 30 transactions that provides the 
data that has been summarised here to highlight trends within broader M&A 
activity.. The transactions have been categorised into dual listings (RTZ – CRA and 
BHP – Billiton), mergers involving scheme of arrangements (8 transactions) and 
traditional takeovers (20 transactions). 
 
Figure 108 plots the average final offer premium over the previous 30-day average 
share price for the target for the three categories. In the case of dual listings and 
mergers, the target is regarded as the company whose shareholders receive new scrip 
or cash. 
 
As expected, the friendly transactions offer target shareholders a lower premium 
(dual listing – 17.8 per cent, mergers – 12.9 per cent) compared to traditional 
takeovers which average 48.7 per cent.  While the number of mergers is only eight 
and reflects their prevalence in M&A activity, they are co-operative approaches to 
merging and hence shareholders have lower premium expectations. 
 
Figure 108. Average premium to 30-day average share prices prior to announcement 
for dual listing, mergers and takeovers. 
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Figure 109 plots the final premia over the 30-day average share prices for non-
competitive and competitive takeover bids. Competitive bids are defined as where 
there is more than one bidder during the course of the takeover. As expected, the 
takeover premium is almost 70 per cent higher with an average premium of 66.1 per 
cent compared to non-competitive bids with an average premium of 39.3 per cent. 
 
Figure 109. Premia over 30-day average target share price prior to bid announcement 
for competitive and non-competitive bids. 
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Figure 110 plots the final takeover premia to the 30-day average target share price 
for hostile and non-hostile (recommended) takeovers. A takeover is regarded hostile 
if the target Board rejects the initial takeover bid and is designed to establish whether 
there was a degree of co-operation between the companies with regard to the 
takeover offer. The data for recommended bids are highly skewed by the recent 
competitive bidding for Consolidated Minerals (final 125.2 per cent premium to the 
30-day average share price) as the initial approach was a recommended offer (see 
Appendix 1).  Figure 112 presents average recommended takeover premia with and 
without the Consolidated Minerals takeover offer.  
 
Figure 110. Takeover premia over the 30-day average target share price prior to 
announcement for recommended (with and without the Consolidated Minerals 
transaction) and hostile takeovers.  
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Interestingly, excluding the Consolidated Minerals transaction which is considered 
an outlier, the final premia over the 30-day average target share price is similar for 
both hostile and recommended offers. Recalling Figure 109, this thesis highlights 
that it is the competitive nature of takeovers which can increase final bid premium 
and not whether the takeover is hostile or recommended. 
 
This is reaffirmed in Figure 111 which plots the final average takeover premium over 
the initial 30-day average target share price less the initial average takeover premium 
over the same 30-day target average price. There are two clear outliers in this data, 
firstly the non-competitive Placer Dome bid for AurionGold was during a falling 
market where the difference was a 67 per cent fall in the final offer premium and 
reflected the falling scrip offer. The second was the Palmary takeover offer for 
Consolidated Minerals discussed earlier which culminated in a 122.5 per cent 
difference in premia between initial and final offers. 
 
Figure 111 plots the difference between final and initial offer premia with and 
without these outliers. Excluding these outliers it is evident that a competitive bid 
can lead to an average 20 to 25 per cent increase in the initial offer premium. 
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Figure 111. Difference between initial premia to the 30-day average target share 
price prior to bid announcement and the final offer premia. 
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Figure 112 compares the final offer premium to the 30-day average target share price 
for scrip and cash bids. Scrip bids are separated into two categories: all bids and 
foreign only offers. Figure 112 also plots the final offer premium for all cash bids, 
foreign only cash bids and a variation on both which excludes the Consolidated 
Minerals cash bidding war outlier. 
 
The author notes that interestingly, if the Consolidated Minerals outlier is removed 
from the data set,  there is no significant premium difference between all scrip offers 
and cash offers and whether the cash is from a foreign company. This contrasts with 
a traditional market view that cash is worth more than scrip, hence scrip offers 
should provide a greater premium. This includes merger schemes but then merger 
schemes can be in effect a takeover, e.g. Xstrata’s 2003 merger with MIM offering 
MIM shareholders cash. Hence as outlined in Figure 108 it is the capacity of the 
bidding company to effect a merger that may influence the size of the premium.  
 
The standout feature of Figure 112 is the different in premia between foreign scrip 
and total scrip offers which is expected to stem from the ‘encouragement’ required 
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for Australian shareholders to receive foreign scrip, even though the company may 
be listed on the ASX. This average premium at 64.7 per cent is approximately 30 per 
cent higher than the total scrip offer average premium at 35.7 per cent. 
 
Figure 112. Average premia for scrip and cash offers. 
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In reviewing payment type through time, Figure 113 appears to support the old adage 
that bids in high markets tend to be with scrip while bids in market lows are with 
cash. One exception is the dual listing of RTZ and CRA in 1995 and as discussed 
earlier, the nature of the deal meant that it wasn’t share price sensitive.  
 
Figure 113. Payment type for transactions each year 1995-2008. 
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Figure 114 plots Australian M&A activity versus transactions involving a foreign 
acquirer. Overall there is a broad trend of foreign bidders acquiring Australian 
companies in weaker markets. This author believes that, at the end of the Tech 
Boom, there was more recognition of a potential turnaround in resource markets in 
North America and Europe than in Australia and that may have stimulated a spate of 
foreign bidders including Rio Tinto, although Rio Tinto has been regarded as an 
Australian company. 
 
Figure 114. Australian takeover/mergers and offshore bidder takeover/mergers from 
1995-2008. 
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Index data sourced from Stock Resource. 
 
5.2.1.3 Independent Expert’s Reports and takeover premia 
In the 30 transactions analysed, 15 of the target companies had commissioned 
valuations from independent experts to assist their shareholders in their decisions. 
All the independent experts provided both high and low values of the target to 
provide a valuation range. 
 
Figure 115 plots firstly the final offer price as a percentage of the mid point of the 
target valuation range. The chart highlights that on average, the final bid price was 
close to 92 per cent of the mid point of the valuation range. Figure 115 also plots a 
measure of the valuation range by displaying the difference between the high and 
low values divided by the lower value. It shows that on average, the high value is 
around 25 per cent higher than the low value and hence a final offer price offer 
which averages 92 per cent of the mid point of the valuation range means that most 
final offers tended to fall within the lower part of the valuation range. This is 
expected to some degree given the fiduciary duty of directors making it difficult for 
them not to recommend an offer which is within the valuation range, particularly 
when they have commissioned the valuation. 
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Figure 115. Average final offer price as a percentage of the mid point of the 
independent expert’s valuation range and average valuation range as a percentage of 
the low valuation.  
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Valuation ranges potentially offer an insight into a company’s asset base as a large 
range would suggest that there is a scope for an acquirer to extract greater value from 
a target company’s asset base. This could reflect undeveloped resources, exploration 
potential, expansion opportunities, etc. which have the potential to be developed 
under certain circumstances such as higher commodity prices or after additional 
exploration or development work has been carried out. 
 
Figure 116 plots the final bid premium against the valuation range in a scatter plot.  
Overall there is a broad trend supporting the proposition that on average, a greater 
valuations range attracts a greater offer premium.. 
 
Figure 116. Average final offer premium versus average independent expert 
valuation ranges. 
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The outliers reflect unusual circumstances where the bid price has fallen during the 
takeover process and this reflects falling markets and hence negative final offer 
premia. The other outlier is the Aberfoyle valuation range which at 72.3 per cent 
appears unrealistic and probably unhelpful to Aberfoyle shareholders! 
 
In Figue 117 these outliers have been removed and a trend line (R2 = .361) included. 
 
Figure 117. Average final offer premium versus average independent expert 
valuation ranges after the removal of outliers and applying linear regression. 
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5.2.1.4 Takeover target and bidder abnormal returns 
The data in Appendix 1 list the estimated cumulative abnormal returns for both the 
target companies and bidders based on the difference between actual returns and the 
returns based on a theoretical share price series calculated using significant 
regression coefficients as described earlier in Section 5.1.2. 
 
The research estimated the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) normally in a 3-day 
at the times of the announcement but with mergers and competitive bidding this may 
be extended through to the completion of the transaction. The intent of the research is 
to estimate the CAR stemming from the transaction, which is normally only evident 
at the time of the initial announcement. However in protracted takeovers with 
competitive bidding anticipated by the market there is a risk that enhanced returns 
received by target shareholders are not recorded as abnormal returns due to their 
incremental nature. 
 
Figure 118 plots the initial and final offer premia to the 30-day average target share 
price as well as the target CAR at the time(s) of the announcement(s). On average the 
CAR is 42 per cent and 45 percent lower than the initial and final offer premia to the 
30-day average target share price. This is likely to reflect a combination of: 
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• The value of the overall market sector increasing in response to the 
announcement of a potential transaction 
• Potential uncertainty associated with the likely success of the transaction 
• The potential changing value of scrip offers 
• A required arbitrage return, e.g. selling Homestake Mining US shares to 
purchase Homestake Gold Australia shares to generate the funds necessary to 
then accept the Homestake Mining offer.  
 
Figure 118. The initial and final offer premia to the 30-day average target share price 
as well as the target CAR at the time(s) of the announcement(s). 
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This impact of scrip bids on CAR is evident in Figure 119 where the CAR can be 60 
per cent less than the final bid premia over the average 30-day target share price. It is 
interesting that the final premium to the average 30-day target share price remains 
similar to both cash and scrip transactions, whereas some scrip offers include 
friendly mergers. As a general comment this thesis reports that the data indicate that 
the final premia over average 30-day target share price on average are independent of 
transaction types and as highlighted earlier, also of whether the transaction is hostile 
or recommended. The premium is dependent on whether it is a competitive 
transaction while the CAR are influenced by whether the payment is in cash or scrip 
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 Figure 119. The initial and final offer premia to the 30-day average target share price 
as well as the target CAR at the time(s) of the announcement(s) for scrip bids only.  
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Figure 120 is a scatter plot of final offer premia to the 30-day average target share 
price against CAR for the target at announcement(s). As expected, there is a general 
trend that the higher the final offer premia to the 30-day average target share price, 
the higher the target CAR over the event(s).  
 
 
Figure 120. Scatter plot of the final offer premia to the 30-day average target share 
price against the target CAR at the time(s) of the announcement(s).  
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Figure 121 compares bidder CAR at the event announcement(s) window(s) with the 
bidder CAR in the 252-day post-event windows. While there is no evident 
relationship in the size of the CAR for both time periods, Figure 121 at least 
indicates that most bids deliver positive CAR in the post-event window irrespective 
of negative CAR at the time of the announcement(s). 
 
Figure 121. Scatter plot of bidder CAR at announcement event window(s) and post-
event windows. 
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This fact supports the contention of this thesis that Acquisitions May Add Value to 
Resource Companies and is presented graphically in Figure 122. Figure 122 plots the 
change in target value due to CAR multiplied by the market capitalisation of the 
target prior to the offer announcement. Similarly, it plots the change in bidder value 
as a result of the average CAR in both the announcement window(s) and the 252-day 
post event window. It also plots the net position of these two CAR values. 
 
Figure 122 indicates that while the target CAR at announcement(s) has returned 
significant value in the transactions studied, from the bidder perspective, negative 
announcement(s) CAR are more than offset by positive CAR in the post-event 
window. In fact post-event window CAR almost twice offset the negative CAR at 
offer announcement(s). 
 
Figure 122. Target CAR value at offer announcement and bidder CAR at 
announcement(s) and in the post-event window. Net bidder CAR value change is 
also plotted. 
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Figure 123 is a scatter plot of net bidder CAR at the initial announcement and post-
event period and of the offer size. While the chart has been scaled to a maximum 60 
per cent CAR return and offer size up to $10 billion, it shows that on average, a 
bidder has gained an average 7.8 per cent CAR on the transactions analysed. 
Furthermore, it highlights that 7 out of the 28 transactions had negative net bidder 
CAR or only 25 per cent of transactions lost bidder shareholder value.  
 
Figure 123. Scatter plot of net bidder CAR at the initial announcement and post-
event period and offer size. 
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Figures 126, 127 and 128 investigate the target and bidder size relationship with 
firstly, the final 30-day offer premia at announcement, secondly, the bidder CAR at 
announcement(s) and thirdly, the net bidder CAR over both the announcement and 
post-event windows. 
 
This thesis argues that there is not a strongly evident relationship between target and 
bidder size and target premia at offer announcement or bidder returns at offer 
announcement or combined with the post-event period on the transactions analysed. 
 
However, it is possible to interpret from Figures 125 and 126 that a larger target size 
results in low bidder CAR at the announcement window while a larger target size 
relative to the bidder can yield greater CAR in the post-event period. Both these 
interpretations are credible from firstly the ability of larger bidders relative to targets 
in their ability to fund and raise bids and secondly, a larger target relative to the 
bidder will have a greater impact on the bidder in the post-event period. 
 
Figure 124. Average offer premia on the 30-day average target price versus the 
relative size of the target compared to the bidder. 
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Figure 125. Bidder CAR in the announcement window(s) versus the relative size of 
the target compared to the bidder. 
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Figure 126. Net bidder CAR in the offer announcement and post-event windows 
versus the relative size of the target compared to the bidder. 
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5.2.1.5 Bidder sensitivity changes 
Appendix 1 presents a comparison of the sensitivity of the bidder to a key index and 
key commodity in the regression analysis in the post-event period. The observed t-
results are compared in the post-event regression analysis with the regression 
analysis carried out in the estimation window. Both of these windows generally 
comprised 252-day periods separated by the transaction period. 
 
As noted in the commentary on individual transactions in Appendix 1, some of the 
changes were extreme, particularly when modest changes were observed over 
initially low t-results. There are also changes which appear unexplainable and may 
reflect specific company issues during one of the analysis periods. In terms of 
commodity exposure, resource companies were found to be relatively insensitive to 
changes in bulk commodity benchmark price changes reflecting typical annual 
negotiations, and in many cases were more sensitive to copper price movements with 
copper being a bellwether of the daily traded metals (see Chapter 3). 
 
Figure 127. Changes in observed t-results in regression analysis in the post-event 
window compared to the estimation window for the key commodity exposure of the 
target company. 
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Despite the limitations discussed above, Figure 127 could be interpreted as indicating 
that higher net bidder CAR is potentially correlated to a greater change in the 
bidder’s sensitivity to its key commodity. This would be in accord with expectations 
that greater bidder returns could reflect an increase in the attractiveness of the bidder 
to investors and would correlate with a greater sensitivity to a key commodity.  
 
Figure 128. Changes in observed t-results in regression analysis in the post-event 
window compared to the estimation window for the key index exposure of the target 
company. 
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In contrast, it appears there is no evident relationship between net bidder’s CAR and 
changes in its sensitivity to a key index (see Figure 128). This differs from a 
perceived importance of index weighting although it could also reflect the diversity 
of the indices involved with the companies in the researched transactions, e.g. the 
investment universe behind international versus domestic indices. Nevertheless, this 
thesis would expect that companies would generally desire a greater sensitivity in 
specific indices to attract investment funds but transactions may not deliver this 
outcome. 
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6.0 The Exploration Alternative 
Exploration projects represent part of the asset portfolio of resources companies and 
in the case of junior explorers, can be the main assets of the company. As for any 
other investment each project has a potential expected return and an associated 
uncertainty . The difference is that in exploration the uncertainty is much wider both 
on the up and downside, hence the risk of failure at the level of an individual project 
is extreme. 
The relevance of exploration to this thesis is the dynamics between the attractiveness 
of investment in exploration versus acquisitions and how the market assesses these 
investments. As discussed in Chapter 5, in the M&A transactions analysed in 
Appendix 1, the average return to a bidder was 7.8 per cent and is the summation of 
generally negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) at the time of the 
announcement(s) and positive CAR in a 252-day post-event period. There was also a 
25 per cent chance of negative cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder but despite 
these negative returns, the bulk of the value of the acquisition is retained by the 
bidder and may yet still deliver positive future returns. 
The overriding factor influencing investment trends in both M&A activity and 
exploration is the scarcity of economic deposits. Indeed, this scarcity and risk 
associated with achieving exploration success has resulted in many companies 
preferring the reliability of acquisitions as source of corporate growth. There is 
evidence that the exploration alternative is experiencing: 
• A general decline in discovery rates. 
• A progressive decline in the deposit size of new discoveries over time for a 
given mineral camp. 
• A steady increase in exploration discovery costs. 
This chapter draws on both academic and industry publications and presentations to 
support these contentions. It also reviews global and domestic exploration 
expenditure trends and proposes a classification to categorise exploration expenditure 
in relation to project risk. By estimating and attributing crude probability of success 
to various exploration categories, it makes it possible to estimate the order of 
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magnitude of the value of an exploration portfolio. While this is less relevant from an 
industry perspective given the necessity of gross generalizations in assessing the 
crude probabilities of success, it is important from a market perspective. 
In recalling the declining probability model applied to junior explorers Anchor 
Resources and Cougar Metals (Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.3) over defined time periods,  
it would appear that the market neither has the patience nor willingness to invest for 
returns on the basis of cumulative probability of success for a series of exploration 
projects on a realistic timeframe. 
Nevertheless, exploration is the first strategic phase of the mineral supply process 
and the stimulus for exploration arises from the demand for the related target 
commodities. (Mackenzie, 1992). Exploration is also the most competitive activity 
within the mineral supply process, as companies tend to be more co-operative in 
respect to the subsequent development and processing of discovered resources, 
(White, 1998). 
The last section and which is further developed in the discussion of Chapter 7 is the 
evolution of the exploration sector. It questions whether increasing commodity and 
acquisition prices will stimulate investor appetite for investment in exploration 
companies given the risks associated with exploration. 
 6.1 Exploration Trends 
Exploration in areas later classified in this thesis as greenfield projects, can exhibit 
certain trends following a major discovery. These trends can involve a steady 
decrease in deposit size of subsequent discoveries, an increase in exploration costs 
and the combined decreasing discovery rates over time. These aspects are discussed 
below and in fact many researchers consider these characteristics can be applied on a 
broader scale to exploration in general over time. 
Given these characteristics, it can be argued that at the time of the first discovery, the 
full value of the deposit and subsequent discoveries are unlikely to be fully 
appreciated by the owner although depending on the ground position held, there is 
now likely to be an enhanced upside from future exploration efforts. This thesis 
would argue that it is difficult to assign this as an ‘embedded option value’ as 
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discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1.3) but rather a probability function given that 
the presence of an initial discovery now increases the probability of future, albeit, 
potentially smaller, discoveries.  
However, in considering the potential share price rerating of the company making the 
initial discovery and with the potential for future albeit smaller, discoveries, it is 
reasonable to expect that the most significant rerating will occur with the 
announcement and proving up of the initial discovery. While the prospect of further 
discoveries exists, it is more likely that after the perceived value (say an approximate 
market NPV estimate) of the new discovery is impounded in the share price, the 
market will turn to consider other factors such as the feasibility studies and 
development timetables and ability for the company to finance the project. This is 
particularly relevant in smaller companies with the market turning to firstly, the 
ability of the company to fund the project and what equity raisings may be required, 
and secondly, the timing to first project cash flows. 
Therefore it is likely that the share price of smaller companies will undervalue the 
increased probability of future discoveries in the area after some resource 
quantification of the first discovery has been completed and the initial exploration 
hype has dissipated. As discussed later in Section 6.1.4, this leaves smaller 
companies particularly vulnerable to an undervalued takeover while providing larger 
bidding companies with confidence that significant new discoveries in smaller 
companies can be bought cheaply at the right time. Alternatively, if the company can 
progress past the financing stage and move to production, then future discoveries 
now offer a greater upside to shareholders with the ability to schedule processing 
through the operating plant.  
6.1.1 Declining deposit size. 
The progressive decline in deposit size over time in a given mineral camp is a well 
known phenomenon and has been reported in many mineral fields (e.g. Guj et al, 
2010, Whiting and Shodde 2006, Guj and Fallon 2009, Huleatt and Jaques 2005, 
Jacques et al, 2005, Parry 2001). Parry (2001) highlights this feature in Figure 129 
which presents the gold endowment at St Ives in the eastern WA goldfields.  
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Figure 129. The size of gold discoveries at St Ives, WA. 
 
From Parry (2001). 
Deposit sizes are fitted well by a lognormal distribution (Guj et al, 2010)and 
reaffirms the adage that 80 per cent of the value comes from 20 percent of the 
deposits. Figure 130, also from Parry (2001), displays a broadly declining size of 
deposits discovered through time at Norseman in the Eastern Goldfields of WA. 
Figure 130. Discovery trends at Norseman, WA. 
 
From Parry (2001). 
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A similar case is outlined by Whiting and Shodde (2006) with the discovery of nickel 
orebodies at Kambalda and includes later resource additions in subsequent 
exploration (Figure 131). They define a search space as a given set of conditions 
which constrain economically-significant outcomes of the search process and 
include: 
• target ore-type (detectability, economics); 
• cover conditions; 
• detection technology; 
• extraction technology; and 
• political/commercial environment. 
A key observation of the researchers is that the largest deposits in any given 
prospective search space are usually found early because they have the most obvious 
signatures. This was certainly the case at Kambalda, with the four largest deposits 
there being found in the first six years following the initial discovery (see Figure 
131). 
Figure 131. Size and discovery date of nickel deposits found at Kambalda 
 
From Whiting and Shodde (2006). 
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The same premise has been applied to global exploration as exploration of mineral 
provinces around the world matures and the discovery of new deposits becomes 
more difficult. This is evident in discovery trends for all deposits over time including 
giant deposits as classified by Blain (2000) with a greater than US$10 billion in-
ground value (IGV). 
Figure 132. Discovery frequency over time for all deposit types. 
 
From Blain (2000). 
In fact McKeith (2009) argues that the gold industry itself is being sustained by 
maturing mines discovered many years ago. He estimates that the historic average to 
1995 is that 75 per cent of discovered ounces are mined (Figure 133). 
Figure 133. Discovery and development of world gold resources. 
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 From McKeith (2009). 
6.1.2 Declining Exploration Success Rates 
Research also indicates that discovery success is waning over time on a per-
exploration-dollar basis (Goodyear 2006, Mercer 2006, Leveille & Doggett, 2006). 
While the evidence is somewhat general in nature, it is in line with expectations 
discussed earlier that the larger, outcropping and shallower orebodies, with obvious 
footprints are discovered first and hence the discovery rate slows as the number of 
remaining undiscovered deposits decreases and they become more difficult to find.   
A review of BHP Billiton’s data on base metal discoveries (Goodyear, 2006) clearly 
shows how exploration ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ have generally deteriorated 
despite volatile but significant exploration expenditure since the 1950s (see Figure 
134). Discoveries in this database exclude satellite deposits to existing operations 
and are limited to individual deposits or local groups of deposits containing more 
than 100,000 tonnes of copper or copper-equivalent metal. 
Figure 134. Exploration expenditure and discovery trends in base metals. 
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 From Goodyear (2006). 
Figure 134 highlights a strong discovery rate in the 1960s and 1970s, which has 
observably declined irrespective of the volatile annual exploration expenditure 
levels. 
Blain (2000) and Palethorpe and Blain (1986) contend that the high discovery rate of 
world class deposits in the 1950s and 1960s has deteriorated over time. These 
authors note that new developments in exploration technologies, including remote 
sensing, have contributed to more recent successes, but in aggregate, they have been 
insufficient to mitigate the overall declining trend. 
Decreasing discovery rates conversely imply an increasing cost of discovery and 
therefore a lower net value of an ‘average’ discovery.  The logical conclusion is that 
there is a decrease in both the effectiveness and efficiency of companies solely 
engaged in exploration given the higher expenditure required per given discovery.  
Ideally the increased rewards of an exploration discovery due to scarcity and higher 
commodity prices should translate into a lower-cost and more easily accessible 
capital for explorers (e.g. through coveted equity raisings) but this has not been the 
case. Most junior explorers listing on the ASX struggle to meet minimum capital 
raising requirements ($2.3 million) despite the increasing costs of discovery, with the 
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proposition that a perceived higher risk due to declining discovery rates is not 
compensated by increasing discovery rewards by the market.  
6.1.3 Trends in Discovery Cost 
A number of researchers have estimated discovery costs over time, and in particular, 
in the gold sector. In fact many gold companies publish discovery costs as a method 
of highlighting to the market their capacity to add shareholder value by ‘discovering’ 
low-cost ounces. 
Unfortunately overall discovery costs do not provide a meaningful trend as the costs 
are largely influenced by: 
• Comparability of the cost data and the way they are collected and collated. 
More often than not, historical dollars of different years are used, making 
comparisons inconclusive or even erroneous during periods of high inflation. 
• The technical ability and competitiveness of individual companies to discover 
further mineralization.  
• The components of the exploration program in terms of minesite, brownfield 
or greenfield exploration. An example is a gold company may commence an 
exploration program near existing deposits where mineralization is known to 
occur from past drilling. This can provide an enhanced ability to ‘discover 
low-cost ounces’ in comparison to a prior program which focused on 
greenfield exploration programs. 
In gold exploration, research by Huleatt and Jaques (2005) noted that average 
discovery costs had stabilised around A$20 to $25/oz after falling sharply during the 
early to mid-1990s. The early to mid-1990s was a time when a number of new 
discoveries were made, notably in the Yandal belt in Western Australia and the 
Lachlan Fold Belt in New South Wales. However in a more recent presentation by 
Gold Fields (Figure 135), Exploration Manager Tommy McKeith, presented a case 
of steadily increasing discovery costs over time from a global perspective (McKeith 
2009). 
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Figure 135. Declining exploration efficiency based on greater than 0.1 million ounce 
discoveries.  
 
From McKeith (2009). 
In base metals exploration, Jacques et al (2005) note that the discovery record is 
strongly cyclical with resource growth for all the base metals punctuated by the 
discovery of some giant and world class deposits each decade (see Section 6.5.1 and 
Shodde & Hronsky (2006) for definition of world class). Jacques et al (2005) noted 
that higher metal prices and renewed interest in base metals, especially nickel, had 
reversed a 10-year decline in base metal exploration attended by reduced rates of 
discovery. This renewed interest had led to record expenditure and new nickel, 
copper and zinc discoveries, while also increasing the resources at a number of 
existing deposits, notably the Olympic Dam copper-uranium-gold deposit. With the 
exception of the Prominent Hill copper-gold and West Musgrave nickel-copper 
deposits, most of the recent discoveries, especially zinc, were noted by Jacques et al 
(2005) as being of small tonnage and supporting the concept of the discovery of 
progressively smaller sized deposits over time in mature provinces. 
6.1.4 Investor sentiment to exploration  
The discussion above highlights the market sentiment towards exploration as a high 
risk venture that may not offer returns within an acceptable timeframe. In fact 
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declining success rates and increased discovery costs along with a general decrease 
in average discovery size across the broader industry does not engender investment 
appeal. 
As an alternative to exploration, many junior companies have acquired existing 
undeveloped but previously marginal projects and which are later referred to as 
Secondary Project Evaluation (Section 6.5). During the 2002-2008 Resources Boom, 
Hronsky et al (2009) notes that the prices paid for many of these assets were 
significantly greater than their underlying value and that the most significant lesson 
to emerge from the recent boom is that increases in commodity prices alone are not 
enough to make poor quality deposits economically viable!  
Their conclusion was based on the fact that while commodity prices move higher, so 
do the potential cost inputs (e.g. energy, labour, materials, etc.) and hence, the 
operating margins remain low. Nevertheless, this has not been the case with all 
projects, Fortescue Metal’s development of the once considered marginal Chichester 
iron ore deposit being a prime example. 
6.2 Exploration expenditure trends and the influence of markets 
Researchers tend to focus on historical exploration expenditure levels as a guide to 
exploration activity and hence the factors that influence these expenditure levels are 
important analytical considerations. 
Exploration expenditure is surveyed by both government organizations (e.g. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics with further analysis by Abare) and private 
organizations. Of the latter the most well known is the Canadian-based Metals 
Economics Group (MEG) (see ABS publications 8412.0, MEG 2008). Metals 
Economics Group (1992-2008) surveys provide a global perspective while 
Government statistical data collections along with surveys by industry or accounting 
bodies tend to be specific to particular countries.  
The surveys also vary in comprehensiveness from reviewing company exploration 
expenditure in the annual accounts, collating statistical data from mail-out responses 
to exploration companies and to organizations conducting personal interviews with 
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company executives. The former tends to provide historical data series while the 
latter seeks to provide contemporary expenditure trends. 
Historically, exploration expenditure has varied from year to year in response to: 
• Relative commodity prices, recent price trends and future expectations 
• Equity market support for the resource sector and the extent of this support to 
junior explorers 
• Consolidation within the resource sector 
• Project availability and access 
In reviewing exploration funding trends on a global and domestic scale there are 
broad correlations between exploration expenditure and both commodity prices and 
equity market levels. This is evident on a global basis by comparing yearly non-
ferrous world exploration estimates from MEG (2002 to 2008) with global mining 
indices and base metal prices. 
Figure 136 plots the Metals Economic Group’s estimated global yearly exploration 
expenditure against the HSBC Global Mining Index. It indicates a broad correlation 
in the 2002-2008 Resources Boom. Due to the size of this boom, the scale 
overshadows earlier trends although an earlier exploration expenditure peak in 1997 
does appear to correlate with an increase in the HSBC Global Mining Index with the 
1992-96 Bull Run. 
Figure 136. Worldwide exploration expenditure trends and HSBC Global Mining 
100 Index. 
 356
 Data sourced Stock Resource, Goulden, 2009, MEG 2007, 2008. 
A comparison of global exploration expenditure and base metal prices is presented in 
Figure 137 and 138. Figure 137 plots the LMEX index (a composite of base metal 
prices from the LME) while Figure 138 plots the three month forward LME copper 
price with Metals Economic Group’s estimated global yearly exploration 
expenditure. 
Figure 137. Worldwide non-ferrous exploration expenditure trends and the LMEX 
commodity price index.  
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 Data sourced Stock Resource, Goulden, 2009, MEG 2007, 2008. 
Figure 138. Worldwide non-ferrous exploration expenditure trends and three-month 
forward LME copper price. 
 
Data sourced Stock Resource, LME, Goulden, 2009, MEG 2007, 2008 
As the exploration expenditure data are annual, analysis is limited to broad trends 
and it is not evident whether commodity or share prices have the greatest influence. 
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Research by Bartrop (2009) notes that in the recent 2002-2008 Resources Boom, the 
share prices of resource companies have moved simultaneously with commodity 
prices rather than displaying a pre-emption period typical of earlier resource rallies. 
This is supported by comments by the Morgan Stanley Australian economist, Gerard 
Minack (AFR, 2008) and as discussed in Chapter 3, and is likely to reflect an 
increased investment in commodities as well as equities by global investment funds. 
Figure 139 and 140 depict two charts adapted from MEG (2008) data, which 
confirms the generally recognized fact that junior explorers increase exploration 
expenditure when equity funding becomes available. 
Figure 139 plots the annual exploration expenditure estimates for the Major, 
Intermediate and Junior companies along with the HSBC Global Mining Index. 
Recalling the 2002-2008 Resources Boom, Figure 140 highlights the dramatic 
increase in junior expenditure as equity funding becomes increasingly available.  
Figure 139. (a) Worldwide Exploration Budgets by company type from 1998 to 2008 
and the HSBC Global Mining 100 Index. 
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The application of this funding is evident in Figure 140 which plots junior 
exploration budgets with junior equity raisings. Figure 140 highlights two important 
issues. Firstly total junior equity financings have been double the exploration budgets 
over the 2002-2008 period and potentially indicating an ‘opportunistic’ factor in 
junior companies management’s fund raising activities. Secondly, the yearly 
variation in total exploration budgets is significant and represents more than a 10-
fold increase from the low point in 2002 to the highest expenditure in 2008 and 
hence the risk that specific exploration programs may struggle to maintain continuity 
from year to year.  Both of these factors suggest a relatively low exploration 
efficiency per equity financing dollar. 
Figure 140. Junior Company Exploration- Related Equity Financings and 
Exploration Budgets*, 2000-2008 (US$ billions) 
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Data sourced MEG, 2008, *2008 data pro-rata estimate on data from Goulden 2008. 
In contrast to junior exploration expenditure, expenditure by the majors and 
intermediate-size companies are less volatile and with expenditure by the majors 
estimated to be greater than junior expenditure in the five to six years prior to the 
Resources Boom. However, over the last 10 years according to the MEG data, the 
total junior exploration expenditure has in fact exceeded the expenditure by the 
majors by around US$2.5 billion. 
 360
This concurs with Mercer (2006) who notes that approximately half of recent 
exploration expenditure was from junior companies in line with stronger equity 
markets. Interestingly over the 10-year time period in Figure 139 the MEG data 
indicate that junior exploration expenditure has been on average, broadly similar to 
the expenditure of the major companies. 
A contentious issue is the effectiveness of junior exploration and this subject draws 
mixed and unquantified opinions. McKeith (2009) presents an assessment which 
claims that junior and prospector expenditure has been less effective than 
expenditure by majors and intermediates in the gold sector (Table 45). In contrast,  
AMEC (2009) report that juniors have been responsible for the discovery of two-
thirds of gold deposits since the 1960’s in Western Australia but unfortunately the 
cost of this success is not quantified nor the average discovery size relative to 
discoveries by the mid-cap and major companies.  
Table 45. The effectiveness of exploration expenditure by major and intermediates 
sized companies versus and juniors and prospectors in the gold sector. 
Majors and Intermediates Juniors and Prospectors
Greenfields and late state exploration funding 40% 59%
Average size of discovery 3.2 Moz 2.2 Moz
Cost per discovery (2008 US$m) $104M $174M
Cost per ounce (US$ 2008/oz) $33/oz $80/oz  
From McKeith (2009). 
As noted in the earlier discussion on junior equity financings, this thesis believes that 
the effectiveness of exploration in smaller companies is likely to be hampered by 
inefficiencies such as the cost of administration relative to the scope of their 
activities, the necessary funding to apply the optimum exploration techniques and 
caution in advancing projects where there is a potential to devalue the project (e.g. 
see Guj, 2009, Shodde and Hronsky, 2006, Bartrop and White, 1995).  
The major companies comprise the global diversified houses such as BHP Billiton, 
Rio Tinto, Vale, Xstrata and Anglo American and these companies tend to allocate 
relatively stable exploration budgets which steadily change over time in line with 
revenue levels (e.g. AFR 2008). This typically varies from 1 to 3 per cent of revenue 
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although disclosure is variable, for example Rio Tinto and Xstrata do not segregate 
exploration expenditure in their accounts, perhaps reflecting a greater focus on 
growth through acquisition over the past few years. 
Figure 141 plots charts BHP Billiton’s annual exploration expenditure as shown in 
its cash flow statement as a percentage of revenue from its profit and loss statement. 
While this is a ratio between cash and an accrual figure, it is an approximate yet 
meaningful metric. Revenue reflects the impact of commodity prices and production 
changes (to lesser extent changes in inventory levels and other accrual items) and 
over this timeframe it is interpreted that exploration expenditure has not kept pace 
with revenue (and commodity price) increases. This exploration expenditure pattern 
appears to apply to most of the majors. 
Figure 141. BHP Billiton’s exploration expenditure as a percentage of revenue. 
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Source: BHP Billiton Annual Reports 2000-2008. 
Figure 142 plots BHP Billiton’s non-petroleum yearly exploration expenditure as a 
percentage of total capital expenditure. Interestingly, this appears to follow a closer 
relationship with the percentage ranging between 10.0 and 16.1 percent of total 
capital expenditure with levels tracking total capital expenditure.  
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Figure 142. BHP Billiton’s yearly exploration expenditure as a proportion of total 
capital expenditure. 
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Exploration based on cash flow statements, revenue from Profit & Loss statements; 
Revenue restated to consolidated as proportional interests from 2004.  Growth capex 
is the development capex attributable to new projects or expansions while sustaining 
capex is ‘stay in business’ capex. Source: BHP Billiton Annual Reports 2000-2008. 
6.2.1 Australian Exploration Expenditure Trends 
To compare Australian exploration spend with the global spend, the Australian 
quarterly exploration expenditure, as recorded by the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS), has been summated to an annual basis and converted to US dollars using 
average yearly exchange rates. As outlined in Figure 143, Australian exploration 
expenditure in historical dollars follows the global trends based on MEG data.  
Figure 143. Australian (red line) and global annual exploration expenditure (bars) in 
nominal US dollars. 
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Source: ABS (2009), MEG (1996 – 2008)  
The ABS data also segregate expenditure among different commodity targets. 
Exploration figures, however, can be distorted by expenditure incurred in the 
feasibility studies of large projects that is not strictly exploration, e.g. BHP Billiton’s 
expenditure on its Olympic Dam expansion.  
Figure 144 plots the exploration levels for the commodities categorized by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 1988 – 2008) prior to the Global Financial 
Crisis. It reiterates the resurgence of industrial-related commodities in the 2002-2008 
Resources Boom and the declining importance of gold exploration. Historically, gold 
exploration has been a major focus of junior explorers due to the relative ease and 
lower costs of developing gold deposits, their generally shorter development 
timeframe and the ease of marketing of the gold produced.  
Figure 144. ABS aggregated exploration expenditure for specific commodities from 
1998 to 2008. 
 364
050
100
150
200
250
Sep-88
Sep-89
Sep-90
Sep-91
Sep-92
Sep-93
Sep-94
Sep-95
Sep-96
Sep-97
Sep-98
Sep-99
Sep-00
Sep-01
Sep-02
Sep-03
Sep-04
Sep-05
Sep-06
Sep-07
Sep-08
A$ million
Base metals expenditure (six month rolling
average)
Gold expenditure smoothed (six month
rolling average)
Iron ore expenditure (six month rolling
average)
Uranium expenditure (six month rolling
average)
Coal expenditure (six month rolling
average)
 
Data sourced from ABS (2009). 
6.3 Exploration Risk Categorization 
Exploration expenditure classifications, such as the one utilized by MEG (Goulden, 
2008), typically divide expenditure into three categories, namely; mine, advanced 
and grassroots exploration. These categories are outlined as follows: 
• Grassroots: Exploration from the earliest reconnaissance and project 
generation stages, through perimeter drilling to the quantification of initial 
resources. 
• Late stage and feasibility: exploration to further define, quantify, and 
upgrade a previously identified mineral resource. It also includes all 
feasibility work up to a decision as to whether or not proceeding to 
development of a mine.  
• Minesite: all exploration (regardless of phase) at or immediately around an 
existing minesite held by the company (excluding production geology on the 
orebody being mined such as geotechnical/rock engineering, reserves 
estimation, and grade control or confirmation drilling on the producing 
orebody). It includes the search for satellite orebodies within an economic 
transport distance of an operating mine and related processing plant. It also 
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includes exploration at or immediately around a project that has been 
committed to development (preproduction stage). 
Yearly survey data provide a useful time series in categorising exploration 
expenditure. However, the classification has limitations as follows: 
• The definition of the ‘Grassroots’ expenditure is very broad. 
• The classification does not attribute exploration risk across the various 
categories although the risk of ‘Grassroots’ exploration expenditure is 
perceived as higher than that of the other two categories. 
• It is difficult to relate company size to exploration expenditure patterns. 
• Late-stage or feasibility study exploration expenditure is not clearly 
differentiated between that relating to advanced projects which have resulted 
from past exploration success in a company’s grassroots campaign from 
expenditure on advanced projects which have been acquired. 
Bartrop and Guj (2009) recommended a slightly different approach to the 
classification of exploration expenditure by linking categories or target styles with 
generalised risk-reward scenarios. Hogan et al (2002) noted the concept of risk in 
exploration as failure to discover an orebody and related it to the level of geological 
information available on a particular area. However, the potential value of an 
exploration target cannot be viewed in isolation from logistical considerations as its 
value will be higher if it is within economic reach of an under-utilised processing 
plant, particularly if the plant is owned by the exploration company. Thus, to broadly 
categorise risk, Bartrop and Guj (2009) focused on a combination of geological 
maturity of the terrain of the project area and the opportunity to utilize an existing 
beneficiating plant or the perceived difficulty in establishing a new one. Their 
proposed classification follows: 
Minesite exploration – This refers to exploration around existing operating mines 
owned by the company. The targets are generally orebody extensions or satellite 
orebodies that can provide feed to an existing mill. The local geology is usually 
known in some detail. These type of projects are considered generally low risk – low 
reward targets. This is because economic mineralization is likely or even known to 
occur on the mine site but historical exploration has generally reduced the potential 
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for a major orebody discovery. Exploration may also yield a substantial discovery at 
a depth below previously defined resources, however, this expectation is normally 
low given the presence of deep drilling to originally define the resources for mining. 
The presence of a plant also reduces the grade and size parameters that would be 
necessary for a new discovery to be economically exploitable. 
Brownfield exploration – This is exploration in geologically prospective areas where 
past discoveries have proven the existence of the style of mineralization sought and 
the broad geology is reasonably well known. The terrain may host existing 
operations generally beyond an economic trucking distance, hence there is an 
expectation that an economic discovery will involve the development of a new 
processing plant or at least, an ore treatment deal with a third party. An example 
could be prospective targets along a structural trend from historical mining centres, 
as is typically the case in Archaean gold exploration in the Eastern Goldfields of 
Western Australian. Exploration may involve soil sampling, localized geophysics 
and drilling rather than detailed large scale remote sensing. Previous exploration 
generally precludes the scope for a major world class discovery, but encourages 
realistic expectations for reasonably attractive middle and small size targets. These 
are classified as moderate risk – moderate reward targets. 
Greenfield exploration – This is typically grassroots exploration over broad areas 
where there is generally no capacity to utilise an existing processing plant and any 
new plant is likely to involve major infrastructural requirements. The project geology 
is not well known and the exploration targets may be mineralization styles that are 
not necessarily known to occur in the area, but which, based on conceptual target 
generation, have potential to be present. This set of circumstances primarily arises 
when an area is opened up to exploration for the first time or a new exploration 
concept unveils as-yet-untapped potential in a previously accessible area. Greenfield 
exploration may also take place when the geology of a terrain, which may have 
hosted some mining operations in the past, is reviewed and re-interpreted on a 
regional scale and new exploration concepts and strategies applied to it. Typical 
exploration will involve remote sensing over large areas to identify anomalies before 
a more detailed exploration program may be justified and implemented. To the 
degree that the terrain is virgin or has not been actively mined for a while, previous 
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exploration does not constrain the potential size of a possible discovery and the 
possibility of a world class or even giant discovery cannot be dismissed even though 
their discovery may have a relatively low probability. These types of projects are 
considered high risk – high reward targets given a generally perceived greater 
capacity for the projects to yield a world class discovery. 
Acquisitions – This refers to expenditure which is allocated towards assets which are 
in a ‘post-discovery’ stage and may even be a fully developed operating mine or 
portfolio of mines, and can be extended to broader M&A activity discussed in other 
chapters in this thesis. In contrast, acquisitions of brownfield or greenfield tenements 
prior to any material discovery are regarded as the normal process of gaining access 
to prospective ground in a similar manner to farming into joint ventures and are 
excluded from this category. This paper classifies these as low risk- low reward 
targets as the purchase price is often set by market valuations and significant due 
diligence is required to ensure that the purchaser does not over pay for the asset. 
However, in comparison to direct exploration expenditure, acquisition price risk is 
significantly lower than discovery risk. 
In this classification system, success in discovery or acquisition can lead to further 
expenditure. This expenditure would then be classified to a greenfield discovery, 
brownfield discovery or minesite discovery in recognition of the success of the 
original exploration program. Likewise if a company has been successful by 
investing in mergers and acquisitions and the acquisition involves further 
expenditure in developing an acquired asset, this expenditure would be referred to as 
development project expenditure on an acquired asset. The classification also avoids 
using the term “grass roots” which really depicts the type of exploration program and 
which may be unrelated to whether it is a minesite, brownfield or greenfield target, 
e.g. a company may conduct a broad geophysical or geochemical sampling survey in 
minesite exploration to generate new targets as existing reserves diminish. 
There is one further category which denotes special cases where there has been a 
delay in the development of a discovery and generally reflects sub-marginal 
economics at the time of discovery outlined below. Mercer (2006) aptly refers to 
these projects as resurrections. 
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Secondary project evaluation – This refers to exploration expenditure on projects 
where previous exploration has discovered and defined resources which can be non-
JORC compliant but represent material commodity tonnages. However, project 
development has stalled for some years after the time of discovery. Some of these 
projects may have been dormant due to marginal economics during periods of 
weaker commodity prices or due to previously unresolved technical, political or 
environmental challenges and differ from a successful discovery where resources are 
progressively and continuously delineated, assessed for commercial feasibility and 
developed on a progressive timetable from the initial discovery. These are classified 
as moderate risk – low reward targets given that their potential upside is diminished 
somewhat by the earlier quantification of their resources.  
Figure 145 outlines the relationships between the categories and their advancement 
with exploration or acquisition success. As outlined earlier, this success is classified 
into the respective discovery classifications (minesite, brownfield or greenfield). 
Alternatively it is directed towards secondary project evaluation or lastly, it is 
directed towards developing an acquired project.  
Figure 145. The relationship between the various proposed exploration expenditure 
classifications.  
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In line with the increasing risk from minesite to brownfield to greenfield exploration, 
there is an expected corresponding increase in returns from the value of a potential 
discovery. However, secondary project evaluation is a special case where the 
potential rewards of the initial discovery have not been realized other than by the 
meagre proceeds from a possible sale of the project to a third party. As mentioned, 
this is based on three generally identifiable factors: 
• Geological understanding: 
o Well known – minesite exploration, secondary project evaluation. 
o Reasonably well known – brownfield exploration. 
o Poorly known – greenfield exploration. 
• Proximity to a beneficiation plant: 
o Close to currently owned plant and within trucking distance – 
minesite exploration. 
o Assumption that development of a plant will be necessary although 
third party plants may be in the area – brownfield exploration. 
o No available plant and possibly considerable infrastructure 
development required – greenfield exploration. 
• Project viability at the time of discovery: 
o Initial project assessments warrant ongoing exploration and evaluation 
programs following initial discovery – minesite, brownfield and 
greenfield discoveries. 
o Initial project assessments indicate marginal or sub-marginal 
economics resulting in exploration and evaluation programs being 
stalled indefinitely at the time of discovery – secondary project 
discovery. 
Another relevant aspect is the cost of exploration of particular projects and this tends 
to accentuate the risk profile of the exploration expenditure categories outlined 
above. The financial commitment to an exploration program is likely to increase 
from a minesite project to that of a brownfield project and in turn is likely to increase 
in a large scale greenfield project given decreasing logistics and the style and breadth 
of the exploration activities that are likely to be involved. This increased financial 
commitment compounds the generalized decreasing discovery probability in creating 
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a money-at-risk profile across the exploration expenditure categories. It stands to 
reason that in greenfield projects, company management must view that the higher 
exploration expenditure, the lower probability of discovery and later higher 
development costs need to be compensated for by the expected size and value of a 
possible discovery in the project area. 
Table 47 summarises the general aspects of the exploration expenditure categories 
along with their potential risks, returns and exploration costs. It also includes an 
acquisition category for comparison which offers the lowest risk but potentially 
lowest returns given the overriding influence of the acquisition price. However, as 
noted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 there are factors which can mitigate M&A risk, 
particularly in relation to acquisition timing relative to the commodity price cycle. 
Table 47. Generalised profiles targets, risk, returns and exploration costs of the 
proposed exploration expenditure categories. 
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Exploration Target 
Profiles Target Size Target Risk Potential Return Exploration Costs Risk/Reward/Cost
Minesite exploration
Generally orebody 
extensions or satellite 
resources
Low risk given geology 
and mineralisation 
styles generally well 
understood
Low to moderate with 
economics supported 
by existing 
infrastructure
Low as existing 
infrastructure and 
access generally in 
place
Low/Low - 
Moderate/Low
Brownfield 
exploration
Medium given that 
large orebody 
discoveries are likely 
to have occurred 
previously due to 
earlier exploration
Medium given that 
there is generally a 
reasonable knowledge 
of geology and 
existence of 
mineralisation styles
Moderate
Moderate as 
preliminary exploration 
has normally been 
carried out and large 
reconnaissance 
programs generally not 
necessary
Moderate/Moderate/M
oderate
Greenfield 
exploration
Potentially large as 
area is generally not 
well explored
High, given little 
previous work carried 
out and geology not 
well known
Very High
High as areas are 
often remote, and 
where comprehensive 
staged exploration 
program may be 
required including 
large scale remote 
sensing programs
High/Very High/High
Secondary project 
evaluation
Variable depending 
on project parameters 
although the larger 
undeveloped projects 
are normally less 
viable at trend 
commodity prices
Moderate to High risk 
given initial resource 
has already been 
identified but viability 
dependent on other 
parameters
Low as project was 
previously marginal
Moderate as 
preliminary exploration 
has normally been 
carried out
Moderate to 
High/Low/Moderate
Acquisition Variable
Low as parameters of 
target generally well 
known
Low given often stock 
market influenced 
acquisition price
High as often fully 
priced and potential 
competing stock 
market pricing
Low to 
moderate/Low/High
 
 
As all explorers appreciate, the classification system and its risk-reward profiles 
represent broad generalizations in an imperfect industry with many exceptions. An 
example is that increasing exploration costs on higher risk projects can sometimes be 
justified on mine sites containing significant invested infrastructure but a rapidly 
declining reserve base. Sims and Bartrop (1993) highlight this situation at Mount Isa 
Mines where the economics of locating additional ore can justify a higher 
exploration risk profile in testing conceptual targets than would normally be carried 
out. 
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Nevertheless, a classification system similar to the one outlined above provides an 
expenditure profile which enables non-explorers, in particular participants in the 
financial markets such as investors, analysts and other interested parties to assess the 
total risk-return contribution of exploration portfolios and hence, assign any material 
contribution to the valuation of a company. Government organisations including 
Treasury departments, the ABS and Abare also need to determine the risk profile of 
Australian exploration expenditure to assess whether the current balance is meeting 
Australia’s long-term economic objectives. 
6.3.1 Risk-reward comparison of exploration expenditure categories 
Exploration risk is defined as the probability of sinking the expenditure of an 
exploration budget in the absence of a successful discovery. In other words, the focus 
is squarely on the downside of the negatively skewed distribution of all possible 
outcomes from an exploration program that defines its expected or mean value or 
return on investment and which generally includes a few successful discoveries and a 
predominance of failures. 
In this context greenfield exploration is characterised by expected returns which are 
higher than those from brownfield and minesite exploration, but also by greater 
uncertainty, as measured by the standard deviation of all possible outcomes, which 
can be much higher as well as much lower than expected. By contrast brownfield and 
minesite exploration and acquisitions are characterised by progressively lower 
expected returns but also by decreasing uncertainty surrounding these returns. On the 
assumption that all companies expend allocated exploration budgets, the risk is a 
continuum from total exploration failure to partial success ranging from the 
discovery of sub-economic mineralisation through to the discovery of the target 
orebody initially sought under the exploration expenditure classification.  
Quantification of historical average exploration risks and returns is extremely 
difficult. However a number of authors have reviewed various data sets from 
different time periods to estimate probabilities and returns from discovery success. 
The financial returns based on the NPV of exploration expenditure and the NPV of 
‘economic’ exploration discoveries has been estimated by a small number of 
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researchers and these returns are summarized in Table 47. The data and analyses are 
generally designed to highlight the attractiveness of exploration over the long-term. 
Table 47. Estimated exploration returns from past research. 
Period Internal Rate of Return Comments Reference
1955 - 1978 12% After tax basis, Australian exploration and discoveries surveyed
Mackenzie and 
Woodall (1987)
1946 - 1977 22% After tax basis, Canadian exploration and discoveries surveyed
Mackenzie and 
Woodall (1987)
1961 – 1984 9%
After tax basis; based on BHP's 
Australian discoveries during this 
period and excluding petroleum
Palethorpe & 
Bain (1986)
 
  
The data indicate that if a company can match the historical average exploration 
success rates, it can achieve a return of around 10 per cent on its Australian 
exploration budget. However, as noted by both Mackenzie and Woodall (1987) and 
Palethorpe & Bain (1986), it is the importance of ‘world class discoveries’ that 
underpins the average return and there is considerable variation in exploration 
expertise and therefore success across the resources sector (Mackenzie and Woodall, 
1987). Under the proposed classification system, world class discoveries are most 
likely to be derived from greenfield exploration programs. 
To quantify the highest returns from greenfield exploration programs this thesis 
refers to the research by Shodde & Hronsky (2006) and Shodde (2006b) who 
proposed an economic definition for major and world-class projects for gold, 
diamond, and base metal deposit discoveries made over the period 1985 to 2003. In 
terms of size they classify a “major” deposit as containing more than one million 
ounces (Moz) of gold or three million carats of diamonds or half million tonne (Mt) 
of copper or other metals expressed as copper-equivalents. It is estimated that during 
this period a total of 258 major greenfield discoveries were made throughout the 
world, including 87 base metal deposits, 160 gold deposits and 11 diamond deposits. 
Among these, deposits containing at least 6 Moz of gold or 5 Mt of copper-
equivalent metal were classified as “world-class”. Shodde’s and Hronsky’s (2006) 
analysis, based on the sub-set of 143 major discoveries in lower risk countries over 
the period, shows that deposits above this threshold have special economic and 
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geological characteristics that result in the deposits having a minimum Net Present 
Value (NPV) of US$250 million in 2004 US dollars at the development decision 
point, based on a 7 percent after-tax real rate of discount and rather conservative 
commodity prices assumptions.  
Bartrop and Guj (2009) were granted access to the discovery database assembled by 
Shodde (2009, P. Guj personal communication), which indicated that only 151 of the 
258 world-wide major greenfield discoveries returned positive NPVs under these 
criteria. These included 53 out of 87 base metal deposits, 89 out of 160 gold deposits 
and 9 out of 11 diamond deposits. Many of the other discoveries proved sub-
economic under the rather conservative evaluation criteria applied, with a number 
returning significantly negative NPV. Around 70 per cent of the major discoveries 
led to subsequent development.  
As the size distribution of mineral deposits is interpreted to be lognormal, Bartrop 
and Guj (2009) were able to use the entire database to estimate a mean value of $270 
million, (median: $103 million, mode: $14.8 million) and a standard deviation of 
$658.2 million. In specific sectors, the mean value for a base metals discovery was 
estimated at $262 million while gold was $162 million. Unfortunately, the number of 
major diamond discoveries was too low to fit a distribution to them, but their 
arithmetic mean value is $1416.40 million. 
Bartrop and Guj (2009) also note that the fact that the values of major discoveries 
also distribute lognormally provides scope to estimate the probability of a major 
discovery exceeding any given target value either by calculating the percentile of the 
distribution corresponding to the minimum target size required or visually by plotting 
the relevant value distributions on a probability-log graph. Bartrop and Guj (2009) 
estimate that given a feasible major base metal discovery there is a 90 per cent 
chance that its NPV will be $37 million or greater, 50 per cent that it will exceed the 
median value of $148 million and a 10 per cent chance that it will be greater than 
$582 million with an outside chance of 1 per cent of it exceeding $1,782 million. The 
151 major greenfield discoveries over the 19-year period 1985 – 2003 included 39 
world-class discoveries. This equates to an average annual rate of discovery of 7.94 
and 2.09 respectively. Using assumptions relating to the average expenditure by 
Majors, Intermediates and Juniors as well as assumptions for the discovery of smaller 
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target sizes, Bartrop and Guj (2009) devised Table 49 as a probability matrix for 
greenfield exploration success. 
 
Table 49. Matrix of probabilities of a greenfield discovery for various combinations 
of budget allocations and costs of exploration 
 
Percentage of budget 
to greenfield 
exploration: Majors, 
Intermediates and 
Juniors
Number of 
trials PROBABILITY OF AN ECONOMIC GREENFIELD DISCOVERY
Deposit 
size
70%, 30%, 10% 2669 0.44% 0.88% 1.31% Irrespective of size
0.15% 0.29% 0.44% Major
0.03% 0.07% 0.10% World-class 
60%, 25%, 7.5% 2259 0.52% 1.03% 1.55% Irrespective of size
0.17% 0.34% 0.52% Major
0.04% 0.08% 0.12% World-class 
50%, 20%, 5% 1849 0.63% 1.26% 1.90% Irrespective of size
0.21% 0.42% 0.63% Major
0.05% 0.09% 0.14% World-class 
US$ 0.25 M US$ 0.5 M US$ 0.75 M
Average cost of a greenfield exploration program
Preferred combination
From Bartrop and Guj (2009). 
 
The preferred probability estimates for greenfield exploration success are around 0.3 
per cent (i.e. 7.9 discoveries in 2669 trials) or about 3 in 330 for a major orebody and 
0.08 per cent  (i.e. 2 discoveries in 2669 trials) or just under 1 in 1000 for a world 
class orebody. The latter figure is of the same order of magnitude of the probability 
of a world-class discovery as estimated by RIO’s Director of Exploration (Finlayson, 
2008), i.e. 0.03 per cent. The difference between the two may be a function of RIO’s 
more ambitious definition of what constitutes a world-class exploration target.  The 
estimate of the probability of discovering a major orebody is consistent with 
unpublished estimates by Shodde (2009, P. Guj personal communication) of one in 
two hundred to one in three hundred. 
 
The importance of Shodde’s database cannot be underestimated in deriving deposit 
values and in addition to research on gold discoveries in WA goldfields (Lord et al, 
2001; Guj and Fallon 2009), Bartrop and Guj (2009) estimate probabilities for both 
brownfield and minesite exploration along with average discovery values for each 
category. In combination estimated cost of the average exploration program for each 
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of the categories, Table 50 presents a probability weighted return per exploration 
program. 
 
Table 50. Exploration probabilities for achieving a minimum desired target (NPV 
values stated) for each exploration category and how this translated into a probability 
weighted value per exploration program. 
Exploration Classification
Probability of Achieving 
Minimum Desired 
Target
Minimum NPV Value 
expected for discovery 
success (US$m)
Probability Weighted 
Succes (US$'000)
Average cost of 
applicable exploration 
program (US$'000)
Probability weighted 
return per exploration 
program (US$'000)
Greenfield 0.30% $270 $810 $500 $310
Brownfield 5% $75 $3,750 $250 $3,500
Minesite 20% $5.0 $1,000 $125 $875  
From Bartrop and Guj (2009). 
 
Interestingly, based on the above assumptions, brownfield exploration programs offer 
the most attractive returns reflecting the combination of a reasonably-sized expected 
target with a good probability of discovery. This is also evident within industry 
trends although Hronsky et al (2009) question for how long the dominance of 
investment in brownfield relative to greenfield exploration can be sustained. They 
argue that following the recent rapid increases in brownfield exploration budgets the 
average probability of discovery and with it the efficiency of brownfield exploration 
will fall. This, combined with the lower contribution that brownfield discoveries 
make to the supply of metals, may eventually lead to a “greenfield renaissance”.  
 
However this thesis would argue that there is a risk that this doesn’t materialise 
outside the exploration effort of the majors as the increased value in deposits through 
increasing commodity prices relative to the development and operating costs over 
say, the 2004 database of Shodde (2006) may  not adequately compensate most 
investors, who are generally risk-averse, for the exploration risk. While the 
probability weighted return may look attractive, it requires a degree of confidence in 
ultimate success to encourage sustainable investment in the high-risk side of the 
spectrum and this is only possible if potential investors have access to significant 
level of risk capital and can therefore be less risk-averse.  
 
6.5.2 Degree of Confidence 
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Unfortunately to achieve a degree of confidence in an outcome implies specific 
levels of the investment. A simple example is rolling a die six times. On average, the 
die should roll one six but to have a high degree of confidence that it will roll at least 
one six requires many more throws. The number of throws necessary to achieve a 
given level of confidence estimated by Saliu (2009) is derived from the following 
formula: 
)1log(
)1log(
p
DCN −
−=  
Where: 
• N = the number of trials to achieve the desired level of confidence 
• DC = the degree of confidence 
• p = the probability of the desired outcome in each individual trial 
This formula makes use of a continuous expression of the discrete binomial 
distribution, which is based on sampling with replacement. The author acknowledges 
that exploration is a form of sampling from the natural endowment of mineral 
deposits without replacement, and that as deposits are progressively discovered from 
a finite pool the probability of success in each trial decreases. This process could be 
better simulated by a difficult to handle hyper-geometric distribution. The depletion 
effects are to some degree counteracted by increasing geological knowledge and 
advancements in exploration technology. Thus while the formula gives a somewhat 
optimistic view of the level of confidence that can be achieved at any given level of 
investment, it nonetheless provides a broadly acceptable order of magnitude. In this 
light this thesis has applied this formula to greenfield, brownfield and minesite 
exploration probabilities to estimate the level of expenditure required to meet a range 
of degrees of confidence. The level of expenditure is estimated by multiplying the 
number of trials (N) above by the estimated average expenditure per applicable 
exploration program as per Table 50. 
Figure 146 plots the degree of confidence along the X axis against the expenditure 
required to meet it on the Y axis for each exploration expenditure classification. 
Figure 147 plots the degree of confidence for greenfield programs given the higher 
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expenditure levels that are required compared to minesite and brownfield programs in 
Figure 146. 
Figure 146. Total exploration expenditure versus degree of confidence for the 
various exploration classifications. 
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Figure 147. Total exploration expenditure versus degree of confidence for greenfield 
exploration. 
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Figures 146 and 147 highlight the difficulties faced by explorers. An explorer 
offering investors exposure to an exciting greenfield exploration portfolio has to 
spend more than US$100 million on exploration to put together a portfolio offering 
greater than 50 percent confidence of discovery – a price tag normally well beyond 
all juniors and most mid-cap explorers. Hence, the only companies capable of 
funding greenfield exploration with a high confidence of success are the majors. 
Similarly, in brownfield exploration which is the main focus of junior explorers, to 
achieve a greater than 50 per cent level of confidence of an exploration success 
requires a budget of $3.4 million. As discussed earlier many junior explorers struggle 
to raise the minimum $2.3 million to list on the ASX, while Kruezer et al, (2007) 
report that the average junior exploration float from 2001 to 2006 raised $4 million. 
After removing capital raising fees (normally around 5 per cent) and administration, 
legal and listing costs, most junior explorers are really only offering shareholders at 
best a 50 percent degree of confidence of achieving discovery success in brownfield 
exploration. 
In the case of minesite exploration, the low cost of exploration programs combined 
with the presence of the operating plant means that a level of certainty is not a 
significant consideration for investors. 
6.4 Investment Approach to Exploration 
Early in this Chapter, it was noted that exploration on greenfield and brownfield 
projects can exhibit certain trends following a major discovery. These trends can 
involve a steady decrease in deposit size of subsequent discoveries, an increase in 
exploration costs and the combined decreasing discovery rates over time. In fact, 
these aspects are evident on a broader scale to exploration in general over time.  
In Chapter 4, this thesis discussed the proposition that share prices move in response 
to share price drivers which impart a probability weighted change in value, νΔ  
according to the formula:  
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
Where: 
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=ΔS The change in company value reflected in the change in the company share 
price 
=Δ )( νP The probability weighted change in value 
Probability weighted values per ‘average exploration program’ have been crudely 
estimated for greenfield, brownfield and minesite projects and with brownfield 
projects appearing to offer the greatest probability weighted return of the three 
classifications.  
As the market (and industry) is yet to embrace these classifications, the market does 
not generally discern between the probability weighted discovery values for each 
classification and groups all exploration activities as a high risk venture that may not 
offer returns within an acceptable timeframe. The exception may be minesite 
exploration but with generally lower value targets, these may not be significant from 
an overall company value perspective at the outset of a minesite exploration 
campaign. 
The dilemma is interpreted to reflect the low levels of certainty in each exploration 
program or conversely, the high level of expenditure required to deliver a high 
degree of certainty. In the above formula markets will not assign any share price 
value unless the probability is generally above a threshold that invokes 
contemplation that there is a real possibility of an occurrence. This threshold is likely 
to be in the order of greater than 50 percent at a minimum although this is dependent 
on the value of occurrence, e.g. a lower probability of say below 20 percent may 
impart some value with an exploration program in a highly prospective terrane 
potentially containing very high value discoveries. However, in the case of 
exploration properties, it is not atypical for the market to assign zero value to a 
portfolio of exploration properties in a resource company if there are other more 
substantial assets such as an operating mine or a defined lead project. 
In markets where investment alternatives include risk free interest rates and reliable 
dividend yielding stocks as well as more general market investments, the magnitude 
of these higher probability levels means that the segregation of degree of certainty 
from the actual probability of returns is not a consideration. The degree of certainty 
 381
only becomes a factor where the probability level is low enough that the occurrence 
is deemed an unlikely outcome as in exploration.  
Chapter 4 also proposed the following equation to model the declining expectation 
that junior explorer, Anchor Resources would make a discovery within an acceptable 
time frame as follows: 
rt
ttt eXVXXV 002 == −=  
Where 
=tXV  Excess Value at time t 
==0tXV  Excess Value at the start (t=0) 
rte  = Continuous compounding factor at a rate of interest r 
The compounding function accelerates the declining expectation over time and 
matches the empirical observation that as the first round of projects are tested and 
fail to deliver encouragement, there is increasing divestment on the expectation that 
the company is likely to be unsuccessful over the medium term and ‘burn’ all its 
cash. The market recognizes that the high levels of expenditure required to deliver a 
high degree of certainty in exploration may well be beyond the financing capabilities 
of the company as well as the time frame of the investor. Hence, investors may 
compensate the high levels of risk by expecting high returns but then rapidly 
discounting the share price if signs of an exploration discovery fail to materialise. 
This is also in accord with the perception that a company will test its best targets first 
and therefore with unsuccessful exploration over time, there is a diminishing 
probability for future discoveries. This can apply to entire company exploration 
portfolios as well as individual projects and suggests that the declining expectation of 
exploration success in junior explorers over time could be equivalent to the declining 
probability of exploration success where exploration activities are actually being 
conducted (viz; Cougar Metals versus Anchor Resources examples in Chapter 5, 
Section 4.1.1.3, p243).  
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Recalling, the M&A transactions analysed in this thesis provided an average return to 
the bidder at 7.8 per cent. There was also a 25 per cent chance of negative 
cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder but despite these negative returns, the 
bulk of the value of the acquisition is retained by the bidder and may yet still deliver 
positive future returns. This contrasts with the high degree of uncertainty in 
exploration where investments manifests itself as short-term ‘punts’ and lack of 
success is quickly reflected in the company’s share price. 
It is concluded in this thesis that while the value of new discoveries will increase 
over time due to economic scarcity, opposing factors such as declining exploration 
discovery rates and market impatience are likely to undermine the attractiveness of 
pure exploration plays to the market unless there is a structural change in the risk-
reward dynamics. The existing structure is likely to continue the polarization of the 
Australian resources sector as outlined earlier in Chapter 3. 
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7.0 Discussion and Conclusions 
This thesis has sought to investigate M&A activity in the Australian resource sector 
and to draw out conclusions on whether it has created shareholder value for bidders 
and merging companies. To develop a model to estimate this value, research has 
been directed primarily at investigating the movements of share prices of resource 
companies and their relationship with commodity prices. The fact that commodity 
prices appear to be the main drivers of share prices of resource companies offers an 
opportunity to explore how this interaction relates to generally accepted models of 
share price movements based on Markovian processes.  
 
Elsewhere, the thesis investigates the characteristics of and recent trends in the 
Australian and global resources sector to provide a background for a discussion on 
the implications of the M&A activity which has occurred over the last two decades, 
and the prospects of further industry consolidation. 
 
Lastly the thesis investigates the investment in exploration as an alternative as well 
as a complement to M&A, keeping in mind that it competes with M&A in terms of a 
resources companies’ budgets. It is notable that all major companies have utilised 
M&A activity for corporate growth in preference to direct exploration,  hence it is 
important to understand how exploration is valued in this decision process. 
Particularly in the case of under-funded junior explorers, their share prices wanes 
over time as successive failure erodes their meagre risk capital and gradually reduces 
the degree of investors’ confidence in a possible discovery.  
 
Discussion of the research findings has been organised into five main categories, as 
follows: 
• Global Mining Sector 
• Consolidation of the Australian Resource Sector  
• Movements of the share price of resource companies 
• M&A findings 
• Exploration 
 
These are then drawn together in a final discussion and further research is proposed. 
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 7.1 Global Mining Sector 
Apart from the presence of the four global majors (BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Anglo 
American, Vale), the “line up” in the resource sector has changed considerably over 
the last decade. Foremost is the presence of Xstrata plc which is now larger than 
Anglo American in market capitalisation but unlike the other diversified majors, has 
not been founded on a world class deposit discovered many years ago. In contrast 
Xstrata has claimed to be the ‘consolidator’ of the mid-tier companies and has 
rapidly grown in the last decade through aggressive acquisitions.  
 
The most recent phase of global consolidation has involved diversified miners taking 
over base-metal companies (e.g. 2004 BHP Billiton takeover of WMC Resources, 
2006 Vale takeover of Inco, 2006, Xstrata takeover of Falconbridge, 2007 Rio Tinto 
takeover of Alcan, etc.) and this has led to an expansion of the diversified sector at 
the expense of the base-metal sector, reducing the scope for pure investment 
opportunities in base-metals. In Australia  similar takeovers during this period 
included the 2002 Rio Tinto bid for Comalco, the 2003 Xstrata takeover of MIM and 
2007 bid for Jubilee Mines and the 2007 Zinifex bid for Allegiance Mining. 
 
This M&A activity has been stimulated by a corporate growth imperative and as 
discussed later, probably represented an ‘overhang’ from the Asian Crisis through to 
the Tech Boom period where smaller companies traded at significant discounts to 
fundamental (NPV) value. This was evident in charts like Figure 50 (Chapter 3) 
which plot an increasing prospective P/E ratio against increasing market 
capitalisation for global resource companies. These size premia created a justification 
to bidding companies for much of the M&A activity that has occurred since 2000 
and as highlighted in Chapter 4, represents the second of the two causes for a change 
in value of a resource company, viz: 
• An expectation of a material change in future earnings and cash flow levels 
leading to an increase in the value of the asset base of the company; and/or 
• A change in the value ascribed by the market to the combined asset base 
where, for example, threshold production levels are met which attract a 
higher market rating than the previously lower production levels. 
 
 385
However, given the lack of significant mid-tier sector and ongoing takeover threat, 
these premia have now probably disappeared (see Figures 52 to 55, Chapter 3) and 
bidders will increasingly have to justify their acquisitions to their shareholders on the 
basis of the first cause. 
 
The focus on base-metals companies and particularly copper production has also not 
been accidental. In terms of market size among various traded metals, the largest is 
the copper market which is estimated to have a value in the order of US$226 billion 
(Table 49, Chapter 3). It represents the bellwether of the LME daily traded metals 
and therefore an increased exposure to copper offers greater share price sensitivity to 
major resource indices – generally a desire of company management to attract global 
funds. The second largest is estimated to be aluminium (US$169 billion), which is 
followed by the gold sector (US$138 billion). Desirable opportunities in the 
aluminium sector have been limited except for the 2007 Rio Tinto takeover of Alcan, 
while the gold sector is fragmented and gold itself doesn’t necessarily follow an 
industrial production growth cycle typical of most commodities. Nickel (US$75 
billion) and zinc (US$57 billion) represent the next largest sectors in terms of 
potential market size. Hence, while the large diversified companies can further 
accumulate new and expand existing coal and iron ore projects, M&A activity in the 
base-metal sector has been the logical avenue to growth with an early focus on 
copper. 
 
In Australia the term resources has been used to cover both the mining and energy 
sectors and while this includes the oil and gas sector, this thesis (and Australian 
investors) use this terminology to predominantly refer to the mining sector, which 
includes energy stocks, (other than oil and gas ones) such as coal and uranium. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the global mining sector represents 3.4 per cent of the 
world stock market. However in Australia the resources sector represents 33 per cent 
of the ASX 200 Index after excluding the oil and gas sector. Hence investment in the 
ASX provides an approximate 10-fold increase in exposure to mining companies 
relative to the global market. Combined with Australia’s significant A$150 billion 
per annum mineral commodity exports, both the ASX and Australian currency offer 
leverage to changes in commodity prices. 
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 However, in line with other resource markets, the resource component of the ASX 
200 Index is now dominated by the diversified miners BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, 
which combined represent over 50 per cent of the resources component of the index. 
Hence, patterns of investment have changed and given the commodity diversification 
offered by these companies and their dominance in the index many investors only 
hold positions in these companies to capture their resources exposure. Therefore if 
the takeover premia discussed earlier diminish due to the market entering another 
period when resources are out of favour, it is likely that the resource sector will 
return to an increasingly polarised state based on market valuations. Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.9.1) the most coveted mining assets are ones with 
long mine lives and low operating costs and material production rates and, depending 
on their balance sheets, companies holding these assets are likely to always remain 
under takeover threat. 
 
7.2 Australian Resource Sector Consolidation 
This research has analysed 30 transactions outlined in Appendix 1 and extended this 
number with a review of a further 22 transactions to investigate the M&A component 
in Australia (Table 51). 
 
Table 51. Total and average transaction values for each commodity group. 
Commodity group Number of transactions Total transaction value (A$m)
Average transaction size for 
sector (A$m)
Uranium 2 $1,178 $589
Mineral sands 1 $470 $470
Gold 23 $14,944 $650
Diversified/iron ore 5 $12,551 $2,510
Diamonds 3 $836 $279
Coal 4 $4,283 $1,071
Base metals 13 $34,061 $2,620  
 
Recalling from Chapter 5, the uranium transactions are skewed by the 2007 Paladin 
takeover of Summit Resources while the only mineral sands transaction recorded is 
the 1998 merger of RGC and Westralian Sands.  
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The average transaction value covering 51 transactions but excluding the 2007 BHP 
Billiton bid for Rio Tinto is $1,340 million. Inclusion of the BHP Billiton bid for Rio 
Tinto would skew this value to $4,804 million due to its abnormally large size. The 
most common transaction size range was from $250 million to $500 million 
representing more than 27 per cent of all transactions, while more than half (51.9 per 
cent) of the transactions were less than $500 million in value. As noted in Chapter 5, 
this is in line with expectations given the size distribution of companies in the sector 
and tendency for companies to acquire smaller companies than themselves.  
 
There was also a confirmed expectation that bidders would acquire targets in similar 
commodities (90 per cent of transactions) with the exceptions involving companies 
seeking commodity (and geographical) diversification. 
 
Interestingly, both base metal and diversified/iron ore transactions averaged similar 
transaction sizes around A$2.5 to A$2.6 billion and generally involved mid-tier 
companies that were in existence during the 1990s and before. Elsewhere, numerous 
gold transactions involved smaller transactions amounts (average A$650m) while 
relatively recently a number of coal transactions have averaged $1,070 million in 
value.  
  
Figure 148. Transaction number and total value per calendar year since 1991. 
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 Figure 148 charts the number and value transactions since 1991 and highlights that 
consolidation has occurred in three waves since the early 1990s. These periods are: 
• Firstly, a period starting in 1995 and ending in 2000 including the end of the 
92-96 bull run, the Asian Crisis and a period known as the 98-2000 bull run 
and ending during the start of the Tech Boom drift, 
• Secondly, a period between 2002 and 2004 covering the waning stages of the 
Tech Boom drift and the commencement of the 2002-2008 Resources Boom, 
and, 
• Thirdly, in a more recent period from 2006 to near the end of the 2002-2008 
resources boom. 
 
This observation is in line Andrade et al’s (2001) reporting that mergers occur in 
waves, and within a wave, mergers strongly cluster by industry. In the US the authors 
report a trend of rapidly increasing numbers and values of transactions from a nadir 
in 1992 and continuing to 1999 at the end of their study period, which broadly 
corresponds to the observation in this thesis that takeovers became prevalent from 
1995 until 2008.  Andrade et al (2001) also report that in the 1990s Metals and 
Mining was one of the top five industries based on average annual merger activity. 
 
Schleifer and Vishny (2003) characterise the takeovers of the 1990s as often being 
friendly and while this research doesn’t record the very low levels of hostility 
reported in the US during this period (estimated at 4 per cent of all transactions by 
Andrade et al, 2001) 30 per cent of the transactions analysed were hostile and 
represents a decrease from the period involving the Australian corporate raiders in 
the 1980s. 
 
To compare the frequency of transactions against the Australian resource indices, 
Figure 152 charts the ASX Accumulation All Resources Index (series ends 5 July 
2002) and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index (commences 1 January 2003) along 
with the annual transaction numbers presented in Figure 149. 
 
Figure 149. Total annual transaction number and Australian Resource Indices. 
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Index data from Stock Resource. 
 
It is evident that the peaking number of transactions appears to correlate to lower, 
albeit temporary points in the Australian indices apart from the period in the latter 
part of the 2002-2008 Resources Boom. 
 
This tends to be supported in Figure 150 which charts total annual transaction values 
and the two Australian resource indices. 
 
Figure 150. Total annual transaction values and Australian Resource Indices. 
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During these periods M&A activity in particular commodities exhibited specific 
trends which are outlined below: 
 
With respect to gold M&A, contrary to some market opinion during the Tech Boom, 
Australian gold shares were generally priced in accordance with their global peers 
after adjusting for the exchange rate. At that time it was considered that share prices 
hadn’t fully compensated for a higher A$ gold price due the overall lack of market 
interest in Australian resource shares at that time. Essentially global gold shares were 
at a nadir in 2001. 
 
However there was a dramatic increase in foreign takeovers of the Australian gold 
sector from the mid-1990s through to the end of 2003. In fact all of the six takeovers 
in the 2000 to end 2003 period were carried out by foreign bidders at a time the gold 
indices were at low levels. These transactions accounted for only 26 per cent of the 
total number of gold transactions but accounted for 60 per cent of the $15 billion in 
M&A transactions or $9 billion of takeovers of the Australian gold sector during the 
overall study period. With this surge in foreign activity in the late 1990s through to 
the end of 2003, it is little wonder that the ASX abandoned the ASX Gold Index 
series. 
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 Interestingly most of the transactions involved scrip (2001 Newmont takeover of  
Normandy, 2002 Placer Dome takeover of AurionGold, 1999 Anglo Gold takeover 
of Acacia, etc.) which meant that the bidders didn’t fully capture the lower equity 
values at that time with cash bids. The only exception was Harmony Gold in its 
takeovers of Hill 50 in 2001, Abelle in 2003 and New Hampton Gold Fields in 2000. 
Overall the use of scrip was probably more a function of low cash reserves given the 
weak gold prices than a perception of overpriced scrip by the bidders, whereas in the 
Harmony takeovers, it is unlikely that management of the target  companies would 
have recommended Harmony scrip as payment. 
 
It can also be argued that the Australian gold sector experienced a significant period 
of consolidation in 1996 and beyond. Most of the sector with a few exceptions 
eventually ended up in foreign ownership, the most notable exception is Sons of 
Gwalia which went into administration in 2004. At present, the ASX-listed gold 
sector is rebuilding with new emerging producers but remains polarised with the two 
major companies, Newcrest and Lihir and only several companies in the mid-tier part 
of the sector.  
 
Trends in base-metal M&A are different to gold and are dominated by fewer but 
generally larger transactions, generally at the rate of only one per year. However the 
five dominant transactions all occurred later than 2000. In 2001 BHP conducted its 
merger with Billiton plc, in 2003 Xstrata took over MIM, in 2004 BHP Billiton took 
over WMC Resources in a bid prompted by Xstrata and in 2007 Xstrata took over 
Jubilee Mines. Lastly Oxiana and Zinifex merged in 2008. Hence three of the five 
dominant takeovers stemmed from the acquisitive nature of Xstrata plc. 
 
Apart from Rio Tinto buying out the minority interests in Comalco with a cash or 
scrip offer in 2000, most of the earlier Australian takeovers have met with mixed 
success. The Pasminco takeover of Savage Resources and the Western Metals 
takeover of Aberfoyle appear to reflect opportunistic cash bids in 1998 following the 
Asian crisis, while the more recent Zinifex takeover of Allegiance in 2007 was timed 
at the top of the market. 
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Overall, in the base metal sector it  is questionable whether many of the transactions 
would have occurred without the aggressive acquisition strategy of Xstrata. As noted 
in the competitive transactions in Appendix 1, it has been an early aggressive 
takeover that has potentially stimulated the more natural owner into action (e.g. 2000 
DeBeers bid for Ashton Mining to be overbid by Rio Tinto, 2000 Italian Eval bid for 
Eastern Aluminium to be overbid by Alcoa). Many larger companies appear hesitant 
to be the first bidder for ‘Australian icons’ but once a target company is ‘in play’ 
then they do not hesitate because it is deemed that the target will be taken over 
anyway.  
 
Trends in M&A activity in the diversified and/or iron ore sector appear relatively 
straightforward. The dominant transaction has been the 1995 dual listing of RTZ and 
CRA which was friendly and not particularly sensitive to market timing. Similarly 
the 2000 takeover of Norths by Rio Tinto appears at a time of moderately lower 
share prices but also involved strategic factors in the consolidation of the Pilbara iron 
ore projects. 
 
More recent M&A activity has involved consolidation in the iron ore sector (e.g. 
2006 Mt Gibson takeover of Aztec Resources) and foreign companies investing in 
the sector (2005 Cliffs partial takeover of Portman Mining, 1997 Palmary takeover of 
Consolidated Minerals). This activity and growth in the iron ore sector have been in 
direct response to perceived growth in iron ore demand from the industrialisation and 
urbanisation of China and other emerging economies and increasing prices which 
have made many previously marginal deposits viable. 
 
This has also been the case with most coal transactions representing foreign 
acquisitions of domestic coal producers. These include the 2006 Peabody Energy 
takeover of Excel coal and the 2007 Xstrata takeover of Resource Pacific Holdings. 
An exception is the 2005 takeover of Austral Coal by Centennial Coal although this 
was later sold to Xstrata. 
 
7.3 M&A findings 
One of the important findings of this research has been the ability to adapt a market 
based event analysis model to resource companies to provide credible analysis of the 
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returns from resource company M&A activity. In Chapter 2, this thesis noted that 
Australian research had generally excluded mining companies due to their 
systematically different financial, operating and risk characteristics (e.g. see Bugeja 
& Walter, 1995; da Silva Rosa, Izan, Steinbeck, and Walter, 2000). 
 
While not documented in the past research, this thesis expects difficulties may stem 
from the influence of commodity prices on resource company share price 
performance with specific commodity exposure varying from company to company. 
Resources share price movements may also be potentially independent of the 
changes in resource indices which tend to be dominated by BHP Billiton and Rio 
Tinto. As highlighted in analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, there is not a strong  
relationship between the returns from commodity price movements versus share 
price movements in contrast to a stronger relationship between absolute commodity 
price levels with absolute share price levels.  
 
Hence, a market model as outlined in Beninga (2008) has been adapted involving: 
• Estimating a theoretical share price series based on the coefficients estimated 
from multiple regression of significant parameters over a 252-day estimation 
window 
• Using the returns from the movement in theoretical prices to estimate the 
abnormal returns from the actual share price movements during the event 
and post-event windows. 
 
The significant parameters vary depending on the attributes of individual companies 
involved in the M&A activity and it was preferable to include a specific commodity 
price series as well as a market index series to account for varying commodity 
exposure. Where companies have a portfolio of projects with diversified commodity 
exposures or produce commodities such as iron ore and coal which are mostly sold at 
infrequently negotiated contract prices, the copper price was tested for significance 
(>5 per cent level) given its standing as an economic bellwether commodity. 
 
Key findings of the research are summarised in the following points with important 
aspects discussed at the end of the chapter. Recalling, the takeover offer premium 
refers to the premium of the initial or final offer price compared to the 30-day 
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average target share price prior to the initial announcement of a potentially 
impending transaction. This is abbreviated to either initial offer to 30-day average 
premium or final offer to 30-day average premium. Transactions are deemed hostile 
when there is an initial rejection of a takeover offer differentiating them from 
friendly transactions where there has been a degree of cooperation between the 
bidder and target companies prior to the initial announcement. Competitive bids are 
where there is more than one bidder. 
 
• Friendly transactions on average offer target shareholders a lower final offer 
to 30-day average premium (dual listing – 17.8 per cent, mergers – 12.9 per 
cent) compared to traditional takeovers which average 48.7 per cent. In 
traditional takeovers the initial offer to 30-day average premium was 37.2 per 
cent with the increase to the final offer to 30-day average premium of 48.7 
per cent reflecting the impact of bidders raising bids, particularly in 
competitive bidding. Mergers are noted as co-operative approaches to 
takeovers and hence there is an expectation that shareholders will have lower 
premium expectations. 
• The takeover premium is almost 70 per cent higher in competitive bids (final 
offer to 30-day average premium of 66.1 per cent) compared to non-
competitive bids (final offer to 30-day average premium of 39.3 per cent). 
• The final offer to 30-day average is similar for both hostile and recommended 
takeovers (44.8 per cent verus 44.5 per cent for hostile) but the recommended 
premium increases to 52.8 per cent if the dataset includes the competitive 
bidding for Consolidated Minerals, which is considered an outlier. 
• Excluding two outliers (2007 Palmary bid for Consolidated Minerals and the 
2002 Placer Dome bid for AurionGold) the difference between the initial bid 
premium and final bid premium over the 30-day average target share for non-
competitive offers was 3.9 per cent compared to 27.3 per cent for competitive 
offers. It is evident that competitive bidding can lead to an average 20 to 25 
per cent increase in the initial offer to 30-day average premium. 
• There is no significant premium difference between all scrip offers and cash 
offers and whether the cash is from a foreign company (excluding the 
Consolidated Minerals outlier). 
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• There is a difference in the final offer to 30-day average premium between 
foreign scrip and total scrip offers and is expected to stem from the 
‘encouragement’ required for Australian shareholders to receive foreign scrip 
albeit it may be listed on the ASX. The average final offer to 30-day average 
premium was 64.7 per cent and is approximately 30 per cent higher than the 
average of all the scrip final offers to 30-day average premium at 35.7 per 
cent. However, while there were only two Australian domiciled hostile scrip 
bids in the dataset, their average final offer to 30-day average premium was 
45.6 per cent suggesting hostile foreign scrip offers may only require an 
additional 20 per cent premium. 
• In reviewing payment type through time, bids in buoyant markets tend to be 
with scrip while bids during low market periods are with cash. One exception 
is the dual listing of RTZ and CRA in 1995 and as discussed earlier, the 
nature of the deal meant that it wasn’t share price or market sensitive. Overall 
there is a broad trend of foreign bidders acquiring Australian companies 
during weaker markets apart from during the 2002-2008 Resources Boom. 
 
It is interesting to note that in approximately half the transactions the payment 
involved scrip (two involved a scrip/cash alternative) while Andrade et al (2001) 
reports that in the US market in the 1990s 70 per cent involved scrip compensation 
with 58 per cent entirely stock focused. Interestingly, this 70 per cent does match 
Australian transactions in the 1995 to 1999 period and it is likely that a move to 
increased cash consideration, which occurred during the 2000-2002 Tech Boom, 
reflected the weaker resource market conditions. As discussed in below, a bidder’s 
choice in using scrip or cash is likely to reflect market conditions and the ability for 
the bidder to pay. In buoyant markets, scrip is preferred by bidders while in weaker 
markets, cash is preferred. 
 
In terms of initial offer to 30-day average premium for traditional takeovers, the 37.2 
per cent average premium is in line with takeover expectations elsewhere, for 
example Shoenberg and Thornton (2006) report that average bid premia in the UK 
between 35 and 45 per cent. The final offer to 30-day average premium for 
traditional takeovers increasing to 48.7 per cent was contributed by competitive 
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bidding with an average increase of 57.6 per cent (N=4). This compares to the 
‘sweetening’ of the offer by bidders which averaged a 16.6 per cent increase. 
 
While there was a significant increase in premia required for foreign bidders using 
scrip (64.7 per cent compared to 45.6 per cent final offer to 30-day average 
premium), the lack of premia difference between domestic scrip and cash (or foreign 
cash) is surprising. This thesis believes it is likely to reflect the size of the Australian 
resource market with many investors accepting bidder scrip to remain exposed to the 
target assets and commodity exposure and as a consequence not demanding an 
additional premium for scrip.  
 
In summary, friendly transactions offer target shareholders a lower final offer 
premium to the 30-day average target share price prior to the announcement (dual 
listing – 17.8 per cent, mergers – 12.9 per cent) and compare to traditional takeovers 
which average 48.7 per cent. In traditional takeovers the initial offer to 30-day 
average premia was 37.2 per cent but increases to the final offer to 30-day average 
premium of 48.7 per cent mostly reflecting the impact of competitive bidding. 
Average increases in the final offer prices in non-competitive bidding were 16.6 per 
cent. 
 
While both scrip and cash bids offered similar premia to target shareholders, foreign 
scrip on average offer a 20 per cent higher premium. Elsewhere, there was no 
material differences between the premia offered in hostile compared to non-hostile 
takeovers. 
 
Overall there is a broad trend of foreign bidders acquiring Australian companies 
during weaker markets apart from during the 2002-2008 Resources Boom. 
 
7.3.1 Target abnormal returns 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) have been assessed for both the target in 
generally in a 3-day event window at the time of the announcement(s) and similarly 
for the bidder in this period as well as in a 252-day post-event period (Appendix 1). 
This section summarises the key findings in relation to target CAR from Chapter 5 
before discussing them in light of previous research. The findings are: 
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• The average final offer premia over the 30-day average target share price 
prior to the initial announcement are: 
o 35.7 per cent for all scrip offers 
o 64.7 per cent for foreign scrip offers 
o 35.9 per cent for all cash offers (excluding the Consolidated Minerals 
outlier) 
o 34.4 per cent for foreign cash offers (excluding the Consolidated 
Minerals outlier) 
• The average target CAR during the announcement event window was 19.0 
per cent. The target CAR during the event window with scrip bids was 
significantly lower (13.7 per cent) compared to cash bids (23.9 per cent). 
• Both hostile and friendly cash offers return similar target CAR during the 
event window (23.7 per cent for hostile, 24.2 per cent for friendly). Bids 
involving foreign scrip returned a slightly lower target CAR at 22.9 per cent. 
• There is also a general trend that the higher the final offer premium as a 
proportion of the 30-day average target share price, the higher the target 
CAR. 
 
In the first instance, it is interesting that scrip and cash offers have similar average 
premia to the 30-day average target share price although foreign scrip offers on 
average are at a 30 per cent higher premium. As previously discussed, scrip offers 
include mergers which attract a lower premia and hence it is likely that the foreign 
scrip offers are elevating the average scrip premium. Foreign scrip offers are 
expected to offer a substantially higher premia given the required inducement for 
Australian shareholders to accept the foreign scrip even though there may be a 
‘token’ listing on the ASX. 
 
The fact that the target CAR is lower than the 30-day average target share price is not 
unexpected given that the share price prior to the announcement may vary from the 
30-day average and in many cases potentially will be increasing on approaching the 
initial announcement given the risk of leakage of the transaction. Other reasons why 
the CAR will be lower reflect the estimation of the CAR with the overall market 
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sector likely to increase in response to the announcement of a potential transaction 
and therefore reducing abnormal returns. 
 
Other factors which will influence the difference between the offer premium to the 
30-day average target share price prior to the announcement and the CAR during the 
event window include: 
• Potential uncertainty associated with the likely success of the transaction 
• The desirability of scrip in scrip offers 
• A required arbitrage return, e.g. selling Homestake Mining US shares to 
purchase Homestake Gold Australia shares to then accept the Homestake 
Mining offer.  
 
As noted earlier this research indicates that the final premium over average 30-day 
average target share price prior to the initial announcement appears independent of 
transaction type and whether the transaction is hostile or recommended. However the 
premium is dependent on whether it is a competitive transaction. 
 
As outlined above, there is a relationship between the target CAR during the event 
window and the size of the final premium over average 30-day average target share 
price prior to the initial announcement. There is also a relationship as to whether the 
offer payment is in cash or scrip. This supports the research of Fuller et al, (2002) 
who report that returns are more positive for cash offers in comparison to scrip 
offers. An average target CAR of 19.0 per cent is higher than the 16 to 17 per cent 
recorded by Budega and Walter (1995) and 16 per cent by Andrade et al (2001) but 
closer to the 18.21 per cent reported by Le and Schultz (2007) and is likely to reflect 
the greater number of foreign acquirers in the resource sector. However the target 
CAR for scrip payments is significantly lower at 13.7 per cent than the 18.3 per cent 
reported by Budega and Walter (1995). Using a subset of their data, Andrade et al, 
(2001) also report that CAR to target companies was an average of 13.0 per cent with 
scrip payment compared to a 20.1 per cent average using cash payment over a 2-day 
event window. 
 
Scrip offers include mergers in this research which attract a lower premia, and hence, 
it is expected that target CAR will be lower during the event window. However, it 
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has been previously highlighted that the final offer premium over the 30-day target 
share price prior to the initial announcement have been similar for both cash and 
scrip offers, which may reflect generous foreign scrip bids which are less valued by 
the market. 
 
This research also contrasts with da Silva Rosa et al (2000) who found that abnormal 
returns earned by Australian bidders and targets over the announcement period were 
not significantly associated with the type of payment.  
 
This research also reiterates the problems associated with defining a merger versus a 
takeover. As noted elsewhere, there are many mergers which are essentially 
takeovers but utilise a scheme of arrangement due to other factors (e.g. financing), 
therefore the merger classification will always involve a range of friendly and ‘less 
friendly’ transactions. On the other hand a cash offer is deemed final in terms of 
removing the association of the target shareholders with the target company and 
irrespective of whether it is friendly or not, it is simply a price consideration. 
 
Therefore, this research expects that a bidder offering a 35 per cent premium 
(whether cash or scrip) to target shareholders will generate CAR for the target 
shareholders around 24 per cent on the bid announcement. If the bid involves foreign 
scrip then the premium needs to be raised by 30 per cent but then the CAR for target 
shareholders will be slightly lower than non-foreign scrip bids at 22.9 per cent. If 
however, the bidder can structure a merger then the premium can reduce to zero in a 
‘merger of equals’. 
 
7.3.2 Bidder abnormal returns 
The following highlights findings from Chapter 5 on bidder CAR during the event 
window and in a 252-day post-event window. 
• On average, bidder CAR during the event period was negative 2.0 per cent 
and offset by positive CAR in the post-event period which averaged 9.1 per 
cent.  
• Bidders with scrip offers experienced a negative CAR of 0.9 per cent and a 
positive CAR in the post-event period of 12.2 per cent. In contrast, bidders 
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with cash offers experience a negative CAR of 3.0 per cent during the event 
period and a lower CAR of 6.5 per cent during the post-event period. 
•  While there is no evident relationship in the size of the CAR for the 
announcement and post-event periods, most bids deliver positive CAR in the 
post-event window irrespective of negative CAR at the time of the 
announcement(s). 
• On average a bidder has a net gain of 7.1 per cent combining both periods. 
Only 7 out of the 28 transactions had negative net bidder CAR or only 25 per 
cent of transactions lost net bidder shareholder value.  
 
The negative CAR at the event window contrasts to some degree with some 
Australian research suggesting takeover announcements having no significant impact 
on bidder CAR (Walter 1984; Bellamy & Lewin 1992; Bugeja & Walter 1995, Le & 
Schultz 2007, Hackbarth & Morellec 2008) with typical bidder event window CAR 
at less than 1 per cent. 
 
However the increased negative CAR in the event window for cash offers is in 
accord with the finding of Bellamy and Lewin (1992) who report a negative 3.0 per 
cent CAR for cash offers while bidders offering cash earned on average a positive 
1.3 per cent during the event window. It also contrasts with Andrade et al (2001) who 
found CAR of negative 1.5 per cent for bidders using scrip and 0.1 per cent for 
bidders using cash in a 3-day event window. 
  
In addition, the research also contrasts with da Silva Rosa et al, (2000) who found 
that abnormal returns earned by Australian bidders and targets over the 
announcement period were not significantly associated with the type of payment. 
However this research also contrasts further where da Silva Rosa et al, (2000) found 
that over a long-term post-bid period, bidders who offer shares significantly under 
perform regardless of the bid outcome. In this research it was found that bidders 
offering scrip on average perform almost twice as well as cash offers in the 252-day 
post-event window. 
 
The stronger overall CAR for bidders offering scrip (event and post-event windows) 
contrasts with the concept that bidders use scrip if there is uncertainty in a target’s 
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value and use cash if there is uncertainty in the bidder’s value (Rhodes-Kropf & 
Viswanathan 2004, Dong et al 2006). Under these circumstances, there is an 
expectation that the CAR for bidders in both the event and post-event windows 
would be lower than for cash bids given the increased uncertainty. However, 
Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan (2004) also believe that cash offers are more likely to 
occur in undervalued markets and this thesis would concur with this observation as 
highlighted earlier. 
 
Healy et al (1997) argues that takeovers involving scrip can sometimes be referred to 
as strategic takeovers, involving similar businesses and are therefore more likely to 
create a better outcome for bidders. This would stem from greater synergies, more 
accurate target valuations and sharing the cost of valuation mistakes by using scrip. 
 
The lack of correlation between the size of bidder CAR in the event window 
compared to bidder CAR in the post-event period also contrasts with Sirower (1997) 
who believes that the initial share price reaction is a good indicator of the likely 
future success of a transaction. 
 
This thesis argues that the net positive CAR from both the event and post-event 
windows (average net positive gain of 7.1 per cent) supports the proposition that 
resource acquisitions add value, Andrade et al, (2001) believe that the positive net 
gain for target positive CAR and bidder negative CAR at the event window (in this 
research, averages 17.0 per cent) is testament that acquisitions add value.  
 
Nevertheless, there are a number of confounding issues in the research, not the least 
that mergers generally offer scrip payments but also offer lower premia so there is an 
expectation that a lower premium will lead to less negative bidder CAR in the event 
window. In the post-event window higher CAR could reflect this lower premium 
paid but also the fact that there is likely to be a degree of cooperation between both 
companies and hence greater scope to realise merger synergies early.  
 
In the analysis in this thesis, cash bids are more prevalent during weaker markets but 
then the presence of a weaker market itself may also lead to greater negative CAR 
for the bidder with the takeover announcement.  
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 Overall, the negative bidder CARs during the event window are more than offset by 
positive CARs during the post-event window, leading to a net positive CAR for 
acquirers on average of 7.1 per cent. The positive net CAR for acquirers using scrip 
bids is 11.3 per cent but falls to 3.5 per cent for bidders using cash offers. 
 
7.3.3 Toeholds and Strategic Stakes 
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.7.8) this thesis briefly reviewed research on the influence of 
toeholds and strategic stakes on target and bidder returns with the most recent 
Australian research by Le and Schultz (2007) reporting that there was a positive 
association between the presence of toeholds and bidder abnormal returns. 
 
In this research it is reported that acquirers with toeholds or strategic stakes do offer 
on average smaller premia based on the final offer price to the 30-day average target 
share price prior to the initial announcement (9.0 per cent with SD of 25.3 per cent 
compared to 51.9 per cent with SD of 33.0 per cent). However some of the acquirers 
include foreign entities e.g. Homestake Mining Company, Placer Dome, etc. which 
are likely to offer higher premia given their foreign scrip offers and hence the premia 
are probably overstated relative to toeholds across the entire market in Le and 
Schultz’s (2007) research. In general, it is expected that companies with toeholds 
include mergers which involve a lower average offer premium relative to takeovers, 
e.g the Normandy Group mergers. 
 
In terms of bidder CAR during the event window and post-event 252-day period, this 
research supports that of Le and Schultz (2007) with the average bidder CAR at the 
event window with and without toeholds were 3.7 per cent and negative 4.8 per cent 
respectively. However this changes in the post-event window with CARs for 
acquirers with and without toeholds recording 2.3 and 12.6 per cent respectively to 
average a net CAR for acquirers with and without toeholds at 6.0 and 7.9 per cent 
respectively. 
 
It can be argued that this is a logical outcome given the market will factor in more 
rapidly the benefits of a takeover of a subsidiary or associated company although the 
upside is likely to be less given that part of the value of the target will already be 
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factored into the bidder’s share price as a consequence of previous control or 
association. In contrast, the benefits of a takeover of target without a prior toehold 
could involve uncertainty during the event window as the market takes time to assess 
the implications of the transaction and whether the bidder is likely to be successful. 
However in the post-event period with the uncertainty removed the market will 
continue to assess the merits of the acquisition. It may experience ‘surprises’ to the 
upside where promotional and marketing programs by the bidder may highlight the 
future synergies and present early evidence of their occurrence while overall, for the 
same size target a non associated company should yield greater post-event synergies 
given the likelihood of its more significant impact on the project portfolio of the 
bidder. 
 
7.3.4 Independent Valuations 
The presence of Independent Expert valuation ranges provides useful data in terms of 
the range itself and to the extent that a report and valuation has been commissioned 
for a particular transaction. Key findings of this research in this area have been: 
• In the 30 transactions analysed, 15 of the target companies had commissioned 
valuations from Independent Experts to assist their shareholders in their 
decisions. All the independent experts provided both high and low valuations 
to present a valuation range. 
• On average, the final offer price was close to 92 per cent of the mid point of 
the valuation range in transactions with Independent Expert valuations. 
• On average, the high valuation is around 25 per cent higher than the low 
valuation and hence a final offer price offer at 92 per cent of the mid point of 
the valuation range means that the offers fall within the valuation range. 
• There is a discernable trend of higher final offer premiums to the 30-day 
target average share price prior to the initial announcement and the range 
between the low and high valuations. 
• The final offer premia to the 30-day target average share price prior to the 
initial announcement is lower for transactions with an Independent Expert’s 
valuation (30.3 per cent) versus transactions without an independent 
valuation (47.7 per cent). However hostile transactions with an independent 
valuation had an average premium of 43.8 per cent. 
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 In terms of past research these findings contradict Eddey (1993) who found bid 
premia where an expert’s report was issued were not significantly lower than bid 
premia in other bids. Bugela (2005) also contradicted some of the findings by Eddey 
(1993) and as noted above, there are clearly lower bid premia for transactions with 
commissioned Independent Expert reports in the resources sector (whether hostile or 
not). 
 
This thesis argues that the presence of an independent valuation may constrain offer 
premia as the valuation itself creates benchmarks where the Boards of target 
companies feel compelled to accept offers only if they are within or above an 
Independent Expert’s valuation range. On the other hand, a bidder could be 
perceived as overpaying if its offer price is above an independent expert’s valuation 
range.  
 
As noted above, approximately half the transactions involved the commissioning of 
an independent expert’s report while in the US, Kisgen et al (2009) report that over 
the period 1994-2003, 80 per cent of targets and 37 per cent of acquirers obtained 
third-party assessment of the fairness of a merger or acquisition. Their findings were 
also in line with this research that if an acquirer obtains a fairness opinion (as was the 
case in the 15 cases in this dataset) the deal premium is lower than otherwise.  
 
Overall, this thesis would argue that it is not in the interest of a target to commission 
an Independent Expert’s report unless the target is entering into an agreed 
transaction. Once a valuation range is presented to the acquirer and the market, the 
fiduciary duties of Boards are likely to maintain offer prices within the valuation 
range. 
 
7.3.5 Commodity and Index sensitivity changes 
In comparing target and bidder commodity exposure it has been noted earlier that 90 
per cent of the bidders had a similar exposure, including all takeovers by gold 
companies. This is not surprising but indicates that bidding companies are more 
interested in building their existing asset portfolios with similar assets rather than 
seeking diversification strategies for growth. As noted in Chapter 3, the gold price is 
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also influenced by monetary factors and less by world industrial production than 
other commodities and attracts a ‘gold premium’ relative to non-gold stocks. 
Therefore it is unlikely that a gold company would seek to dilute an existing gold 
exposure with non-gold assets. 
 
The post-event regression analysis compared to the estimation window can be 
interpreted as indicating that higher net bidder CAR is potentially correlated to a 
greater change in the bidder’s sensitivity to its key commodity. This would be in 
accord with expectations that greater bidder returns could reflect an increase in the 
attractiveness of the bidder to investors and would correlate with a greater sensitivity 
to a key commodity.  
 
In contrast, it appears there is no evident relationship between net bidder’s CAR and 
changes in its sensitivity to a key index. This differs from a perceived importance of 
index weighting although it could also reflect the diversity of indices involved with 
the companies in the researched transactions, e.g., the investment universe behind 
international versus domestic indices. Nevertheless, this thesis expects that 
companies would generally desire a greater sensitivity in specific indices to attract 
investment funds. While the transactions do not appear to have delivered this 
outcome, further research may be required to determine what is the most relevant 
index for a particular company in relation to investability rather than share price 
correlation. 
 
7.4 Share price movements of resource companies 
In Chapter 4, this thesis refers to events which lead to perceived changes in company 
valuations as share price ‘drivers’. However it also highlighted that there is an 
important distinction between ‘drivers’ and sustainable changes in company 
valuations as a share price driver may or may not lead to an actual underlying change 
in the fundamental valuation of the company – it may be only perceived at the time 
of the emerging driver. 
 
The mechanism interpreted to move share prices involves a continuous process 
stimulated by emerging share price drivers along the following steps: 
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9. A share price driver emerges resulting in a market perception that the  
company fundamental valuation may change. 
10. Share price movement (positive or negative). 
11. Ongoing assessment as to the credibility and sustainability of the new 
valuation. 
12. Potential refinement of the share price movement (positive or negative). 
 
This mechanism employs the Bayesian probability theorem with the market 
assigning a probability to these factors and hence the change in value, νΔ  will be 
probability weighted according to the confidence the market has in the change in 
value. Hence, the change in share price (S) can be described as: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
 
Where: 
=ΔS  The change in company value reflected in the change in the company share 
price 
=Δ )( νP The probability weighted change in value 
 
The two separate factors – the perceived change in value and the probability that this 
value change is real, sustainable and capable of being expressed in the share price 
may also be quite unrelated. 
 
Nevertheless, while the process is simple, the probability distribution can incorporate 
the summation of complex items. This was highlighted in Chapter 4 with an example 
of the factors involved in the share price change following a company announcement 
(the announcement is the share price driver, the material content represents the 
change in value and the probability incorporates both the ability to sustain this 
change in value as well as the degree to which the market will factor in this change in 
value into the share price).  
While it is difficult to model across the broader market, this thesis can interpret 
waning probability associated with the lack exploration discovery success over time 
and which is evident in other market scenarios. In the analysis of the share price 
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movements of Anchor Resources, a model incorporating continuous compounding as 
reflecting declining expectations of imminent exploration success is deduced from 
the excess value (XVt) in the share price at time t above the net cash backing per 
share. Therefore the model assumes that XVt is equal to XV at time zero (XVt=0 ) 
less the excess continuously compounded value of XV over the time period (t) less 
XVt=0 such that: 
( )000 === −−= trtttt XVeXVVXXV   
Or 
rt
ttt eXVVXXV 002 == −=  
Where 
=tXV  Excess Value at time t 
==0tXV  Excess Value at the start (t=0) 
rte  = continuous compounding factor for an interest rate r over time t 
However, in the case of Cougar Metals where exploration activities were relatively 
continuous, declining expectations could be interpreted as declining probabilities of 
exploration success on particular projects or programs over time. This stems from the 
fact that many explorers test their best targets first and hence, over time, the 
probability of a successful discovery does diminish as noted in Chapter 6. 
 
Returning to the original equation: 
 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  
Where: 
=ΔS  The change in company value reflected in the company share price 
=Δ )( νP The probability weighted change in value 
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In the case of Anchor Resources, with no new share price drivers, the decline in the 
share price can be attributed to the declining expectation of imminent exploration 
success with the market assigned probability at time t derived from: 
 
0
00 )2(
=
== −=
t
rt
tt
t XV
eXVXVP  
 
And νΔ is the potential for exploration success within an acceptable timeframe. 
Hence, it can be argued that at any point in time, the share price is: 
 
νΔ−+=
=
==
0
00 )2(
t
rt
tt
tt XV
eXVXVIVSP  
Where: 
=tSP Share Price at time t 
=tIV Intrinsic Value of the company per share at time t. In the case of an exploration 
company it may reflect its cash backing but in other companies, the share price prior 
to the emergence of the share price driver could be a reasonable approximation. In 
other situations it may be some other form of valuation, e.g. NPV valuation. 
 
Adapting the earlier formula leads to the following derivation: 
 
)( νΔ+= PIVSP tt  
 
Where again: 
 
0
00 )2(
=
== −=
t
rt
tt
t XV
eXVXVP  
 
In most cases, given that share price drivers occur frequently, e.g. daily commodity 
price changes, the ‘wane’ or decline estimated in the equation above is small and can 
be ignored. Alternatively, the probability factor may be applied to a more permanent 
value change and there is not a ‘waning’ expectation. However the formula provides 
an important basis for discussing exploration probabilities in Section 7.5. 
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 One of the key observations for resource companies is that daily movements in 
commodity prices are a significant share price driver. Bartrop and Guj (2006) 
hypothesise that, on average over a full market cycle, resource shares tend to trade 
around NPV values. However, NPV values often follow share prices given that they 
are responding to the same drivers and this thesis interprets that the market strives for 
a quick assessment of the change in expected value reflecting say an overnight 
increase in a commodity price. This may ideally involve an NPV recalculation, 
although this is generally not practical. Instead the market assumes a relationship 
between the percentage change in share price and that of the corresponding 
commodity price movement, which is often simplified to a one to one relationship.  
 
The relationship between commodity prices and share prices is strongest when both 
prices are viewed in absolute terms rather than comparing the returns from daily 
price movements. This can reflect the fact that share prices may pre-empt or lag 
commodity price movements at certain times and react to other factors such as 
improving macro-economic conditions. A number of scatter plots of commodity and 
share price levels in Chapter 4, however, highlight the linear relationships over 
specific periods of time and under the probability weighted value model, 
)( νΔ=Δ PS  the P component is interpreted as being relatively stable during these 
periods leading to the linear relationship.  
 
As reported in Chapter 2, the most widely used model of stock price behaviour is a 
generalised Wiener process adapted for expected stock returns according to Hull 
(2008): 
 
SdzuSdtdS σ+=  
Where: 
=S stock price at time t 
=u expected rate of return on the stock 
=σ volatility of the stock price 
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Given the relationship between commodity prices and resource company share price 
movements, the question is then whether commodity prices follow a Markov process 
and can be modelled as a geometric Brownian motion variable. There is general 
acceptance that the returns from holding physical metal distribute lognormally. The 
mean of the distribution is dictated by the commodity supply/demand fundamentals 
as well as the general macro-economic outlook and the influence of speculators. 
These factors are likely to cause the trend commodity and resource company prices 
in a common direction most of the time as evident in the linear relationships outlined 
earlier. Furthermore there is no evidence of an increasing variance of this distribution 
over time as evidenced in Chapter 4 where relationships can remain in place over 
time and over a range of commodity prices until a new share price driver emerges. 
This study in share price movements has created confidence to adapt the market 
models in event analysis to derive the CAR estimates in the previous sections as well 
as apply its ramifications to exploration companies (next section). Further work can 
build on this model, particularly as the resource sector is unusual as it differs from 
other market segments given the presence of a dominant share price driver. 
7.5 Exploration  
Investment opportunities are generally assessed in terms of their risk-return profile 
and as noted in this thesis, the prices of shares and of other investments are set on 
expected value basis. On the other hand, the probability of positive returns on 
exploration expenditure is generally so low that an expected value can only be 
determined on the basis of a very significant number of projects and for this reason 
exploration is deemed a necessary but risky alternative avenue to corporate growth in 
mining. In contrast, the petroleum industry frequently outlines the probability 
weighted returns (i.e. estimates of possible NPV values) on drilling oil and gas 
targets. Investors in junior explorers and to lesser degrees, small-cap, midcap and a 
major mineral producers have generally been incapable of evaluating their projects 
on a risk-adjusted basis when allocating exploration budgets. In research associated 
with this thesis, a simple classification system was proposed to provide a platform 
for the categorization of exploration projects as follows: 
• Greenfield exploration – areas with poor geological understanding, where 
exploration often involves remote sensing to identify target areas 
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• Brownfield exploration – areas with reasonably well known geological 
knowledge and past indications of mineralizing styles, often exploration 
‘along strike’ from existing deposits 
• Minesite exploration – areas neighbouring operating mine sites and which 
can utilize existing infrastructure 
The series is characterised by decreasing risk but with a corresponding decreasing 
value of potential discoveries. Naturally a smaller brownfield size discovery can be 
made in a greenfield exploration project, while a large world-class discovery is 
unlikely in a brownfield.. There are also two further classifications to cover the 
remaining spectrum: 
• Secondary project evaluation – past discoveries of significant mineralization 
(JORC or non-JORC resources) where development has stalled due to 
submarginal economics at the time of initial discovery and assessment 
• Merger and acquisition – acquisition of significant assets including mines 
(operating or non-operating) through to company takeovers and mergers  
Utilising limited historical research, stock market expectation and experience a risk 
and return profile for each exploration category is presented in Table 52, which also 
includes an estimated average exploration program budget, the estimated minimum 
NPV of an expected discovery and an overall probability weighted return per 
exploration program for each category.  
Table 52. Exploration categories and risk-return estimates. 
Exploration Classification
Probability of Achieving 
Minimum Desired 
Target
Minimum NPV Value 
expected for discovery 
success (US$m)
Probability Weighted 
Succes (US$'000)
Average cost of 
applicable exploration 
program (US$'000)
Probability weighted 
return per exploration 
program (US$'000)
Greenfield 0.30% $270 $810 $500 $310
Brownfield 5% $75 $3,750 $250 $3,500
Minesite 20% $5.0 $1,000 $125 $875  
In Chapter 6, this thesis has highlighted the attractiveness of brownfield exploration 
expenditure given the combination of a higher probability of success and the value of 
a moderate size discovery. The potential of a brownfield discovery on some 
greenfield programs also increases the attractiveness of this normally high risk 
exploration expenditure. Overall, apart from pure greenfield exploration, the 
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probability weighted return on exploration expenditure provides significantly 
attractive returns. 
However, applying degrees of confidence or certainty in achieving the probability 
weighted return per exploration program means that there is significant risk involved 
in achieving these returns. As noted in Chapter 6, to achieve a greater than 50 per 
cent level of certainty for each type of exploration requires, under the assumptions of 
Table 52, the expenditures levels outlined in Table 53. 
Table 53. Expenditure levels required for greater than 50 and 75 per cent degrees of 
certainty.
 
Minimum expenditure for….. >50% degrees of certainty (US$m)
>75% degrees of certainty 
(US$m)
Greenfield $115 $231
Brownfield $3.4 $6.8
Minesite $0.39 $0.78  
These levels of expenditures have important implications for the ability of companies 
to fund and execute effective exploration programs. An example is that the only 
companies capable of funding greenfield exploration with a high certainty of success 
are likely to be the majors.  
Similarly, in brownfield exploration which is the main focus of junior explorers, to 
achieve a greater than 50 per cent level of certainty of exploration success requires a 
budget of $3.4 million. As discussed in Chapter 6, many junior explorers struggle to 
raise the minimum $2.3 million to list on the ASX while Kruezer et al, (2007) report 
that average junior exploration float from 2001 to 2006 raised $4 million. In both 
these scenarios it is doubtful whether a junior can offer investors a 50 per cent degree 
of certainty in its exploration portfolio.  
With regards to minesite exploration, this is considered a core activity of all 
producers, irrespective of size. The level of commitment is dependent on current 
reserves, the expected conversion rate of remaining resources to reserves, the level of 
investment in existing infrastructure as well as the overall economics of individual 
operations. Therefore mine site exploration budgets will be least influenced by the 
size of a company and to some degree, the vagaries of the overall exploration budget. 
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Perkin (2004) believes that the fundamental truth behind mineral exploration is the 
fact that the more you explore, the more you find, and that one success will often 
lead to further discoveries. This thesis takes this further to highlight that it is simply 
not the overall level of exploration but who is spending and hence, is it being spent 
where it delivers the best probability weighted returns with an optimal degree of 
certainty of success? 
Table 54 outlines the typical company size involved in the mentioned activities. The 
assumptions are necessarily generalised but the activities are a consequence of the 
cost and availability of capital for companies, which in turn are generally related to 
the company size. 
Table 54. Resource company size and expenditure preferences. 
Company Status Junior Explorer Small Cap Producer (often pure play) Mid Cap Producer
Large Cap 
Diversified
Presence of Mining 
Operations
None Generally one, maybe 
two Several
Well Diversified 
Portfolio
Common Funding 
Sources
Stock Market
Stock Market/Internal 
Cash Generation/Limited 
Corporate Debt
Internal Cash 
Generation/Project Debt
Internal Cash 
Generation/Project 
Debt
Cyclicality of Funding Totally To a significant extent
Less given some 
diversification but still 
dependent given volatile 
earnings and cash flows
Not reliant but strong 
earnings can result in 
additional funding
Cost of capital High Moderate Moderate/Low Low
Minesite exploration No Yes Yes Yes
Brownfields exploration All Mostly Significant Minor
Greenfields exploration Minimal Minimal Minor Major
Secondary project 
evaluation
Yes, if available Yes Minor Minor
Acquisition of 
mines/companies
Extremely limited Minimal except to build 
'critical mass'
Moderate, particularly 
targeting smaller 
producers
Significant and 
targeting major or 
world class assets
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In summary, the trend is that larger companies with a number of operating assets 
producing a reliable cash flow are likely take greater risks in exploration. This 
includes both budget and the allocation to a greater proportion of greenfield 
programs. This risk appetite is also matched by the relevance of the target being 
sought as outlined above. Greenfield exploration has become increasingly the 
domain of the majors with mid-caps and especially juniors requiring a comparative 
advantage to ‘beat the odds’. 
However most of the majors have exploration expenditure levels which would 
exceed the expenditure level of a 75 per cent degree of certainty of a greenfield 
discovery although the number of greenfield discoveries are estimated to average 
around two per year (Shodde and Hronsky, 2006). While this is at odds with the 
degree of certainty expectations, the author believes that this level of greenfield 
discovery is to be expected given the logistical constraints in exploration. To meet a 
75 per cent degree of certainty requires this expenditure to be spread over 462 
individual projects – a difficult task for even the largest exploration company and 
then each project is likely to be staged over a number of field seasons. Assuming the 
exploration probability for greenfield exploration is reasonable at 0.3 per cent, then 
discoveries are likely and it simply becomes a matter of time.  
Nevertheless, given the size of the majors and the logistical time constraints in 
attaining greenfield discoveries, there is question as to whether these discoveries 
have the ability to deliver the required corporate growth. Goodyear (2006) 
commented that while the average value of a world class target was estimated by 
Shodde and Hronsky (2006) at US$650m, it represented only a small proportion of 
the market capitalization of large companies such as BHP Billiton. Hence, 
exploration is likely to remain as one part of the overall growth strategy for 
companies like BHP Billiton but project expansions and acquisitions will remain 
necessary components. 
The risk-return analysis outlined earlier suggests that the greater probability 
weighted value lies in brownfield exploration and while the discovery size (US$75 
NPV) is not material to the majors, it offers modest upside to the mid tier sector and 
the strongest returns (in line with expectations) to a junior explorer. This thesis has 
already discussed the funding issues faced by juniors above, but in any economic 
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model, the risks are normally counterbalanced by the returns. However it is evident 
that while scarcity and increasing commodity prices have increased the values of 
discoveries, these increased returns are outweighed by the risks (probability of 
discovery with an acceptable level of certainty) and companies often struggle to raise 
the same level of funding as they did a decade ago. 
With the market (and industry) yet to embrace these exploration project 
classifications, the market tends to group most exploration programs as high risk-
high-return ‘plays’. The exception may be minesite exploration but with generally 
lower value targets, these may not be significant from an overall company value 
perspective at the outset of a minesite exploration campaign. 
Investors tend to compensate for the high levels of risk by expecting a high return but 
then rapidly discounting the share price if signs of an exploration discovery fail to 
materialise. This decline may be modelled using a continuous compounding factor 
described earlier and but underpins the difficulties faced by junior explorers in 
raising capital in the face of negative exploration results. 
As a consequence, many juniors will focus on secondary project evaluation and 
brownfield exploration while greenfield exploration is becoming increasingly the 
domain of the majors. To reverse this situation requires a structural change in the 
risk-reward equation where greenfield exploration can attract lower cost funding and 
not simply represent the 1- 3 per cent of revenue expenditure of the majors.  
7.6 Final Discussion 
In Chapter 2, this thesis presented modified Figures 23 and 24 to present the 
opportunities for adding value in resource acquisitions. These figures are reproduced 
below in Figures 151 and 152 but importantly highlight that there are three 
identifiable areas where an acquisition can add value. These are: 
• Acquisitions at a discount to NPV 
• Synergies 
• Premium for market rerating 
 
Figure 151. Potential value creation in resource acquisitions. 
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Market re-rating due to 
increase in size, 
diversification and 
potential fewer 
alternative investments
Value to acquirer 
shareholders
Synergies, e.g. costs 
savings, sharing of 
infrastructure, greater 
commodity price control, 
etc.
Fundamental Value e.g. 
NPV base valuation 
using long term 
commodity prices and 
exchange rates
Premium to target 
shareholders
Market Value
Synergy value
Market discount to fundamental
 value less takeover premium
Premium from market re-rating
 
 
In the case of mergers, while a discount to NPV may not be available, there is still 
scope to capture the value from synergies and a market rerating. 
 
Figure 152. Potential value creation in resource company mergers. 
Market re-rating due to 
increase in size, 
diversification and 
potential fewer 
alternative investments
Value to all 
shareholders
Synergies, e.g. costs 
saving, sharing of 
infrastructure, additional 
market premium
Market Value 
Company A
Market Value 
Company B
Synergy value
Premium from market re-rating
 
 
This ability to add value through these opportunities are likely to contribute to the 
positive returns to bidders observed through the cumulative abnormal returns in the 
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post-event period offsetting the potentially modest cumulative abnormal losses in the 
announcement (event) window.  
 
However, what is particularly interesting is the ability for the bidder to take control 
of the transaction, leaving the target management struggling to divert the market onto 
other issues. Appendix I profile the 30 transactions and include a number of these 
cases although there are situations where the target has exerted greater control as in 
competitive bids. 
 
In this final discussion it is worth briefly reviewing the 2007 BHP Billiton US $183 
billion bid for Rio Tinto which represented 72 per cent of the size of the world’s 
largest mining company with a market capitalisation of US$251 billion. At the bid 
announcement Rio Tinto shareholders earned cumulative abnormal returns of 16.7 
per cent on a bid premium to the 30-day average Rio Tinto share price prior to 
announcement of 55.5 per cent. Over this event window, BHP Billiton shareholders 
lost cumulative abnormal returns of negative 3.6 per cent. 
 
Over the subsequent period the Rio Tinto share price was generally locked into a 
trading pattern around the offer price (and an increased over price) over the next 10 
months. This was irrespective of Rio Tinto’s management rejection of the bid and its 
operational and strategic performance elsewhere. 
 
On the 25 November 2008, BHP Billiton withdrew its offer. This generated 
cumulative abnormal losses for Rio Tinto of negative 49.4 per cent but cumulative 
abnormal gains for BHP Billiton of 8.6 per cent. 
 
In this scenario where the market’s expectations are set by the bidder, it almost 
appears that the bidder is in a ‘no-lose’ situation whereas the target finds it difficult 
to break a trading pattern established by fund managers who start arbitraging any 
price differential. 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
The last two decades have witnessed a high degree of M&A activity which has 
largely involved the foreign takeover of Australian resource companies and the loss 
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of household names such as Normandy Mining, Comalco, Norths, MIM, WMC 
Resources etc. Since 2000 Xstrata has been the main stimulator of M&A activity and 
by also bringing other companies into ‘play’ both here and overseas, has led other 
companies that may not consider launching hostile bids, providing “white knight” 
offers. However in the mid to late 1990s, many Australian gold companies were 
taken over or consolidated first, then taken over by other foreign companies. 
 
Since the Tech Boom, a major factor in the justification of takeovers has been the 
size premium associated with larger companies. Using this justification, bidders have 
been able to justify non-eps accretive acquisitions. However, an irony has been that 
these acquisitions have delivered greater than expected returns given the forthcoming 
2002-2008 Resources Boom at that time. This size premium is not now evident but 
the scarcity of quality mineral deposits and projects are now seen as a major driver of 
future M&A activity. 
 
This thesis concludes that acquisitions add value to resource companies which is 
evident in positive post-event window cumulative abnormal gains offsetting 
cumulative abnormal losses in the event window. These abnormal gains have been 
estimated using an adapted market model for event analysis and draw on the strong 
correlation of absolute resource share prices and commodity prices. 
 
Overall, acquisitions of resource companies appear almost a ‘one way bet’ as only 25 
per cent of transactions lost bidder shareholder value and a carefully structured 
acquisition where the market’s expectations are designed to suit the bidder, can leave 
the bidder in total control of the process, 
 
This is unlike exploration where attractive probability weighted exploration returns 
are dampened by high levels of expenditure required to achieve satisfactory levels of 
certainty. This will continue to undermine the investment appeal of junior explorers 
while greenfield exploration will become solely the domain of the majors. 
 
7.8 Further Research 
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The breadth of this thesis has left many areas suitable for further investigation. While 
an obvious area is to extend the number of analysed transactions to produce more 
statistically meaningful results and to record transaction data before it is lost, there 
are a number of other areas which include: 
• Investigating the oil and gas sector in a similar study 
• Investigating overseas transactions in a similar study 
• Investigating company share price response to significant greenfield 
discoveries and quantify further share price value from subsequent, albeit 
smaller, discoveries over time. 
• Further developing the q NPV parameter using consensus NPVs 
• Investigating gold company sensitivities to A$ and US$ gold price versus 
hedging positions 
• Further developing the resource share price movement model and 
characteristics of commodity price behaviour. 
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BHP merger with Billiton plc 
 
On 19 March 2001, BHP and Billiton plc (Billiton) announced a merger in the form 
of a dual listing similar to the dual listing for CRA and RTZ created in 1995. 
 
Under the terms of the merger, one existing Billiton share would have an economic 
interest equivalent to 0.4842 existing BHP shares. This implied an apparent premium 
of about 20% to the closing share price on Friday 16 March, the last closing price 
prior to the announcement of the proposed merger (Tomlinson et al, 2001).  
 
To meet the respective shareholder group interests’ in the combined entity, bonus 
shares were issued to BHP shareholders. After this allocation it was deemed that the 
dividend, capital and voting rights of each BHP share relative to each Billiton share 
would be equivalent.  
 
BHP would issue bonus shares in a ratio of 106.51 additional shares for every 100 
BHP shares held and the BHP shares on issue after this bonus issue would total 
around 3.705 billion. Including Billiton’s existing shares on issue the merger would 
leave the combined company with approximately 6.024 billion shares on issue. BHP 
and Billiton shareholders’ interests in the new group would therefore be about 61.5% 
for BHP and 38.5% for Billiton (Tomlinson et al, 2001). 
 
At the time the author noted that there was some disappointment that the merger 
appeared to favour Billiton shareholders, particularly as the market generally viewed 
Billiton as having inferior assets. Reports at that time suggest merger ratio terms at 
70/30 rather than 61.5/38.5 would have been preferred by BHP investors. 
 
BHP shareholders have approved the proposed DLC merger with Billiton Plc at a 
vote on the 18 May 2001 with 88.2% shareholders voting in favour of the transaction 
(BHP 2001). On the 22 May 2001, 91.5 percent of Billiton plc shareholders gave 
their approval at a similar meeting in London (Hiscock 2001).  
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On 29 June 2001 BHP Limited (BHP) and Billiton Plc (Billiton) announced that they 
had formally completed their merger with the combined group to be known as BHP 
Billiton (BHP 2001a). 
Assets 
Prior to the merger, Billiton was promoted as a global leader in mining and metals 
and a major producer of aluminium and alumina, chrome and manganese ores. It had 
previously been undergoing an expansion phase prior to the merger, having 
purchased Rio Algom, a Canadian based base metal and metal distribution business 
for $1.75 billion, a 56% stake in Worsley, a Western Australia alumina refinery for 
$1.49 billion, CdelC and CZN, two Columbian coal companies, for $291 million, and 
a 2.3% indirect interest in CVRD, the Brazilian mineral company, for $327 million 
(Tomlinson et al, 2001). 
At the completion of the merger, BHP (2001a) outlined a plan of aggregating the 
major operating assets into Customer Sector Groups ("CSGs"). These would 
comprise: 
• Aluminium (Aluminium, Alumina)  
• Base Metals (Copper, Silver, Zinc, Lead)  
• Carbon Steel Materials (Coking Coal, Iron Ore, Manganese)  
• Stainless Steel Materials (Chrome, Nickel)  
• Thermal (Steaming) Coal  
• Petroleum (Oil, Gas, LNG)  
• Steel 
Hiscock (2001) commented that BHP’s CEO Mr. Anderson had told shareholders the 
merged company would have "a truly global scale" that would be "well and truly on 
the radar screens of international funds managers". BHP is the world's third largest 
iron ore producer, the largest exporter of metallurgical coal, is a significant oil and 
gas producer and the world's fourth largest copper producer. Billiton is one of the 
world's biggest producers of aluminium, nickel, copper, steaming coal and mineral 
sands.  
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Synergies related to procurement savings, reduction of corporate offices by the 
combining of the two head offices, and the less tangible items such as joint 
marketing and common customers were expected to be in the range of $250-400 
million per year (Tomlinson et al, 2001)  
Unfortunately the Billiton plc share price data prior to the merger is not available, 
hence the analysis has focused on the performance of BHP during firstly the 
announcement period (around 19 March 2001) and secondly, at the time of 
shareholders’ approval for the merger on the 29 June 2001. The 252-day post-event 
period from this time is also analysed. BHP is referred to as the bidder. 
Takeover details are summarised in Table A1. 
 
TableA1. Takeover Parameters. 
Bid Price (38.5% of a BHP share) $3.55
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 20.0%
Offer Value ($m) (based on $1.30) $8,233
Date 19-Mar-01
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance 16-Oct-00
Takeover Completion (shareholder approval) 1H CY 2009  
As evident in TableA2, Billiton plc was around 30% the size of BHP prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
 
TableA2. Bidder and target relative sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Billiton plc $18,896
BHP $32,074
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 12.8%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 29.5%  
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The regression analysis outlined in Table A3 indicates that the BHP Billiton share 
price was most sensitive to the ASX Accumulation All Resources Index and with a 
lower level of sensitivity to the Spot LME copper price and the MSCI Metals & 
Mining Index. 
 
Table A3. Regression analysis for bidder. 
Bidder BHP 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 1.97
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 2.97
MSCI Metals & Mining observed  t-result 3.09
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 23.68
Intercept observed  t-result 10.82
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) Slope -1.14282
MSCI Metals & Mining Slope -0.00465
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00144
Intercept 3.09348
R2 0.86
Standard error 0.18
F-statistic 373.6
SSregression 48
SSresidual 8
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.00825  
Table A4 summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder at -4.8% over 
the three day event window during the merger announcement and is likely to reflect 
the earlier discussed disappointment at the size of the premium paid to Billiton 
shareholders. No cumulative abnormal returns were recorded at the time of 
shareholder approval for the merger. 
Table A4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the bidder over the 3-day event 
window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target (Billiton) na £3.00 2,319 na
Bidder (BHP) at announcement -4.8% $9.22 3,478 -$1,542.8
Bidder (BHP) at shareholder approval 0.0% $9.70 6,024 $0.0  
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However in the post event 252 day period BHP is estimated to have experienced 29 
days of abnormal returns with total cumulative abnormal returns of -9.3% over this 
period (Table A5). This corresponded to a value decrease of around A$3 billion. This 
represents around 5% of total market capitalisation, it is an interesting observation 
given the high level of promotion of the merits of the merger during this period.  
Table A5 Post event window abnormal returns for Harmony. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 29 -9.3% -$2,979
 
In the regression analysis of BHP Billiton in the 252-day period following 
shareholders’ approval of the merger, it is also interesting to note that the significant 
increase in share price sensitivity to the HSBC Global Mining Index but not the 
MSCI Metals & Mining Index. As with the HSBC Global Mining Index, the 
observed increased sensitivity to the ASX Accumulation All Resources Index is also 
likely to reflect the increased weightings (TableA6). Tomlinson et al (2001) report 
that the MSCI Metals & Mining Index was undergoing a review to determine the 
appropriate weightings for dual listed entities at that time. 
 
Table A6. Regression analysis in the post event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 7.55 1.97 283.5%
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 1.94 2.97 -34.5%
MSCI Metals & Mining observed  t-result 1.86 3.09 -40.0%
observed  t-resultASX Accumulation All Resources Index 34.04 23.68 43.7%  
BHP’s share price sensitivity to the spot LME copper price also appeared lower in 
the post-event period which could correspond to increased diversification (e.g. 
aluminium) away from copper. 
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CRA: RTZ dual listing 
On 9 October 1995 London based RTZ Corporation plc and CRA Limited (CRA), 
which was 49% owned by RTZ,  announced they had agreed to combine their 
businesses in a dual listing. The companies argued that this would place them in a 
better position to respond to the challenges and opportunities in the world metals and 
minerals industry into the next century (Business Wire 1995).  
The dual listing involved establishing an Implementation Agreement between RTZ 
and CRA, dated 3 November 1995, which set out the terms and conditions for the 
implementation of the operation in a dual listed company structure (DLC). The 
structure would not involve any change in the legal or beneficial ownership of any 
assets of RTZ or CRA. Rather, the DLC operation was to be effected by the entering 
into of contractual arrangements designed to ensure that as far as possible, RTZ and 
CRA operate as a single economic enterprise. The relative values of the two 
companies were such that the combined public shareholder ownership was 
approximately in the proportion of 76.5% RTZ shareholders and 23.5% CRA 
shareholders (Official Publications of the European Communities 1995). 
Prior to the merger announcement, RTZ had 1,068 million shares on issue and with a 
market capitalisation of A$21.1 billion. CRA had 598 million shares on issue giving 
it a total market capitalisation of A$13.0 billion of which RTZ owned 49%. Allowing 
for the cross shareholding of RTZ in CRA, the total market capitalisation of the DLC 
would be A$27.8 billion (O’Connor 1995). 
In the period to 10 October the share price of CRA had traded at a 7.5% premium to 
that of RTZ. In order to bring the share prices into line for the merger of the assets, 
the Board of CRA issued an additional 7.5% of CRA shares as a bonus issue to 
existing shareholders (O’Connor 1995). This is outline in Table A7. 
Table A7. Adjustment of CRA shares for dual listing. 
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CRA Shares (m) RTZ Shares (m)
RTZ issued shares 1,068
CRA issued shares 598
Add bonus shares 45
Total CRA shares issued 643 1,068
CRA shares held by RTZ 315
CRA shares held by public 328 328
CRA/RTZ total issued shares 1,396  
From O’Connor (1995). 
In effect the bonus shares were a premium that RTZ shareholders were paying for the 
implementation of the dual listing. 
On 21 December 1995 RTZ Corporation announced that, following approval of the 
dual listed companies merger by both RTZ and CRA shareholders, and satisfaction 
of the other conditions precedent, completion of the merger has taken place with 
immediate effect (Business Wire 1995a). 
Overall, the announcement and approval for the dual listing was conducted in a short 
space of time and while there were vocal opponents that RTZ was in effect not 
paying an adequate premium for a takeover, Australian shareholders voted for the 
dual listing. The group was shortly after renamed Rio Tinto. 
Assets 
RTZ and CRA were separately managed and operated, with CRA focusing on 
opportunities within Australasia and RTZ operating in the rest of the world. 
RTZ’s principal mining interests were in copper, gold, borates, titanium, steaming 
coal, talc, zircon and uranium. These interests were primarily located in North 
America, South America, Southern Africa and Europe. 
CRA was a mining and metals producer based in Australia. Its principal mining and 
processing interests were in iron ore, coal, bauxite (including alumina and 
aluminium), diamonds, gold and salt. In addition to its major operations in Australia, 
the group had interests in mines, smelters and fabrication plants principally in 
Indonesia, New Zealand and Italy (Official Publications of the European 
Communities 1995). 
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Takeover and Event Analysis 
Unfortunately there is uncertainty over the share price series from various data 
sources for CRA although it is likely that the RIO AU share price data series prior to 
the merger does reflect these data (Bloomberg 2009). There are also complications 
from the data series being adjusted for future issues. This analysis incorporates some 
assumptions and utilises data from research at the time of the dual listing process 
(e.g. O’Connor 1995). 
 
Table A8 summarises the transaction with the bid value reflecting the estimated 
share price prior to the dual listing announcement and the value of the 45 million 
bonus shares issued to CRA shareholders. The offer value is adjusted for RTZ’s prior 
interest in CRA. 
 
Table A8. Dual listing merger parameters. 
Bid Price (value of 45 million bonus shares to CRA shareholders) $25.04
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 15.7%
Offer Value ($m) $7,087
Date 9-Oct-95
Initial target director response Recommended
Takeover Completion 2H CY 1995  
 
The relative company sizes are presented in Table A9. 
 
Table A9. Bidder and target company sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
CRA $13,927
RTZ $21,097
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 33.6%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 66.0%  
 
The regression analysis for CRA and RTZ are presented in Table A10 with both 
companies regressed against the spot LME copper price and the relevant domestic 
resource indices. RTZ share price movements were only sensitive (at a 5% 
significance level) to movements in the FTSE Mining Index in which it dominates.  
 
Table A10. Regression analysis of CRA and RTZ. 
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Target CRA
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
LME Spot Copper Price (US $/lb) observed  t-result 7.64
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 34.08
Intercept observed  t-result 7.53
Factors of significance used (>5%)
LME Spot Copper Price (US $/lb) Slope 4.11309
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00412
R2 0.83
Standard error 0.470
F-statistic 601.9
SSregression 265.61
SSresidual 54.94
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.01355
Bidder RTZ
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 131.06
LME Spot Copper Price (US $/lb) observed  t-result 1.90
Intercept observed  t-result 1.36
Factors of significance (>5%)
FTSE 350 Mining Index Slope 0.18333
R2 0.99
Standard error 4.89
F-statistic 8,799
SSregression 421,139
SSresidual 5,959
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.00856  
 
Table A11 outlines that there were no cumulative abnormal returns for either 
company from the announcement of the dual listing through to final shareholder 
approval. 
 
Table A11. Cumulative abnormal returns for CRA and RTZ. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
CRA 0.0% $23.29 598 $0.0
RTZ 0.0% £9.50 1,068 $0.0  
 
This continued in the subsequent 252-day post event window for RTZ suggesting 
early benefits of the merger were not evident (Table A12). 
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Table A12. Cumulative abnormal returns in the post event period. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 0 0.0% $0.0
 
 
Lastly in Table A13, regression analysis of RTZ in the post-event period suggests a 
decline in sensitivity to the FTSE 350 Mining Index but an increase in the sensitivity 
to the copper price. The former may reflect further differentiation from other 
companies in the FTSE 350 Mining Index (e.g. less iron ore, coal exposure). 
 
Table A13. Regression analysis of RTZ in the post-event window. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 55.58 131.06 -57.6%
LME Spot Copper Price (US $/lb) observed  t-result 15.06 1.90 693.8%  
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Excel Coal: Peabody Energy merger 
 
On 6 July 2006 Peabody Energy announced a takeover offer of $8.50 cash per share 
for Excel Coal and which was to be implemented by a Scheme of Arrangement 
(Excel Coal 2006). The Board of Excel Coal appeared supportive of the bid although 
shareholder pressure encouraged the Board to seek some ‘sweetening’ of the offer. 
On 19 September 2006 Peabody Energy announced an increase in the offer price 
under its Scheme of Arrangement from $8.50 to $9.50 per share. At that time it was 
rumoured that Anglo American was about to make a counter offer for Excel (Energy 
Minerals 2006). 
A successful Scheme Meeting was held on 4 October 2006 and the company was 
delisted on 10 November 2006. Overall, Excel Coal was a company that grew rapidly 
by acquiring mid-tier coal assets over a short period of time and which later, became 
attractive with an increase in world coal demand. 
Assets 
The company owned coal assets in NSW, Queensland and Venezuela. It had three 
operating mines, viz: Wambo, Metropolitan and Chain Valley. It also had a number 
of promising coking coal development projects including the Queensland 
Millennium project.  
Takeover and Event Analysis 
This research has only focused on Excel Coal and its performance at the time of the 
announcement and lead up to the Scheme meeting on 4 October 1996. Table A14 
summarises the offer details. The company commissioned an independent valuation 
which was included in the Scheme Booklet (Excel Coal 1996).  
Table A14. Offer parameters. 
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Bid Price $8.50
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 10.5%
Offer Value ($m) $1,827
Date 5-Jul-06
Initial target director response Recommended
Final bid price $9.50
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 23.5%
Offer Value ($m) $2,042
Date 19-Sep-06
Independent Valuation: low value (from initial valuation) $7.00
Independent Valuation: high value (from initial valuation) $7.60
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 8.6%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 130.1%
Takeover Completion 2H CY 1996  
The regression analysis with the S&P/ASX 300 Resources is presented Table A15 
with unfortunately a low R2 value. 
Table A15. Regression analysis for Excel Coal and the S&P/ASX 300 Resources 
Index. 
Target Consolidated Minerals
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 6.40
Intercept observed  t-result 18.75
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00051
R2 0.14
Standard error 0.592
F-statistic 40.9
SSregression 14.33
SSresidual 87.51
Model One factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.00038  
The cumulative abnormal returns are presented in Table A16. While the returns are 
relatively modest, they are in line with the offer price and the share price at that time 
in a rising resources market.  
 
Table A16. Cumulative abnormal returns for Excel Coal. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Excel Coal (at announcement) -0.6% $7.94 215 -$9.6
Excel Coal (to Scheme Meeting) 9.7% $7.94 215 $165.4  
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Normandy Mining: Merger with PosGold, Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie and North 
Flinders Mines 
 
On 14 November 1995, Normandy presented the investment community with a 
proposal to merge Normandy Mining, PosGold, Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie and North 
Flinders Mines. Normandy Mining would remain the listed company for the merged 
group (Bartrop 1996). Normandy already held effective controlling interests in each 
of the other gold producers. 
 
Normandy stated that the benefits in merging were: 
• To enhance the group’s financial strength 
• To achieve internal management savings across the broader group 
• To eliminate potential conflicts within the group 
 
The merger was conditional on a successful merger of Normandy Mining and 
PosGold. Further merging with GMK and North Flinders Mines was desirable but 
not essential for the Normandy/PosGold entity. 
 
Each company appointed an independent expert to assess the merger terms with the 
findings reported on 9 February 1996 (Grant Samuel 1995). The merger terms are 
presented in Table A17.  
 
Table A17. Normandy merger terms. 
 
Posgold (PGO) 157 NDY share for 100 PGO shares
Gold Mines of Kalgoorlie (GMK) 71 NDY shares for 100 GMK shares
North Flinders (NFM) 425 NDY shares for 100 NFM shares, or
300 NDY shares plue 100 "Tanami 
options" for every 100 NFM shares  
From Grant Samuel (1995) 
 
Previously North Flinders shareholders had been the most vocal opponents to the 
merger with Normandy as the company promoted a deemed higher level of 
prospectivity of its Tanami exploration tenements relative to the exploration potential 
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of the broader group. To help placate these shareholders, North Flinders shareholders 
were offered Tanami options. 
 
The “Tanami” options enabled North Flinders Mines shareholders to retain direct 
exposure to the exploration potential of the Tanami desert in Central Australia. Their 
conversion rate was dependent on the exploration success in this area over the 
subsequent four years until the exercise data of 31 March 2000 (Bartrop 1996). The 
option provides the right to acquire one new Normandy share for each 1 million 
ounces of gold (or part thereof rounded down to the nearest 0.5 million ounces) 
contained in measured, indicated or inferred resources with a minimum average 
grade of 3.5 g/t discovered on existing North Flinders’ exploration tenements other 
than the Granites and Dead Bullock Soak mining leases and on tenements under 
application. The exercise price for each Normandy share was $0.20 or the weighted 
average Normandy share price for the 5 days prior to exercise less $2.30 (Normandy 
1996). 
 
Normandy’s expert valuer stated that it based the merger terms on the relative value 
contributed by each group measured in terms of both underlying values and share 
market values. Underlying values were generally determined by discounted cash 
flow analysis of each operation while the share market values were based on share 
prices at 13 November 1995 and the weighted average share prices in the three 
months to 13 November 1995 (Grant Samuel 1995). 
 
Table A18 is reproduced from the expert valuer’s report and summarises the 
“underlying” and share market values.  
 
Table A18. Estimated underlying values of the merger companies. 
Underlying Value Per Share Market Prices as at 13 January 1995
Disount to Underlying 
Value
NDY $2.18 - $2.53 $1.75 24.6% - 44.6%
PGO public (49.86%) $2.40 - $2.82 $2.61 (8.0%) - 8.0%
GMK public (68.92%) $1.26 - $1.38 $1.18 6.8% - 16.9%
NFM public (50.97%) $6.54 - $8.72 $7.75 (15.6%) - 12.5%
 
From Grant Samuel (1995). 
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 One of the more controversial aspects of the merger was that Normandy announced 
on 14 November 1995 its intention to issue new options to holders of existing 1996 
options and to its shareholders. At the time Normandy had previously issued 146 
million options that were well ‘out-of-the-money’ with a $2.10 strike price and 
expiring on the 31 May 1996. 
 
The new options had an exercise price of $2.50 and expired on the 31 May 2001. 
They were offered on the basis of two new options in exchange for each five existing 
options and for every five shares. The offer of options to Normandy shareholders and 
holders of the May 1996 options was to occur irrespective of the outcome of the 
merger proposals. 
 
In justifying the issue of Normandy Mining options to Normandy Mining share and 
option holders, the expert valuer emphasised the perceived discount of the 
underlying value to share prices as outlined in the final column in Table A18 as the 
company was deemed to trade with a ‘holding company’ discount (Grant Samuel 
1995). This thesis notes that in the issue of options and Normandy’s holding 
company discount, Normandy shareholders had the most to gain from a successful 
merger. 
 
However, in early March 1996 Newcrest Mining Limited (Newcrest) acquired a 
substantial shareholding in Normandy and in PosGold from Minorco S.A. 
(AngloAmerican) and subsequently expressed a desire to participate in a merger 
involving the Normandy Group companies. On 15 March 1996, the PosGold scheme 
was voted down by Newcrest despite an overwhelming level of support from the 
remaining (non-Newcrest) shareholders who voted. On the same date GMK 
shareholders voted in favour of the GMK scheme but the scheme was conditional on 
the success of PosGold scheme (Normandy 2006). 
 
At a meeting on 4 April 1996, North Flinders shareholders voted against the North 
Flinders Scheme with North Flinders shareholders holding approximately 10% of the 
issued capital voting for the North Flinders scheme.  
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On 14 June 1996, Normandy announced that the merger schemes for PosGold and 
GMK were being reactivated and at the same time announced a takeover offer for 
North Flinders share with the considerations based on the original merger terms. 
 
This merger was successful with both PosGold and GMK delisted on 4 October 1996 
(delisted 2009). The minority interests in Normandy North Flinders were eventually 
acquired by Newmont and this company was delisted on 29 May 2003. 
 
The focus of this analysis is on the period prior to the announcement that Newcrest 
had acquired Minorco S.A.’s stakes in Normandy and PosGold as this action was 
confounding at that time given the uncertainty of Newcrest’s intentions.  
 
Merger Analysis 
This study has focused on the period between the merger announcement on 14 
November 1995 and 29 February 1996 prior to the confounding news that Newcrest 
had purchased the Minorco’s stake in Normandy Mining and PosGold. 
 
Due to the various times at which merger ratios were being announced and finalised, 
this study has used the above period as an ‘event window’ to determine the 
cumulative abnormal returns for each of the companies. 
 
Table A19 summarises the merger parameters and the premium/discounts based on 
the Normandy share price prior to the announcement event window. 
 
Table A19. Merger parameters. 
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PosGold
Bid Price (157 NDY for 100 PGO shares) $2.67
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 12.2%
Offer Value ($m) $1,537
Date 14-Nov-95
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value $2.40
Independent Valuation: high value $2.82
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 17.5%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 102.3%
GMK
Bid Price (71 NDY for 100 GMK shares) $1.21
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 7.8%
Offer Value ($m) $1,153
Date 14-Nov-95
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value $1.26
Independent Valuation: high value $1.38
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 9.5%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 91.4%
North Flinders Mines (excl. Tanami Options)
Bid Price (425 NDY for 100 NFM shares) $7.23
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price -3.9%
Offer Value ($m) $536
Date 14-Nov-95
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value $6.54
Independent Valuation: high value $8.72
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 33.3%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 94.7%
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 2H CY 1996  
 
The various sizes of the companies relative to Normandy are presented in Table A20. 
It is evident that the merger provided a significant increase in the size of Normandy.  
 
Table A20. The relative sizes of the companies and offers. 
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Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
PosGold $1,428
GMK $1,069
North Flinders Mines $548
Normandy $904
PosGold: Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 169.9%
GMK: Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 127.4%
NFM: Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 59.2%
PosGold size as percentage of Bidder 17.9%
GMK size as percentage of Bidder 118.3%
NFM size as percentage of Bidder 60.6%  
 
Table A21 outlines the results from regression analysis for all companies. All 
companies had a greater sensitivity to the US$ gold price than the A$ gold price. The 
ASX Gold Index has been used in the regression for all companies except North 
Flinders Mines which displayed a greater sensitivity to the Philadelphia Gold and 
Silver Index although this may be a coincidence given North Flinders Mines 
represented an exploration-focused company with a greater domestic shareholder 
base. This is also highlighted in its low R2 factor below. 
 
Table A21. Regression analysis on the companies. 
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Target PosGold
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 9.56
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 17.65
Intercept observed  t-result 11.43
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope 0.02076
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00267
Intercept -8.55819
R2 0.77
Standard error 0.127
F-statistic 426.4
SSregression 13.68
SSresidual 3.99
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02295
Bidder GMK
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 12.02
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 15.73
Intercept observed  t-result 17.40
Factors of significance (>5%)
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00091
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope 0.01703
Intercept -6.49740
R2 0.78
Standard error (reflects high gold values in Rand) 0.06
F-statistic 434.8
SSregression 3
SSresidual 1
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02144
Bidder North Flinders Mines
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia Gold & Silver Index observed  t-result 2.58
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 2.86
Intercept observed  t-result 0.52
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia Gold & Silver Index Slope -0.00877
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope 0.01964
R2 0.03
Standard error (reflects high gold values in Rand) 0.32
F-statistic 4.3
SSregression 1
SSresidual 26
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx -0.03528
Bidder Normandy Mining
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 5.94
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 12.72
Intercept observed  t-result 7.58
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) Slope -0.00213
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00114
Intercept 1.48561
R2 0.41
Standard error (reflects high gold values in Rand) 0.09
F-statistic 87.7
SSregression 1
SSresidual 2
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02155  
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The cumulative abnormal returns for the extended ‘event window’ from 14 
November 1995 to 29 February 1996 are presented in Table A22 and with PosGold 
achieving the largest value increase following by Normandy Mining. 
 
Table A22. Cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidder during the 
announcement and lead up to merger. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
PosGold 10.2% $2.48 576 $146.2
GMK 4.4% $1.12 955 $47.0
North Flinders Mines 4.8% $7.40 74 $26.5
Normandy 10.0% $1.70 532 $90.8  
 
In a 252-day post-merger event window, Normandy Mining’s sensitivity to the ASX 
Gold Index increased and which would be expected given the larger gold index 
weighting after the merger (Table A23). However it is not clear why its share price 
movements experienced less sensitivity to movements in the US$ gold price relative 
to the estimation window. 
 
Table A23. Post event window regression analysis. 
Estimation window (days) 76
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 14.42 12.02 20.0%
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 4.07 15.73 -74.1%  
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M.I.M. Holdings: Xstrata takeover 
 
This case study has been outlined earlier in Chapter 4. Recapping, on the 21 
November 2002, MIM Holdings Limited (MIM) announced that it was in discussions 
with Xstrata plc (Xstrata) in relation to a transaction that could lead to a change in 
control of MIM. Later, on the 26 March 2003, MIM announced that it was still 
continuing the discussions with Xstrata (MIM ASX Releases, 2002, 2003). 
 
On the 7 April 2003, MIM and Xstrata announced a proposed transaction under 
which Xstrata, through a wholly-owned subsidiary, would acquire all the shares in 
MIM for $1.72 cash per share (Xstrata 2003). This valued MIM at $3.4b or $4.9b 
including MIM’s net debt position. 
 
In this thesis, the time period from the 21 November 2002 until the formal offer was 
announced on the 7 April 2003 is referred to as the ‘discussion period’. This period 
corresponds with the period of greatest uncertainty given that Xstrata indicated that it 
sought to acquire MIM but did not indicate the price or terms of the potential 
acquisition. 
 
MIM stated that a scheme approach was required by Xstrata to enable Xstrata to 
secure the funding necessary to offer MIM shareholders cash for their shares. 
 
The scheme required approval by a majority in number of the MIM shareholders who 
voted at the scheme meeting (in person or by proxy) and at least 75% of the total 
number of shares had to register a vote at the scheme meeting (in person or by 
proxy). It then required approval by the Supreme Court of Queensland. 
 
The Board resolved by a 6:1 majority that the scheme was in the best interests of 
shareholders, and the majority of the directors recommended that shareholders vote 
in favour of the scheme in the absence of a superior competitive bid. The dissenting 
director (Managing Director Vince Gauci) was also the only executive director on 
the Board.  
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In summary, the majority of the Board was attracted to the premium offered over the 
share price prior to the announcement of Xstrata’s approach and the fact that the bid 
was a cash payment. While the bid was close to the low end of the independent 
expert’s valuation range, it concluded that alternative increased value would only be 
realised in the medium to longer term. Therefore the certainty associated with 
accepting a bid was preferred. 
 
These views are crystallised with the Majority Directors stating that in the absence of 
the Xstrata’s offer or any superior offer, ‘it is unlikely that MIM shares will trade at 
levels materially in excess of $1.72 through this and the next financial year (year 
ending June 2004) and it is more likely that MIM shares will, during this period, 
trade at significantly lower levels.’(page 9 MIM 2003a). As evident with the 
resources rally occurring several months later, this assumption was incorrect. 
 
MIM’s Main Assets 
MIM was involved in the production of copper, coal, lead-zinc-silver and gold. 
MIM’s major assets listed by the independent expert (MIM, 2003) were: 
 
• 75% interests in the Oaky Creek (coking) and NCA (steaming and coking) 
coal projects, which are located in the Bowen Basin and a 100% interest in 
the Rolleston coal project. The NCA project comprises the Newlands and 
Collinsville mines. 
• The Mount Isa mining and processing complex and related facilities, which 
incorporate the X41 and Enterprise copper mines, the Isa Lead mine and 
nearby George Fisher lead-zinc-silver mine, concentrator and smelting 
facilities at Mount Isa for copper and lead-zinc-silver, the Townsville copper 
refinery and port facilities and Britannia Refined Metals for refining lead in 
England, 
• The Ernest Henry copper-gold mine 
• A 75% interest in the McArthur River lead-zinc project 
• A 50% interest in the Alumbrera copper project in Argentina 
• The Ravenswood gold mine 
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• A number of proprietary technologies in its base metals business including 
the Albion process, ISAPROCESS, ISASMET and MIMDAS. 
 
Xstrata Funding Arrangements 
The consideration payable by Xstrata for the MIM shares was to be financed in part 
by way of a rights issue by Xstrata to qualifying Xstrata plc shareholders of 
convertible unsecured loan stock. Xstrata stated at the time that except for stock units 
that the Xstrata plc Directors and Glencore International AG had irrevocably 
undertaken to subscribe (or procure the subscription of), the Rights Issue which was 
fully underwritten by Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan to raise approximately GBP 
901 million (approximately US$1,406 million, A$2,340 million) net of expenses. 
The balance of the consideration payable by Xstrata was to be satisfied by bank debt. 
 
The rights issue of convertible unsecured loan stock meant that Xstrata shareholders 
committed the funds to proceed with the scheme of arrangement. As the scheme was 
successful, they received Xstrata shares, but if it wasn’t successful, they would have 
received their loan funds. This funding arrangement requires a degree of certainty 
over the acquisition cost and hence Xstrata’s preference for a scheme of arrangement 
with MIM. The fact that the rights issue was fully underwritten provides support to 
Xstrata shareholders that if the acquisition is successful, its funding is secure. The 
structure was clever in that the funds were only raised and stock issued if the offer 
was successful, therefore derisking the commitment of Xstrata shareholders. 
 
MIM Share Price Reaction 
The MIM share price reaction has been analysed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1.1.1) and 
Figure 69 has been reproduced in Figure A1 to highlight the share price performance 
during the lead up to the announcement of the scheme of arrangement. 
 
Figure A1. The MIM share price and interpreted changing bid probabilities. 
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Data sourced from Bloomberg, MIM ASX releases, 2002, 2003. 
 
Given the staged disclosure of the Xstrata offer to MIM shareholder via the scheme 
of arrangement, this thesis has investigated three different times of abnormal returns. 
Nevertheless, the opening and final successful offer was $1.72 as outlined in Table 
A24. The bid premium appears high at 46.4% but this reflects the $1.72 premium 
over the 30 day average MIM share price prior to the announcement that MIM was in 
discussions on the 21 November 2002 and there is a likelihood that the MIM share 
price would have risen in these four months. However, once MIM was deemed to be 
‘in play’, then normal market movements became less relevant. 
 
Figure. A24. Xstrata and MIM scheme of arrangement parameters. 
 
Takeover Parameters
Bid Price $1.72
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 46.4%
Offer Value ($m) $3,436
Date 7-Apr-03
Initial target director response Acceptance
Independent Valuation Range $1.70 - $2.24
Target director recommended acceptance 7-Apr-03
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2003  
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 Table A25 indicates that the offer for MIM was of similar size to Xstrata and hence, 
would double the size of the company. 
 
Table A25. Bidder, offer and target sizes. 
 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
MIM $2,437
Xstrata (converted at CY2003 average FX rates) $3,280
Offer value as percentage of Bidder 104.8%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 74.3%  
 
Table A26 outlines the main commodity exposures of MIM and Xstrata. MIM 
contributed further coal exposure as well as adding base metals and gold to the 
previous Xstrata portfolio. 
 
Table A26. The main commodity exposure of the Target and Bidders. 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure
Other Commodity 
Exposure
MIM Cu, Coal Zn, Pb, Ag, Au
Xstrata Coal Ferrochrome  
 
Regression analysis over a 252 day period estimation window was carried out for 
MIM while due to the short listing period prior to the bid, the estimation window is 
reduced to 176 days. As a separate line of investigation, regression was estimated on 
both the spot LME copper price and the three month forward LME copper price. 
Interestingly, the MIM share price was estimated to be more slightly more sensitive 
to the three month forward copper price than the spot copper price while the reverse 
was evident for Xstrata (see Table A27). 
 
The regression was rerun using the three month forward LME copper price and the 
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index for MIM as the more sensitivity parameters to its 
share price. Similarly, in the case of Xstrata, the regression was rerun using FTSE 
Mining Index and the LME spot copper price. 
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 Table A27. Estimation window parameters  
Target MIM 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index observed  t-result 13.58
Other metals index observed  t-result 9.77
3mth forward copper price observed  t-result 7.91
LME Spot Copper Price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 7.15
Intercept observed  t-result 14.19
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index Slope 0.00041
3mth forward LME copper price (offset by one day) Slope 1.53053
Intercept -0.50148
R2 0.74
Standard error 0.045
F-statistic 356.7
SSregression 1.47
SSresidual 0.51
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02062
Bidder Xstrata
Estimation window (days) 176
Regression analysis
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 11.48
MSCI Metals & Mining - Local Currency observed  t-result 2.71
3mth forward copper price observed  t-result 2.96
LME Spot Copper Price observed  t-result 3.31
Intercept observed  t-result 0.02
Factors of significance (>5%)
FTSE 350 Mining Index Slope 0.08377
LME Spot Copper Price Slope -331.39975
R2 0.91
Standard error 15.94
F-statistic 918.7
SSregression 466,925.37
SSresidual 43,961.94
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02641  
 
Table A28 outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidders over 
the three deemed events, namely, the first announcement on 21 November 2002 that 
the companies were in discussions, on the 26 March 2003 when MIM announced that 
it was still continuing the discussions with Xstrata, and lastly, on the 7 April 2003 
when both companies announced a proposed transaction under which Xstrata, 
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through a wholly owned subsidiary, would acquire all the shares in MIM for $1.72 
cash per share. 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns total 18.6% for MIM and which comprise 11.9% in 
the event window at the first announcement around the 21 November 2002 and with 
the remainder in a second and third event window around the announcement of 
ongoing discussions (MIM 2003) and then the final offer announcement (Xstrata 
2003). Xstrata experience no abnormal returns during any of the events. 
 
Table A28. Cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day event window over the three 
events. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 18.6% $1.22 1,998 $454.3
Bidder (after rights issue) -7.0% £2.06 632 -$230.7  
 
In the 252-day post event period Xstrata experienced strong cumulative abnormal 
returns of 34.7% and which represented around 30% of the acquisition cost (Table 
A29). 
 
Table A29. Cumulative abnormal returns for Xstrata in a 252-day post event period. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR Annualised AR Change in value (A$m)
252 16 34.7% $1,137.29
 
 
The success of Xstrata in what is now (and at the time) considered a relatively cheap 
takeover is a credit to Xstrata management who probably took advantage of a naïve 
and ‘sleepy’ MIM Board who hadn’t recovered from the lack of interest in resource 
companies during the Tech Boom.  
 
The overall transaction also highlighted the fact that the presence of short term 
traders which can provide support to an impending transaction (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.2). This is because they allow existing shareholders to exit early at a 
slight discount to the offer price but then earn this margin by accepting the bid. 
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 While Xstrata didn’t receive any post event abnormal returns, its sensitivity to both 
the FTSE 350 Mining Index and the LME Spot copper price increased (Table A30). 
While this is a natural consequence of Xstrata’s increase in size and newly found 
copper production, they are nevertheless positive outcomes and could justify the 
acquisition. 
 
Table A30. .Regression analysis in the post event window for Xstrata. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 25.23 26.79 -5.8%
LME Spot Copper Price observed  t-result 23.21 4.57 407.9%  
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QNI: Billiton plc merger and takeover 
 
On 18 June 1997 QNI Limited and Gencor Limited announced that QNI would 
acquire 100% o Gencor’s nickel business (‘Billiton Nickel’) in exchange for the 
issue of shares in QNI. Billiton Nickel was a division of Billiton plc (Billiton) which 
itself had recently demerged from Gencor and floated as a major independent mining 
company. The transaction was to effect a merger between QNI and Billiton Nickel 
(QNI 1997). 
 
On the 4 August 1997 the Directors of QNI and Billiton announced that they had 
agreed to alter the terms on which QNI would acquire Billiton Nickel. The revised 
terms would result in QNI issuing 455.802 million new full paid ordinary shares to 
Billiton, equivalent to 52.5% of the expanded capital of QNI (QNI 1997). 
 
QNI and Billiton’s independent expert for the scheme regarded the proposed 
acquisition as fair and reasonable although warned that QNI shareholders should 
recognize that the acquisition had the commercial effect of a reverse takeover of QNI 
by Billiton. QNI would become a subsidiary of Billiton and would be subject to the 
direction and control of Billiton. Billiton would also not pay a premium for this 
control. The acquisition would also lead to a dilution in earnings per share and cash 
flow per share in the short term for QNI shareholders. In addition, a major part of 
QNI’s assets would now be located in Colombia and which involved both currency 
and country risks (Grant Samuel & Associates Report p2 in QNI 1997). 
 
Billiton announced 90 cent takeover offer for the minority shareholders of QNI on 
the 8 September 1998. This was increased to $1.05 on the 27 October 1998 and was 
successful. 
 
Assets 
QNI’s primary asset is the Yabulu nickel refinery near Townsville, Queensland. It is 
one of the largest laterite nickel refining plants in the world, capable of processing up 
to 2.3 million tones of dry nickel ore per annum from which approximately 29,000 
tonnes of nickel and 1,900 tones of cobalt can be extracted (QNI 1997). 
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The assets of Billiton Nickel to be acquired by QNI include: 
• 98.88% shareholding in Cerro Matoso SA, a Colombian company which 
owns and operates a laterite nickel mine and ferronickel smelter in northern 
Colombia; 
• 50% interest in the Lake Johnston Joint Venture, an undeveloped nickel 
project in WA encompassing 100% of the Maggie Hays deposit; 
• 37.5% interest in the Roundtop Joint Venture, an undeveloped nickel project 
in WA encompassing 100% of the Emily Ann deposit; 
• A 4.7% interest in Capricorn Resources Australian NL, a minerals 
exploration company with a 25% interest in the Roundtop JV; 
• Rights in relation to Billiton’s proprietary nickel processing technologies 
including BioNIC, GenNIC and Plasma smelting; and 
• Rights in relation to Billiton Nickel’s exploration interests and international 
database  
  
The demerger of Billiton was approved by Gencor shareholders on 17 July 1997. Its 
shares were listed on the London Stock Exchange on 28 July 1997 and the company 
had a market capitalization of approximately £4.7 billion (QNI 1997). 
 
Key Parameters 
As part of the scheme booklet (QNI 1997) the companies’ commissioned Grant 
Samuel and associates as independent experts to provide a valuation of QNI. The 
high and low valuations estimated by the independent expert are included Table A31 
which also summarise the key parameters of the merger and later, Billiton takeover 
offer. To estimate the offer price, this thesis has used the independent expert’s mid 
point value of the combined entity and then divided the portion (47.5%) which would 
then be attributable to QNI shareholders by the new QNI shares on issue. 
  
Table A31. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover. 
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Takeover Parameters
Merger offer
Independent Valuation of merged entity: low value (A$m) $1,920
Independent Valuation of merged entity: high value (A$m) $2,304
New value per diluted QNI share $2.31
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 7.0%
Offer Value (47.5% of combined valuation) ($m) $1,003
Date 18-Jun-97
Initial target director response Acceptance
Initial takeover offer $0.90
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price -58.3%
Offer Value (value of minority holding) ($m) $372
Date 8-Sep-98
Initial target director response Hold
Offer increased $1.05
Bid Price $1.05
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price -51.4%
Offer Value (value of minority holding) ($m) $434
Date 27-Oct-98
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value (from initial valuation) 2.22
Independent Valuation: high value (from initial valuation) 2.66
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 19.8%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 43.0%
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1999  
 
As evident above, there were very modest premiums in both transaction offers with 
the second low offer premium justified because the takeover was not incurring a 
change of control given that this had already occurred with the first transaction.  
 
 
Table A32 highlights that the merger offer for QNI was relatively small compared to 
the newly demerged Billiton plc. 
 
Table A32. Bidder, offer and target sizes. 
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Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
QNI (at merger) $856
Billiton plc $9,527
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 8.1%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 9.0%  
 
Table A33 reiterates that the main commodity exposure of both companies was 
nickel. 
 
Table A33. The main commodity exposure of the target and bidders. 
 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure
Other Commodity 
Exposure
QNI Ni Co
Billiton plc Ni Co  
 
Regression analysis over a 252-day period estimation window was carried out prior 
to the merger event window for the target but given Billiton was only recently listed, 
the event window for Billiton is estimated in the 252-day period prior to its final bid 
for QNI (Table A34). 
 
In the case of QNI, the major share price sensitivity factor is the ASX Other Metals 
Index followed by the ASX Accumulation All-Resources Index. Interestingly, in 
terms of nickel price the sensitivities in decreasing order are: the 3-month forward 
LME nickel price, the LME spot nickel price and lastly, the spot nickel price in 
Australian dollar terms. In the latter case, lack of sensitivity tends to support a lack of 
relevance of the A$/US$ exchange rate in the pricing of many Australian resource 
stocks. 
 
In the case of Billiton, out of the factors tested the only factor exhibiting sensitivity 
to the share price is the HSBC Global Mining Index (at a 5% level) and hence, a 
single factor model has been used for the theoretical pricing. 
 
Table A34. Estimation window parameters  
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Target QNI
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 5.16
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 17.60
LME spot in A$ terms observed  t-result 0.20
LME spot nickel price observed  t-result 2.26
3 Month forward LME nickel price observed  t-result 2.42
Intercept observed  t-result 0.02
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Other Metals Index Slope 0.00222
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope -0.00017
R2 0.60
Standard error 0.070
F-statistic 123.5
SSregression 1.79
SSresidual 1.20
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01426
Bidder Billiton plc
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 23.61
LME spot nickel price observed  t-result 0.96
3 Month forward LME nickel price observed  t-result 1.44
Intercept observed  t-result 2.76
Factors of significance (>5%)
HSBC Global Mining Index Slope 0.68207
Intercept -11.05108
R2 0.85
Standard error 6.42
F-statistic 476.5
SSregression 58,922.69
SSresidual 10,221.36
Model Single factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx -0.00885  
 
 
Table A35 outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidders which 
are both zero. This is not surprising given the structure and lack of material premium 
in the merger as well as the significant size difference in the companies. 
 
Table A35. Cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day event window. 
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CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Merger 6.7% $2.08 412 $27.8
Target (first offer) 19.6% $0.68 870 $171.0
Target (increased offer) 13.4% $0.93 870 $116.8
Bidder 0.0% £1.37 2,258 $0.0  
 
Table A36 summarises that there were no abnormal returns to Billiton plc following 
its successful takeover offer in the subsequent 252 day period. 
 
Table A36. Bidder abnormal returns in a 252-day post-event window. 
 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 4 0.0% $0.0
 
 
In summary, the QNI merger and then takeover was well executed by Billiton plc 
and with a deteriorating nickel price, involved a final takeover at a discount to the 
original valuation. QNI shareholders received no abnormal returns and lost control of 
the company through a merger which ultimately derided their ability to extract a 
significant premium in the final takeover offer. 
 
The following post event regression analysis indicates that the Billiton plc share 
price became more sensitive to nickel price movements and which was expected 
(Table A37). 
 
Table A37. Regression analysis in the post-event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 24.93 23.61 5.6%
LME spot nickel price observed  t-result 3.58 0.96 271.1%
3 Month forward LME nickel price observed  t-result 3.10 1.44 115.8%  
References 
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RGC: Merger with Westralian Sands 
 
On 24 July 1998, RGC and Westralian Sands Limited (Westralian) announced their 
intention to merge through a scheme of arrangement. Under the proposed scheme, 
RGC shareholders would receive 0.65556249 Westralian shares plus an RGC Gold 
Unsecured Note (RGC Limited and Westralian Sands Limited 1998).  
 
RGC’s 56% interest in Goldfields was not included in the merger and hence the RGC 
Gold Unsecured Note would represent the pro-rata share of the economic interest in 
this stake less an amount of debt, which as at the 30 June 1998 was $76.2 million 
along with certain costs. The independent expert (Grant Samuel) valued the RGC 
Gold Unsecured Notes at 65.6 cents (RGC Limited and Westralian Sands Limited 
1998). 
 
The merged company was to be the second largest producer of titanium dioxide 
minerals (rutile, synthetic rutile, ilmenite and leucoxene) in the world. It would also 
be the largest zircon producer in the world. It was expected that RGC shareholders 
would end up owning 62% of the shares in Westralian Sands. 
 
A successful Scheme Meeting was held on the 11 December 1998 and RGC was 
delisted on the 15 January 1999 (Delisted 2009). Westralian Sands was later renamed 
Iluka Resources while Goldfields merged with Delta Gold to become AurionGold. 
 
Assets 
RGC owned the Eneabba mine, the Narngulu synthetic rutile operation and the Capel 
mine in WA as well as the Green Cove Springs mine in Florida, USA. It also held a 
43.1% interest in Consolidated Rutile (a separately listed company) and prospective 
tenement in the Murray Basin. Non-mineral sands assets included PT Koba Tin in 
Indonesia, Thalanga base metal mine in Queensland, the Renison Tin mine in 
Tasmania and a 50% interest in the Narama coal joint venture in the Hunter Valley. 
 
Westralian’s main asset was the Capel Vale mineral sands project and it also owned 
Westlime (WA) Limited which was a lime production and distribution business. 
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Takeover and Event Analysis 
Table A38 outlines the merger parameters which involved RGC shareholders 
accepting Westralian Sands scrip. The separate gold note with an assessed value of 
65.5 cents is included in the bid price to establish the 30-day premium but is not 
included in the offer price. 
 
Table A38. Merger details. 
Bid Price (0.65556249 Westralian for each RGC share; plus 65.5 cents for gold note) $2.89
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 63.9%
Offer Value ($m) $470
Date 24-Jul-98
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value (includes 65.6 cents for gold note) $2.35
Independent Valuation: high value (includes 65.6 cents for gold note) $3.23
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 37.7%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 103.6%
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1999  
 
Table A39 below outlines the bidder (Westralian Sands) and target (RGC) sizes 
indicating that the merger was in effect a reverse takeover. 
 
Table A39. Comparison of Bidder and Target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
RGC $484
Westralian Sands $288
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 163.0%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 167.8%  
 
Table A40 highlights the main commodity exposures of the companies and reiterates 
the diversity in the RGC portfolio. 
 
Table A40. Bidder and target commodity exposure. 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure
Other Commodity 
Exposure
RGC Minerals Sands Au, Sn, Ag, Zn, Pb, Coal
Westralian Sands Minerals Sands  
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The regression analysis against the ASX Accumulation All Resources Index and the 
ASX Other Metals Index is presented Table A41. The lower R2 for Westralian Sands 
is likely to reflect the fact that it was a relatively pure mineral sands ‘play’ as well as 
its smaller size. 
 
Table A41. Regression analysis for bidder and target. 
Target RGC
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 7.74
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 21.00
Intercept observed  t-result 1.88
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope -0.00136
ASX Other Metals Index Slope 0.00799
R2 0.88
Standard error 0.277
F-statistic 892.5
SSregression 136.67
SSresidual 19.06
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.03371
Bidder Westralian Sands
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 12.84
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 15.11
Intercept observed  t-result 21.30
Factors of significance (>5%)
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope -0.00167
ASX Other Metals Index Slope 0.00426
Intercept 5.82232
R2 0.50
Standard error 0.20
F-statistic 123.3
SSregression 10.35
SSresidual 10.45
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01786  
 
Table A42 outlines the cumulative returns at the merger announcement and in the 
subsequent period until merger completion (event window extends to 14 December 
1998). While initially the merger was viewed as positive for RGC, reflecting the 
offer premium, in the period to completion both companies experienced negative 
abnormal returns. 
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 Table A42. Cumulative abnormal returns at the merger announcement and 
subsequent period to merger completion. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
RGC (at announcement) 11.5% $2.30 210 $55.8
RGC (to completion) -13.7% $2.30 210 -$66.5
Westralian Sands (at announcement) 0.0% $3.41 85 $0.0
Westralian Sands (to completion) -16.6% $3.41 85 -$47.8  
 
However in the 252-day post event window after merger completion, Westralian 
Sands did recover abnormal returns of around 24% (Table A43). 
 
Table A43. Abnormal returns in the 252-day post event period. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 46 23.9% $69.0
 
 
Lastly, Westralian Sands appears to have experienced a decreased sensitivity to both 
indices and perhaps reflects an uncertain period with the rationalisation of the 
various assets from the merger (Table A44). 
 
Table A44. Regression analysis in the post event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 9.57 12.84 -25.5%
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 7.13 15.11 -52.8%  
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Oxiana: Zinifex merger 
 
On 3 March 2008, both Zinifex Limited (Zinifex) and Oxiana Limited (Oxiana) 
announced that they had reached an agreement for the merger of both companies to 
be implemented by way of a Scheme of Arrangement between Zinifex and its 
shareholders (Oxiana 2008).  
 
As evident in the company descriptions below, Zinifex was predominantly a zinc 
producer with assets in Australian while Oxiana was a gold and copper producer with 
its main assets in Laos (Sepon) but it was also developing the Prominent Hill copper 
gold mine in South Australia. 
 
Under the terms of the merger, Zinifex shareholders would receive 3.1931 Oxiana 
ordinary shares for each Zinifex ordinary share held. With the approval of the merger 
Zinifex shareholders received ordinary shares in Oxiana equivalent to approximately 
a 50% interest in the merged company (Oxiana 2008). 
 
An independent expert’s report was commissioned to outline the benefit of the 
merger for Zinifex shareholders in relation to the scheme. Oxiana shareholders were 
not required to vote on the scheme (Zinifex 2008).  
 
Overall, the merger met with mixed market sentiment, particularly from Oxiana 
shareholders who felt that the deal was too generous to Zinifex shareholders. They 
also believed that Zinifex’s assets were of lower quality than their existing 
copper/gold exposure. 
 
Readers will recall that the renamed merged entity (Oz Minerals) had difficulties in 
refinancing its debt in November 2008 and after subsequently being suspended for 
approximately two months on the ASX, eventually structured a deal which involved 
selling its main zinc assets to China’s Minmetals to reduce its debt. 
 
Give the rapid demise of Oz Minerals in the 2H CY 2008 as concerns regarding the 
debt emerged in the market after August 2008 and short sellers were prevalent in the 
stock through to the time of its suspension, this analysis is restricted to the period 
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from the merger announcement through to its completion with Zinifex ceasing to 
trade as a separate company on the 20 June 2008. 
 
In the post event period Oz Minerals certainly underperformed the market but is 
confounded with the overriding debt refinancing issues. 
 
Assets 
Zinifex ’s main operating assets were: 
• the Century zinc mine located in Queensland 
• the Rosebery zinc/lead mine located in Tasmania 
• a number of development projects and exploration interests in Australia, 
Canada, China, Mexico, Sweden and Tunisia. 
• At time it owned 97% of the shares in Allegiance Mining N.L. which itself 
owned the Avebury nickel project in Tasmania 
 
For the year ended 30 June 2007, Zinifex produced 584,976 tonnes of zinc and 
61,335 tonnes of lead (Zinifex 2008).  
 
Oxiana’s main assets were: 
• The Sepon gold and copper mines in Laos 
• The Golden Grove base and precious metals mine in Western Australia 
• It was constructing the Prominent Hill copper-gold project in South Australia 
and which was expected to commence production during the fourth quarter 
of 2008.  
• It had recently announced the decision to develop the Martabe gold project in 
Indonesia.  
 
For the year ended 31 December 2007, Oxiana produced 77,945 tonnes of copper 
(cathode and concentrate), 131,954 tonnes of zinc, 8,119 tonnes of lead, 151,197 
ounces of gold and 3,310,056 ounces of silver (Zinifex 2008). 
  
Merger Event Analysis 
The merger parameters are outlined in Table 45A below. 
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 Table 45A. Merger Parameters. 
Takeover Parameters
Bid Price (3.1931 OXR shares for 1 ZFX share) $12.42
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 26.9%
Offer Value ($m) (based on $1.40) $6,048
Date 3-Mar-08
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value (from initial valuation) $12.72
Independent Valuation: high value (from initial valuation) $14.25
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 12.0%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 92.1%
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2008  
 
As evident in Table 46A, both companies were relatively similar in size. 
 
Table 46A. Bidder and target relative sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to merger announcement (A$m)
Zinifex $5,122
Oxiana $6,011
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 100.6%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 85.2%  
 
In the regression analysis testing of commodity prices, Zinifex was found to be more 
sensitive to the spot LME zinc prices in A$ terms while Oxiana was found to be most 
sensitive to A$ gold prices (compared to US$ gold prices and US$ and A$ copper 
prices) despite having its main gold project in Laos.  
 
The regression analysis in Table 47A outlines the parameters used in the analysis. 
  
Table 47A. Regression analysis for Zinifex and Oxiana. 
 501
Target Zinifex
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 15.26
Spot LME zinc price (offset by one day) (A$/lb) observed  t-result 27.29
Intercept observed  t-result 12.16
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00353
Spot LME zinc price (offset by one day) (A$/lb) Slope 11.36635
Intercept -22.20430
R2 0.76
Standard error 1.514
F-statistic 389.0
SSregression 1784.12
SSresidual 570.97
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02479
Bidder Oxiana
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 35.27
Spot Gold (A$/oz) observed  t-result 16.41
Intercept observed  t-result 16.61
Factors of significance (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00062
Spot Gold (A$/oz) Slope -0.00207
Intercept 1.83656
R2 0.83
Standard error 0.15
F-statistic 622.8
SSregression 26.87
SSresidual 5.37
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.05004  
 
Table 48A outlines the cumulative annual returns for Zinifex and Oxiana at the time 
of the announcement and in the subsequent time period through to merger 
completion at 20 June 2008. It is evident that there was value transfer from Oxiana to 
Zinifex with the merger and which aligns with market sentiment at the time. 
 
Table 48A. Cumulative abnormal returns for Zinifex and Oxiana at the time of the 
announcement and in the subsequent 78 days to the 20 June 2008. 
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CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Zinifex (announcement) -0.4% $10.52 487 -$1.9
Zinifex (time to merger completion) 10.2% $10.52 487 $49.9
Oxiana -9.6% $3.89 1,545 -$148.7
Oxiana (time to merger completion) -9.4% $3.89 1,545 -$562.1  
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Aberfoyle: Western Metals takeover 
 
On 28 April 1998 Western Metals Limited announced its intention to make a 
takeover offer for all the issued ordinary shares in Aberfoyle that it did not already 
own. The offer was priced at $2.85 cash (Aberfoyle 1998). 
 
The takeover was acrimonious and litigation led to Western Metals providing an 
undertaking to the Court to dispose of 8.38 million shares purchased prior to the 
announcement of the offer. Western Metals was also restrained from despatching its 
takeover offer to Aberfoyle shareholders until the 28 August 1998, 
 
On the 14 July 1998, the offer was increase to $3.00 cash per share and was 
successful. 
 
Unfortunately the share price data for Western Metal is unavailable and hence 
determining abnormal returns has been limited to the target only. However, the bid 
was largely funded by a convertible note which caused immense shareholder dilution 
in later years. This occurred as the Western Metals share price fell, the conversion 
rate had a fixed dollar value and hence involved the company having to issue an 
increasing amount of shares to repay the convertible notes This is known as a classic 
‘death spiral’ because as more and more shares are issued, the share price falls 
further due to the increased dilution, and therefore requiring more and more shares to 
be issued, and so on. In later years, convertible notes issued by other companies 
included dilution caps to prevent this re-occurring. 
 
Assets 
Aberfoyle had three major assets: 
• Gunpowder copper mine in the process of being developed in NW 
Queensland 
• Hellyer copper and zinc mine which had limited remaining reserves (two year 
life) in Tasmania 
• Khartoum, an undeveloped one million ounce gold project in WA 
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With limited reserves at Hellyer, the development of Gunpowder was designed to 
deliver the company’s future cash flow. However, the company had been ‘sitting’ on 
significant cash reserves for some years and which had irked many shareholders. 
This cash was now being directed at developing Gunpowder. 
 
Western Metals was primarily a zinc producer with mines (Cadjebut, Pillara) in the 
Kimberley region, WA. 
 
Key Parameters 
Aberfoyle’s Part B statement provides an independent valuation range for Aberfoyle. 
The high and low valuations along with other key parameters are outlined in Table 
49A. 
  
Table 49A. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover 
Takeover Parameters
Initial bid
Bid Price $2.85
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 26.6%
Offer Value ($m) $269
Date 28-Apr-98
Initial target director response Rejection
Increased bid
Bid Price $3.00
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 33.2%
Offer Value ($m) $284
Date 14-Jul-98
Initial target director response na
Independent Valuation: low value 3.74
Independent Valuation: high value 4.56
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 21.9%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 72.3%
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 2H CY 1998  
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As evident above, the initial and final premium was 26.6% and 33.2% respectively 
over the initial 30-day average price for Aberfoyle shares.  
 
Table 50A highlights that the bidder and target were of similar sizes. 
 
Table 50A. Bidder, offer and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Aberfoyle $231
Western Metals $264
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 107.6%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 87.5%  
 
Table 51A reiterates that the main commodity exposure of both companies was zinc 
and lead with Aberfoyle also having significant copper exposure. 
 
Table 51A. The main commodity exposure of the Target and Bidders. 
 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure
Other Commodity 
Exposure
Aberfoyle Cu, Zn Pb, Ag
Western Metals Zn Pb, Ag  
 
Regression analysis over a 252-day period estimation window was carried out prior 
to the merger event window for Aberfoyle but as mentioned above, the share price 
data series was not available for Western Metals. The Aberfoyle share price shows 
key sensitivities to the three month forward copper price, the spot copper price (US$ 
price is more sensitive than the A$ price), the spot zinc price (in this case slightly 
higher to the A$ zinc price), and the ASX Accumulation All-Resources Index as well 
as the ASX Other Metals Index (Table 52A). 
 
Table 52A. Estimation window parameters  
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Target Aberfoyle
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 3.00
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 2.89
3 month forward LME copper price observed  t-result 2.98
LME spot zinc price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 1.30
A$ LME spot zinc price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 1.62
LME spot copper price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 2.73
A$ LME spot  copper Price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 2.23
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope -0.00027
Spot LME Zinc Price (offset by one day) Slope 2.82134
Spot LME Copper Price (offset by one day) Slope 3.44592
Intercept -0.75038
R2 0.89
Standard error 0.225
F-statistic 651.4
SSregression 98.85
SSresidual 12.55
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02485  
 
Table 53A outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for Aberfoyle which are zero. 
This highlights that the daily return of 17.2% on the 28 April 1998 when the first bid 
was announced is not deemed significant at a 5% level in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 53A. Cumulative abnormal returns for target and bidder. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 17.2% $2.44 95 $39.7
Bidder na $0.84 314 na
 
 
Overall, the Western Metals bid met with mixed views with some shareholders 
frustrated with the performance of Aberfoyle prior to the bid while other 
shareholders were disappointed at the loss of Aberfoyle given its longevity in the 
market. From the Western Metals perspective, it signaled the start of the demise of 
the company with the dilutive convertible notes, greater than expected 
commissioning problems at Gunpowder and a falling A$/US$ exchange rate 
generating significant hedging losses. 
References 
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Acacia Resources: Anglo Gold takeover 
 
On 3 September 1999 Delta Gold launched a scrip takeover bid for Acacia Resources 
in an attempt to become Australia's second largest gold mining company, with 
annual production nearing one million ounces. The Acacia board immediately 
rejected the offer which was comprised of one ex-dividend Delta share for each 
Acacia share and valued the company at $570 million (Financial Express 1999).  
 
On 5 October 1999 Acacia was granted an injunction preventing Delta sending its 
Part A documents to its shareholders. The Victorian Supreme Court agreed with 
Acacis's concerns that there were 'serious issues' or deficiencies in the Part A 
takeover documents (Reflections 1999). 
 
On 11 October 1999 AngloGold Limited announced its intention to make a takeover 
offer for all the shares in Acacia, offering 3.5 of its shares for every 100 Acacia 
shares held. The Acacia Board recommended that Acacia shareholders accept 
AngloGold’s offer in the absence of a higher offer (Reflections 1999). 
 
Delta announcing it was withdrawing its takeover bid for Acacia on the 22 October 
1999 (Reflections 1999). 
 
With effect from 31 December 1999 AngloGold reported that it had acquired control 
of Acacia Resources (AngloAshanti 2009). Acacia was delisted on 11 January 2000 
(Delisted 2009). 
 
Assets 
Acacia was listed on the ASX in 1994 when Shell Australia floated its mineral assets. 
Its gold assets include four operations producing more than 500,000 ounces a year. 
These are Sunrise Dam (100% owned) and Boddington (33.33%) in Western 
Australia and Pine Creek (100%) and Tanami (40%) in the Northern Territory. In 
October 1999, the company had 3.8 million ounces of reserves and 11.4 million 
ounces of resources. It also had extensive exploration tenements in Australia 
including interests in bauxite and magnesite resources (AngloAshanti 2009a). 
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Takeover and Event Analysis 
Table 54A summarises the two bids and premia to the 30-day average price prior to 
the first bid. The Acacia price increased in the lead to the Delta Gold bid 
announcement and hence the premia is greater than in the commentary at the time of 
the offer. 
 
Anglo Gold share prices have been converted at spot exchange rates prevailing 
immediately prior to the announcement of its offer. 
 
Table 54A. Takeover parameters. 
Initial bid - Delta Gold
Bid Price (1 Delta for 1 Acacia share) $2.26
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 22.0%
Offer Value ($m) $570
Date 3-Sep-99
Initial target director response Rejection
Counter bid - Anglo Gold
Bid Price (3.5 AngloGold for 100 Acacia shares) $3.30
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 78.1%
Offer Value ($m) $833
Date 11-Oct-99
Initial target director response Recommended
Takeover Completion 2H CY 1999  
 
Table 55A compares the size of Acacia with the successful bidder, Anglo Gold. 
 
Table 55A. Relative bidder and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Acacia Resources $492
AngloGold $4,448
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 18.7%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 11.1%  
 
The results of regression analysis for the three companies against the gold price and 
gold indices are presented in Table 56A. Interestingly, the Acacia share price was 
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found to more sensitive to the A$ gold price while Delta Gold was found to be more 
sensitive to the US$ gold price. Similarly, the AngloGold share price was more 
sensitive to the US$ gold price in comparison to the Rand gold price. 
 
Table 56A. Regression analysis for the bidders and target. 
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Target Acacia Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 10.02
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 14.13
Intercept observed  t-result 16.86
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot gold price (A$/oz) Slope 0.00408
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00315
Intercept -2.46837
R2 0.79873
Standard error 0.150
F-statistic 494.1
SSregression 22.18
SSresidual 5.59
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02203
Target Delta Gold
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 6.82
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 15.34
Intercept observed  t-result 9.36
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope -0.00552
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00303
Intercept 1.13441
R2 0.60
Standard error 0.099
F-statistic 186.6
SSregression 3.64
SSresidual 2.43
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02209
Bidder Anglo Gold
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia gold and silver index observed  t-result 17.75
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 7.31
Intercept observed  t-result 8.89
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia gold and silver index Slope 179.59881
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope -30.77467
Intercept 8881.77453
R2 0.56
Standard error 821.05
F-statistic 160.8
SSregression 216,830,622
SSresidual 167,857,734
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02728435  
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The cumulative abnormal returns for the target and two bidders are presented in 
Table 57A. While Delta’s low bid probably negated it experiencing negative 
abnormal returns at the time of the bid, Anglo Gold did experience some modest 
negative abnormal returns. 
 
Table 57A. Cumulative abnormal returns for the bidders and target. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target (Delta bid) 11.7% $1.95 252 $57.7
Target (Anglo Gold bid) 6.6% $1.95 252 $32.3
 Bidder (Delta Gold) 0.0% $2.26 270 $0.0
Bidder (Anglo Ashanti) -3.8% R 181.15 98 -$168.9  
 
However, in the 252-day post-event period after the effective completion of takeover 
(31 December 1999) Anglo Gold experienced significant cumulative abnormal 
returns and well in excess of the offer value (Table 58A). 
 
Table 58A. Cumulative abnormal returns in the post-event window. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 10 43.8% $1,946.3
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AurionGold: Placer Dome takeover 
 
On the 27 May 2002 Canadian Placer Dome announced a $2 billion scrip-based 
takeover bid for AurionGold. The offer was 17.5 Placer Dome shares for every 100 
AurionGold shares. 
 
However, after the initial takeover offer announcement a fall in the Placer Dome 
share price reduced the value of the bid from A$4.51 to $A$3.83 per AurionGold 
share (Australian Business Intelligence 2002). The offer was increased on the 30 July 
2002 by a cash component of A$0.35 cash per AurionGold share. (Asian Wall Street 
Journal 2002) 
 
Later in 2002 AurionGold  declared a 7 cents fully franked dividend but which was 
not considered part of Placer Dome’s takeover consideration as the AurionGold  
directors continued to reject Placer Dome’s offer (AurionGold 2002). 
 
On the 31 December 2001 AurionGold was formed from the merger of Delta Gold 
and Goldfields. The assets of both of these companies were dominantly WA gold 
mines and reserves at 30 June 2002 were 7.6 million ounces. 
 
Placer Dome reported that AurionGold's assets would comprise some 30 per cent of 
the combined company with Placer Dome but AurionGold shareholders would have 
only 20 per cent of the total equity of Placer Dome (Sykes 2002). However, Sykes 
(2002) noted that AurionGold shareholders who accept the bid might be well advised 
to hang onto their Placer Dome shares because there was a chance that Placer itself 
could become a takeover target. 
 
On the 14 October 2002 AurionGold Board recommended the Placer Dome offer 
(AsiaPulse News 2002). On the 31 December 2002, Placer Dome announced that 
through compulsory acquisition, it now owned 100% of AurionGold (PR Newswire 
2003).  
 
Assets 
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The AurionGold acquisition increased Placer Dome's interest in the Granny Smith 
mine in Western Australia from 60% to 100%. It also increased the company's 
interest in the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea as well as providing exposure to 
other WA gold operations. 
 
Takeover and Event Analysis 
The takeover parameters in outlined in Table 59A. It shows that with the decreasing 
Placer Dome share price, the bid value decreased despite the additional 35 cents 
added to the offer on the 30 July 2002. An independent valuation was not 
commissioned by the target. Placer Dome share price conversions are estimated on 
spot rates immediately prior to the event window for the initial bid. 
 
Table 59A. Takeover parameters. 
Bid Price (17.5 Placer Dome for 100 AurionGold shares) $4.55
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 68.3%
Offer Value ($m) $2,026
Date 27-May-02
Initial target director response Rejection
Final bid premium (based on 17.5 Placer Dome for 100 AurionGold shares plus 35 cents) 1.0%
Final offer  value ($m) $1,319
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance 14-Oct-02
Takeover Completion 2H CY 2002  
 
Table 60A details the company sizes relative to the size of the offer. 
 
Table 60A. Bidder and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
AurionGold $1,432
Placer Dome (converted at spot exchange rates at time of bid) $7,784
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 11.3%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 18.4%  
 
The regression analysis is outlined in Table 61A. Initial testing with the A$ and US$ 
gold price indicate that at that time, AurionGold was more sensitive to A$ gold price 
than US $ gold price. 
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 Table 61A. Regression analysis for the target and bidder. 
Target AurionGold
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 7.41
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 41.47
Intercept observed  t-result 4.76
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot gold price (A$/oz) Slope 0.00116
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00190
Intercept -0.50502
R2 0.92
Standard error 0.128
F-statistic 1392.3
SSregression 45.54
SSresidual 4.07
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02105
Bidder Placer Dome
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 5.59
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 13.81
Intercept observed  t-result 8.71
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index Slope -0.10065
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope 0.14967
Intercept -18.57740
R2 0.68
Standard error 0.89
F-statistic 262.1
SSregression 419.72
SSresidual 199.34
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02074  
 
Table 62A shows the cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidder at the 
time of the initial announcement and during an event window at the time of the 
increase in the offer on the 30 July 2002. In both cases the bulk of the returns were 
recorded at the initial announcement of the takeover. 
 
Table 62A. Cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidder at the time of the 
initial bid and subsequent increase in the offer. 
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CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Aurion Gold 20.7% $3.22 445 $296.7
Placer Dome -7.4% $19.02 349 -$491.7  
 
The post event window returns for the bidder are listed in Table 63A with the post-
event window extending 252 days from the increase in the offer price. 
 
Table 63A. Post event returns for the bidder. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 74 -12.3% -$959.5
 
 
Lastly the regression analysis in the post event window indicates an increased 
sensitivity of the Placer Dome share price to the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index 
but decreasing sensitivity to the spot gold price – potentially in response to the 
inherited hedging from AurionGold (Table 64A). 
 
Table 64A. Post event period regression analysis. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 24.07 5.59 330.5%
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 6.42 13.81 -53.5%  
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Austral Coal: Centennial takeover 
 
On the 23 February 2005 Centennial Coal Limited (Centennial) announced a scrip 
offer for Austral Coal Limited (Austral) on the basis of 37 Centennial shares for 100 
Austral shares. At that time Austral had been under pressure due to financing issues 
associated with the expansion of its Tahmoor colliery. The attraction of Austral to 
Centennial was that Austral offered diversification into coking coal (Centennial was 
primarily a thermal coal producer) as well as the attraction of maintaining an asset 
portfolio largely in the Sydney basin. 
 
Centennial announced that its offer was unconditional on the 23 March 2005 
(Centennial Coal 2005). The company attained an 80.0% interest in Austral Coal by 
the 21 April, 2005 (Centennial Coal 2005a). 
 
Austral was suspended from trading on the ASX on the 16 February 2007 (Austral 
Coal, 2007). 
 
Unfortunately Centennial could not gain a greater than a 90% interest to proceed to 
compulsory acquisition and ended up holding a 85.85% interest in Austral. This was 
primarily due to Glencore International A.G. which had accumulated 13.72% interest 
in Austral and refused to accept Centennial’s offer. 
 
Over the period 2006 and 2007 Centennial Coal came under financial pressure due to 
its debt levels ($161.3 million with Austral as part of the Tahmoor expansion) inter 
alia as well operational problems at its Newstan colliery which reduced cash flow. 
Most of Centennial coal sales were also in A$ denominated contracts to domestic 
power stations in a regime where export coal prices were increasing along with 
operating costs and creating a margin squeeze. 
 
As part of a rationalisation programme, Centennial Coal decided to sell its Austral 
Coal stake to Xstrata via a takeover bid by Xstrata at $1.83 per share and which was 
announced on 17 September 2007. Centennial also announced it had entered into an 
agreement to sell its Anvil Hill project for $425 million to Xstrata on the same date 
(Xstrata Coal 2007). 
 520
 On l5 October 2007 Xstrata plc through its subsidiary, Helios Australia Pty Limited, 
released a bidder’s statement offering $1.83 per share with Austral directors 
recommending shareholders accept the offer in the absence of a superior proposal 
(Xstrata Coal 2007). This offer was successful. 
. 
Assets 
Austral’s principal activities were mining and marketing of coal from its Tahmoor 
Colliery located 75 kilometres southwest of Sydney. It primarily produced export 
coal with raw coal production in 2007 at 2.3 million tonnes (Xstrata Coal 2007). 
 
Takeover and Event Analysis 
This research has focused on the time of the initial offer for Austral Coal by 
Centennial Coal. While the later sale to Xstrata Coal was for a profit, this sale was 
unlikely to have eventuated if Centennial had not been under financial stress and 
most market analysts believed that Centennial could have delivered greater value to 
its shareholders out of retaining a combined group. 
 
Table 65A summarises the details of the bid. While the independent valuation was 
conducted later with the Xstrata Coal takeover offer, it nevertheless provides a useful 
comparison to the offer by Centennial two years earlier. Major differences largely 
reflect changing (higher) coal price expectations over the intervening period so the 
valuations are likely to be higher than in 2005. 
 
Table 65A. Takeover parameters. 
Bid Price (37 AUO for 10 CEY shares) $1.25
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 39.9%
Offer Value ($m) $381
Date 23-Feb-05
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value (from Xstrata sale valuation) $1.20
Independent Valuation: high value (from Xstrata sale valuation) $1.60
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 33.3%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 89.4%
Target director recommended acceptance (Xstrata Coal) 17-Sep-07
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2008
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 As evident in Table 66A, Austral was almost double the size of Centennial . 
 
Table 66A. Bidder and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Austral Coal $311
Centennial Coal $161
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 237.4%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 193.5%  
 
The regression analysis conducted in Table 67A indicates a low R2 relative to the 
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index for Austral Coal and is likely to reflect the financial 
difficulties faced by the company during the estimation period. 
 
Table 67A. Regression analysis for both Bidder and Target. 
Target Austral Coal
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 12.48
Intercept observed  t-result 1.81
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00037
Intercept -0.12
R2 0.38
Standard error 0.11
F-statistic 155.66
SSregression 1.75
SSresidual 2.81
Model One Factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.03950
Bidder Centennial Coal
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 27.86
Intercept observed  t-result 3.66
Factors of significance (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00117
Intercept -0.34
R2 0.76
Standard error (reflects high gold values in Rand) 0.15
F-statistic 776.2
SSregression 17.39
SSresidual 5.60
Model One Factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01779  
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Table 68A outlines the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window of the 
bid announcement.  
 
Table 68A. Cumulative abnormal returns at the time of takeover announcement. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 10.0% $1.02 305 $31.2
Bidder 0.0% $4.63 35 $0.0  
 
Table 69A outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for Centennial Coal and which 
approximate the returns for Austral Coal at the time of the announcement outlined 
above and suggesting the takeover was viewed as positive for both companies. 
 
Table 69A. Post event cumulative abnormal returns for Centennial Coal 
Days in post-event windows Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 24 11.5% $18.4
 
 
Lastly the decline in the sensitivity of the Centennial Coal share price to movements 
in the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index is likely to reflect both the company’s 
financial and operational issues as well as new coal entrants to the market, e.g. Excel 
Coal, Resource Pacific Holdings (Table 70A). 
 
Table 70A. Regression in the post-event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 12.85 27.86 -53.9%  
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Aztec Resources: Mt Gibson takeover 
 
On the 24 July 2006 Mount Gibson Iron Limited (Mt Gibson) announced a takeover 
bid for Aztec Resources Limited (Aztec). The scrip offer was 1 new Mount Gibson 
share for every 3 shares held in Aztec and which were reported to value each Aztec 
share at $0.263 based on the Mt Gibson volume weighted average price on 21 July 
2006 of $0.789, being the last trading day before announcement of the offer (Mt 
Gibson 2006). 
 
Previously Mt Gibson had secured an option agreement with Aztec’s major 
shareholder, Cambrian Mining Plc for its Aztec shares and which were equivalent to 
19.9% of Aztec’s issued capital (Mt Gibson 2006). 
 
Mt Gibson stated that the rationale for the merger was to create a substantial pure-
play iron ore producer on a world scale, and with potential to produce up to 9.5 
million tonnes per annum of hematite by 2009. The company would hold three high 
quality hematite projects in Western Australia: Tallering Peak (Mount Gibson – in 
production), Extension Hill (Mount Gibson – near-term production) and Koolan 
Island (Aztec – near-term production) (Mt Gibson 2006).  
 
The bid was considered hostile by the Board of Aztec Resources and an acrimonious 
battle ensued over a number of months involving submissions to ASIC. Aztec 
Resources did not commission an independent expert’s valuation of the company 
which itself met with some market cynicism.  
 
Mt Gibson announced that the bid was unconditional on the 26 October 2006 (Mt 
Gibson 2006a) when it had attained a 31% interest in Aztec. On 21 December 2006, 
Mt Gibson announced that it had attained 90.06% and that the takeover was closing 
on the 22 December 2006 (Mt Gibson 2006b). 
 
Assets 
Aztec was the owner of the Koolan Island iron ore project located 130 kilometres 
north of Derby off the West Australian Kimberley coast. Koolan Island has remnant 
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resources and previously produced 68 million tonnes of high grade (Fe @ 67%) and 
low impurity iron ore.  
 
In August 2005, Aztec announced the successful completion of a Bankable 
Feasibility Study with capital costs estimated at $125 million, inclusive of mine 
development costs. This was to support an annual production rate of approximately 4 
million tonnes. 
 
Mount Gibson was established as a specialist iron ore exploration company in 1996 
to undertake the progressive development of iron ore hematite deposits in the 
Midwest region of Western Australia. Mount Gibson’s first mine at Tallering Peak 
commenced exporting direct shipping grade hematite to China in February 2004 and 
at that time, was expanding its direct shipping grade hematite operations to 3.0 
million tonnes per annum (Mt Gibson 2006)..  
 
The company had recently entered into agreement to sell its 73% shareholding in 
Asia Iron Holdings Limited, for $52.5 million. The funds were to be held in escrow 
until receiving EPA approval for the Extension Hill magnetite project which was 
expected by December 2006. The funds from this sale were used in the development 
of Mount Gibson’s Extension Hill DSO hematite project (Mt Gibson 2006). 
 
Takeover and Event Analysis 
The details of the takeover are presented in Table 71A. 
 
Table 71A. Takeover parameters. 
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Bid Price $0.26
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 36.7%
Offer Value ($m) $269
Date 24-Jul-06
Initial target director response Rejection
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 2H CY 2006  
 
Table 72A below highlights that Aztec Resources was around 65% the size of Mt 
Gibson Iron prior to the bid. 
 
Table 72A. Bidder and target company sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Aztec Resources $198
Mt Gibson Iron $312
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 86.5%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 63.6%  
 
Table 73A details a single parameter regression analysis using the S&P/ASX 300 
Resources Index. This is due to the nature of the annual contract pricing of iron ore 
and its irrelevance in many day-to-day share price movements. R2 factors are low 
reflecting the growth of iron ore demand and the desirability of iron ore companies to 
investors relative to some of the other constituents of the S&P/ASX 300 Resources 
Index. 
 
Table 73A. Regression analysis of the Bidder and Target. 
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Target Aztec Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 13.38
Intercept observed  t-result 16.26
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00002
Intercept 0.10030
R2 0.42
Standard error 0.012
F-statistic 179.0
SSregression 0.03
SSresidual 0.04
Model One factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.03429
Bidder Mt Gibson Iron
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 7.98
Intercept observed  t-result 12.31
Factors of significance (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00008
Intercept 0.47221
R2 0.20
Standard error 0.07
F-statistic 63.6
SSregression 0.36
SSresidual 1.40
Model One factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02489  
 
Table 74A outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for both Aztec Resources and 
Mt Gibson, firstly over a 4-day event window at the time of the announcement, and 
secondly, during the period until bid closure. Interestingly, over both periods the 
change in value was similar with Aztec generating abnormal returns at the time of 
the initial announcement while Mt Gibson benefited during the subsequent period. 
 
Table 74A. Cumulative abnormal returns for both the Bidder and Target at the time 
of the announcement and in the subsequent period before the bid closed. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Aztec Resources (at announcement) 20.1% $0.19 1,043 $39.9
Aztec Resources (to bid closure) 6.3% $0.19 1,043 $12.5
Mt Gibson Iron (at announcement) 0.0% $0.78 402 $0.0
Mt Gibson Iron (to bid closure) 16.4% $0.78 402 $51.2  
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 In the 252-day period following the bid closure, Mt Gibson generated cumulative 
abnormal returns of 81.5% with a value of $254 million. This was a period during 
strong grow in the resource sector (Table 75A). 
 
Table 75A. Bidder abnormal returns in post event window. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 31 81.5% $254.1
 
 
Finally Table 76A highlights the increase sensitivity of the Mt Gibson share price to 
the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index which is expected given the greater weighting of 
the combined company following bid closure. 
 
Table 76A. Mt Gibson sensitivity to the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index in the 252-
day period after closure of the bid. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 41.62 7.98 421.9%  
 
References 
Mt Gibson Iron Limited 2006 Mt Gibson Announces Scrip Takeover 
Offer for Aztec to Create $600 miillion Australian Iron Ore 
Producer. ASX Release dated July 24, 2006. 
 
Mt Gibson Iron Limited 2006a Offer by Mount Gibson Iron Limited 
for Aztec Resources Limited now Unconditional. ASX Release 
dated October 26, 2006. 
 
Mt Gibson Iron Limited 2006b Takeover bid by Mount Gibson Iron 
Limited for Aztec Resources Limited 90.06% acceptance 
achieved. ASX Release dated December 21, 2006. 
 529
Comalco: Rio Tinto takeover 
 
On the 25 February 2000, Rio Tinto announced a long-expected takeover offer for 
the minority interests in Comalco Limited (Comalco). The offer price was $9.50 per 
share and shareholders had an option to take $9.50 cash or one Rio Tinto Limited 
share for every three Comalco shares or one Rio Tinto plc (UK scrip) share for every 
three Comalco shares; or any combination of the above (Howarth, 2000). 
 
The offer valued Comalco at $5.326 billion although Rio Tinto was effectively 
purchasing only the 27.6% interest in Comalco that it did not already own, given Rio 
Tinto already controlled the company with a 72.43 per cent interest. 
 
In supporting its bid, Rio Tinto argued that the cash offer represented a substantial 
premium to the historical prices of Comalco shares. The offer price of $9.50 per 
share was at a 17.3% premium to the closing price on 24 February 2000 when the 
offer was announced and a 21.7% premium to the average Comalco share price over 
the preceding month. The cash offer was also reported as being the highest price ever 
offered or paid for Comalco shares prior to the announcement, either by Rio Tinto or 
in general market trading. 
 
It also noted that the share alternative being offered for Comalco provided its 
shareholders with the opportunity to take advantage of capital gains tax roll-over 
relief, by selecting to receive Rio Tinto Limited shares.  
 
Rio Tinto also argued that its offer addressed Comalco investor concerns arising 
from the reduced public float and the reduction in the ASX index weighting of 
Comalco shares. 
 
Comalco Assets 
Comalco prided itself as being Australia’s first fully-integrated aluminium producer. 
The company was established more than 40 years ago following the discovery of 
bauxite deposits at Weipa on Cape York Peninsula (Comalco 2001).  
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The company operates three smelters (Boyne Smelters, Queensland; Bell Bay, 
Tasmania; New Zealand Aluminium Smelters, New Zealand) and the Weipa bauxite 
mine. It also has interests in Queensland Alumina Limited at Gladstone, Queensland 
(38.6 per cent), the Gladstone Power Station (42 per cent), Eurallumina alumina 
refinery in Italy (56 per cent) and Boké bauxite mine in Guinea (4 per cent). 
 
Comalco was headquartered in Brisbane and operates a research and technology 
facility at Thomastown in Victoria. Comalco New Zealand is managed from an 
office in Wellington. 
 
In 1999 Comalco produced 678,000 tonnes of primary aluminium from its three 
wholly owned or majority controlled smelters in Australia and New Zealand and 1.65 
million tonnes of alumina. For the 2000 year, Comalco reported a $308 million 
operating profit, a result significantly enhanced by increased metal production and a 
major reduction in operating costs (Howarth, 2000). 
 
Australian Aluminium Industry 
Howarth (2000) notes that the Rio Tinto bid for Comalco compounds a volatile 
period for the Australian aluminium industry, a large part of which was under 
takeover or up for sale including Capral Kurri Kurri smelter in the Hunter Valley in 
NSW and CSR seeking to divest its stake in the nearby Tomago smelter. 
 
Meanwhile, Rio Tinto had been using the ``creep" provisions of the Corporation Law 
to steadily increase its stake in Comalco in the previous two years (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.6).  
 
Bid Progress 
Independent expert, Grant Samuel concluded that the offer made by Rio Tinto was 
not fair but reasonable in its review (Business Wire, 2000a). 
 
On 5 May 2000, Rio Tinto declared that its offer price was final and that it would not 
be increased. The offer was declared unconditional on the 9 May 2000 (Business 
Wire, 2000). On the 5 June 2000 the offer closed with Rio Tinto having acquired 
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98.45% of Comalco. Rio Tinto then moved to compulsory acquisition of the 
remaining shares (Business Wire, 2000a). 
 
Based on the acceptances received as at the close of the offer, Rio Tinto was 
expected to issue 5.9 million ordinary shares and pay $1,217.7 million in cash for the 
Comalco shares it had acquired (Business Wire, 2000b). Table 77A indicates that 
88.3% of Comalco shares were paid for in cash and this could have reflected a lack 
of further investment appeal in Rio Tinto during the Tech Boom and the diversion of 
cash to non-resource sector investments. It also suggested that the offer of tax relief 
through the scrip offer was not a significant incentive for shareholders to accept scrip 
over cash. 
  
Table 77A. Comalco acceptance split between scrip and cash offers. 
Consideration Number of Comalco Shares accepted 
Cash/Shares issued, or to be 
issued by Rio Tinto
$9.50 cash 128.2 million A$1,217.7 million
Rio Tinto Limited Shares 9.0 million  3.0 million
Rio Tinto plc Shares 8.7 million       2.9 million
 
From Business Wire, (2000b) 
 
The bid details are presented in Table 78A  
 
Table 78A. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover 
Takeover Parameters
Bid Price $9.50
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 17.7%
Offer Value ($m)* $1,468
Date 25-Feb-00
Initial target director response Review
Independent Valuation Range na
Target director recommended acceptance 5-May-00
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2000
*Prior to bid, Rio Tinto had a 72.43% interest in Comalco  
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Table 79A outlines the bidder and target sizes immediately prior to the bid 
announcement and the percentage sizes of the target and offer value relative to the 
bidder. Both the offer value and the market capitalisation of Comalco were less than 
15% of the size of Rio Tinto prior to the bid. 
 
Table 79A. Offer size  and target size 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Comalco $4,485
Rio Tinto $30,274
Offer value as percentage of Bidder 4.9%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 14.8%  
 
Table 80A reiterates that Comalco was contributing increased aluminium and 
alumina exposure to the diversified production base of Rio Tinto.. 
 
Table 80A. The main commodity exposure of the Target and Bidder. 
 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure Other Commodity Exposure
Comalco Al Alumina
Rio Tinto Fe, Cu Al, U, Au, Ti, Industrial minerals  
 
Multiple Regression analysis over a 252-day period estimation window has 
highlighted that the 3-month forward aluminium price, ASX Accumulation All-
Resources Index and the ASX Other Metals Index as factors of significance (at a 5% 
level) for the target as outlined in Table 81A. 
 
Table 81A. Estimation window parameters. 
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Target Comalco Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
3mth forward aluminium price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 4.65
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 7.58
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 16.97
Intercept observed  t-result 8.75
Factors of significance (>5%)
3mth forward aluminium price (offset by one day) Slope -0.00180
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope -0.00154
ASX Other Metals Index Slope 0.01248
Intercept 4.20507
R2 0.90
Standard error 0.345
F-statistic 710.1
SSregression 253.11
SSresidual 29.46
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01882
Bidder Rio Tinto
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
3mth forward aluminium price observed  t-result 2.35
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 1.01
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 9.94
Intercept observed  t-result 1.68
Factors of significance (>5%)
3mth forward aluminium price Slope -0.00211
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00502
R2 0.87
F-statistic 535.8
SSregression 1064.06
SSresidual 164.17
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01221  
 
With the international status of Rio Tinto and aluminium exposure of Comalco, 
regression has been tested with the 3 month forward aluminium price (not offset by 
one day given the London pricing of Rio Tinto plc and its direct impact on the share 
price of Rio Tinto Limited), HSBC Global Mining Index and the ASX Accumulation 
All-Resources Index. Interestingly, only the aluminium price and the ASX 
Accumulation All-Resources Index are significant at a 5% confidence level. 
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As outlined in Table 82A, interestingly there were no recorded abnormal returns for 
Comalco (and Rio Tinto) over the event window. 
 
Table 82A. Cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day event window. 
 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 15.2% $8.00 561 $681.7
Bidder -3.4% $19.38 1,562 -$1,030.4
 
 
Table 83A summarises the abnormal returns to the bidder in the subsequence 252 
day period and which were estimated at zero for Rio Tinto. 
 
Table 83A. Bidder abnormal returns in a 252-day post-event window. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 16 -5.2% -$1,580  
 
Overall it would appear that Rio Tinto acquired the minority shareholding in 
Comalco at a time of weakness and uncertainty in the Australian aluminium industry. 
Rio Tinto’s existing shareholding gave it significant advantage in the takeover and 
the lack of abnormal returns offered to the minority shareholders is in accordance 
with the independent expert’s view that the offer is fair but not reasonable. 
 
It is difficult to identify value to Rio Tinto but this may partly reflect the relative 
small size of Comalco and other events occurring in the subsequent period (e.g. 
Norths takeover.) Interestingly, the post event window highlights that the Rio Tinto 
share price became more aligned with the HSBC Global Mining Index although this 
will be influenced to a greater extent with Rio Tinto’s bid for Norths and which was 
announced on the 23 June 2000 (Table 84A). 
 
Table 84A. Post event observed t-results for the parameters tested in the estimation 
window. 
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Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
3mth forward aluminium price observed  t-result 0.95 2.35 -59.5%
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 4.90 1.01 384.5%
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 9.81 9.94 -1.3%  
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Consolidated Minerals: Palmary Enterprises takeover 
 
On the 23 February 2007 the Chairman of Consolidated Minerals wrote to its 
shareholders outlining a deal that would create a new company by way of 3 schemes 
of arrangement. It was proposed that the new company would be 60% owned by an 
investment vehicle of Pallinghurst Resources Fund LP and AMCI and 40% owned 
by the existing Consolidated Minerals shareholders.  
 
Under the proposal, Consolidated Minerals shareholders would receive what was 
considered by the Board as an attractive cash and scrip package comprising: 
• A$1.38 cash for each Consolidated Minerals share they hold; and  
• 2 shares in the new company for every 5 Consolidated Minerals shares they 
hold.  
 
The letter stated that the deal valued Consolidated Minerals shares at $2.28 
representing a 32.6% premium to the Consolidated Minerals share price of $1.72 
(being the price prior to the takeover speculation in October 2006) (Consolidated 
Minerals 2007). 
 
The proposed complicated transaction attracted criticism from shareholders but also 
started one of the most competitive and colourful bidding wars in the history of the 
Australian resources sector. There were three bidders with a series of counter bids 
extending over a period of 10 months and included: 
• Pallinghurst Resources which was run by former BHP CEO, Mr Brian 
Gilbertson 
• Territory Resources run by former Consolidated Minerals CEO Mr Michael 
Kiernan 
• Palmary Enterprises Ltd run by Ukrainian billionaire Mr Gennadiy 
Bogolyubov. 
 
The bidding was finally won by Palmary Enterprises which offered a $5.00 per share 
cash offer on 4 December 2007 and managed to achieve greater than 90% interest in 
the target on 3 January 2008 (Wai-yin Kwok 2008). 
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 Assets 
Consolidated Minerals owns and operates the Woodie Woodie Manganese operation, 
located approximately 400km south east of Port Hedland in the Pilbara, WA. It also 
has a 50% interest in the Mindy Mindy Iron Ore Project, located 60km northwest of 
Newman, also in the Pilbara region. 
 
It also has a 27.6% strategic interest in Jabiru Metals Limited which owns the Jaguar 
Zinc/Copper Project, located at the Teutonic Bore base metals mine, around 60km 
north of Leonora, WA. 
 
Merger and Event Analysis 
This thesis has not recorded each counter offer but rather assessed the cumulative 
abnormal returns between the initial offer and the 3 January 2008 when Palmary 
moved to compulsory acquisition. The first offer outlined in Table 85A is the 
Pallinghurst and AMCI deal while the final offer is from Palmary Enterprises. 
 
Table 85A. Takeover parameters. 
Bid Price $2.28
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 2.7%
Offer Value ($m) $496
Date 23-Feb-07
Initial target director response Recommended
Final bid price $5.00
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 125.2%
Offer Value ($m) $1,088
Date 4-Dec-07
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1998  
 
The regression analysis is presented in Table 86A and the R2 is low but which may 
reflect the takeover speculation in the share price prior to the first offer 
announcement. 
 
Table 86A. Regression analysis. 
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Target Consolidated Minerals
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 9.49
Intercept observed  t-result 3.25
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00078
R2 0.26
Standard error 0.269
F-statistic 90.1
SSregression 6.54
SSresidual 18.15
Model One factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.00067  
 
However, the cumulative abnormal returns are presented in Table 87A and appear 
quite low in comparison to the bidder and final offer price.  
 
Table 87A.  Bidder cumulative abnormal returns. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Consolidated Minerals (at announcement) 0.7% $2.25 218 $3.2
Consolidated Minerals (to >90% acceptance) 11.0% $2.25 218 $53.9  
 
Chart 88A plots the S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index along with the Consolidated 
Minerals share price and highlights that the market was generally rising during this 
period. Hence while the bid price almost doubled in this high profile takeover, 
Consolidated Minerals shareholders may not have gained the abnormal returns they 
appeared to receive. 
 
Chart 88A. The S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index and the Consolidated Minerals share 
price between the first offer and the timing of the move to compulsory acquisition. 
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Gasgoyne: Sons of Gwalia takeover of Orion, Gasgoyne and Burmine 
 
As part of a proposed amalgamation, Sons of Gwalia sought to substantially 
consolidate the mining tenement holdings in the Marvel Loch/Southern Cross region 
of WA through a series of merger/takeovers of Burmine (Burmine), Orion Resources 
(Orion) and Gascoyne Gold Mines (Gasgoyne). This was considered by the company 
to be one of the major gold producing provinces and greenstone belts in WA. The 
area encompassed the original mining centres of Bullfinch, Southern Cross and 
Marvel Loch (Sons of Gwalia, 1996). 
 
The activity appeared stimulated by the corporate manoeuvring of US Coeur d’Alene 
Mines Corporation (Coeur d’Alene) which took a strategic position in both Orion 
and Gascoyne. 
 
On the 17 January 1996, Sons of Gwalia and Burmine announced a proposed merger 
and at the same time, Sons of Gwalia announced a takeover bid for Gasgoyne (Sons 
of Gwalia, 1996). A later bid for Orion represented the last step in Sons of Gwalia’s 
amalgamation strategy. 
 
All three transactions involved scrip offers with the focus of this analysis on the 
Gasgoyne transactions as representative of the three transactions. The offer to 
Gasgoyne comprised one Sons of Gwalia share for every three Gasgoyne shares. The 
offer was based on a Sons of Gwalia share price of $8.50 and was equivalent to 
approximately $2.80 per Gascoyne share at the time of the announcement. As the 
Sons of Gwalia share price increased over the ensuing months, the value of the bid 
increased and became more attractive to Gascoyne shareholders. 
 
Coeur d’Alene Activities 
The following summarises the activities of Coeur d’Alene during this period: 
• On 21 December 1995 Gasgoyne announced to the ASX that its directors had 
received a letter from Coeur d’Alene Mines Corporation of the US advising 
of its intentions to make a conditional takeover offer for the issued ordinary 
shares of Gasgoyne on the basis of 7 fully paid ordinary shares in Coeur 
d‘Alene and A$60.00 for every 100 Gasgoyne shares. 
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• On the 22 December 1995 Coeur d’Alene lodged with Gasgoyne a Notice of 
Interest of Substantial Shareholder in which it advised that it and its 
associates held relevant interests in 19.9% of Gasgoyne shares. 
•  On the 31 January 1996 Coeur d’Alene served Gasgoyne with a Part A 
Statement but Sons of Gwalia commenced proceedings in the Federal Court 
where, inter alia, Sons of Gwalia sought declaration that the Coeur d’Alene’s 
Part A Statement did not comply with the Corporations Law. 
 
To also thwart Coeur d’Alene’s efforts, on the 21 February 1996, Burmine lodged 
with Gasgoyne a Notice of Change in Interest of Substantial Shareholder in which it 
advised that it and its associates held relevant interests in 19.32% of Gasgoyne 
shares. 
 
Orion 
On the 24 January 1996 Coeur d’Alene announced to the ASX that it had acquired 
Homestake Mining Company’s 5.5 million shareholding and 5 million options in 
Orion Resources for a total consideration of A$14.5m. Coeur d’Alene stated that 
when added to its existing Orion shareholding of 3.33 million shares, it would hold 
13.1% of Orion’s undiluted issued share capital and upon exercise of options, 19.2% 
on a fully diluted basis. 
 
Later in 1996, Sons of Gwalia announced a $1.80 per share takeover offer for Orion 
Resources, declaring the bid with a total value of $130 million as final and 
unconditional on 23 September 1996 (Dixon 1996a). Orion's independent expert, 
Price Waterhouse, had estimated a low and high value for Orion at $1.92 and $2.14 
per share respectively.  
 
While the bid was rejected by the Orion directors, it was ultimately successful and 
Orion was delisted on the 12 November 1996 (Delisted 2009). 
 
Burmine 
On the 17 January 1996, Sons of Gwalia and Burmine announced to the ASX a 
proposal to merge by way of a scheme of arrangement. Sons of Gwalia would issue 
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one Sons of Gwalia share for every two Burmine shares which would then be 
cancelled and extinguished under the scheme of arrangement (Sons of Gwalia, 1996). 
 
Sons of Gwalia held approximately 9% of Burmine’s issued share capital prior to the 
implementation of the scheme. 
 
As at 26 February 1996, Burmine had strategic shareholdings of approximately 10% 
of the ordinary shares of Orion and approximately 19% of the ordinary shares of 
Gasgoyne. 
 
Burmine was delisted on the 15 May 1996 following the completion of the scheme of 
arrangement (Delisted 2009a). 
 
Assets 
The major attraction of Gasgoyne and Orion were their 50% and 45% respective 
interests in the Yilgarn Star gold mine. Orion was the operator of the mine and which 
produced 110,000 oz in FY 1995 at low cash costs of A$269/oz. The companies also 
held a substantial tenement position in the Marvel Loch area (Sons of Gwalia, 1996). 
 
Gasgoyne also had a 45% share in the Awak Mas gold project in South Sulawesi, 
Indonesia. Lone Star Exploration NL also owned 45% of this project and the 
remaining 10% was held by an Indonesia company. A total resource of 1.8 million 
ounces grading 2.02g/t was announced by Gasgoyne on the 11 January 1996 for the 
Awak Mas gold project (Sons of Gwalia, 1996). 
 
Burmine’s assets include three producing gold mines located near Southern Cross, 
namely: Copperhead, Golden Pig and Frasers. All mine production was processed 
through the Copperhead mill, approximately 35 kilometres north of Southern Cross 
and which had recent undergone an expansion in capacity to 1.2 million tonnes per 
annum (Sons of Gwalia, 1996). 
 
Sons of Gwalia 
Dixon (1997) reports that in 1997 Sons of Gwalia was one of the most aggressive 
corporate entities in Western Australia, mounting a successful $164 million takeover 
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bid for Gasgoyne and merging with Burmine Ltd and Orion Resources NL, to 
emerge as a dominant player in the Yilgarn goldfield as well as in its own right in the 
Leonora region. 
  
However, he also noted that Perth analysts had expressed concerns about the 
company's debt position after these manoeuvres, despite the company's forecasts of 
producing around 500,000 oz per year at a profit margin of around A$280/oz. 
 
To address the debt position, Sons of Gwalia had agreed to sell its interest in the 
Awak Mas gold project to Lone Star for US$15 million, 10 million Lone Star shares 
and a royalty on future production. It also planned to sell a 13.8 per cent stake in 
Gasgoyne to Coeur d’Alene for $22.7 million. (Dixon, 1997). It also entered an in-
principle agreement with Citibank for a $120 million facility to consolidate and 
refinance its current debt that arose from these acquisitions. 
Dixon (1996) reports that Sons of Gwalia's director, Mr Chris Lalor, said he was 
comfortable with a cost per ounce through acquisition at about $80 per oz for 
Gascoygne. Sons of Gwalia had extensive hedging programs in place, and which at 
that time, returned an average of around $600 per oz.  
In respect of Gascoyne, Delisted (2009b) reports that shareholders approved a 
selective reduction of capital to privatise Gasgoyne, with the result that the company 
became wholly-owned by Coeur d'Alene Mines Corporation and Sons of Gwalia. 
Gascoyne was delisted on the 14 February 1997. 
 
Data Limitations 
Unfortunately the share price series for Orion and Burmine are not available, 
primarily from the re-use of their ASX codes by more recent companies. Hence, this 
analysis has focused on Gascoyne as a target and the impact of the takeover on the 
Sons of Gwalia share price returns. It also analyses the Sons of Gwalia share price 
returns from the mergers with Orion and Burmine. Given 1996 was a year of 
corporate activity for Sons of Gwalia, a second event 252-day window has been 
included to highlight returns from a 252-day period from the 8 January 1997. 
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With regards to the Gascoyne takeover, Table 89A summarises the main parameters. 
 
Table 89A. Takeover parameters for Gasgoyne bid. 
Gasgoyne bid
Bid Price (scrip: one SGW for three GGM) $2.81
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 29.3%
Offer Value ($m) $153
Date 17-Jan-96
Initial target director response na
Takeover Completion 2H CY 1996  
 
As evident in Table 90A, Sons of Gwalia was substantially larger than Gascoyne 
(and Burmine and Orion). 
 
Table 90A. Relative bidder and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Gasgoyne $131
Sons of Gwalia $556
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 27.5%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 23.6%  
 
Regression analysis has been carried out for the bidder and target to movements in 
the gold price (US$/oz or A$/oz). This indicated weak sensitivity for Gasgoyne 
during the estimation period to either gold price while Sons of Gwalia was more 
sensitive to the A$ gold price. Both share prices are sensitive to movements in the 
ASX Gold Index (Table 91A). 
 
Table 91A. Regression analysis of the target and bidder. 
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Target Gasgoyne
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 9.41
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 1.16
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 2.00
Intercept observed  t-result 3.13
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00252
Intercept -1.45976
R2 0.45
Steyx 0.182
Model Single factor 10.81
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02564
Bidder Sons of Gwalia
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 12.88
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 2.63
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 0.78
Intercept observed  t-result 3.55
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) Slope 0.01126
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00849
Intercept -10.03614
R2 0.61
Standard error 0.49
F-statistic 196.9
SSregression 95.38
SSresidual 60.33
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01351  
 
Table 92A outlines the cumulative abnormal returns at the time of the bid 
announcement and with the positive abnormal returns suggesting that the market 
believed that the consolidation of the Southern Cross area as a positive move. 
 
Table 92A. Cumulative abnormal returns at the time of the offer announcement. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 5.9% $2.41 54 $7.7
Bidder 0.9% $7.74 72 $4.8  
 
Table 93A outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for two post events windows; 
namely, Window 1 is following the Gasgoyne offer (22 January 1996 to 7 January 
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1997) while Window 2 is later from 7 January 1997 to 25 December 1997 to reflect 
the full effects of the consolidation of the three way merger. 
 
Table 93A. Cumulative abnormal returns for two periods following the Gasgoyne 
bid. 
Window Days in post-event windows Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
1 252 18 18.0% $100.0
2 252 42 23.9% $133.0
 
 
Table 94A outlines the results of regression analysis in the Window 2 period for 
Sons of Gwalia. Interestingly the share price displays a greater sensitivity to the US$ 
gold price perhaps reflecting dilution of the company’s large hedge book across a 
larger production and reserve base. It is not clear why there is diminished sensitivity 
to the ASX Gold Index during this period and it is perhaps reflecting company 
specific issues such as debt management problems. 
 
Table 94A. Regression analysis in the post event period for Sons of Gwalia. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 9.13 12.88 -29.1%
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 7.58 2.63 188.9%
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 7.63 0.78 880.1%  
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Hill 50: Takeover by Harmony Gold Mining  
 
On the 11 December 2001, Harmony Gold Mining Company of South Africa 
(Harmony) announced that it intended to make a cash offer of $1.35 for each Hill 50 
Limited (Hill 50) share and 65 cents for each of its listed options. Harmony also 
stated that it would pay a further five cents in cash for each share, listed and unlisted 
options if the offer was accepted by holders of at least 90% of Hill 50’s shares and 
options (Ferret, 2001) 
 
Ferret (2001) report that Harmony had been advised that the Board of Hill 50 
intended to recommend Harmony’s offer in the absence of a higher offer, and to 
accept Harmony’s offer in respect of their own shares and options. Harmony had also 
entered into pre-bid acceptance agreements with Hill 50’s largest shareholder, Robert 
Pittorino, and an associated company. 
 
Harmony reported that the acquisition of Hill 50 would represent an important step in 
the development of Harmony’s Australian gold mining business and allowed the 
company to create a substantial integrated business with the potential to produce in 
excess of 1 million ounces of gold per annum in Australia. Harmony operated the 
Big Bell and Jubilee operations in Western Australia and which are near to Hill 50’s 
major operations (Ferret, 2001).  
 
On 8 March 2002, Harmony gained control of Hill 50 after its holding reached 
53.1% (Ferret, 2001a). The company was delisted following compulsory acquisition 
on the 21 June 2002 (delisted, 2009). 
 
Assets 
Hill 50’s main assets are the Mt Magnet operations n the Murchison Belt and the 
New Celebration operation south of Kalgoorlie, both in Western Australia, and the 
Maud Creek advanced exploration project in the Northern Territory. 
 
Takeover details are summarised in Table 95A. 
 
Table 95A. Takeover Parameters. 
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Bid Price ($1.35 but increased to $1.40 on 90% acceptance) $1.40
Bid premium over 30 day average share price ($1.35) 24.0%
Bid premium over 30 day average share price ($1.40) 28.6%
Offer Value ($m) (based on $1.40) $201
Date 11-Dec-01
Initial target director response Recommend
Independent Valuation Range na
Target director recommended acceptance 8-Mar-02
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2002  
 
As evident in Table 96A, Hill 50 was around 10% the size of Harmony prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
 
Table 96A. Bidder and target relative sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Hill 50 Gold $172
Harmony Gold Mining $1,791
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 11.2%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 9.6%  
 
The regression analysis outlined in Table 97A indicates that the Hill 50 share price 
was sensitive to ASX Gold Index movements and the A$ gold price relative to the 
US$ gold price. 
 
The Harmony share price was sensitive to all parameters tested with the gold price in 
Rand the most sensitive factor. 
 
Table 97A. Regression analysis for both bidder and target. 
 550
Target Hill 50
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 26.57
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) observed  t-result 2.26
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 1.80
Intercept observed  t-result 1.31
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00152
Spot Gold Price (A$/oz) Slope -0.00041
R2 0.83
Standard error 0.049
F-statistic 412.6
SSregression 2.94
SSresidual 0.59
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02583695
Bidder Harmony Gold Mining
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia gold and silver index observed  t-result 9.32
Spot Gold Price (Rand/oz) observed  t-result 27.62
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 6.37
Intercept observed  t-result 1.58
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia gold and silver index Slope 56.01577
Spot Gold Price (Rand/oz) Slope 2.94946
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope -23.91647
R2 0.86
Standard error (reflects high gold values in Rand) 263.83
F-statistic 490.2
SSregression 102,363,478
SSresidual 17,262,903
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.03174  
 
Table 98A summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the target at 12.4% and 
generating value of $21.4m for Hill 50 shareholders. There were no cumulative 
abnormal returns for Harmony. 
 
Table 98A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the bidder and target over the 3-day 
event window. 
 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 12.4% $1.20 143 $21.4
Bidder (after rights issue) 0.0% R 6,700 154 $0.0  
 
However in the post event 252 day period Harmony is estimated to have experienced 
48 days of abnormal returns with total cumulative abnormal returns of 43.1% over 
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this period (Table 99A). This corresponded to a value increase of $773m to Harmony 
shareholders and while this exceeds the value of the Hill 50 offer, it is likely to be 
partly attributable to other acquisitions and the growth of the company at that time. 
 
Table 99A. Post event window abnormal returns for Harmony. 
Days in post-event windows Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 48 43.1% $772.5
 
 
Interestingly, as highlighted in the regression analysis of Harmony, there is a 
significant increase in the sensitivity of the Harmony share price to the US$ gold 
price and a decrease in the sensitivity to the Rand gold price (Table 100A). 
 
Table 100A. Regression analysis in the post event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Philadelphia gold and silver index observed  t-result 9.84 9.32 5.5%
Spot Gold Price (Rand/oz) observed  t-result 5.24 27.62 -81.0%
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 21.70 6.37 240.5%  
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Homestake Gold of Australia: Homestake Mining takeover 
 
On the 14 August 1995, Homestake Mining (Homestake) announced that it would 
make a formal and unconditional takeover offer for Homestake Gold of Australia 
Limited (HGAL). The offer was either scrip (0.089 Homestake Mining shares for 
each share Homestake Gold share) or $1.90 cash per share (Business Wire 1995). 
 
Homestake Mining previously owned 81.5% of HGAL and the time of the proposed 
transaction had a market value of approximately US$162 million for the HGAL 
minority interests (Business Wire 1995). 
 
HGAL’s main asset was a 50% ownership of the Kalgoorlie Super Pit and Mt 
Charlotte mines. The company’s policy was not to hedge gold production. 
 
The Offer document was sent to shareholders in late October 1995 and Homestake 
was required to include forecasts of future net income and cash flow which projected 
1996 net income at US$38.5 million (Business Wire 1995a). 
 
At December 31, 1995 a total of 38.9 million HGAL shares were acquired at a cost 
of US$59.1 million and leading to Homestake owning 88.1% of the shares of HGAL. 
The acquisition was completed in the first quarter of 1996 when the  remaining 70.7 
million  publicly held HGAL shares were acquired at a cost of US$105.8  million, 
including $99.3 million for 6 million newly issued shares of the company, $5 million 
in cash and $1.5 million of transaction  expenses. The total purchase price to acquire 
all of the 18.5% of HGAL held by minority  shareholders was US$164.9 million, 
including US$141.7 million for 8.5 million newly issued shares of the  company, 
US$19.5  million in cash and US$3.7 million of transaction expenses (SEC Info 
1997). This indicates that only 12% of the final shareholders accepted cash and 
hence investors seeking cash are likely to have sold earlier on-market. Acquiring 
investors (funds) are likely to have sought to arbitrage any price differential and then 
accept Homestake Mining scrip as part of a longer term investment. 
 
The company was delisted on the 26 February 1996 (Delisted 2009). 
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Takeover and Event Analysis 
Table 101A summarises the takeover offer. The cash offer price has been used to 
determine the bid premium. 
 
Table 101A. Takeover parameters. 
Bid Price (A$1.90 or 0.089 HomeStake Mining for 1 Hometake Australia share) $1.90
Bid premium over 30 day average share price (cash offer) 17.8%
Offer Value (A$m) (based on cash offer but for 18.5% interest not owned) $208
Date 14-Aug-95
Initial target director response Review
Independent Valuation Range na
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1996  
 
The relative size of the companies is outlined in Table 102A. The offer has been 
scaled back to reflect the value to the minority interests in HGAL. 
 
Table 102A. Relative bidder and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Homestake Gold Australia $923
Homestake Mining Company $2,438
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder (outside equity interests only) 1.6%
Target size as percentage of Bidder (outside equity interest only) 7.0%  
 
The regression analysis for both the bidder and target are outlined in Table 103A. 
With Homestake’s no gold hedging policy, HGAL share price movements were more 
sensitive to the US$ gold price than A$ gold price over the 252-day estimation 
window. 
 
It is unclear why Homestake Mining had a low sensitivity to the Philadephia Gold 
and Silver Index during this period. 
 
Table 103A. Regression analysis for bidder and target. 
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Target HGAL
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 9.08
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 40.24
Intercept observed  t-result 10.78
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope 0.00752
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00146
Intercept -3.14264
R2 0.94
Standard error 0.053
F-statistic 1949.0
SSregression 10.82
SSresidual 0.69
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02693
Bidder Homestake Mining Company
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 7.51
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 1.42
Intercept observed  t-result 6.97
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope 0.18804
Intercept -57.26979
R2 0.58
Standard error 1.01
F-statistic 171.1
SSregression 349.22
SSresidual 254.09
Model One factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01749  
 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the target are presented in Table 104A for the 
event window around the bid announcement.  
 
Table 104A. Cumulative abnormal returns in the bid event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
HGAL (A$m) 17.1% $1.56 592 $158.2
Homestake Mining Company (US$m) 0.0% $16.63 147 $0.0  
 
The post event cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder are presented in Table 
105A and like the zero returns above, are likely to reflect the significant ownership 
of the target prior to the bid announcement. 
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Table 105A. Cumulative abnormal returns in the 252-day post event window. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (US$m)
252 11 1.4% $33.3
 
 
Lastly, Table 106A outlines a dramatic change in the sensitivity of the Homestake 
Mining share price to movements in the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index and 
which appear unrelated to the takeover. 
 
Table 106A. Regression analysis in the post-event window. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 5.77 7.51 -23.2%
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 44.15 1.42 3001.5%  
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Jubilee Mines: Xstrata plc takeover 
On the 29 October 2007 Xstrata plc (Xstrata) and Jubilee Mines NL (Jubilee) 
announced that they had entered into a Bidding Agreement for an all-cash offer for a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Xstrata plc to acquire all of the issued and outstanding 
shares of Jubilee by way of a recommended off-market takeover offer.  
The offer price was A$23.00 per share, valuing Jubilee at approximately $3.1 billion 
(US$2.9 billion). The offer price represented a 35% premium over the closing price 
of A$17.10 per Jubilee share on the ASX on 26 October 2007, a 36% premium over 
the volume weighted average price of Jubilee shares over the previous 30 trading 
days on the ASX and a 25% premium to Jubilee’s all time record high share price 
(Xstrata, 2007). 
Executive Chairman of Jubilee, Mr Kerry Harmanis and certain other shareholders, 
including the other directors and senior management of Jubilee had agreed to sell all 
of their Jubilee shares to Xstrata and no other party for $23.00 per share (Xstrata, 
2007).  
At the time, the $23 per share was considered a generous offer, particularly as 
Jubilee’s main asset was the Cosmos nickel mine and which had a relatively short 
mine life based on the high grade ore associated with the first few production years. 
The Xstrata offer received FIRB approval on the 7 November 2007 (Xstrata 2007a) 
and it declared the offer unconditional on the 31 January 2008 after it had attained a 
61.66% relevant interest (Xstrata, 2008). The bid was closed on the 21 February 
2008 (Xstrata, 2008a). 
Assets 
Jubilee owned and operated the Cosmos Nickel Project in the Mt Keith-Leinster 
region of WA. At the time of the bid, Jubilee had discovered eight high grade 
massive nickel sulphide deposits within the vicinity of the Cosmos Nickel Project, 
namely Cosmos, Cosmos Deeps, Alec Mairs (AM) 1, 2 and AM5, Prospero, Tapinos 
and Sinclair along with the large low grade Anomaly 1 deposit (Xstrata, 2007). 
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 The company had also announced approval to develop its wholly owned Sinclair 
Nickel Project located 100km to the south of Cosmos with a new A$90 million 
standalone mine and processing facility (Xstrata, 2007). 
An updated targeted production profile provided by Jubilee forecast high-grade 
production of nickel-in-concentrate increasing from 12,000 tonnes in 2007/08 to 
approximately 17,000 tonnes in 2008/09 and then to 22,000 tonnes in 2010/11 
followed by around 30,000 tonnes per annum thereafter (Xstrata, 2007).  
Takeover details are summarised in Table 107A. 
Table 107A. Takeover Parameters. 
Bid Price $23.00
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 36.3%
Offer Value ($m) $3,100
Date 29-Oct-07
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance 29-Oct-07
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2008  
As evident in Table 108A, Jubilee was around 5% the size of Xstrata prior to the 
takeover announcement. 
 
Table 108A. Bidder and target relative sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Jubilee Mines $2,170
Xstrata plc $44,695
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 6.9%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 4.9%  
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As outlined earlier, Jubilee was a nickel producer and contributed additional nickel 
exposure to Xstrata’s then recent acquisition of Canadian Falconbridge (Table 
109A). 
Table 109A. Bidder and target main commodity exposures 
Promoted Commodity Exposure Other Commodity Exposure
Jubilee Mines Ni
Xstrata Cu,  Ni, Coal Zn, Pb, Ferrochrome, V  
The regression analysis outlined in Table 110A indicates that the Jubilee share price 
was sensitive to S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index movements and the US$ spot LME 
nickel price. The sensitivity to the A$ nickel price was marginally lower than the 
US$ nickel price. 
 
The Xstrata share price was sensitive to MSCI Metals and Mining and the FTSE 350 
Mining Indices as well as the spot LME nickel price. 
 
Table 110A. Regression analysis for both bidder and target. 
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Target Jubilee Mines
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index observed  t-result 19.17
Spot LME nickel price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 24.75
Intercept observed  t-result 6.02
Factors of significance used (>5%)
S&P/ASX 300 Resources Index Slope 0.00145
Spot LME nickel price (US$/lb) Slope 0.34115
Intercept 2.98121
R2 0.76
Standard error 0.781
F-statistic 387.8
SSregression 473.03
SSresidual 152.48
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02402822
Bidder Xstrata plc
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
MSCI Metals & Mining observed  t-result 7.01
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 6.08
Spot LME nickel price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 3.36
Intercept observed  t-result 2.47
Factors of significance (>5%)
MSCI Metals & Mining Slope 2.33967
FTSE 350 Mining Index Slope 0.03511
Spot LME nickel price (US$/lb) Slope -2.72418
Intercept 79.59474
R2 0.95
Standard error 44.98
F-statistic 1591.5
SSregression 9,660,795
SSresidual 503,829
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02710  
Table 111A summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the target at 31.5% and 
generating value of $709.5 million for Jubilee shareholders. There were no 
cumulative abnormal returns for Xstrata over the three day event window. 
 
Table 111A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the bidder and target over the 3-day 
event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 31.5% $16.70 135 $709.5
Bidder (after rights issue) 0.0% £18.91 972 $0.0  
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 However in the post event 252-day period Xstrata is estimated to have experienced 
15 days of abnormal returns with total cumulative abnormal returns of 17.9% over 
this period (Table 112A). This corresponded to a value increase of $8,021m to 
Xstrata shareholders and while this exceeds the value of the Jubilee offer, it is likely 
to also be attributable to other acquisitions and the growth of the company at this 
time. 
 
Table 112A. Post event window abnormal returns for Xstrata. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 15 17.9% $8,021
 
Interestingly, as highlighted in the post event regression analysis of Xstrata, there is a 
significant decrease in the sensitivity of the Xstrata share price to the MSCI Metals 
and Mining Index while its sensitivity to the FTSE 350 Mining Index increased 
slightly. There is also a greater sensitivity to the nickel price and Xstrata had a 
greater sensitivity to the nickel price than to the copper price at this time (US$ terms) 
(Table 113A). 
 
Table 113A. Regression analysis in the post event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
MSCI Metals & Mining observed  t-result 0.85 7.01 -87.9%
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 7.64 6.08 25.8%
observed  t-resultSpot LME nickel price (US$/lb) 5.14 3.36 53.0%  
Overall, the takeover was considered expensive, particularly occurring as it did near 
the peak of the 2002 -2008 Resources Boom. 
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Normandy Mining:  Newmont takeover  
 
On the 5 September 2001, South African AngloGold Limited (Anglo Gold) 
announced a scrip offer for Normandy Mining Limited (Normandy) valued at 
approximately A$3.2 billion (Normandy 2001). The offer was for 2.15 Anglo Gold 
shares for every 100 Normandy shares. 
 
In a newsletter the AngloGold CEO is reported to state that the offer would provide 
Normandy shareholders with the opportunity to participate in a bigger, more diverse 
AngloGold and that with a successful transaction, AngloGold would have a 
combined annual production of over 9 million ounces and reserves of 106 million 
ounces (Normandy 2001a). 
 
On 14 November, Newmont announced a competing cash and scrip bid for 
Normandy worth A$4 billion and entered into a deed of undertaking with Normandy 
containing “no talk/no shop” provisions and a break fee. Newmont also announced a 
merger with Franco-Nevada, a Canadian precious metals royalty company, and a 
lock-up agreement with Franco-Nevada over its 19.9% shareholding in Normandy 
(Allens Arthur Robinson, 2002). 
 
The terms of Newmont’s offer were 3.85 Newmont shares for every 100 Normandy 
shares plus an additional 5 cents per share if it achieved acceptances for 90% of 
Normandy shares (Normandy 2001b). 
 
It the transaction was successful, Newmont stated that it would rank first in the world 
gold industry with respect to annual production and reserves and would have one of 
the lowest cash cost profiles in the industry (Normandy 2001b). The concurrent offer 
for Franco-Nevada was to be conducted through a Plan of Arrangement and while 
this offer had full support of the Franco-Nevada Board, it was conditional on 
Newmont acquiring a minium of 50.1% of Normandy. 
 
On the 19 November 2001, Normandy Directors announced that they unanimously 
recommended shareholders reject the AngloGold offer (Normandy 2001c).  
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Later on the 26 November 2001, AngloGold announced it was challenging 
Newmont’s offer, particularly believing it contravened Australian corporate law with 
the complications involving the Franco-Nevada deal and the anti-competitive nature 
of a ‘break fee’ ($38.33 million) with Normandy (Allens Arthur Robinson, 2002). 
 
On the 29 November AngloGold announced an increase in its takeover offer by 
adding a cash payment of 20 cents per Normandy share. On the 10 December 2001 
Newmont announced it would increase its offer by a cash payment of 35 cents per 
Normandy share and increasing the total cash payment to 40 cents per share 
(Normandy 2001f). 
 
On 27 December 2001 AngloGold announced it had revised its unconditional offer 
(at that time) by adding a further unconditional cash payment of 10 cents per 
Normandy share to its current offer. The revised offer was 2.15 AngloGold shares for 
every 100 Normandy shares as well as 30 cents per Normandy share (Normandy 
2001e). The increased offer loosely related to the ability for AngloGold to rationalise 
(sell) some Western Australian Normandy assets with Canadian Barrick Gold. 
 
On the 3 January 2002 Newmont announced an increase in its offer by 10 cents cash 
per Normandy shares with the offer then standing at 3.85 Newmont shares and 50 
cents cash (Normandy 2002). This bid was successful and Normandy Mining was 
eventually delisted on 1 July 2002 (Delisted 2009). 
.  
An independent expert (Grant Samuel and Associates) was commissioned to provide 
a valuation Normandy in response to AngloGold’s initial offer. The expert estimated 
a valuation range of $1.48 to $1.88 per Normandy share (Normandy 2001f). 
 
Takeover Offers and Event Analysis 
Details of the competing offers for Normandy are outlined in Table 114A and which 
indicate three rounds of bidding. 
 
Table 114A. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover 
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Initial bid 1 - Anglo Gold
Bid Price (2.15 Anglo shares for 100 NDY shares) $1.42
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 25.6%
Offer Value ($m) $3,169
Date 5-Sep-01
Initial target director response Review
Counter bid 1 - Newmont
Bid Price (0.0385 NEM shares per NDY share plus 5 cents per share for 90% acceptance) $1.70
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 50.4%
Offer Value ($m) $3,794
Date 14-Nov-01
Initial target director response Recommended
Increased bid 2 - Anglo Gold
Bid Price (2.15 Anglo shares for 100 NDY shares plus 20 cents per share) $1.70
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 50.4%
Offer Value ($m) $3,794
Date 29-Nov-01
Initial target director response Rejection
Counter bid 2 - Newmont
Bid Price (0.0385 NEM shares per NDY share plus 40 cents per share) $1.83
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 61.89%
Offer Value ($m) $4,084
Date 10-Dec-01
Increased bid 3 - Anglo Gold
Bid Price (2.15 Anglo shares for 100 NDY shares plus 30 cents per share) $1.84
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 62.77%
Offer Value ($m) $4,106
Date 27-Dec-01
Initial target director response Review
Counter bid 3 - Newmont (successful offer)
Bid Price (0.0385 NEM shares per NDY share plus 50 cents per share) $1.93
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 70.74%
Offer Value ($m) $4,307
Date 3-Jan-02
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value (from initial valuation) 1.48
Independent Valuation: high value (from initial valuation) 1.88
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 27.0%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 114.9%
Target director recommended acceptance 14-Nov-01
Takeover Completion mid CY 2002  
 
The size of Normandy relative to AngloGold and Newmont is outlined in Table 
115A with Newmont being substantially larger than both the other companies. 
 
Table 115A. Bidder, offer and target sizes. 
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Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Normandy Mining $2,366
Anglo Gold $3,366
Newmont $8,620
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder (Newmont) 50.0%
Target size as percentage of Bidder (Newmont) 70.3%  
 
Regression analysis has been carried out with the gold price in US$ terms except in 
the case of AngloGold where the share price exhibited a greater sensitivity to the 
Rand gold price. Normandy was regressed against the Australian Gold Index (now 
defunct) while both the international companies were regressed against the 
Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index (Table 116A). 
 
Table 116A. Estimation window parameters. 
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Target Normandy
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Australian gold index observed  t-result 35.10
Spot gold price (US/oz) observed  t-result 2.86
Intercept observed  t-result 4.92
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Australian gold index Slope 0.00165
Spot gold price (US/oz) Slope 0.00132
Intercept -0.54086
R2 0.88
Standard error 0.034
F-statistic 906.8
SSregression 2.12
SSresidual 0.29
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.01406
Bidder Anglo Gold
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia gold and silver index observed  t-result 12.79
Spot gold price (Rand/oz) observed  t-result 5.15
Intercept observed  t-result 6.75
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia gold and silver index Slope 229.26014
Spot gold price (Rand/oz) Slope 5.30241
Intercept -10932.56
R2 0.72
Standard error 941.77
F-statistic 313.1
SSregression 555,392,901
SSresidual 220,845,236
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02375
Bidder Newmont
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 54.14
Spot gold price (US/oz) observed  t-result 5.73
Intercept observed  t-result 9.77
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index Slope 0.47208
Spot gold price (US/oz) Slope 0.04483
Intercept -18.78724
R2 0.94
Standard error 0.59
F-statistic 2130.5
SSregression 1,493.92
SSresidual 87.30
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.01251  
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Table 117A summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the target at only 10.3% 
and generating value of $244m for Normandy shareholders. There were negative 
cumulative returns for both AngloGold and Newmont at each successive bid except 
for the final offer by AngloGold. The negative cumulative abnormal returns did 
decrease at the announcement of each successive offer for each bidder. 
 
Table 117A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the bidder and target over the 3-day 
event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target: Initial bid 1 - Anglo Gold 10.3% $1.06 2,232 $244.0
Target: Counter bid 1 - Newmont 0.0% $1.44 2,232 $0.0
Target: Increased bid 2 - Anglo Gold 0.0% $1.51 2,232 $0.0
Target: Counter bid 2 - Newmont 0.0% $1.68 2,232 $0.0
Target: Increased bid 3 - Anglo Gold 0.0% $1.82 2,232 $0.0
Target: Counter bid 3 - Newmont (successful offer) 0.0% $1.82 2,232 $0.0
Initial bid 1 - Anglo Gold (Rand) -7.6% R 13,949 108 -$257.4
Counter bid 1 - Newmont (US$) -5.4% $23.30 195 -$469.7
Increased bid 2 - Anglo Gold (Rand) -6.6% R 2,315 108 -$36.6
Counter bid 2 - Newmont (US$) -3.4% $20.28 195 -$252.2
Increased bid 3 - Anglo Gold (Rand) 0.0% R 2,310 108 $0.0
Counter bid 3 - Newmont (US$) -2.5% $19.02 195 -$177.6  
 
The Normandy takeover highlights one of the limitations of event analysis where 
there is a lack of significance with the relatively small but competitive bidding and 
AngloGold more or less matching the Newmont bids. Thus the total cumulative 
abnormal returns were estimated at 10.3% from the initial bid to the last event 
window at the time of the winning Newmont bid and these abnormal returns were 
generated on the 5 September 2001 at 10.3%. This is despite the final Newmont offer 
being at a 71% premium to the 30 day average share price prior to the initial bid on 
the 5 September 2001. 
 
In a 252-day post event period, Newmont did gain cumulative abnormal returns of 
5.1% (Table 118A). 
 
Table 118A. Cumulative abnormal gains for Newmont in a 252-day post event 
period. 
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Days in post-event windows Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 27 5.1% 231
 
 
Table 119A highlights a general decline in the sensitivity of Newmont’s share price 
to the Philadelphia Gold and Silver Index and the US$ gold price, perhaps reflecting 
inherited hedging from Normandy.  
 
Table 119A. Regression analysis in the post event period for Newmont. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 27.96 54.14 -48.3%
Spot gold price (US/oz) observed  t-result 4.45 5.73 -22.2%  
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North: Rio Tinto takeover  
 
The competitive bidding for North Limited (Norths) has been previously discussed in 
Chapter 4 as a case study. Recapping, on 23 June 2000, Rio Tinto announced its 
intention to make a takeover offer for all the listed shares of Norths that it did not 
already own for cash of $3.80 per share. The offer was made by Rio Tinto 
Investments Pty. Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto and valued Norths 
at A$2.80 billion (Rio Tinto 2000). 
 
Rio Tinto also announced that it had acquired a 14.5% interest (106,894,910 shares) 
in Norths through on-market purchases with a maximum price of $3.80 per share. 
 
During the takeover process, Rio Tinto announced it had received approval for the 
acquisition from FIRB on the 24 July 2000 (Rio Tinto 2000a) and in the following 
month it received approval from the European Commission and the ACCC (Rio 
Tinto 2000b). These approvals were key conditions of the bid. 
 
As also mentioned in Chapter 4, Rio Tinto’s bid for Norths was targeting potential 
synergies between both companies’ iron ore operations in the Pilbara of Western 
Australia (RIO 2000, Wisenthal, 2000, Counsel, 2000). It followed a breakdown in 
negotiations between the companies over access to Rio Tinto’s extensive railway 
infrastructure near the North's controlled Robe River iron ore operations. On behalf 
of the Robe River Associates, Norths had been seeking access to Rio Tinto’s 
Hamersley's rail facilities. This was estimated to save around $350 million of the 
total $1 billion cost of developing the 20 million tonnes per annum West Angelas 
mine. Hamersley Iron also had limited capacity at its port facilities in Dampier and 
the economics of expanding this capacity were not as attractive as expanding North’s 
Cape Lambert port. (Counsel, 2000). 
The takeover also diversifid Rio Tinto's iron ore production into a mix of pellets and 
lump ore and also provided the company with a strategic entry into North America. 
Norths was rumoured at the time to be bidding for Brazil’s second largest iron ore 
producer, Caemi (Counsel, 2000). 
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The importance of North’s iron ore assets were underlined by Rio Tinto’s CEO when 
he stated that ``By combining our companies' iron ore businesses, we will become 
the world's second largest producer with diversified resources, products and 
markets," (Rio Tinto 2000). 
On 22 July 2000, Anglo American plc (Anglo) announced it was preparing a 
competing offer for Norths with a cash bid of $4.20 per share. The sum would be 
payable after a 5 cent dividend and was unanimously recommended by North 
directors "in the absence of a higher offer". As with the earlier Rio Tinto $3.80 bid, it 
was focused on the value of North’s iron ore businesses (North 2000). 
 
In response to the competing offer from Anglo American, Rio Tinto announced that 
it was increasing its bid to $4.75 on 3 August 2000 and declared that this bid was 
unconditional (Rio Tinto 2000c). It also stated that it would shorten payment terms to 
within three business days of valid acceptances being received (Rio Tinto 2000c). 
Rio Tinto’s increased offer was made prior to the lodgement of Anglo's offer 
documentation. As Anglo’s offer still remained subject to a number of conditions, 
including FIRB approval, it was never formally submitted to shareholders. 
The increased bid was successful and Rio Tinto announced that it had completed 
compulsory acquisition of minority interests in Norths on 10 October 2000 (Rio 
Tinto 2000d). 
 
North’s share price and bid levels as presented in Figure 70 (Chapter 4) and are also 
presented in Figure 2A.  
 
Figure 2A. North’s share price and bid levels. Note the successive over running by 
the share price at each announced bid price before trending towards that bid price. 
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(Share price data sourced from Stock Resource, bids from Norths, Rio Tinto & Anglo American 
announcements).  
 
Target Board Recommendation. 
On the advice from the independent expert (Grant Samuel), the Board rejected the 
first offer of $3.80 per share as undervaluing the company and not being fair and 
reasonable. 
 
However North’s directors unanimously recommended Anglo’s competing cash bid 
of $4.20 per share "in the absence of a higher offer" with Anglo appearing as a 
‘white knight’. This offer forced Rio Tinto to increase its offer to $4.75 per share and 
declare this offer unconditional. 
 
North’s Assets 
Norths was an international mining group with interests in iron ore, base metals, 
uranium and wood fibre. Its major business interests comprised: 
 
• An effective 53% interest in Robe River iron Associates (Robe River) in 
Western Australia, a joint venture that produces approximately 30 milliont 
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tonnes per annum of sinter feed and lump ore from its Pannawonica 
operations. Robe River had announced that it intended to proceed with the 
development of a major new iron ore project at West Angelas; 
• A 56.1% shareholding in the Iron Ore Company of Canada Limited (IOC), 
which produced approximately 12.5 million tonnes per annum of pellets and 
4.5 million tonnes per annum of iron concentrates at its Carol Lake operations 
in the province of Labrador and Newfoundland, Canada. At that time IOC 
had recently announced the re-activation and expansion of additional pellet 
production capacity at Sept-Iles, Quebec; 
• Ownership (100%) of the Zinkgruvan zinc mine in Sweden, an 80% interest 
in the North Parkes copper-gold mine in New South Wales, and an effective 
25% interest in Minera Alumbrera Limited (Minera Alumbrera), a company 
which operates the Alumbrera copper-gold mine in Argentina; 
• A 68.4% shareholding in Energy Resources of Australia Limited (ERA), an 
ASX listed company which produces approximately 5,000tpa of uranium 
from the Ranger mine in the Northern Territory. Ranger was the second 
largest uranium mine in the world; and 
• 100% of North Forest Products (Forest Products), a wood fibre business 
which had significant plantation and forest interests and operated four timber 
processing facilities in Tasmania. It was Australia’s largest exporter of 
woodchips to Japan. 
 
Norths directors commissioned an independent expert’s report on the value of 
Norths and whether the offers were fair and reasonable. A summary of this 
valuation is presented in Table 120A. The independent expert (Grant Samuel) 
concluded that Rio Tinto’s offer price of $3.80 per share undervalued Norths and the 
offer was not fair and reasonable. 
 
Table 120A. Independent Valuation of North. 
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Valuation Valuation
Low High Low High
Interest US$ US$ A$m A$m
Rober River Iron Associates 53% 1218 1419
Iron Ore Company of Canada 56.10% 450 510 750 850
Total iron ore assets 1968 2269
Minera Alumbrera 25% 120 140 200 233
Northparkes 80% 125 145 208 242
Zinkgruvan 100% 200 220 333 367
Lake Cowal gold project 100% 35 45
Yakabindie nickel project 100% 20 30
Regional exploration 100% 47 73
Total base metal assets 843 990
Energy Resources of Australia 68.40% 375 440
North Forest Products 100% 340 380
Hedge book -15 -10
Corporate overheads -85 -85
Total other businesses 615 735
Total enterprise value 3427 3994
Cash at 30 June 2000 97 97
Loans and amounts receivable (net) 116 116
External borrowings at 30 June 2000 -94 -94
US bonds -200 -200 -333 -333
Net debt -214 -214
Value of net assets 3213 3780
Shares on issue (millions) 737.2 737.2
Net value per share 4.56 5.13
Net value per share - diluted for options 4.34 5.09  
From Norths (2000) 
 
Rio Tinto’s Intentions 
RIO publicly indicated that once it gained control of North, it would sell most of the 
other assets, including its majority-owned ERA, forestry and woodchipping and zinc 
operations. It would keep the copper-gold mining interests, including the North 
Parkes mine in NSW (Counsel, 2000). 
 
Event Analysis 
Details of the two offers by RIO and the proposed offer by Anglo American are 
outlined in Table 121A.  
 
Table 121A. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover. 
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Takeover Parameters
Initial bid - Rio Tinto
Bid Price $3.80
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 34.6%
Offer Value ($m) $2,801
Date 23-Jun-00
Initial target director response Rejection
Counter bid - Anglo American
Bid Price $4.20
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 48.8%
Offer Value ($m) $3,096
Date 22-Jul-00
Initial target director response Recommended
Increased bid - Rio Tinto
Bid Price $4.75
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 68.3%
Offer Value ($m) $3,502
Date 3-Aug-00
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value 4.34
Independent Valuation: high value 5.09
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 17.3%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 100.7%
Target director recommended acceptance 7-Aug-00
Takeover Completion 2H CY 2000  
 
As the Anglo bid was never formalised and was unsuccessful, this analysis has 
focused on impacts of the successive bids on Norths and Rio Tinto share prices only. 
Table 122A outlines the Bidder and Target sizes immediately prior to the first bid 
announcement. The total value of the final Norths bid still only represented less than 
12% of the size of Rio Tinto. Norths was also just over 7% of the size of Rio Tinto 
prior to the initial offer (see Table 123A). 
 
Table 123A. Bidder, offer and target sizes. 
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Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
North $2,170
Rio Tinto $29,713
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 11.8%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 7.3%  
 
Table 124A outlines the main commodity exposure of Norths as well as Rio Tinto. 
As mentioned earlier, the WA iron ore synergies were attractive to Rio Tinto with the 
other assets considered as ‘non-core’. However it is likely Anglo was more interested 
in the total portfolio given it also has forestry interests and it was keen to build its 
presence in Australia. 
 
Table 124A. The main commodity exposure of the Target and Bidder. 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure
Other Commodity 
Exposure
Norths Fe, Cu, U Forestry, Zn, Au
Rio Tinto Fe, Cu, Al U, Au, Ti, Industrial minerals  
 
Regression analysis for a number of parameters was conducted over a 252-day 
estimation window for both Norths and Rio Tinto. Unfortunately, annual contract 
prices for iron fines or Indian spot iron ore prices (INWPIRON Index from 
Bloomberg) which change in periods of a month or longer provided no statistical 
significance to movements in the Norths share price. However, the spot LME copper 
price was found to be more significant than the LME three month forward copper 
price while the ASX Accumulation All-Resources Index was found to be more 
sensitive than the ASX Other Metals Index. Hence a regression analysis was rerun 
using these parameters as outlined in Table 125A. 
 
Similarly, regression analysis was conducted over a 252-day estimation window for 
Rio Tinto. Factors of significance were the MSCI Metals and Mining Index, the ASX 
Accumulation All-Resources Index and both the spot and three-month forward 
copper prices. Regression was rerun using the MSCI Metals and Mining Index, the 
ASX Accumulation All-Resources Index and the three-month forward LME copper 
price. The international MSCI Metals and Mining Index was included to diversify the 
analysis from the ASX given the influence of both Rio Tinto and Norths on ASX 
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indices. However, this was deemed unnecessary in analysis of the Rio Tinto takeover 
of Comalco given Rio Tinto already owned 72.43% of Comalco prior to its Comalco 
bid. 
 
Table 125A. Estimation window parameters  
Target Norths
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Fines contract pricing observed  t-result na
LME Spot Copper Price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 7.29
3mth forward LME copper price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 6.10
ASX Acumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 5.71
Other Metals observed  t-result 3.32
Intercept observed  t-result 6.45
Factors of significance used (>5%)
LME Spot Copper Price (offset by one day) Slope -4.86136
ASX Acumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00113
Intercept 1.88193
R2 0.60
Standard error 0.208
F-statistic 186.3
SSregression 16.17
SSresidual 10.81
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02171
Bidder Rio Tinto
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 0.64
MSCI observed  t-result 11.72
LME Spot Copper Price observed  t-result 6.85
3mth forward LME copper price observed  t-result 7.02
ASX Acumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 11.07
Intercept observed  t-result 7.55
Factors of significance (>5%)
ASX Acumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00418
MSCI Metals & Mining Index Slope 0.10480
3mth forward LME copper price Slope -4.99495
Intercept -7.97818
R2 0.90
Standard error 0.01
F-statistic 726.3
SSregression 723.35
SSresidual 82.33
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.01514  
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Table 126A, outlines the cumulative abnormal returns for Norths and Rio Tinto and 
uses three event windows; namely, Rio Tinto’s first bid on the 23 June 2000, Anglo’s 
purported bid around the 22 July 2000 and then Rio Tinto’s increased bid on 3 
August 2000. With the uncertainty associated with the exact timing of the Anglo 
offer, this event window has been increased to five days with the others remaining at 
three days. 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for Norths is zero and reflects the relatively 
high standard error in the regression compared to the 34.6% first bid premium over 
the previous 30-day average. During the event window a raw premium of 28.6% on 
the 23 June 2000 reduces to 25.8% after adjusting for theoretical pricing movements 
and dividing this by the standard error (0.208) leaves a non-significant abnormal 
return at the 5% confidence level.  
 
In the case of Rio Tinto, it experienced negative abnormal returns during the events 
(Tables 126A). 
 
Table 126A. Cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Norths 38.9% $2.94 737 $844.4
Rio Tinto -8.3% $19.02 1,562 -$2,476.1  
 
However, in the post event period Rio Tinto gained cumulative abnormal returns of 
15.9% which offsets a large proportion of the cost of bid and leaving a net deficit of 
$1.2 billion from an acquisition cost of $3.5 billion (Table 127A).  
 
Table 127A. Bidder abnormal returns in a 252-day post-event window. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 8 15.9% $4,727.4
 
In the post-event window for Rio Tinto, the level of significance of both indices to 
share price movements fell but particularly to the ASX Accumulation All-Resources 
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Index. However, the significance of the copper price did markedly increase (Table 
128A). 
Table 128A. Post event window analysis  
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
ASX Acumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 5.59 14.06 -60.2%
MSCI Metals & Mining Index observed  t-result 10.42 12.01 -13.2%
3mth forward LME copper price observed  t-result 7.17 3.69 94.2%  
In summary, Rio Tinto’s acquisition of Norths is likely to be regarded as successful 
given the cumulative abnormal returns during the post-event window offset a 
significant proportion of the value of the negative abnormal returns at the time of the 
announcement of offers and the overall cost of the acquisition. The final offer was 
also at the mid point of the independent expert’s valuation despite the competitive 
nature of the bid. However, the reduced level of significance of the ASX 
Accumulation All-Resources Index and the MSCI Metals & Mining Index remains 
unclear, perhaps reflecting greater leverage to iron ore and annual contract pricing as 
evident five years earlier in the RTZ-CRA dual listing. 
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Placer Pacific:  Placer Dome takeover 
 
On the 28 November 1996 Canadian Placer Dome announced that it was offering one 
of its shares for every 15 shares in Placer Pacific and which valued Placer Pacific at 
$2.03 per share (New York Times 1996). 
 
Placer Dome previously held 75.2% of Placer Pacific and the offer was to purchase 
the 24.8% minority interest of Placer Pacific Limited. The takeover was completed 
on April 11, 1997 (Placer Dome 2000). 
 
At the same time Placer Dome also proposed to buy Highlands Gold Limited with 
Highlands Gold directors rejecting the offer. The acquisitions were designed to give 
Placer Dome control of the Porgera gold mine in Papua New Guinea (New York 
Times 1996). Placer Pacific held a 25 percent interest in the Porgera mine and had an 
80 percent interest in the Misima silver-gold mine, which was also in Papua New 
Guinea. It had interests in the Kidston and Granny Smith gold mines and the Osborne 
copper-gold mine in Australia.  
 
The bid was successful with no complicating factors and Placer Pacific was delisted 
on the 12 May 1997 (Delisted 2009).  
 
Takeover and Event Analysis 
Details of the takeover are presented in Table 129A. There are no available reports 
on the recommendation by the independent directors and an independent valuation 
was not commissioned. 
 
Table 129A. Takeover parameters. 
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Bid Price ( 1 Placer Dome for 15 Placer Pacific shares) $2.04
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 35.4%
Offer Value (A$m) (adjusted for initial Placer Dome interest) $317
Date 28-Nov-96
Initial target director response na
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1997  
 
Table 130A compares the size of the target and bidder. The low offer size as a 
percentage of the bidder reflects the prior interest in Placer Pacific which was owned 
by Placer Dome. 
 
Table 130A. Size of target and bidder. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Placer Pacific $852
Placer Dome $9,540
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 3.3%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 8.9%  
 
The regression analysis of the target and bidder are presented in Table 131A. Share 
price movements in Placer Pacific were found to be more sensitive to the A$ gold 
price than the US$ gold price during the estimation window. 
 
Table 131A. Regresssion analysis of bidder and target. 
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Target Placer Pacific
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 13.19
Spot Gold price in (A$/oz) observed  t-result 23.28
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 7.75
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00169
Spot Gold price in (A$/oz) Slope 0.01877
Intercept 35.09807
R2 0.89
Standard error 0.181
F-statistic 969.9
SSregression 63.47
SSresidual 8.15
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02397
Bidder Placer Dome
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Philadelphia gold and silver index observed  t-result 30.35
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 5.37
Factors of significance (>5%)
Philadelphia gold and silver index Slope 0.24901
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope 0.00944
Intercept -0.80715
R2 0.92
Standard error 0.81
F-statistic 1451.4
SSregression 1,886.70
SSresidual 162.49
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.00855  
 
Table 132 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidder. The 
relatively generous bid, albeit ‘foreign scrip’, generated a strong abnormal return.  
 
Table 132A. Cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder and target. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 37.8% $1.36 627 $322.4
Bidder 0.0% $33.30 312 $0.0  
 
In the 252-day post event window, Placer Dome did not gain significant abnormal 
returns (Table 133A). 
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Table 133A. Post event cumulative abnormal returns for the bidder. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 20 1.4% $4.5
 
 
Lastly, Placer Dome demonstrated a greater sensitivity to the spot US$ gold price in 
the post event period (Table 134A). 
 
Table 134A. Post event regression analysis. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Philadelphia gold and silver index observed  t-result 30.35 31.23 -2.8%
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 5.37 0.88 509.6%  
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Plutonic: Homestake takeover 
 
On the 23 December 1997 Homestake Mining Company of the US (Homestake) 
announced a takeover bid for Plutonic Resources in a scrip deal which offered 34 
Homestake shares for 100 Plutonic shares. It was regarded as a generous offer that 
provided Plutonic shareholders with a 30 per stake in Homestake. As a consequence 
of the takeover, Homestake would also become the third-largest gold producer in 
North America. 
 
The announcement of the bid is reported to have triggered widespread investment in 
what was considered a depressed gold sector at that time (Salmons 1997). The 
increase in the Plutonic share price was also seen as an endorsement by institutional 
investors by Salmons (1997), particularly given the deal valued Plutonic shares at 
$5.20 when the deal was announced relative to the $2.80 share price that the 
company was trading at prior to the announcement of the offer.  
 
However,  increasing confidence of the likely success of the bid led to some selling 
pressure on Homestake as investors switched out of Homestake and into Plutonic to 
participate in an arbitrage opportunity from different market valuations. This 
arbitrage was typically in the 5 – 8% per cent range (Hextal, 1997). 
 
Overall, the timing (close to Christmas), and the attractiveness of the offer which 
itself was to partly to compensate for payment in US scrip, led to a low key and 
relatively quick takeover. No independent expert’s report was prepared and the 
company was delisted on the 26 June 1998 (Delisted, 2009). 
 
Lastly Hextal (1998b) reports that Plutonic announced a large but expected A$62.29 
million net loss for the year ending 31 December 1997 and which included $84.3 
million of abnormal losses, largely made during the first half of CY 2007 when the 
company decided to write down the carrying value of most of its projects to reflect 
lower gold prices. The company reported a $40.7 million net profit in the previous 
year.  
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While there is likely to be an element of ‘cleaning the balance sheet’ prior to 
completion of the Homestake takeover, Hextal (1998a) cites that Plutonic’s CEO, Mr 
Ron Hawkes said that the Australian gold industry remained a tough business despite 
record 1997 production. He noted capital raising was extremely difficult and led to a 
drying-up of exploration funding which was reducing support for the entrepreneurial 
spirit which had provided the impetus for the industry's rapid growth in the previous 
15 years. 
 
This commentary is interesting as it reiterates a subdued industry at this time. 
 
Assets 
The main assets of Plutonic were the three WA gold mines, namely: 
• Plutonic project, now in underground production 
• Darlot project 
• Lawlers project.  
 
However, the flagship project was the Plutonic mine. The company also owned the 
higher-cost and smaller Peak Hill and Mount Morgans mines which were expected to 
close during 1998 (Hextal 1998).  
 
Takeover Parameters and Event Analysis 
Table 135A outlines the broad takeover parameters for the Plutonic takeover. 
 
Table 135A. Takeover parameters. 
Bid Price (34 Homestake US for 100 PLU shares) $5.31
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 127.4%
Offer Value ($m) $999
Date 23-Dec-97
Initial target director response Recommended
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance 7-Aug-00
Takeover Completion 2H CY 2000  
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 The size of the companies is presented in Table 136A. The market capitalisation of 
Homestake is converted to A$ at the prevailing exchange rates immediately before 
the event window of the offer announcement. It is evident Plutonic was only around 
13% of the size of Homestake prior to the bid announcement. 
 
Table 136A. Company size comparisons. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Plutonic Resources $527
Homestake Mining Company $4,112
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 24.3%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 12.8%  
 
The US$ spot gold price and a relevant gold index have been used in the regression 
analysis of each company as outlined in Table 137A. 
 
Table 137A. Regression analysis of Plutonic and Homestake Mining Company. 
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Target Plutonic Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 5.15
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 13.13
Intercept observed  t-result 7.77
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope 0.01422
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00421
Intercept -4.79866
R2 0.94
Standard error 0.233
F-statistic 1995.8
SSregression 217.50
SSresidual 13.57
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02923259
Bidder Homestake Mining Company
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 3.43
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index observed  t-result 22.47
Intercept observed  t-result 7.11
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot Gold Price (US$/oz) Slope -0.01282
Philadelphia Gold and Silver index Slope 0.12420
Intercept 5.58978
R2 0.89
Standard error 0.48
F-statistic 1012.8
SSregression 457.91
SSresidual 56.29
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01244  
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QCT Resources: takeover by BHP and Mitsubishi  
 
On the 28 August 2000 BHP Billiton and Mitsubishi Development Pty. Ltd. 
(Mitsubishi) announced a joint cash offer of A$1.20 per share for all of the ordinary 
shares in QCT Resources Limited (QCT). The offer by the 50/50-owned bidding 
vehicle, MetCoal Holdings (Qld) Pty Ltd (MetCoal), valued QCT’s equity at A$830 
million (BHP 2000). 
 
The directors of QCT Resources recommended that its shareholders reject the offer 
and commissioned an independent expert valuation to be carried out by Grant 
Samuel. The independent expert estimated a low and high valuation for QCT of 
$1.57 and $1.89 per share respectively (Highbeam, 2000).  
 
BHP (2000) reported at that time that QCT Resources’ major shareholder, Santos, 
had announced that its 36.4% shareholding in the company was considered non-core 
to the company’s future. It therefore believed that it was the appropriate time for 
BHP and Mitsubishi to address the ownership of the Bowen Basin assets. As existing 
joint venture partners, BHP and Mitsubishi considered themselves the natural buyers 
of QCT. 
 
On 16 October, 2000, MetCoal announced it would increase the offer price for all the 
shares in QCT to $1.30. All shareholders of QCT who accepted the offer would 
receive $1.20 cash from MetCoal. In addition, all shareholders of QCT who had 
acquired their shares of QCT prior to when the shares had commenced trading ex-
dividend on 18 October 2000 would now receive the fully franked 10c special 
dividend announced by QCT on Friday 13 October, 2000. Shareholders who had 
acquired their QCT shares after the shares commenced trading ex-dividend would 
only receive the $1.20 from MetCoal and not the dividend. The offer was deemed 
final (BHP 2000a).  
The revised offer was successfully closed on 3 November, 2000. The company was 
delisted on the 29 December 2000 (delisted, 2009). 
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Assets 
QCT helds a non-operating 32.37% interest in the Central Queensland Coal 
Associates (CQCA) and Gregory joint ventures and 100% of the South Blackwater 
coal mining operation in the Bowen Basin. BHP and Mitsubishi own the remaining 
interests in these joint ventures. BHP manages the CQCA and Gregory joint ventures 
and markets all products (BHP 2000). 
 
Takeover details are summarised in Table 138A. 
 
Table 138A. Takeover Parameters. 
Bid Price (includes special QCT 10cps ff dividend) $1.30
Bid premium over 30 day average share price (excl special dividend) 34.6%
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 45.8%
Offer Value ($m) (based on $1.30) $899
Date 28-Aug-00
Initial target director response Rejected
Independent Valuation: low value 1.57
Independent Valuation: high value 1.89
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 20.4%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 75.1%
Target director recommended acceptance 16-Oct-00
Takeover Completion 2H CY 2000  
 
As evident in Table 139A, QCT Resources was around 4% the size of BHP prior to 
the takeover announcement but as the takeover is a 50:50 joint bid with Mitsuibishi, 
this falls to around 2%. 
 
Table 139A. Bidder and target relative sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
QCT Resources $631
BHP Billiton $15,403
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 2.9%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 2.0%  
 
As noted in Table 140A, QCT Resources contributed additional coal (metallurgical) 
exposure to BHP’s portfolio at that time. 
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Table 140A. Commodity exposures. 
Promoted Commodity Exposure Other Commodity Exposure
QCT Resources Coal
BHP Cu,  Fe, Coal Pb, Zn, Ag, Au  
 
The regression analysis outlined in Table 141A uses a single factor (ASX 
Accumulation All-Resources Index) although R2 is relatively low in comparison to 
other resource companies. As demonstrated elsewhere, annual contracts for bulk 
commodities such as metallurgical coal are not consistent share price drivers (e.g. 
iron ore in Rio Tinto-Norths analysis). 
 
The BHP share price is sensitive to the ASX Accumulation All-Resources Index, the 
MSCI Metals and Mining Index and the spot LME copper price (it is less sensitive to 
the three month forward copper price). 
 
Table 141A. Regression analysis for both bidder and target. 
Target QCT Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Factors of significance used (>5%)
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00021
Intercept -0.20134
R2 0.25
Steyx 0.099
Model One factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.02955188
Bidder BHP 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 3.41
MSCI Metals & Mining observed  t-result 9.25
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 32.38
Intercept observed  t-result 9.20
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) Slope -2.01490
MSCI Metals & Mining Slope -0.02001
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00177
Intercept 3.77619
R2 0.86
Standard error 0.18
F-statistic 514.2
SSregression 50
SSresidual 8
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01075  
 593
 Table 142A summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the target at 25.0% and 
generated value of $157.6m for QCT Resources’ shareholders. There were no 
cumulative abnormal returns at the time of the special dividend for the target while 
the bidder experienced no cumulative abnormal returns at both times. 
 
Table 142A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the bidder and target over the 3-day 
event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 25.0% $0.91 692 $157.6
Bidder 0.0% $8.71 1,769 $0.0  
 
In the post event 252-day period BHP is estimated to have experienced 5 days of 
abnormal returns with total cumulative abnormal returns of -6.8% over this period 
(Table 143A). This is not considered significant given the relative company sizes and 
the fact that BHP announced a merger with Billiton plc in March 2001. 
 
Table 143A. Post event window abnormal returns for Harmony. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 5 -6.8% -$1,042
 
 
Interestingly, as highlighted in the regression analysis of BHP in the 252-day post 
event period, its sensitivity to the MSCI Metals and Mining decreased markedly 
(discussed in the Billiton merger). There is an expected increase in BHP’s sensitivity 
to the ASX Accumulation All-Resources Index given it dominates this index (Table 
144A). 
 
Table 144A. Regression analysis in the post event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 11.99 3.41 251.1%
MSCI Metals & Mining observed  t-result 3.39 9.25 -63.3%
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 61.76 32.38 90.7%  
 
 594
References 
BHP 2000 BHP and Mitsubishi announce Cash Bid for QCT Resources. News 
Release dated 28 August 2000. 
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/investorsMedia/news/2000/bhpAndMitsubishiAnn
ounceCashBidForQctResources280800b.jsp (accessed 10 December 2009). 
 
BHP 2000a BHP and Mitsubishi Declare Offer for QCT Unconditional. 
Announcement dated 23 October 2000. 
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/bb/investorsMedia/news/2000/bhpAndMitsubishiDec
lareOfferForQctUnconditional231000b.jsp (accessed 10 December 2009).  
 
Delisted 2009 QCT Resources (QRL). Available at: 
http://www.delisted.com.au/Company/6802/QCT%20RESOURCES%20LIMITED 
(accessed 10 December 2009).
 
Highbeam 2000 QCT board rejects BHP-Mitsubishi bid. Article from Mining Journal 
dated October 6, 2000. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-66449834.html 
(accessed 10 December 2009) 
 
 595
Rio Tinto: BHP takeover offer 
On the 8 November 2007, the BBC News (2007) reported that that Rio Tinto had 
rejected a takeover approach from BHP Billiton. The proposal was an offer for three 
BHP Billiton shares for one Rio Tinto share. At that time, Rio Tinto stated that the 
proposed all-share offer significantly undervalued the company. Rio Tinto shares 
rose 27% on the news, while BHP Billiton shares fell by 1.3%. 
The bid took the market by surprise and did raise concerns that the deal could be 
blocked from anti-trust regulators, particularly in relation to the consolidation of iron 
ore production. It also came at a time that Rio Tinto was under intense shareholder 
pressure due to its US$38 billion acquisition of Canadian aluminium producer, 
Alcan, and which had significantly increased the company’s debt. 
On 6 February 2008, BHP Billiton lifted the offer to 3.4 BHP Billiton shares per Rio 
Tinto share to create what it considered would be the world’s premier diversified 
resources company (BHP 2008). It referred to its earlier approach on the on 1 
November 2007 and which was announced on the 8 November 2007 stating that 
BHP Billiton had proposed combining the groups through two inter-conditional 
schemes of arrangement. It estimated that the offer would have given Rio Tinto 
shareholders:  
• A 45 per cent premium (based one month average market capitalisation of 
both companies) which the Board of BHP Billiton believed was attractive for 
an equity offer in this sector;  
• Ongoing participation in the world’s premier diversified resources company;  
• Approximately 44 per cent of the enlarged group, compared to approximately 
36 per cent based on the market capitalisations prior to the approach by BHP 
Billiton to Rio Tinto; and  
• A share of ongoing synergies not available to either company alone.  
 
BHP Billiton (2008) also commented that it had continued to seek the support and 
recommendation of the Board of Rio Tinto. However, to-date, Rio Tinto had refused 
to enter into discussions with BHP Billiton and, as a result, BHP Billiton now 
believed it was appropriate to make an offer directly to Rio Tinto shareholders. 
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 After the announcement and during 2008 there was considerable opposition from 
European, Chinese and Japanese steel mills to the takeover given the dominant 
position of a potential combined BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto group in the iron ore 
market and its ability to influence iron ore prices. In late October 2008 the European 
Commission held confidential discussions with BHP Billiton over its proposed 
takeover of Rio Tinto and while the conditions were never disclosed, the author 
expects that the required divestments were onerous. 
 
On the 25 November 2008 BHP Billiton announced it was withdrawing its US$66 
billion offer for Rio Tinto, citing the turmoil in global markets (Keenan 2008). BHP 
Chief Executive Officer Mr Marius Kloppers stated that buying Rio Tinto would 
have increased his company’s debt and it would have been difficult to sell assets.  
 
On the news of the withdrawal of the offer, the BHP Billiton share price immediately 
increased 106 pence, or 11 percent, to 1,086 pence in London trading. At the same 
time the Rio Tinto share price fell 36 percent to 1,577 pence (Keenan 2008). 
 
Bid Summary and Event Analysis 
Takeover details are summarised in Table 145A including the first offer and 
subsequent increase in the offer. 
 
Table 145A. Takeover Parameters. 
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Bid Price (3 BHP Billiton shares for 1 Rio Tinto share) $134.58
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 55.5%
Offer Value ($m) (based on 3 BHP: 1 RIO) $182,699
Date 9-Nov-07
Initial target director response Rejected
Bid Price (3.4 BHP Billiton shares for 1 Rio Tinto share) $133.69
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 54.5%
Offer Value ($m) (based on 3.4 BHP: 1 RIO) $181,488
Date 6-Feb-08
Initial target director response Rejected
Independent Valuation: low value na
Independent Valuation: high value na
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) na
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point na
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion Withdrawn  
 
As evident in Table 146A, Rio Tinto was around half the size of BHP Billiton prior 
to the takeover announcement. 
 
Table 146A. Bidder and target relative sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Rio Tinto $120,159
BHP Billiton $250,744
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 72.4%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 47.9%  
 
With both companies holding substantial weightings in the various indices, positive 
performance in one company can exacerbate a weaker performance in the other 
company. In the following regression analysis outlined in Table 147A, the author has 
used the S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index only with BHP Billiton given its dominant 
position in this index but used the FTSE Mining Index for Rio Tinto given its greater 
influence on this index (both reflecting the stock market where the greater proportion 
the company’s shares are domiciled; i.e., plc versus limited shares). 
 
The broader HSBC Global Mining Index has also been used but the MSCI Metals 
and Mining Index has been found to be non-significant (at a 5% level) for both 
companies in the estimation period (Table 147A).  
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 Both companies’ share prices are sensitive to the spot LME copper price and hence, 
three factor models have been used. 
 
Table 147A. Regression analysis for both bidder and target. 
Target Rio Tinto 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 2.16923
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 2.00145
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 12.18368
Intercept observed  t-result 5.23369
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) Slope -1.04584
HSBC Global Mining Index Slope 0.00684
FTSE 350 Mining Index Slope 0.00319
Intercept 5.57993
R2 0.97
Standard error 1.80
F-statistic 2438.72
SSregression 23748.76
SSresidual 808.27
Model Three Factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.01762
Bidder BHP 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 7.61
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 3.26
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index observed  t-result 23.94
Intercept observed  t-result 20.18
Factors of significance (>5%)
HSBC Global Mining Index Slope -0.01614
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) Slope -0.68022
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index Slope 0.00293
Intercept -11.02366
R2 0.98
Standard error 0.80
F-statistic 5438.7
SSregression 10,564
SSresidual 161
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.00755  
 
Table 148A summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the target at 16.7% at 
the time of the initial approach but there were no abnormal returns at the time BHP 
Billiton raised the offer, suggesting this was already expected by  the market. At the 
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time of the initial approach, BHP Billiton experienced abnormal returns of only -
3.6% and similarly, no abnormal returns at the time it increased its offer. 
 
Table 148A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the bidder and target over the 3-day 
event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Rio Tinto (offer periods) 16.7% $88.51 1,358 $20,051.0
Rio Tinto (bid withdrawal) -49.4% $47.33 1,358 -$31,718.0
BHP Billiton (offer periods) -3.6% $44.86 5,589 -$8,982.7
BHP Billiton (bid withdrawal) 8.6% $21.90 5,589 $10,493.3  
 
However, when BHP Billiton withdrew its offer on the 25 November 2008, Rio 
Tinto experienced sharp negative cumulative returns over a three-day event window 
of -49.5%. This was exacerbated by a strong increase in the FTSE Mining Index at 
that time which coincided with a falling Rio Tinto share price. 
 
Ignoring the intervening period between the raised offer and the BHP Billiton’s 
withdrawal, Rio Tinto experienced a net 32.7% negative return or loss of almost 
A$12 billion. This compares to BHP Billiton which experienced an overall abnormal 
return of 5% or equivalent to A$1.5 billion in value. 
 
Table 149A covers a post-event window which is defined as the 206 day period after 
BHP Billiton raised its offer (6 February 2008) until immediately prior to the event 
window around BHP Billiton withdrawing its offer (to 21 November 2008). During 
this time BHP Billiton gained cumulative abnormal returns of 6.5% with a value of 
A$16 billion while Rio Tinto experienced negative abnormal returns of 11.6% or lost 
value of A$14 billion. A significant proportion of these negative returns were 
experienced late in the period when there was considerable uncertainty over the 
findings of the European Commission and whether it would become a deal ‘breaker’.  
 
Table 149A. Bidder and Target cumulative abnormal returns in the 206-day period 
between BHP Billiton raising its offer and then withdrawing its offer. 
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Company Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
BHP Billiton 206 79 6.5% $16,196
Rio Tinto 206 63 -11.6% -$13,955  
 
Netting the post-event window returns for BHP Billiton with the earlier event 
windows suggests shareholders received an overall gain of 11.4% or A$17.7 billion. 
In contrast the net position of Rio Tinto was a total negative 44.3% return amounting 
to lost value of A$25.6 billion.  
 
Interestingly, as highlighted in the regression analysis of BHP Billiton during this 
period, there is a significant increase in the sensitivity of the BHP Billiton share price 
to the S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index (as expected) but an unexpected decline in the 
sensitivity to the HSBC Global mining Index (Table 150A). 
 
Table 150A. Regression analysis in the post event period for BHP Billiton. 
Estimation window (days) 206
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
HSBC Global Mining Index observed  t-result 3.71 7.61 -51.2%
Spot LME copper price (US$/lb) observed  t-result 4.30 3.26 32.0%
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index observed  t-result 37.63 23.94 57.2%  
 
Overall, BHP Billiton’s bid for Rio Tinto was courageous and at a time Rio Tinto 
was experiencing weakening market sentiment given its earlier and costly Alcan 
acquisition. The author believes that the performance of both reflects the dominant 
positions that both companies have in the global resources markets, and therefore a 
scrip offer by BHP Billiton immediately places Rio Tinto ‘in play’. Hence, market 
expectations are then directed towards whether the bid will succeed or not, and with 
adverse events increasing the risk of the bid failing leading to under performance in 
the Rio Tinto share price. In the author’s experience at this time, once the revised 
offer was announced and the share prices of both were more or less aligned with this 
offer ratio, the risk associated with the bid failing and Rio Tinto’s problematic debt 
position led many investors to prefer investing in BHP Billiton. 
 
From BHP Billiton’s position, the exercise led to strong (+10%) abnormal returns at 
the expense of Rio Tinto’s performance and hence was a worthwhile strategy which 
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would have created the world’s premier diversified resources company if it had been 
successful. 
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Savage Resources: Pasminco takeover 
 
On 20 October 1998, Pasminco Investment Pty. Limited (Pasminco), a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Pasminco Limited, announced a condition takeover offer for Savage 
Resources Limited (Savage) of $0.85 cash for each Savage share (Savage Resources 
1998). The bid was considered hostile and rejected by the directors of Savage 
Resources. 
 
Savage’s main businesses were: 
• A 100% interest in the Clarkesville zinc refinery and the Gordonsville and 
Clinch Valley zinc mines in Tennessee; 
• A 49% interest in the producing Liddell Coal Joint Venture and a 67.5% 
interest in the undeveloped Glendell Joint Venture, both located in the Hunter 
Valley of New South Wales; 
• A 33.3% interest in the Togara North Coal Project in Queensland’s Bowen 
Basin; and 
• Various interests in zinc, gold and base metal exploration and evaluation 
properties in Australia, Peru, Canada and the USA, 
 
As noted by the company’s independent expert’s review (Savage Resources 1998), 
Clarksville represented the company’s largest asset and which had a production rate 
of approximately 109,000 tonnes per annum of zinc metal. However, the company 
had recently completed a feasibility study to expand this refinery to a capacity of 
300,000 tonnes per annum.  
 
There was a market expectation at that time that the refinery expansion was attractive 
for the following reasons: 
• Its presence within the North American Free Trade area (NAFTA) 
• An expanded Clarksville refinery was expected to be the lowest cost producer 
of zinc metal in the world; and 
• Because of its location, the Clarksville refinery was expected to be able to 
deliver metal to customers in the major US markets more cheaply and 
effectively than its competitors. 
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 The view of this research based on discussions with management of both companies 
at that time was that the Clarksville zinc smelter was the key attraction for the 
takeover offer from Pasminco. This is due to: 
• Clarksville providing an entry point for Pasminco into the North American 
market 
• The expansion was economically attractive 
• Clarksville required low iron zinc concentrates which Pasminco had available 
from its Century mine in Queensland 
 
Pasminco’s strategy was to sell the other assets to recoup part of the cost of the 
takeover which indeed occurred subsequent to the completion of the takeover. 
However, one of the surprises for Pasminco after the acquisition (T. Shard pers 
comm. 1998) was the extent of the negative value of the hedge book (mainly adverse 
AUD/USD currency hedging) and which was exacerbated due to the A$/US$ 
depreciation with the Asian crisis. In fact the Asian crisis had placed earnings 
pressure on both companies from adverse currency hedging as well as weak 
commodity prices. 
 
Takeover and Event Analysis 
Table 151A summarised the offer details. 
 
Table 151A. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover 
Bid Price $0.85
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 20.2%
Offer Value ($m) $452
Date 20-Oct-98
Initial target director response Rejection
Independent Valuation: low value 1.02
Independent Valuation: high value 1.19
Independent Valuation range (increase on low va 16.7%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 76.9%
Target director recommended acceptance 1-Feb-99
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1999  
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Table 152A outlines the bidder and target sizes immediately prior to the bid 
announcement and the percentage sizes of the target and offer value relative to the 
bidder. Both the offer value and the market capitalisation of Savage Resources was 
around one-third the size of Pasminco prior to the bid. 
 
Table 152A. Bidder and target sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Savage Resources $399
Pasminco $1,473
Offer value as percentage of Bidder 30.7%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 27.1%  
 
Table 153A reiterates the main commodity exposure of the target as well as the 
bidder. The earlier discussion outlines that the Clarksville zinc smelter and its 
expansion options were deemed the main asset of Savage Resources. 
 
Table 153A. The main commodity exposure of the target and bidder. 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure
Other Commodity 
Exposure
Savage Resources Zinc Cu, Coal
Pasminco Zinc Pb, Cu  
 
Multiple Regression analysis over a 252 day period estimation window has 
highlighted that the 3-month forward zinc price, the ASX Accumulation All-
Resources Index and the ASX Other Metals Index are all significance (at a 5% level) 
for both the target and bidder share prices as outlined in Table 154A. 
 
Table 154A. Estimation window parameters. 
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Target Savage Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
3mth forward zinc price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 2.78
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 6.23
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 14.35
Intercept observed  t-result 0.60
Factors of significance (>5%)
3mth forward zinc price (offset by one day) Slope 0.00014
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope -0.00012
ASX Other Metals Index Slope 0.00131
R2 0.67
Standard error 0.037
F-statistic 171.5
SSregression 0.70
SSresidual 0.34
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02805
Bidder Pasminco
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
3mth forward zinc price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 7.67
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 5.51
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 10.01
Intercept observed  t-result 16.29
Factors of significance (>5%)
3mth forward zinc price (offset by one day) Slope 0.00078
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index Slope 0.00022
ASX Other Metals Index Slope 0.00019
Intercept -1.622
R2 0.83
F-statistic 409.9
SSregression 6.97
SSresidual 1.41
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.02211  
 
Hence, a three factor model has been used to estimate abnormal returns over the 
three-day event window. Table 155A indicates that the bid generated a CAR for the 
target of 15.5% and this occurred only on the announcement day. No abnormal 
returns were calculated as being significant for the bidder. 
 
Table 155A also indicates that the abnormal return was equivalent to a $61.9m value 
to Savage shareholders. 
 
Table 155A. Cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day event window. 
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 CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target 15.5% $0.75 532 $61.9
Bidder 0.0% $1.31 1,125 $0.0
 
 
Table 156A summarises the abnormal returns to the bidder in the subsequence 12 
month period and which were zero based on the model developed in the 252-day 
estimation window. 
 
Table 156A. Bidder abnormal returns in a 252-day post-event window. 
 
Days in post-event 
window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 113 -17.6% -$259.7  
 
However, in the regression analysis of Pasminco in a 252-day post-event window 
(see Table 157A), it is evident that movements in the ASX All Resources Index are 
more significant rather than the ASX Other Metals Index observed in the estimation 
window above (see Table 156A above). This is unlikely to be explained by the 
removal of Savage Resources from the ASX Other Metals Index given its relatively 
small market capitalisation ($399m) relative to either the index or the increase in size 
of Pasminco relative to the All-Resources index. This would be deemed a mildly 
positive outcome for Pasminco given the larger weighting of this index in the overall 
market. 
 
Table 157A. Post event regression analysis for Pasminco. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
3mth forward zinc price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 1.44 7.67 -81.2%
ASX Accumulation All Resources Index observed  t-result 13.46 5.51 144.4%
ASX Other Metals Index observed  t-result 0.67 10.01 -93.3%  
 
Summary  
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Savage Resources shareholders received CAR of 15.5% at time of the bid 
announcement. While there was expectation that the bid may be raised, this did not 
eventuate, particularly with increasing concern at the state of Savage’s hedge book. 
 
While Savage Resources was a strategic and logical acquisition for Pasminco, both 
companies were in fact recovering from the impacts of the Asian crisis. The 
combination of delays in the sale of the non-core Savage assets to reduce debt, the 
discovery of the worse than expected Savage Resources hedge book and the inability 
to fully capture the synergies of Clarksville zinc smelter within a short time frame 
probably contributed to Pasminco’s inability to gain abnormal returns in the post 
event period. At least there were no negative abnormal returns at the time of the bid 
or subsequent period and greater correlation with movements in the All-Resources 
index is deemed a modest benefit. 
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Wiluna Mines: Great Central takeover 
 
As part of the rationalisation of the Yandal Belt in WA, Great Central Mines Limited 
embarked on the takeover of Wiluna Mines Limited and Eagle Mining Limited. 
Great Central Mines was financially supported by Normandy Mining at that time 
(Dixon 1997). This thesis has focused on Great Central’s takeover of Wiluna Mines 
as representing parameters typical in these takeovers. Unfortunately the Eagle 
Mining share price series data appears to be unavailable. 
 
On the 21 August 1997 Great Central Mines announced a takeover for Wiluna Mines 
with a 65 cents per share cash offer. The Wiluna Board rejected the bid and advised 
shareholders not to accept the offer. On the same day the company announced a 
takeover offer for Eagle Mining for $3.00 per share (PR Newswire 1997). 
 
Earlier Plutonic Resources Limited had accumulated a strategic 19.9 per cent stake in 
Wiluna in 1996 and at the time of the bid announcement stated that it would maintain 
its support for the Wiluna board.  
 
The first offer closed on 10 October 1997 but on the 14 October 1997 the company 
launched a second Part C takeover offer at a higher price of 75 cents per share. After 
ASIC raised some concerns that earlier accepting shareholders were disadvantaged, 
Great Central Mines decided to extend the new offer price to all shareholders who 
accepted the earlier offer (Howarth 1997). 
 
On 7 November 1997 Kitney (1997) reported that Great Central Mines had virtually 
won full control of Wiluna Mines Ltd after the last remaining major shareholder, 
Plutonic Resources Ltd, sold its 19.9 per cent stake. This provided Great Central 
Mines with an 89 per cent stake in Wiluna and along with the successful takeover of 
Eagle Mining, significant control of the Yandal gold belt in WA.  
 
Wiluna Mines was delisted on the 20 January 1998 (Delisted 2009) 
 
Assets 
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Wiluna Mines Limited owned the Wiluna gold mine at Wiluna and also had a large 
surrounding exploration tenement position. Eagle Mining’s Nimary gold mine and 
Great Central Mines’ own Jundee mine were nearby and east of Wiluna. 
 
Takeover and Event Analysis 
Table 158A summaries the bid parameters and offer dates interpreted from media 
reports at that time. 
 
Table 158A. Takeover parameters. 
Bid Price $0.65
Bid premium over 30 day average share price 67.0%
Offer Value ($m) $105
Date 21-Aug-97
Initial target director response Rejection
Increased bid
Bid Price $0.75
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 92.6%
Offer Value ($m) $121
Date 14-Oct-97
Initial target director response Recommended
Target director recommended acceptance na
Takeover Completion 1H CY 1998  
 
The company sizes relative to each other and the offer are presented in Table 159A. 
Wiluna Mines was only around 10% of the size of Great Central Mines. 
 
Table 159A. Relative company sizes. 
Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
Wiluna Mines $84
Great Central Mines $769
Offer (final) value as percentage of Bidder 1.9%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 10.9%  
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The regression using both the gold price and the ASX Gold Index is presented in 
Table 160A. Both Wiluna Mines and Great Central Mines share price movements are 
more sensitive to US$ gold price movements relative to gold price movements in A$. 
 
Table 160A. Regression analysis of target and bidder. 
Target Wiluna Mines
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 5.58
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 53.59
Intercept observed  t-result 15.51
Factors of significance used (>5%)
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope 0.00144
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00183
Intercept -1.84140
R2 0.95
Standard error 0.040
F-statistic 2541.8
SSregression 8.23
SSresidual 0.40
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.03121
Bidder Great Central Mines
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 3.60
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 15.27
Intercept observed  t-result 1.64
Factors of significance (>5%)
Spot gold price (US$/oz) Slope -0.00612
ASX Gold Index Slope 0.00342
Intercept 1.28070
R2 0.73
Standard error 0.26
F-statistic 333.9
SSregression 46.60
SSresidual 17.37
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns regression error Steyx 0.01869  
 
Table 161A presents the cumulative abnormal returns for the two periods, namely at 
the announcement of the first 65 cent offer and secondly, with the new offer at 75 
cents. 
 
Table 161A. Cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidder at the time of the 
announcements. 
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CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Wiluna Mines 25.7% $0.52 161 $21.5
Great Central Mines -9.9% $2.49 309 -$76.3  
 
In the case of Great Central Mines, the negative cumulative returns extended into the 
252-day post event period extending after the second bid. There were complications 
with Great Central at this time (particularly with some control exerted by Normandy 
Mining) and culminated in a bid by Yandal Gold Pty Ltd for Great Central mines late 
1998/early 1999 (Table 162A). 
 
Table 162A. Cumulative abnormal returns in the post event period. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 197 -36.5% -$280.2
 
 
Lastly, the sensitivity of the Great Central Mines share price to both movements in 
the US$ gold price and the ASX Gold Index increased as expected (Table 163A). 
 
Table 163A. Regression analysis in the post event period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
Spot gold price (US$/oz) observed  t-result 11.01 3.60 205.8%
ASX Gold Index observed  t-result 29.39 15.27 92.4%  
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WMC Resources:  BHP Billiton takeover 
 
On 28 October 2004 WMC Resources Limited (WMC) advised that it had received a 
conditional proposal from Xstrata to acquire WMC for $6.35 per share in cash by 
way of a scheme of arrangement (WMC 2004). WMC announced that after it had 
considered the offer, its Board had determined that the level of the offer failed to 
recognize the current and prospective value of WMC’s assets and the strategic 
benefits to Xstrata or other potential acquirers. Accordingly the Board declined the 
proposal to put forward a scheme of arrangement to WMC shareholders. However, 
the Board did advise Xstrata that it was willing to enter further discussions and that 
any material improvement in Xstrata’s proposal would be given due consideration in 
the context of alternatives available to WMC to maximize shareholder value (WMC 
2004).  
 
On the 2 February 2005 Xstrata announced an unconditional takeover offer of $7.20 
per share for WMC Resources by Xstrata Capital Holdings Pty Ltd, and that this 
offer would be final. However, while the takeover offer was $7.20, it included the 20 
cent dividend that had previously been declared by WMC Resources. Once this 
dividend had been paid, Xstrata’s offer was reduced to $7.00 per WMC share 
(WMC, 2005). 
 
On the 8 March 2005 BHP Billiton announced a cash offer of $7.85 per share for 
WMC and which was unanimously recommended by the WMC Board (BHP 2005).  
WMC Assets 
The principal operations of WMC Resources are: 
• Nickel. Nickel mining operations are located at Leinster, Mount Keith, and 
Kambalda in Western Australia. WMC Resources also operates a smelter at 
Kalgoorlie and refinery at Kwinana, Western Australia. 
• Copper/Uranium. Copper ore is mined at Olympic Dam in South Australia 
where an adjacent complex produces refined copper, uranium oxide, gold and 
silver. The world class Olympic Dam deposit is the world’s largest known 
uranium deposit as well as holding significant copper and gold resources. 
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• Fertilisers. Phosphate ore is mined at Phosphate Hill south of Mt Isa and an 
adjacent compex produces mono- and di-ammonium phosphate for the 
domestic and export markets.  
• Mineral sands. Corridor Sands is a large undeveloped titanium dioxide-
bearing mineral sands deposit in southern Mozambique.  
 
WMC Resources appointed Grant Samuel as an independent expert to estimate a 
valuation range for the company. An upper and lower valuation range was estimated 
at $7.17 and $8.24 per share respectively but the valuations included the declared 20 
cent dividend (WMC 2005). 
 
Details of the two offers by Xstrata and the trumping offer by BHP are outlined in 
Table 164A.  
 
Table 164A. Key Parameters and dates of the takeover. 
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First Bid - Xstrata
Bid Price (initial) $6.35
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 22.5%
Offer Value ($m) $7,458
Date 28-Oct-04
Initial target director response Reject
Bid Price (second) $7.20
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 38.9%
Offer Value ($m) (adj for 20c dividend) $8,221
Date 2-Feb-05
Initial target director response Reject
First Bid - BHP Billiton
Bid Price (initial) $7.85
Bid premium over initial 30 day average share price 51.4%
Offer Value ($m) $9,219
Date 8-Mar-05
Initial target director response Accept
Independent Valuation: low value 6.97
Independent Valuation: high value 8.04
Independent Valuation range (increase on low value) 15.4%
Final bid over Independent Valuation mid point 104.6%
Target director recommended acceptance 29-Mar-05
Takeover Completion 1H CY 2005  
 
Figure 3A presents the timing of the bids and share price performance of WMC 
Resources at this time. 
 
Figure 3A. The WMC Resources share price and the Xstrata and BHP Billiton offers. 
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Share price data from Stock Resource 
 
Table 165A outlines the bidder and target sizes immediately prior to the first bid 
announcement for Xstrata while size for BHP is estimated from the share price 
immediately prior to its bids. The Xstrata market capitalisation is converted to 
Australian dollars using average GBP/USD and AUD/USD exchange rates for 
CY2004. 
 
Table 165A also highlights that the offer for WMC by Xstrata was relatively 
aggressive given that the total value of the offer was larger than the market 
capitalisation of Xstrata prior to its bid. 
 
Table 165A. Bidder, offer and target sizes. 
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Company Size Data Market Capitalisation prior to bid (A$m)
WMC Resources $5,778
Xstrata (converted at CY2004 average FX rates) $7,089
BHP Billiton $30,274
Offer value as percentage of Bidder 1 (first offer) 105.2%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 1 81.5%
Offer value as percentage of Bidder 2 30.5%
Target size as percentage of Bidder 2 19.1%  
 
Table 166A outlines the main commodity exposure of the target as well as both 
bidders. WMC would have increased Xstrata’s exposure to copper, and adding 
material exposure to nickel and uranium. However, a major attraction was the future 
expansion potential of the world class Olympic Dam project given its large resources 
of copper, gold and uranium ore. 
 
Table 166A. The main commodity exposure of the target and bidders. 
Promoted Commodity 
Exposure Other Commodity Exposure
WMC Resources Ni, Cu, U Minerals Sands, Fertiliser
Xstrata Cu, Coal Zinc , Ferrochrome
BHP Billiton Fe, Cu, Oil Al, U, Au, Minerals Sands  
 
Multiple Regression analysis over a 252-day period estimation window was carried 
out prior to the event window for the target and both bidders (Table 167A). The table 
highlights that nickel, copper and the S&P/ASX 200 Resources are factors of 
significance (at a 5% level) for WMC Resources.  In terms of the bidders, factors of 
significance for Xtrata were the MSCI Metals and Mining Index and the copper 
price. Interestingly, for BHP the only factor of significance was the S&P/ASX 200 
Resources Index which of course, it dominates from a weighting perspective.  
 
Table 167A. Estimation window parameters  
 618
Target WMC Resources
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
S&P/ASX 200 Resources observed  t-result 3.00
3mth forward copper price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 5.47
3mth forward nickel price (offset by one day) observed  t-result 20.33
Intercept observed  t-result 17.49
Factors of significance (>5%)
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Slope 0.00033
3mth forward copper price (offset by one day) Slope -0.58359
3mth forward nickel price (offset by one day) Slope 20.33379
Intercept 3.02295
R2 0.67
Standard error 0.165
F-statistic 171.0
SSregression 13.90
SSresidual 6.72
Model Three factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01782
Bidder 1 Xstrata
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
FTSE 350 Mining Index observed  t-result 0.18
MSCI Metals & Mining Index observed  t-result 6.60
3mth forward copper price observed  t-result 13.61
Intercept observed  t-result 10.57
Factors of significance (>5%)
MSCI Metals & Mining Index Slope 3.05575
3mth forward copper price Slope 178.76296
Intercept -325.25388
R2 0.74
F-statistic 230.9
SSregression 364,584.06
SSresidual 130,506.80
Model Two factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.01055
Bidder 2 BHP Billiton
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis
3mth forward copper price observed  t-result 0.58
S&P/ASX 200 Resources observed  t-result 27.62
MSCI Metals & Mining Index observed  t-result 1.54
Intercept observed  t-result 7.10
Factors of significance (>5%)
S&P/ASX 200 Resources Slope 0.00676
Intercept -2.16063
R2 0.98
F-statistic 4269.7
SSregression 812.06
SSresidual 15.79
Model Single factor
Actual versus Theoretical Returns  regression error Steyx 0.00387  
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Table 168A summarises the cumulative abnormal returns for the target and bidders. 
As it highlights, there were no recorded abnormal returns during the event windows. 
This is despite the first bid price representing a 22.5% premium to the 30 day 
average pre-bid price (see Table 164A above) and reflects the size of standard error 
of the regression (0.165). 
 
Table 168A. Cumulative abnormal returns over a 3-day event window. 
CAR Share Price prior to event
Shares on Issue 
(m)
Change in value 
(A$m)
Target (initial bid - XTA) 17.4% $4.92 1,174 $1,002.7
Target (increased bid - XTA)* 3.1% $7.20 1,174 $259.2
Target (new bid - BHP) 3.9% $7.46 1,174 $343.6
Bidder 1 (initial bid - XTA) 0.0% £4.51 632 $0.0
Bidder 1 (increased bid - XTA) 0.0% £4.67 632 $0.0
Bidder 1 (new bid - BHP) 0.0% $19.29 6,228 $0.0
* Includes 20 cent dividend to be paid by WMC Resources  
 
Table 169A outlines that there were no material abnormal returns to the successful 
bidder (BHP Billiton) in the subsequent 252 day period. 
 
Table 169A. Bidder abnormal returns in a 252-day post-event window. 
Days in post-event window Number of days of AR CAR over period Change in value (A$m)
252 12 0.1% -$1,580
 
 
In summary, this thesis views that Xstrata’s hostile approach for WMC Resources 
was a surprise and created some public angst. In particular, there was concern that 
Olympic Dam being a major uranium supplier, would end up in foreign ownership.  
It was also recognized that MIM was probably taken over too cheaply; hence, there 
was an element of relief and more eager acceptance when BHP Billiton announced 
its higher offer.  
 
The volatility of the WMC share price and its sensitivity to the nickel price and to a 
lesser degree, the copper price, leaves the regression analysis with a reasonably high 
standard error and potentially negating apparent abnormal returns as being non-
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significant. Nevertheless, in 2004 the resources boom was gaining momentum and 
given the course of this boom that there is no doubt that WMC Resources would 
have attained a share price beyond the level of any of the bids.  
 
In the post-event window for BHP Billiton, it is not surprising that BHP Billiton’s 
share price movement was more sensitive to the S&P/ASX 200 Resources Index 
given the increase in size of BHP Billiton following the takeover and combined with 
the loss of WMC from the index (Table 170A). It is interesting that there appears to 
be more sensitive relationships of the BHP Billiton share price with the copper price 
and MSCI Metals and Mining Index. 
 
Table 170A. Regression analysis of BHP Billiton in the post event 252-day period. 
Estimation window (days) 252
Regression analysis New Result Old Result Change
3mth forward copper price observed  t-result 4.14 0.58 614.2%
S&P/ASX 200 Resources observed  t-result 38.23 27.62 38.4%
MSCI Metals & Mining Index observed  t-result 3.66 1.54 138.4%  
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